MANUEL I. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RICARDO NAVAL AND JUANITO P. FRANCISCO, RESPONDENTS.

Invoked in this petition is the power of the Supreme Court to review, by certiorari, any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections^[1]
which, in the case of Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251, was clearly defined to
be confined to questions of law, particularly violations of the Constitu­tion
and/or constitutional rights.  The right
to due process is what has been noted to have been allegedly violated, more
than any other constitutional right, in petitions like the present which have
assailed resolutions of the COMELEC holding certain candidates disqualified
from running for an elective office on ground of what is popularly known as
“political turncoatism.”

Where allegations of denial of procedural due process have been
found to be clearly well-founded, factual or legal, We
have taken the only course legally proper in the premises.  We have set aside the COMELEC resolution
complained against, and remanded the case to the COMELEC for the observation of
the cardinal requirement of procedural due process.^[2]
Where municipal elective positions are
involved, and the winning candidates have
been proclaimed, We ordered the filing of election
contests or quo warranto proceedings as may be pro­per.^[3]

In the instant case, We perceive no sign
of complaint of denial of due process insofar as the sufficiency of noticed and
hearing is concerned.  It appears that
all the evidence as was desired to be presented by petitioner who had duly
filed his Answer, have been duly admitted for evaluation by the COMELEC.  The only question presented for
determination, and which We cannot avoid, is whether
the COMELEC resolution under review is supported by substantial evidence, which
may also be said to go into the broad concept of due process.  We have examined the evidence on record, and
We are satisfied that the COMELEC correctly adjudged its sufficiency to support
its con­clusion that petitioner was disqualified from running as NP candidate
for the position of Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, by reason of violation of the constitutional provision expressly prohibiting
“turncoatism”,^[4] as well as PD 1661 against “guest can­didates.”

The COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 19, 1980, the
challenged resolution, on a petition seeking petitioner’s dis­qualification
filed on January 14, 1980 by above-named private respondents, as NP candidate
for Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, found that “x x x Santos changed his political
party affiliation from the KBL as shown by the aforesaid letter-resignation
dated January 2, 1980 (Exh. A), wherein he was ‘tendering my resig­nation as MEMBER,
Mun. Com. (Position) Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, Taytay, Rizal,’
to the NP, his present affiliation with the NP having been expressly admitted
by him (see also Exh. B); that the NP, thru its Acting President Jose J.
Roy, initially revoked/withdrew the ‘NP nomination in favor of Mr. Manuel
Santos and other candidates x x x because they were members of good standing of
the KBL as of January 2, 1980 x x x’ and in view also of ‘the provisions of the
Constitution against turncoatism’ and the provisions ‘of recent Presidential
Decree against Guest Candidates’ (Exh. G); and that the NP revoked respondent
Santos’ designation as Municipal
Chairman of the NP in the
Municipality of Taytay (Exhs. 3 & 4), although later said respondent Santos
was chosen as the NP official candidate for Mayor of said muni­cipality (Exh.
5), thereby violating Section 10, Article XII (C) of the Constitution and
Presidential Decree No. 1661, as amended.”^[5]

The facts in this case as above recited find strong resem­blance,
if not almost exact similarity, with those in the case of Evasco vs. COMELEC,^[6] a
petition like the present, which We dismissed, there being substantial evidence
to support the challenged COMELEC resolution disqualifying candidate Evasco as
candidate of the NP for the position of Mayor of Liliw, Laguna for
“political turncoatism”.  In
said case, this Court noted that candidate Evasco attended as a member of the
7-man municipal committee the reorganizational meeting of the leaders and
members of the KBL held in the evening of November 24, 1979, and thereafter said committee
organized itself on November 26, 1979
with Evasco also attending the same (Exh. C & C-1); that admittedly said
Evasco submitted a letter of irrevocable resignation dated December 28, 1979 as
a member of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Chapter of the Municipality (Exh.
B), thereby clearly showing by the aforesaid overt acts that candi­date Evasco
was formerly affiliated with the KBL on November 24, 1979 or earlier, but has
later affiliated with the NP as shown in his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Liliw, Laguna, subscribed and sworn to on December 31, 1979,
(Exh. A), or within six (6)
months immediately preceding the election scheduled on January 30, 1980.

