G. R. No. L-6191. January 31, 1955
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CIRILO P. BAYLOSIS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Batangas by the Bureau of Lands in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
involve seven lots formerly a part of the Hacienda LIAN or LIAN ESTATE in the
municipality of Lian, Batangas, which estate formerly belonged in its entirety
to the Colegio de San Jose Inc., a Jesuit corporation, under Original
Certificate of Title No. 15521. It seems that the Hacienda or rather the income
therefrom was used for the support and education of young Filipinos studying for
the priesthood. The Hacienda originally had an extension of several thousand
hectares and was occupied and cultivated by lessees and by tenants (inquilinos).
About the year 1931 the religious authorities decided to break up this big
estate as far as possible into small lots averaging one hundred hectares each
and sell it to bona fide lessees, the price to be payable on the
installment plan.
One of these lessees was Nelson V. Sinclair. He had occupied under a contract
of lease a portion of this estate since 1928, cultivating a portion by means of
tractors and the remainder by means of aparceros under yearly contracts
such as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B (Baylosis).
In 1937 he bought from the Lian Estate the portion leased to him with an
approximate area of 87 hectares. Subsequently, this portion was subdivided into
seven lots, to wit: 306-YYYY, 306-BBBB, 306-CCCC, 306-DDDD, 306-EEEE, 306-Z and
306-LL. In 1947 Sinclair sold lot 306-YYYY with an area of about 25 hectares and
306- BBBB with an area of about 17 hectares to Cirilo P. Baylosis for P40,000
and P28,000, respectively, although the corresponding transfer certificates of
title were not issued until 1948 and 1949, respectively. After the purchase,
Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided the two lots into small parcels and sold the same
to his co-defendants in this case, except Sinclair and Luis Baylosis. In 1950
Sinclair sold to Cirilio P. Baylosis lot 306-CCCC with an area of about 13
hectares and lot 306-DDDD with an area of about 10 hectares for P39,000. (See
Exhibit 16-Baylosis)
About October 7, 1946, some 68 persons claiming to be tenants and occupants
of the parcels originally owned by Sinclair addressed a petition in Tagalog to
the Rural Progress Administration, a rough translation in English of which
follows:
We, the undersigned, are all workers in this land for a long time, and were
the ones who cleared the place of its big trees.That is why we are requesting the Government to buy the land and we shall pay
the instalment to the Government.”
Much later, on the basis of the petition, the Rural Progress Administration
through its Manager Faustino Aguilar, on May 4, 1948, addressed a letter to
Sinclair reading as follows:
“May 4, 1948
Mr. N. V. Sinclair
181 David, Escolta
ManilaSir:
There has been received in this Office a petition for the acquisition by the
Government for resale to the tenants of the following six lots in Binubusan,
owned and/or administered by you:Lot N. 306—CCCC under tax declaration No.
852
Area—13.9125 hectares.
Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land.
Assessed value—P6,400.00Lot No. 306—Z under tax declaration No. 858
Area—8.7762
hectares.
Kind—7.7762 hectares irrigated agricultural land 1.0000
hectare
—riceland.
Assessed value—P4,040.Lot No. 306—YYY under tax declaration No.
864
Area—25.0159 hectares.
Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land.
Assessed value—P9,760. :Lot No. 306—BBBB under taof declaration No.
365
Area—17.9827 hectares.
Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land.
Assessed value—P7,010Lot No. 306—EEEE under tax declaration No.
866
Area—10.4955.
Kind—Irrigated agricultural
land.
Assessed value—P4,090.Lot No. 306—LL under tax declaration No. 350
Owner—
Colegio de San Jose.
Administrator—N. V.
Sinclair.
Area—14.3208 hectares.
Kind—Fish
pond.
