PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FAUSTO CAPUYAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
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People versus Capuyan
The Case
This is the People of the Philippines against Fausto Capuyan, a criminal appeal from a conviction for murder. The accused was charged, together with Leonardo Ay-Yokad and one John Doe, with having mauled and stabbed Adolfo Pascua to death on a Baguio City street in August 1995, the killing being qualified by abuse of superior strength. The case matters to a reviewee because it gathers in one decision the two most common eleventh-hour defenses in Philippine criminal practice — the recantation of a prosecution witness and the affidavit of desistance executed by the victim's relatives — and tells us, as a rule, how little weight each one carries when offered after the trial has run its course.
Procedural History
An amended information for murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6. The accused, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty, and after pre-trial the case went to trial, with the prosecution presenting three witnesses and the defense presenting the policeman himself, the accused, and his co-accused. On May 6, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision finding Fausto Capuyan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity and 50,000 pesos as moral damages, and to pay the costs, with credit for preventive imprisonment. The accused moved for reconsideration; the trial court denied it in an order dated June 2, 2005. He filed a second, or supplemental, motion for reconsideration; the trial court denied that too in an order dated June 14, 2005. From these rulings the accused elevated the case to the Supreme Court by appeal, assigning as errors the reliance on the policeman's first testimony despite his later recantation, the failure to acquit on reasonable doubt, the disregard of the affidavit of desistance, and the denial of the supplemental motion and the motion to reopen the case.
Facts
On the evening of August 9, 1995, along Kayang Hilltop Road in Baguio City, a policeman then assigned to Precinct 7 of the Baguio City Police Office, SPO2 Eusebio Benmaho, saw from about twenty meters away a group of more than five men mauling another man in front of a billiard hall. He testified that he saw the accused, Fausto Capuyan, repeatedly stabbing the victim, Adolfo Pascua, with a Batangas knife while the victim lay prostrate on the ground and the accused's companions kicked him. When the policeman announced that he was a policeman and told the group in Ilocano to stop, the companions fled. He collared the accused and seized the knife, then hailed a passing taxicab driven by SPO1 Jerry Tumbaga to bring the wounded man to the hospital. The victim was later pronounced dead; the stab wounds had caused hypovolemic shock.
The defense told a different story. The accused testified that he and Leonardo Ay-Yokad had been drinking at a bar and were waiting for a taxicab when two to four men crossed his path, one of them asking whether he was among those with whom they had quarreled, and then punching him. He parried the blows, his knuckles were wounded, and his companion came to his rescue, at which the men ran away. On his way home he saw a blood-stained knife on the ground and picked it up to protect himself. The policeman then handcuffed him. Ay-Yokad corroborated him and added that a body search conducted shortly before they left the bar had yielded no bladed weapon.
At trial the prosecution's case rested on the policeman's positive identification, supported by the fact, admitted by both sides, that the knife recovered from the accused tested positive for human blood. Then the defense called the same policeman again, and he recanted, saying that resentment over having been berated by the accused had moved him to execute an exaggerated affidavit. The relatives of the deceased also executed an affidavit of desistance, sworn before an assistant city prosecutor in January 2005, which the accused attached to his memorandum filed on the very day the trial court promulgated its decision of conviction.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of the policeman's first testimony notwithstanding his subsequent recantation.
- Whether or not the accused should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt arising from the two conflicting testimonies of the policeman.
- Whether or not the affidavit of desistance executed by the relatives of the deceased warrants the accused's acquittal.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration and the motion to reopen the case.
Applicable Provisions
The information charged, and the trial court convicted of, murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is what raised the killing from homicide to murder and fixed the penalty imposed on the accused.
The decision also applies Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code on the credit for preventive imprisonment, which the trial court expressly extended to the accused:
Article 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases: 1. When they are recidivists or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily. If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Because the accused did not fall within the excepted cases, the trial court credited him with four-fifths of his preventive imprisonment, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in full.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal is unmeritorious and that the trial court correctly disregarded the recantation. Recantations are looked upon with disfavor, because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for a monetary consideration, and are always in danger of later repudiation. The test is one of comparison: the previous testimony and the subsequent one are carefully compared, the circumstances under which each was given are scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change are weighed. Here the policeman's explanation — a bothered conscience over an exaggerated affidavit prompted by resentment at having been berated — was not satisfactorily shown and explained. His positive identification stood, reinforced by the admitted fact that the blood-stained Batangas knife was found in the accused's possession at the moment of arrest, in the very place where the mauling had just occurred and where the stabbed body of the victim lay.
On the second issue, the Court refused to acquit on reasonable doubt. The two conflicting testimonies did not neutralize each other; the first, solemnly given in open court and tested on cross-examination, prevailed over the later change of mind.
On the third issue, the Court held that an affidavit of desistance, to benefit the accused, must be given prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. Here it was executed and filed long after the trial had concluded — attached to the memorandum filed on the very day of promulgation — and so could not serve as a basis for acquittal.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the trial court was correct in denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration and the motion to reopen the case, and in convicting the accused notwithstanding the affidavit of desistance.
Doctrine
First, a recantation does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be lightly set aside; before it may be, both the previous and the subsequent testimony must be carefully compared, the circumstances of each scrutinized, and the motives for the change weighed. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions, because retracted testimony is exceedingly unreliable and can easily be secured through intimidation or for a monetary consideration.
Second, where a witness testifies for the prosecution and later retracts and testifies for the defense, the test is one of comparison coupled with the general rules of evidence. Contradictory testimony subsequently given does not discredit the previous testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained; a witness may be impeached by a previous contradictory statement, but a previous testimony is not presumed false merely because the witness now says it is not true.
Third, an affidavit of desistance, to benefit the accused, must be given prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. One filed after the trial has concluded cannot serve as a basis for acquittal.
Fourth, abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and a detention prisoner who does not fall within the excepted cases is credited with four-fifths of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of conviction and the two orders denying reconsideration, so the People won and Fausto Capuyan stands convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the civil indemnity, moral damages, and costs as ordered.
Remember This
Memorize the line: a testimony solemnly given in court should not be lightly set aside, and an affidavit of desistance must come before the filing of the criminal complaint to benefit the accused. Examiners use this case whenever a recantation or a desistance surfaces after judgment, and whenever they test the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength under Article 248.