Petitioner Santos,
however, comes up with the contention that he has always been an NP and has
never ceased to be such, even when he joined the KBL and became a member of the
KBL, Municipal Committee of Taytay, Rizal.  He alleges with stress that KBL is not a
political party when he joined it, but a mere umbrella organization, a mere
movement to hasten the achievement of the goals, and firmly establish the gains
of the New Society, and so he cannot be said to have changed political party.^[7]

This argument does not appear to have been unequivocally put
forth in petitioner’s Answer to the petition for his dis­qualification (Annex C to Petition), which explains the
lack of any ruling on this issue as raised by such argument, by the COMELEC in
its assailed resolution.  In any case,
the contention was evidently rejected by the COMELEC; otherwise, it would have
denied the petition for petitioner’s disqualification on ground of changing
political party.  After Our ruling in
Evasco and Gabatan, and finding striking similarity in the evidence upon which
We based Our finding of the existence of compliance with the substantial
evidence requirement for which We upheld the challenged resolutions of the
COMELEC in those cases, particularly the act of “resigning” from the
KBL, in whose municipal committees they were active members, an act obviously
unnecessary unless petitioners feel that in joining the KBL they had taken to a
distinct political aggrupation from the NP which remained as a distinct,
independent and active political party in the elections of 1978, for which
COMELEC accredited NP separately from the KBL, the conclusion seems inevitable
that KBL had always been a political party. 
Conse­quently, one who actively identified himself with the KBL, without
any reservation that he keeps intact his
full status as an NP member, had joined the KBL as a distinct
aggrupation and ceased thereafter to be an NP. 
Double affiliation is intolerable under a party system which is the very
essence of the parliamentary form of government We
have adopted and have just started firmly to establish.

The COMELEC’s determination of whether the KBL was a political
party from the inception of its existence, distinct and separate from the NP is
undoubtedly an exercise of its constitutional power of administering the laws
relative to the conduct of elections. 
This power is exclusive.  Unless
its exercise is tainted with error correctible by certiorari which
usually takes the form of lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
discretion, We should not disturb the orders,
resolutions or other acts of the COMELEC.^[8]
As was said in the early case of Morrero vs. Bocar, et al., 66 Phil. 429, the
decision of the COMELEC is beyond judicial interference except upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power as will constitute
denial of due process of law.

Under its Resolution No. 1406, promulgated December 22, 1979, laying down rules on the
accreditation of political parties, Section 1 thereof provides that any duly
registered political party in the April
7, 1978 election shall be entitled to accreditation.  Pursuant to this Resolution, KBL was duly
accredited, separately from the NP.  That
KBL had always been a political party
or aggrupation can, therefore, no longer be open to question.  Were KBL not such a political party, block
voting as was declared valid in the case of Peralta vs. COMELEC^[9] could not have been availed of by it, as it
un­questionably did, in the 1978 elections.  For block voting is voting for a political
party.

In the light of the ruling in the cases of Evasco and Gabatan,
COMELEC can by no means then be held to have gravely abused its discretion to
justify Our setting aside its assailed Resolution in
the instant petition.  Active involvement
in KBL political affairs as a party, such as being a member of the Municipal Committee
thereof was the primary and decisive consi­deration upon which
“turncoatism” was found to have been com­mitted in the aforesaid
cases.  We cannot avoid coming upon the same conclusion here with how petitioner
had similarly manifested his adherence to the KBL as a political party which
earned for him from no less than ranking officials of the NP to which he claims
unbroken affiliation their regard of him as “a KBL of good standing”,
for which initially, they cancelled his candidacy in the NP slate obviously in fear of his being actually a
“turncoat”, from KBL to NP, that COMELEC correctly found him to be.

The constitutional provision against “political
turncoatism” already in force upon the effectivity of the New Constitution more than seven (7)
years ago, is clearly intended to apply to all elections held under its regime,
regardless of whether the holding of said elections is declared less than the
6-month period mentioned in the provision. 
The stance taken by petitioner that it should not apply in the last
election the holding of which was announced only a month before,
is clearly not tenable, even only under the well-known legal maxim that where
the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish.  No right constitutionally protected under the
due process is involved for petitioner to complain against lack of sufficient
notice because of the less than six (6) months intervening between the
declaration of the holding of an election and the day of the election.  The Constitution speaks so un­equivocally
with its innovative and mandatory provision, obedience thereof must be imposed.