Assessed value—P5,730.The reason given by the tenants in presenting their petition is that your
relation with them is not altogether too satisfactory having on previous
occasion tried to disregard the 70-30 crop sharing basis, although later have
yielded to observance thereof upon the insistence of the tenants. They likewise
complain that you are planning to eject them, a plan which if carried out, will
result in untold sufferings on their part, without mentioning the pain of
leaving the premises which they have occupied and tilled since time
immemorial.Before we take action on their petition we will appreciate your favor of
informing us for your willingness to sell said parcels of land, in accordance
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the conditions of the
sale.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar
Manager“
On May 7th, Sinclair wrote the following answer:
“May 7, 1948
Rural Progress Administration
Department of Justice Building
Walled
City, ManilaAttention: Mr. Faustino Aguilar, Manager
Gentleman:
This will acknowledge receipt today of your communication dated May 4th, with
reference to the petition for your Administration to purchase lands of the
writer located in barrio Binubusan, munic- ipality of Lian, Province of
Batangas.The reasons given by the petitioners are not true and it will be a pleasure
to acquaint you with the facts concerned with each of the lots specified.This information will be assembled at the earliest possible time and in order
to expedite its submission to your goodselves, your letter is being forwarded to
my representative at Lian.In the meantime, it is requested that you kindly allow me sufficient time to
submit the true facts pertaining to each lot before you take action on this
Petition.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) N. V. Sinclair
Owner
On November 15, 1958, Manager Aguilar again wrote to Sinclair as follows:
“November 15, 1948
Mr. N. V. Sinclair
181 David Escolta
ManilaSir:
In connection with your letter dated May 7, 1948, advising us that you will
forward to this Office under separate cover information regarding your refusal
to sell to certain petitioners your lands in Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as
lot Nos. 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY; 306-BBBB; 306-EEE and 306-LL, please be
informed that up to the present we have not as yet received said letter. As it
is our desire to apprise the petitioners of the same, the favor of fin early
information from you will be appreciated.Likewise the petitioners again called at this Office and have made an offer
to buy said lands at P600 per hectare on a 10-year period to pay. If the said
price iflf acceptable to you, please advise us accordingly.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar
Manager”
Thereafter, having been informed that Sinclair had sold his parcels or seme
of them to one Cirilo P. B.aylosis, Manager Aguilar on January 17, 1949, wrote
the following letter:
“January 17, 1949
Atty. Cirilo P. Baylosis
Balayan, BatangasSir:
We have been informed that you bought the lands of N. V. Sinclair at
Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lots 306-YYY; 306- LL; 306-Z; 306-CCCC;
306-BBBB and 306-EEEE and that you are at present taking all the crops thereon
including the share due to the tenants with the help of constabulary soldiers.
If the report is true, we request that you refrain from taking such step in
order to avoid any untoward incident that may arise therefrom.The lands which you bought are the stibject of a petition for acquisition and
resale to the tenants thereof which is pending final action by this Office.Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar
Manager”
Thereafter, on February 6, 1951, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
original complaint for expropriation against Cirilo P. Baylosis and Sinclair,
which complaint was twice amended, the second amended complaint being filed on
April 16, 1952, so as to include all the persons to whom Sinclair and Cirilo P.
Baylosis had sold portions of the lots sought to be expropriated.
On February 14, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Batangas after hearing
the parties issued an order placing the plaintiffs in possession of the property
sought to be expropriated after plaintiff had made a deposit of P27,105.22. On
February 24, 1951, the tenants and occupants in whose behalf the expropriation
proceedings were instituted moved to intervene, accompanying their motion with a
complaint in intervention. Believing that their interests were sufficiently
taken care of and defended by the plaintiff, the trial court deemed said
intervention unnecessary. The defendants numbering about 21 filed 9 separate
motions to dismiss based on several grounds, among which are: that the
expropriation was being made not for public use; that the defendants would be
deprived of their property without due process of law; that the plaintiff has no
right under the guise of expropriation to take the property of a private citizen
and deliver the same to another private individual; that the Constitution
authorizes the expropriation of big landed estates but not of small areas like
these owned by the defendants; that the present expropriation was intended to
benefit only about 44 persons who do not represent the public and that many of
said persons already have lands of their own; that tHe various defendants
individually own only small portion of the property under expropriation; that
the second amended complaint is defective in that it did not describe the
specific property sought to be expropriated; and that the current price of
irrigated lands in Batangas is about P3,000 per hectare and so plaintiff’s
deposit was insufficient.
After hearing and the introduction of evidence, both oral and documentary,
the trial court issued an order dated July 18, 1952, dismissing the various
motions for dismissal and declaring the plaintiff entitled to take the property
sought to be condemned for public use as described in the second amended
complaint upon payment of just compensation to be ascertained by Commissioners
to be appointed by the court for this purpose. The defendants are now appealing
from that order directly to this Tribunal.
