CORPUS B. ALZATE, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. RAPHIEL F. ALZATE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 1, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BANGUED, ABRA, RESPONDENT.

Alzate versus Alzate

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Judge Corpus Alzate against Judge Raphiel Alzate, a presiding judge of a regional trial court branch in Bucay, Abra. The complainant accused the respondent of gross misconduct and dishonesty, alleging that the respondent and his wife, a lawyer, ran a so-called conjugal syndicate that offered package deals to couples seeking annulment, and that the respondent decided these cases in favor of parties who were not even residents of his court's territorial jurisdiction. The case matters because it clarifies the mandatory nature of judicial disqualification and the standard of proof in administrative proceedings against judges.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Supreme Court and referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, which in turn recommended that the matter be referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. An Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals conducted the investigation and found the evidence insufficient to establish gross misconduct and dishonesty, but recommended a judicial audit of the nullity cases decided by the respondent. The Office of the Executive Director of the Judicial Integrity Board agreed that the evidence was insufficient for gross misconduct but found the respondent guilty of violating Section 5, Canon III of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for failing to inhibit from one of the cases, and recommended a fine of 5,000 pesos. The Judicial Integrity Board affirmed the findings but modified the penalty, finding the respondent guilty of simple misconduct and imposing a fine of 100,000 pesos. The matter then reached the Supreme Court for final resolution.

Facts

The complainant alleged that the respondent's court was known as the Annulment Capital of the North, where lawyers filed annulment cases even if the parties were not residents of Bucay, Abra. He claimed that the respondent and his wife, a lawyer, offered package deals to couples seeking annulment, with the wife dealing with the parties and assigning the case to a lawyer who often had no knowledge of the case. The complainant cited two cases, Villanueva and Bermudez, to support his allegations.

In Villanueva, the petition was filed when another judge was still presiding over the court. The respondent's wife was the counsel on record. When the respondent became the acting presiding judge, his wife withdrew her appearance as counsel. However, the complainant alleged that she continued to appear in the case, as shown by the minutes of a hearing held in March 2014. The respondent denied this, claiming that the appearance was an inadvertence by a court staff member. In Bermudez, the complainant alleged that the lawyer on record merely lent his name and did not participate in the proceedings, and that the case was decided without any hearing.

The respondent denied all allegations, claiming that the parties in both cases were residents of Bucay, Abra, and that he had no personal knowledge of any irregularities. He submitted affidavits and certifications to support his claims. The complainant submitted a second affidavit from the lawyer in Bermudez, denying that he executed the first affidavit and insisting that he was never notified of any hearing.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty in deciding the annulment cases.
• Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure for failing to inhibit from the Villanueva case.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Disqualification of Judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of the review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and agreed upon the record.

This provision mandates compulsory disqualification when a judge's wife or child has a pecuniary interest or when the judge is related to counsel within the fourth degree, and it bears directly on the respondent's failure to inhibit from the Villanueva case.

Canon III, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.

This provision reinforces the rule on disqualification and applies to the respondent's situation where his wife was counsel for a party.

Canon IV, Section 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Section 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

This provision explicitly prohibits a judge from participating in a case where a family member represents a litigant, which is precisely what happened in the Villanueva case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Court quoted with approval the findings of the Judicial Integrity Board that there was no substantial evidence showing that the respondent and his wife were involved in a modus of negotiating package deals, and that the allegations were sufficiently disputed by affidavits and certifications. The Court also noted that an audit had already been conducted, and in that audit case, the respondent was found guilty of gross neglect of duty for proceeding with nullity cases without pre-trial and without awaiting collusion reports.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent was duty-bound to inhibit from the Villanueva case due to his wife's participation. The Court ruled that his inhibition was not merely discretionary but compulsory. The Court quoted Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Canon III, Sections 5(f) and (g) and Canon IV, Section 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court found that the respondent's wife actively participated in the case prior to her withdrawal, and that her withdrawal did not change the fact that there still exists a perception that the case was decided in her favor. The Court cited Paderanga v. Judge Paderanga, where a judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure for disobeying the rule on compulsory self-disqualification. The Court concluded that the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, instead of simple misconduct as found by the Judicial Integrity Board.

Doctrine

A judge must compulsorily disqualify himself from sitting in a case in which his wife or child is pecuniarily interested, or in which he is related to counsel within the fourth degree, or in which a member of his family represents a litigant. This is not a matter of discretion but a mandatory rule under Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Canon III, Section 5 and Canon IV, Section 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Failure to comply constitutes gross ignorance of the law or procedure, which is a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations by substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere allegations, conjectures, and suppositions are not sufficient.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure for failing to inhibit from the Villanueva case, and imposed the appropriate penalty, considering his previous administrative liabilities.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a judge's failure to inhibit from a case where his wife is counsel is not a mere discretion but a compulsory disqualification, and non-compliance constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Examiners like to use this case to test the rules on judicial disqualification and the standard of proof in administrative complaints against judges.