PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO CARCEDO Y CARREDO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Teodoro Carcedo versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the appeal of Teodoro Carcedo from a judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City convicting him of murder for the killing of Pedro Camahalan. The victim's wife, Milagros Camahalan, was charged with parricide and convicted as a co-principal by inducement; Carcedo was convicted as a co-principal by direct participation. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a clean illustration of the constitutional right of an accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and of the rule that the extrajudicial confession of one accused is not evidence against his co-accused.

Procedural History

Milagros Camahalan, Teodoro Carcedo, and Elizardo Carcedo were charged before the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District, Cebu City, with parricide and murder. Elizardo was not arrested and was to be prosecuted separately. Upon arraignment, both accused present, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the trial court, in its decision of January 12, 1978, found Milagros Camahalan and Teodoro Carcedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and murder, respectively, qualified by treachery, as co-principals by inducement and direct participation, and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, with accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs jointly and severally in the amount of 12,000 pesos, plus 8,000 pesos in moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs proportionately.

Teodoro Carcedo filed his notice of appeal on January 13, 1978, through his counsel de oficio. Milagros Camahalan filed her own notice of appeal on January 26, 1978, personally and without the assistance of counsel. By letter dated February 8, 1980, Milagros Camahalan withdrew her appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the withdrawal in its resolution of February 25, 1980. The appeal of Teodoro Carcedo thus proceeded alone before the Supreme Court.

Facts

Milagros Camahalan and Pedro Camahalan were legally married and lived with Benita Baylosis, the woman who had adopted Milagros, in Malabuyoc, Cebu. On the afternoon of May 21, 1977, Milagros and Pedro left the house to go fishing. The next day, Milagros returned alone and told Benita that Pedro had gone to Santander to borrow money. Later that afternoon, children came and reported that Pedro was dead and that his body had been brought to town by the police.

Earlier, on May 20, 1977, Simplicio Daplas saw a woman near his house who turned out to be Milagros Camahalan. She said she was looking for Ely, or Elisardo Carcedo, and finally revealed that she wanted Ely to kill her husband because she could no longer bear his maltreatment. Simplicio advised her against the plan and pointed out where Ely lived. On the evening of May 21, 1977, Alma Licaros, a twelve-year-old student, saw Milagros, Pedro, and Elisardo Carcedo seated inside the store of Inting Lim and afterwards leave at around ten o'clock in the evening.

On the morning of May 22, 1977, Sergeant Paulino Manlunas went to the crime scene in sitio Tapi, barrio Montanesa, and found the dead body of Pedro Camahalan, with injuries on the top and back of the head, on the nape, and on the throat. An empty bottle of Tru-Orange and pieces of bloody stones were found near the body. Dr. Danilo Cabigon conducted the autopsy and listed multiple lacerated wounds on the scalp, a fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and defensive wounds on the right forearm and wrist, and declared that the cause of death was hemorrhage and shock secondary to violent physical injuries to the skull. That evening, Milagros Camahalan arrived at the municipal building and admitted her participation in the killing, and she was placed in jail. She gave several statements, the first and third implicating Teodoro Carcedo and the second excluding him. Teodoro was taken into custody, released after the second statement, and re-arrested after the third statement again implicated him.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court denied the appellant his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine Milagros Camahalan, whose testimony in her own defense incriminated him and was made the primordial basis of his conviction.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating as evidence the third statement of Milagros Camahalan against the appellant, when it violated his right to confront and cross-examine her and the rule against res inter alios acta, the rule that the acts or declarations of one person are not evidence against another.

Applicable Provisions

Section 17, Article III of the Constitution provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.

The guarantee to meet the witnesses face to face is the constitutional anchor of the appellant's first assignment of error, because Milagros Camahalan testified against him without his being able to cross-examine her on that testimony.

Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides:

The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

This is the rule against res inter alios acta, which the appellant invokes against the use of Milagros Camahalan's extrajudicial statement as evidence against him.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appellant's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine Milagros Camahalan was indeed violated. Milagros testified in her own defense, and her testimony implicated the appellant. The appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine her on that testimony, and yet the trial court made it the primordial basis of his conviction. The Court ruled that the conviction cannot stand on evidence the accused was never permitted to test through cross-examination.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in appreciating the third statement of Milagros Camahalan as evidence against the appellant. That statement was her extrajudicial declaration, and under the rule against res inter alios acta, the act or declaration of one person cannot prejudice another. The statement was therefore inadmissible against the appellant, and the trial court's reliance on it was error.

With the inadmissible testimony and statement set aside, the Court examined the remaining evidence against the appellant and found it insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The identification of the appellant as a participant rested on the excluded evidence, and without it the prosecution's case against him collapsed.

Doctrine

First, the accused in a criminal prosecution has the constitutional right to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and a conviction cannot rest on testimony the accused had no opportunity to cross-examine. Second, the extrajudicial confession or statement of one accused is not admissible against his co-accused, because the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another. These two rules, drawn from the constitutional guarantee and from the rule against res inter alios acta, protect the accused from being convicted on evidence he could neither confront nor rebut.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction against Teodoro Carcedo and acquitted him of the crime charged, on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the confession or statement of one accused is not evidence against his co-accused, and a conviction cannot rest on testimony the accused was never allowed to confront. Examiners use this case to test the right to confrontation and the res inter alios acta rule in conspiracy cases.