The trial court declared that the present expropriation proceedings are based
on Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that—
“The Congress may authorized upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost
to individuals.”
and section 1 of Commonwealth Act 539 which provides that the President of
the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands through purchase or
expropriation and subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale to
bona fide tenants or occupants. The trial court also said that although this
Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, G. R.
No. L-2089 (47 Off. Gaz.,No. 4 p. 1848) held that section 4 of Article XIII of
the Constitution had reference to large estates, still, the total area of the
parcels now sought to be expropriated, whicn, is between 67 arid 77 hectares,
may hot be considered small; that the tenants and occupants of the land for whom
these expropriatioh proceedings were instituted have by themselves and their
ancestors been occupying, clearing and cultivating the land for many years and
that they are entitled now to purchase the same; that the situation in the area
in question was far from peaceful because there was misunderstanding and trouble
between tenants on one side, and their landlords (the defendants herein) on the
other, regarding their shares in the harvests and that the only way to solve
this tenancy problem was to expropriate the land and sell it to the tenants;
that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis were formerly agreeable to sell this
land to others for a profit as shown by the fact that they had actually sold
portions thereof to others and that consequently, they can now have no valid
objection to the expropriation, that heretofore the Government had already
expropriated a large portion of Lian Estate or Hacienda, divided the same into
small lots and thereafter resold them to tenants, thereby showing that by its
nature, location and destination, the property is suitable for the purpose for
which it is being expropriated, and that these proceedings are in keeping with
what the Government had alreay done with respect to other portions; that
although it is contended that several of the tenants and occupants have already
lands of their own aside from the portions they are now occupying, still, they
are actual occupants and it would noi be fair or just that they would not be
included in the benefits of the expropriation, and that in any event, once the
expropriation is carried out, it is for the Government to screen and process the
tenants, and that those found already owning lands may be disqualified to buy
the land being expropriated. As to the portions into which lots 306-YYYY and
306-BB have been sub-divided and then sold by Cirilo P. Baylosis to his
co-defendants, the trial court observed that said sales were made after Baylosis
had been served on January 17, 1949, with notice by the Rural Progress
Administration of the intention of the Government to purchase said lots, and
that considering that the purchasers are relatives of Baylosis, and that the
transfer certificates of title were issued in 1950, there was reason to believe
that these sales by Baylosis were simulated, and intended to frustrate the
attempt of the Government to expropriate.
For a better and a clearer understanding of the facts in this case,
particularly the parcels involved, their areas and owners, the particular
portions sought to be expropriated and the number of tenants and occupants
sought to be benefitted by the expropriation, we have prepared the following
tables or graphs, marked “A” and “G,” based on the pleadings and on the order
appealed from.
1. Lot 306-YYY ……………………….. 2. Lot 306 BBB ………………….. 3. Lot 306-CCC …………………… 4. Lot 306-EEEE ………………….. 5. Lot 306-Z …………………… 6. Lot 306-LL ……………………. 7. Lot 306-DDDD…………………….
Maria Lunesa…………………………… Pastora Baylosis ……………………… Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan
…..Spouses Tomas Asuncion and Bonifacio Bayungan
….Spouse Raymunda Hernandez and Juan Gonzales
….Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan …. Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda …. Spousea Benito Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres …. Spouses Alejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon …. Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina Baylosis….
…………
…………………….
………..N. V. Sinclair
Table “A” shaws the number of lots to be affected by the expropriation
including the areas to be expropriated, and the number of their occupants and
dependents. Table “B” shows the names of the owners of the original seven lots
involved and of the smaller lots into which they had been subdivided and their
areas. Table “A” further shows the area sought to be expropriated from each
individual lot, totaling approximately 67 hectares. The number of tenants or
occupants is about 44 and the number of their dependents is about 214. For the
defendants owners, there are about 23 of them with about 90 dependents.
It will be seen from the tables that neither the exact location of the
portion to be expropriated from each lot nor its form or shape is stated or
defined, thereby supporting the contention of the defendants on this point.
Table “A” also shows that the Government wants to expropriate, not one whole
parcel or the seven lots comprising said parcel but is selecting only portions
of said seven different and separate lots, presumably those actually occupied
and cultivated by the tenants. If the expropriation is carried out, we do not
know what portions would be left to the owners, the forms therof and whether or
not it would be worthwhile for the said owners to keep them.
