LAURENCHITO V. HERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION SOBIDA MOTORS CORP., AND SUSIE JANE V. ABEL, RESPONDENTS.
ZALAMEDA, R.V., J.:
As borne by the records of the case, the antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner worked as purchaser/buyer/driver by respondent Sobida Motors Corporation[7] since 14 October 2004. On 25 February 2012, petitioner was told by Warlito Soriano,[8] his supervisor, to report at the Tayuman office in Manila to be assigned as driver to a certain Mrs. Baguno effective 27 February 2012.[9] Petitioner was then instructed by private respondent Susie Jane Abel,[10] the HR Manager, to wait for one Oca Ramos, the driver to be replaced, for proper turn-over of duties.[11] However, petitioner left the Tayuman office when he heard from Mrs. Baguno’s assistant that the latter was not showing up.[12]
On 27 February 2012, petitioner reported for work at the Tayuman office but since he did not know how to operate a vehicle with an automatic transmission, Mrs. Baguno asked for his replacement.[13] Likewise, on the same day, he was required to explain why he should not be dismissed for insubordination as defined under Article VII of the company’s Code of Discipline.[14] According to private respondents, petitioner’s act of leaving the Tayuman office on 25 February 2012 despite instructions to wait Oca Ramos for turn-over of duties, caused delays in the deliveries, prompting a client to complain.[15]
Petitioner explained through a letter[16] dated 27 February 2012 that he was suffering from ulcer, rheumatism, high blood pressure, urinary tract infection and poor eyesight. Also, he claimed not knowing how to drive a vehicle with automatic transmission, thus, he found it necessary to relay the same to Mrs. Baguno. As to the allegation that he left the Tayuman office on 25 February 2012 despite the directive from his superiors, he explained that he did ask permission from Soriano.[17]
Private respondents were not impressed with petitioner’s explanation. For one, Soriano denied that petitioner asked permission to leave the Tayuman office. For another, when petitioner left the said office in his service truck, he encountered engine trouble, stalling the vehicle on the road for a few hours. This apparently caused delay in the operations of the company prompting a client to complain.[18] Thus, on 06 March 2012, petitioner was issued a Notice of Termination[19] for violation of Article VII No. 6 of Insubordination of the Code of Conduct, which has the corresponding penalty of dismissal, and which states:
“X x x Refusing or willfully neglecting to perform one’s assigned work or refusal to comply with instructions, rules and regulations.
X x x”
Petitioner later on filed a Complaint[20] for illegal dismissal and for payment of separation pay before the Labor Arbiter.
According to private respondents, petitioner was dismissed for just cause and that due process, substantive and procedural, was observed. Further, they took into account petitioner’s propensity to disregard the rules and regulations of the company, i.e., repeated tardiness, in terminating the services of petitioner.[21]
In her Decision,[22] the Labor Arbiter ruled that while petitioner is indeed guilty of insubordination, the penalty of dismissal was too severe. Moreover, petitioner’s repeated infractions on tardiness have already been dealt with, and thus, petitioner should not be penalized once again for his past infractions.
The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision reads:
“X x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring complainant Laurenchito V. Hernandez to have been illegally dismissed from employment;
2) Ordering respondent Sobida Motors Corporation liable to pay complainant Laurenchito V. Hernandez’
a) backwages from date of dismissal on March 7, 2012 up to the finality of this decision, which is provisionally computed as of the date of this decision in the sum of P56,640.00;
b) separation pay of one month pay for every year of service, which is in the amount of P94,400.00;
3) Denying complainant Laurenchito V. Hernandez’ claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees for lack of factual and legal basis.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
X x x”[23]
Private respondents partially appealed[24] the Labor Arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC.
In its assailed Decision, the NLRC granted the Partial Appeal and dismissed the Complaint against private respondents. According to the NLRC, private respondents correctly enforced the termination of petitioner based on the company’s Code of Conduct which penalizes insubordination with dismissal.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision provides:
“X x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 29, 2012 is hereby ordered SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
X x x”[25]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] but the same was denied by the NLRC in its assailed Resolution dated 28 February 2013:
“X x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
No further Motion of similar nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
X x x”[27]
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, raising the following as issues, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF [DISCRETION] WHEN IT REVERSED THE LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION AND DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT.II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT AWARDING PETITIONER’S MONEY CLAIMS.[28]
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
According to petitioner, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner’s alleged insubordination does not merit the supreme penalty of dismissal inasmuch as there was no bad faith on petitioner’s part when he failed to wait for Oca Ramos and to return the company’s vehicle to the Tayuman office. Further, petitioner’s previous infractions on tardiness have already been addressed in the past and thus, the same are considered to have been condoned by the company.