It follows that the applicability of PD No. 1661, being merely an
implementation, or in furtherance, of the well-studied
and wise constitutional provision is neither open to doubt.  The prohibition against ex post facto law which petitioner invokes in his
mistaken belief that the decree,
if applied to him, is being given retrospective effect, which it is not, does
not apply, as We have already so held in effect in the earlier cases of Evasco
and Gabatan.  The decree could by no
stretch of the clear scope of the novel constitutional concept, be banned under
the ex post facto law clause of the Constitution,
for it merely provides, for a certain disqualification of a candidate aspiring
to be chosen to an elective office which, being
a mere privilege, is a fit subject for reasonable statutory regulation, clearly
not penal in character.  As defined, ex
post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.^[10]

We must, therefore, declare that the Resolution of the COMELEC of
January 19, 1980,
disqualifying petitioner and cancelling his certificate of candidacy suffers
from no reversible error or infirmity. 
It must be enforced as if no
restraining order had been issued, for in issuing the restraining order, this
Court’s sole purpose was to give petitioner a chance to be voted for, since the
question of his disqualification could not be resolved before the elections by
reason of time constraint, so that should he win and be ultimately declared by this Court not disqualified, the
people’s will shall have been known and should be given effect, as is the
paramount object of holding elections, the instrument most valued in the
exercise of sovereignty by the people to whom such sovereignty belongs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of
January 19, 1980 of the
COMELEC should be allowed to stand with all its legal effects.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a
separate opinion.

Aquino, J., in the result.

Fernando, C.J., no part.

Abad Santos, J., on official
leave.

^[1] Section 11 of Article XII (C) of the New
Constitution provides: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by aggrieved party within
thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

^[2] Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G. R. No. 52428, February 21, 1980.

^[3] Renato N. Reyes vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G. R. No. 52699, May 15, 1980; Cesar E. Nepomuceno, Leon C. Arcillas and Ruben C. Avenido vs. COMELEC and Oscar E. Laserna, G. R. Nos. 52427 and
52506, May 15, 1980.

^[4] Section
10, Article XII (C) of the New Constitution pro­vides: “No elective public
officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office,
and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political party
affiliation within six (6) months immediately preceding or following an
election”; and Section 1 of the Presidential Decree No. 1661, as amended
provides: “It shall be unlawful for any registered or accredited political
party to nominate and/or support as its official candidate any person belonging
to another accredited or registered party unless he has affiliated with the
nominating party at least six (6) months before the election:  Provided,  that a person who participated as an officer
in the campaign of apolitical party, group or aggrupation in the immediately
pre­ceding elections shall be deemed a member of such party as of the date of
the political campaign, for purposes of nomination as official candidate of
such party in succeeding elections.”

^[5] Comelec Resolution dated January
19, 1980, Annex A to
Petition, p. 18, Rollo.

^[6] G.R. No. 52401, Resolution
of January 28, 1980; See also G. R. No. L-32381, Gabatan vs. COMELEC, Resolution of January 26, 1980.

^[7] pp. 5-8, Petition, pp.
7-10; Rollo.

^[8] Bashier vs. COMELEC, 43 SCRA 238;
Puñgutan vs. Abubakar, et al., 43 SCRA 1, 10-11; Lucman vs.
Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387-388.

^[9] 82 SCRA 30, G. R. No. L-47771, March
11, 1978.

^[10] E.G., Mekin vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74, 78 (1903); U.S. vs. Jueves,
23 Phil. 100, 105 (1912); Roman Cath. Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipal of
Taal, 38 Phil. 367 (1918); Province of Camarines Sur vs. Director of
Lands, 64 Phil. 600 (1937); Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 54 (1950);
Tolentino vs. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309, 318 (1956); Phil. National Bank vs.
Ruperto, L-13777, June 30, 1960; Santos vs. Secretary of Public
Works & Communications, L-16049, March 18, 1967.

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