Let us now discuss the several reasons given by the trial court for upholding
the right of the Government to expropriate in this case. It says that the
tenants and occupants for whose benefit the land is being expropriated have by
themselves and their ancestors been occupying and cultivating the same for many
years and are therefore entitled to purchase the same. We. are afraid that that
holding has no legal basis. The mere fact that d person as a tenant has occupied
and cultivated and even cleared the land for his landlord does not entitle him
to purchase the same against his landlord’s will, by means of expropriation.
Expropriation by the Government, obliging a land owner to part with his real
estate is authorised only when done for public use or for public benefit and not
to enable one to own real property at the expense of another especially when
said owner has no other real property except the one being expropriated. Some of
the defendants herein (Alejandro Abellera and Benito Baylosis) have no other
land except the small lots bought by them from Cirilo P. Baylosis and now
subject of the present expropriation proceedings. Defendant Juan Gonzales told
the Court that he is actually by himself, plowing and cultivating the small lot
of about one hectare that he bought from Cirilo P. Baylosis, now sought to be
condemned. We should not forget that the Constitution protects private property,
prohibits a citizen being deprived of his property without due process of law,
and that even in condemnation proceedings when said citizen is given just
compensation for his property expropriated, still, the expropriation to be valid
must be for a public use or public benefit.
Again, the trial court says that there are tenancy problems in the lands
being expropriated, there being misunderstanding between the owners and the
tenants as to the share of each in the harvest, and that the only way this
problem could be solved is to expropriate the land. This seems to be a novel
theory which finds no statutory or constitutional support. If this theory were
correct and is to be followed and applied, then all that a tenant has to do in
order to be able to buy the land of his landlord is for him, or better still,
with the help and cooperation of his co-tenants, to violate the tenancy law,
refuse to give the 30% corresponding to his or their landlord or even deny the
title of said landlord, thereby creating a tenancy problem, upon which the
Government will immediately step in and commence expropriation proceedings,
claiming that the only solution of the trouble between the landlord and the
tenants lies in expropriation. We cannot believe Jhat was ever the intention of
either tfie framers of the Constitution or of the members of Congress. That is
the reason why Congress has promulgated the Tenancy Law, clearly specifying the
rights and obligations of both landlord and tenant, their respective shares in
the harvest, and the removal of a tenant only for certain specified reasons or
causes; and that is why we have the Tenancy Division in the Court of Industrial
Relations to handle and decide tenancy disputes.
Furthermore, it is not exactly correct to say that there is a tenancy problem
in the land in question, and even if there were, the fault may be attributed to
the tenants themselves rather than to the owners. It will be remembered that in
the petition filed by about 68 persons claiming to be occupants of the parcels
originally owned by Sinclair dated October 6, 1946, addressed to the Rural
Progress Administration, nothing was said about tenancy trouble. All that they
said in said petition was that they had been working on the land for a long time
and had cleared the place of big trees, and that they wanted to buy the land and
pay the price to the Government in installment. Indeed, the evidence shows that
Sinclair never had any trouble with his tenants. And there is reason to believe
and evidence to support the belief that the tenancy trouble on the land in
question began only around the year 1948 after the tenants and occupants were
presumably given the hope and the assurance by the Rural Progress Administration
that the Government was going to acquire the land for them either through
purchase or expropriation. It was then according to Cirilo P. Baylosis that the
tenants refused to give him and his co-defendants their share of the harvest and
even refused to acknowledge him as owner of the land he had bought from
Sinclair. So, according to Cirilo P. Baylosis, he and his co-defendants to whom
he had resold portions of the land bought from Sinclair, had to go to the
Tenancy Law Enforcement Office and complain against the tenants and said Tenancy
Office in several orders concurred in by the Court of Industrial Relations held
that even under Commonwealth Act 538 which authorizes the suspension of cases of
ejectment against tenants of lands included in condemnation proceedings, the
tenants should first pay the current rents or give the shares of the landlords
in the harvest, a thing which the tenants in those cases had failed and refused
to do and so the cases against the tenants were decided against them. (See
Exhibits V-1-1, V-2-1, V-3-1 and V-4-1)
The trial court also said that if Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis formerly
were willing to sell their holdings or portions thereof to others as they have
done to their co-defendants, there was no reason why the defendants should now
object to the Government purchasing said lands through expropriation. But there
is a difference and room for distinction. The right to dispose or not to dispose
of one’s property is one of the attributes of ownership. A person just because
he is willing to sell his property to “A” may not be obliged to sell it to “B”
unless the law in certain specific cases such as legal redemption compels him to
do so. Again, a land owner may be willing or even offer to sell his land today
to “A”, but unless the offer is accepted and acted upon, he may change his mind
and refuse to sell to “A” next year or refuse to sell it to anyone for that
matter.