As he was illegally dismissed, petitioner asks for backwages and reinstatement, or if reinstatement is no longer feasible, with the payment of separation pay.
In their Comment/Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari,[29] private respondents claim that petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting their Partial Appeal. They maintain that petitioner’s dismissal was for just cause and was done in a valid exercise of management prerogative.
After an assiduous deliberation of the facts and evidence presented by both parties, We find merit in petitioner’s arguments.
Indeed, whether or not petitioner is guilty of insubordination is no longer of issue. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that petitioner committed insubordination as defined under the Code of Conduct of private respondent company. However, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had different views on the penalty imposed on petitioner. On one hand, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal too harsh a penalty while the NLRC found the same to be proper.
The NLRC ruled that private respondent company has the management prerogative to formulate rules and regulations and that the same are generally valid and binding on the parties. Concomitant with the said prerogative, the company may validly dismiss an employee who committed an infraction based on such rules promulgated.
We are perfectly aware that the constitutional protection afforded to labor does not condone wrongdoings by the employee; and an employer’s power to discipline its workers is inherent to it.[30] However, while the employer has the inherent right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees, this prerogative is subject to the regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.[31]
In the present case, petitioner was terminated when he failed to heed the instructions of the company to wait for the driver he was replacing and to turn over his vehicle to the proper person who was supposed to pick it up from the Tayuman office. In considering whether he should be terminated, his previous infractions for tardiness were taken into account.
As We have ruled, there is no dispute that petitioner is guilty of insubordination based on the company’s Code of Conduct and said infraction has a corresponding penalty of dismissal. Petitioner’s past infractions on tardiness was also used in determining whether or not petitioner should be terminated from work. And We are aware that the totality of infractions could very well be used by the management in determining the appropriate penalty:
“X x x
The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While it may be true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this does not and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out since an employee’s past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed upon petitioner, he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable behavior onboard. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has the right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-protection.
X x x”[32]
Notwithstanding, We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the penalty of dismissal was too severe a penalty. While petitioner had reservations about his new assignment due his health conditions and inability to drive the new vehicle assigned to him, We agree that petitioner’s refusal was not willful. Neither was it done in bad faith. Moreover, it was petitioner’s first time to be charged with insubordination. Given his length of service with private respondent company, eight (8) years at the time of his termination, the penalty meted out to petitioner should have been tempered.
In this regard, it is a hornbook doctrine that infractions committed by an employee should merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee and must be imposed in connection with the disciplinary authority of the employer.[33]
As elucidated by the Supreme Court in Dongon vs. Rapid Movers and Forwarders:[34]
“X x x
To us, dismissal should only be a last resort, a penalty to be meted only after all the relevant circumstances have been appreciated and evaluated with the goal of ensuring that the ground for dismissal was not only serious but true. The cause of termination, to be lawful, must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood. This requirement is in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws to lean over backwards in favor of the working class, and with the mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor.
Although we recognize the inherent right of the employer to discipline its employees, we should still ensure that the employer exercises the prerogative to discipline humanely and considerately, and that the sanction imposed is commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. The discipline exacted by the employer should further consider the employee’s length of service and the number of infractions during his employment. The employer should never forget that always at stake in disciplining its employee are not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he may also have a family entirely dependent on his earnings.
X x x”
Having established that the supreme penalty of dismissal is too severe, We now resolve the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to the payment of backwages and separation pay.
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.[35]
However, in certain instances, the reinstatement of the dismissed employee was ordered but not the payment of backwages. In the case of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. vs. Adonis Pionilla,[36] the Supreme Court held that reinstatement sans payment of backwages is proper when the dismissal of the employee was done in good faith:
“X x x
In certain cases, however, the Court has ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages considering the fact that (1) the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (2) the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. For instance, in the case of Cruz v. Minister of Labor and Employment the Court ruled as follows:
The Court is convinced that petitioner’s guilt was substantially established. Nevertheless, we agree with respondent Minister’s order of reinstating petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial of backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions. The bank officials acted in good faith. They should be exempt from the burden of paying backwages. The good faith of the employer, when clear under the circumstances, may preclude or diminish recovery of backwages. Only employees discriminately dismissed are entitled to backpay.
Likewise, in the case of Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court pronounced that “the ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private respondent is reinstated but without backwages in view of petitioner’s good faith.”
The factual similarity of these cases to Remandaban’s situation deems it appropriate to render the same disposition.