The evidence shows that both Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis at one time were
willing to sell to some of the tenants and occupants herein involved under
certain conditions and provided that they buy in groups, presumably to avoid
subdivisions and the problem of dealing with many individual buyers, but the
tenants failed to buy. Naturally, they may not now compel Sinclair and Cirilo P.
Baylosis to sell to them through the Government by means of expropriation.
Besides, the bulk of the lands that Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis had formerly
offered to them for sale which offer they failed to take advantage of, has now
been sold to others, the other co-defendants herein, in small lots.
One reason not improbable why the tenants and occupants failed to take
advantage of the former offer of Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis to sell the
lands to them was the matter of price. According to the letter of the Rural
Progress Administration to Sinclair on November 15, 1948, those who signed the
petition of October 17, 1946, claiming to be the tenants and occupants of the
land, offered to buy the same at P600 per hectare, payable within a period of
ten years. The defendant owners of the land herein claim that the current price
of first class riceland in Batangas is around P3,000 per hectare. Even taking as
a basis the price paid by Cirilo P. Baylosis for the lots bought by him from
Sinclair, now being expropriated, the price is way over P1,000 almost P2.000 per
hectare. Naturally, Sinclair and Baylosis were unwilling to sell at P600 a
hectare, to say nothing of said price being paid in ten years. And that is the
reason why the defendants herein claim that the deposit of P27,000 made by the
tenants and occupants, is insufficient to cover the price of the land, said
amount of the deposit being equivalent to only about P400 per hectare for the 67
hectares sought to be expropriated.
Supposing that the expropriation is carried out and the Commissioners and the
trial court find that the land expropriated is worth P2,000 or more per hectare,
would the tenants and occupants be still willing and would they be able to pay
said price? Supposing that they were not, then what would happen? Would the
Government undertake to pay the difference between the actual value of the land
expropriated for them and their offer to pay only P600 per hectare, and this
payable in ten years at that? Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution on
which tiie present expropriation proceedings are supposed to be based says that
the lands expropriated are to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to individuals. That means that the Government will not make any
profit in the transaction, but it also conveys the idea that the Government will
sell at a price to include what it cost the Government to expropriate. The cost
of subdivision, registration fees and transfer certificates of title will
probably have to be added to the cost of the land. Again, it may be asked, what
will the Government do if the tenants and occupants are neither willing nor able
to pay said total cost?
There is another point that merits consideration. The defendants claim and
correctly that many of the tenants and occupants now insisting on expropriation
have lands of their own. According to the list prepared by the Bureau of Lands
containing the names of persons who are occupying and holding portions of land
being administered by the Bureau of Lands in Batangas (ExhilHt 13-Baylosis),
many, if not the majority of the tenants and occupants of the lands now sought
to be expropriated are included in said list The evidence further shows that
several of the tenants, among them Victor Magpantay, C. Balaquiot, Luciano
Panganiban, Isabelo Manguera and Andres Castronuevo have lands of their own;
that some of the lands are sugar lands for which they hold sugar quotas and one
of the said tenants, Andres Castronuevo, is cultivating a portion of the land
sought to be expropriated and which he wants to buy, not by himself but through
an aparcero or tenant.
In relation to this claim of the defendants that some of the tenants and
occupants have lands of their own and so are not qualified to be the
beneficiaries of expropriation, the trial court said that that is no problem
because the Government can later screen and process said, tenants and occupants,
and that if some are found to be disqualified because they are already land
owners, then they should not be allowed to purchase the portions occupied by
them. But if and when this happens, what becomes of said portions taken away
from their former owners over their vigorous opposition and which portions later
proved to be not subject to expropriation for the reason that the persons
occupying them do not deserve and are not qualified to purchase them? A real
injustice will have been done to the owners of these portions because they had
been included and made defendants in these proceedings, deprived of their
holdings against their will, only to find out later that the expropriation as to
these portions was improper and unjustified.