In this case, the Court observes that: (a) the penalty of dismissal was too harsh of a penalty to be imposed against Pionilla for his infractions; and (b) IMI was in good faith when it dismissed Pionilla as his dereliction of its policy on ID usage was honestly perceived to be a threat to the company’s security. In this respect, since these concurring circumstances trigger the application of the exception to the rule on backwages as enunciated in the above-cited cases, the Court finds it proper to accord the same disposition and consequently directs the deletion of the award of back wages in favor of Pionilla, notwithstanding the illegality of his dismissal. [Emphasis supplied]
X x x.”
The concurring conditions, i.e., penalty of dismissal as too severe and good faith of the employer in dismissing the employee, are patently present in this case.
Here, We find that private respondents’ act of terminating petitioner’s services is bereft of bad faith. This, considering that the termination was done in accord with due process and that based on the company’s Code of Conduct, insubordination merits the penalty of dismissal. Moreover, as We have already ruled, the penalty of dismissal, vis-à-vis the length of service of lack of bad faith on the part of the petitioner in failing to comply with the orders given to him, is not commensurate to the infraction imputed on petitioner. Thus, in this regard, We see no reason why the ruling in Integrated Microelectronics, Inc., vs. Adonis Pionilla should not be applied.
In this regard, We find the payment of backwages no longer necessary in light of the abovementioned disquisition. However, since reinstatement is no longer feasible, and inasmuch as petitioner opted for the payment of separation pay, We rule that in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of separation pay at the rate of one (1) month for every year of service, which, as computed by the Labor Arbiter amounts to ninety-four thousand four hundred (Php 94,400.00) pesos, is proper.
Anent the charge against private respondent Abel, We hold that inasmuch as she acted in good faith, and that there was no imputation of bad faith against her in terminating the services of petitioner, the case against her should be dismissed.
Finally, although we recognize the inherent right of the employer to discipline its employees, we should still ensure that the employer exercises the prerogative to discipline humanely and considerately, and that the sanction imposed is commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. The discipline exacted by the employer should further consider the employee’s length of service and the number of infractions during his employment. The employer should never forget that always at stake in disciplining its employee are not only his position but also his livelihood, and that he may also have a family entirely dependent on his earnings.[37]
All told, We find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by ruling that the penalty of dismissal is proper and commensurate to the infraction committed by the petitioner. After all, conclusions or findings derived from erroneous considerations are not mere errors of judgment but one tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[38]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision and Resolution rendered by the NLRC are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. A NEW JUDGMENT is hereby rendered, finding private respondent Sobida Motors Corporation liable for illegal dismissal.
Accordingly, private respondent company is ORDERED to PAY petitioner separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of ninety-four thousand four hundred (Php 94,400.00) pesos with the legal interest rate of six (6%) percent per annum until fully satisfied based on the Court’s disquisition above.
Further, for lack of legal basis, the Complaint against private respondent Susie Jane V. Abel is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[1]Barza, (Acting Chairperson), and Sempio Diy, JJ., concur.
[1] Vice J. Ramon M. Bato, Jr., per Office Order No. 441-14-ABR dated 24 October 2014.
[2] Rollo, pages 02 to 19.
[3] “Petitioner,” for brevity.
[4] Rollo, pages 22 to 32.
[5] Id. at 40 to 42.
[6] “NLRC,” for brevity.
[7] “Private respondent company,” for brevity.
[8] “Soriano,” for brevity.
[9] Rollo, page 49.
[10] “Private respondent Abel,” for brevity.
[11] Rollo, page 49.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 77.
[15] Id. at 62 to 63.
[16] Id. at 78 to 79.
[17] Id. at 80.
[18] Id. at 83. See Termination Notice.
[19] Id. at 82 to 83.
[20] Id. at 43 to 46.
[21] Id. at 59 to 62.
[22] Id. at 97 to 115.
[23] Id. at 114 to 115.
[24] Id. at 116 to 147.
[25] Id. at 32.
[26] Id. at 33 to 38.
[27] Id. at 41.
[28] Id. at 08.
[29] Id. at 173 to 199.
[30] Nathaniel N. Dongon vs. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 163431, 28 August 2013.
[31] Sagales vs. Rustan’s Corporation, G.R. No. 166554, 27 November 2008.
[32] Brendo D. Merin vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 171790, 17 October 2008.
[33] Sagales vs. Rustan’s Corporation, G.R. No. 166554, 27 November 2008.
[34] G.R. No. 163431, 28 August 2013.
[35] Bani Rural Bank, Inc., et al. vs. Teresa de Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 170904, 13 November 2013.
[36] G.R. No. 200222, 28 August 2013.
[37] Nathaniel N. Dongon vs. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 163431, 28 August 2013.
[38] Id.