The defendants have introduced evidence without refutation through the
testimony of one Anacleto Jonson, an employee of the Bureau of Lands in charge
of the 3,700 hectares of the Lian Estate expropriated by the Government way back
in 1940 and 1941, and intended to be subdivided into small lots and resold to
their tenants and occupants, on the status of said lands. According to Jonson,
since then which up to now, involves a period of about thirteen years, said area
of 3,700 hectares remains unsubdivided; that no portion of said big area has
been resold or even contracted to be resold by the Government to their occupants
and tenants, and all that the Government is doing is to administer the same and
receive the portion of the yearly harvest corresponding to the owner. In other
words, all that has been done, thirteen years after the expropriation was to
transfer the ownership and administration of this big area with about 800
tenants and families from the lian Estate to the Government which has assumed
the role of lessor and landlord. No reason or explanation was given for this
rather strange if not anomalous situation. The defendants, owners of the land
being condemned, feeling a little bitter against the Government, condemns its
action in instituting the present proceedings, and point to this unfortunate
situation and status of the 3,700 hectares expropriated in 1941 as an example of
the Government’s rather over-ambitious program of expropriation. They say:
“* * *. In 1939, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, filed the expropriation
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Batangas of certain portions of
the Lian Estate still owned by Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and occupied by 800
persons (t.s.n. p. 359). The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., finally executed the
Deed of Sale for 4,300 hectares of land on May 1940, and title and ownership to
these lands were then transferred to the Commonwealth of the Philippines
(t.s.n., pp. 73-74, 357-359). However, notwithstanding, the expropriation of
this Urge estate of 4,300 hectares of homesites and agricultural lands by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines 13 years ago, for resale to the poor and
landless, up to the present time this property has not been subdivided into
small lots, nor sold to the actual occupants (t. s. n., p. 360). Notwithstanding
this state of affairs, the plaintiff is still bent on expropriating another 67
hectares of agricultural lands consisting of 18 small lots of small areas which
do not adjoin each other and belonging to 20 small landowners (Record on Appeal,
pp. 2-14) who are intended by the framers of the Constitution to be protected by
section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.
7-8).
This Tribunal in the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress
Administration, supra, held that Section 4 Article XIII of the
Constitution has reference only to large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and
lands that embrace a whole town or a large portion of a. town or city. The lands
now sought to be expropriated with a total area of 67 hectares, even if
considered as one whole parcel which they are not, can of course not be regarded
as a landed estate. During the discussion of this case it was urged by the
minority that as long as any land formerly formed part of a landed or large
estate, it may, regardless of its present area be still subject to expropriation
under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, citing the doctrine laid down
in the case of Rural Progress Administration vs. Reyes, G. R. No. L-4703,
October 8, 1953. It is true that said ruling was made in the Reyes case but we
should bear in mind that that was a decision by a highly divided court, six for
the majority and four dissenting, but two majority concurring only in the result
and one of them concurring in a separate opinion. It seems that the members of
the Tribunal espousing the majority opinion therein were greatly impressed by
the fact that notwithstanding the small area involved, about two hectares, there
were 113 persons living on the same, and dependent on the products of the
fisheries on it, and evidently had no other place to go to live. We feel that
the decision in that Reyes case was a departure from the doctrine laid down in
the leading case of Guido which doctrine has been subsequently affirmed and
reiterated in a long line of cases, and we now believe that in abandoning the
ruling made in the Reyes case, this Tribunal is merely returning to and
re-affirming the sound and wholesome doctrine laid down in the Guido Case.
The main purpose of the constitutional provision contained in section 4,
Article XIII of that instrument was to break up landed estates into reasonably
small portions. Once said landed estate is broken up, the purpose of the
constitution is achieved. Otherwise, were we to adhere to1 the rule made in the
Reyes case that if a piece of land, regardless of size, formerly formed part of
a big landed estate, it is necessarily subject to expropriation, then there
would be no limit or foreseeable end to expropriation. A landed estate of say
3,000 hectares is broken up into say 50-hectare lots and sold to the lessees or
occupants thereof. The tenants in that 50-hectare lot want to buy their holdings
and because the lot was formerly a part of a landed estate, it is again
expropriated and subdivided into say 5-hectare lots. A buyer oÂŁ this 5- hectare
portion may have tenants cultivating portions thereof and these tenants would
again insist on expropriation into say one hectare lots and so this
expropriation would and may go on endlessly until the minimum of a few square
meters is reached, just to accommodate one single tenant. We hold that that
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. We also
say that once a landed estate is broken up into portions of reasonable area, the
buyers thereof are protected by the Constitution against further
expropriation.
The trial court in justifying the present expropriation held that the land
sought to be condemned with an area between 67 and 77 hectares is not small. It
perhaps meant to say that it is large, and so may be regarded as a landed estate
coming within the contemplation of the Constitution for purposes of
expropriation. As a matter of fact, the land is only about 67 hectares in area.
Not only this but it has already been subdivided into smaller portions ranging
from thirteen hectares to as small as one hectare and now owned by different
individual families. But even considering the land as a whole parcel of 67
hectares, may it be considered a landed estate whose ownership by one person is
discouraged by the Constitution, and so subject to expropriation?
Our attention is called by the defendants-appellants to Land Administrative
Order No. R-3 issued by the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Executive Order No. 376 dated November 28, 1950, abolished the Rural Progress
Administration which was formerly in charge of the expropriation of landed
estates and transferred said function to the Bureau of Lands, creating therein a
Division of Landed Estates. The Bureau of Lands is under the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the latter promulgated Administrative
Order No. R-3 under the provisions of Section 79-B of the Revised Administrative
Code. This Administrative Order is entitled “Rules and Regulations Governing the
Acquisition and Diposition of Landed Estates. Section 3 thereof reads as
follows:
“3. Minimum Area of Private Estates to be acquired.—Except in
special cases, no proceedings shall be initiated for the appropriation of an
estate unless the area thereof be at least 5 hectares if for residential
purpose; and at least 100 hectares if for agricultural purposes. This shall be
without prejudice to the acquisition of smaller areas thru
negotiation.”
According to the above reproduced section, no agricultural land will be
expropriated for purposes of resale if less than 100 hectares in area. Although
this Administrative Order was issued on October 19, 1951, after the commencement
of the present expropriation proceedings, nevertheless it embodies the policy of
the Government as to the size of agricultural lands that may be expropriated
under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. In other words, the
Government considers 100 hectares of agricultural land not to be too large to be
owned by an individual, family, or entity so as to be subject to expropriation
And this policy is but just and is consistent and in keeping with the policy
contained in our laws governing the public domain. Under the old Public Land Law
(Act No. 926), a person and his family may apply for and obtain a homestead with
an area of 16 hectares. This was evidently found to be too small for purposes of
expansion for a family and the area for a homestead was later increased to 24
hectares under Act 2874 and Commonwealth Act 141. That means that a man, poor
and landless, who has to apply to the Government for a homestead may own as much
as 24 hectares of land. Commonwealth Act 141 provides that an individual may
purchase 144 hectares of public land, meaning to say, that 144 hectares is not
too large a parcel to be owned by a person or a family. And as to corporations
the Public Land Act authorizes them to purchase or lease 1024 hectares of the
public domain. In view of this policy of the Government as to the size of
agricultural land which a corporation or an individual may legitimately own,
even purchase from the Government itself, it is clear that a parcel of 67
hectares in area such as the land now sought to be expropriated is not a landed
estate or too large a parcel so as to justify expropriation; and if we consider
the fact that these 67 hectares were originally seven distinct and separate
parcels owned by Sinclair and later subdivided into about 17 parcels now owned
by twenty-three, one would realize the impropriety of expropriating so as to
enable the tenants and occupants thereof to buy them In the Guido case we
indirectly held through Mr. Justice Tuason that parcels of 10, 15 or 25 hectares
in area may not be expropriated for the purpose of reselling them to the tenants
and occupants, and that to do so would be an act of oppression. What the
Government is now trying to do in the present case is to take away parcels
ranging from one to thirteen hectares in area from about 23 land owners with
about 90 dependents and transfer them to about forty-four tenants with about 214
dependents. We hold that that cannot be done, not only because it has no
statutory or constitutional support but also because it is unjust. What section
4, Article XIII of the Constitution intended and sought to do was merely to
break up landed estates, and trusts in perpetuity. It intended to discourage the
concentration of and excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few individuals,
but surely it did not intend or seek to distribute wealth among citizens or take
away from a citizen land which he did not actually need and give it to another
who needs it. That does not come within the realm of social justice. Said this
Tribunal in the Guido case:
“The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply
paramount basis for untraxnmeled expropriation of private land by the Rural
Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice
does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it
and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and
received, and equitable sharing of the social and material goods on the basis of
efforts in their production.”
The trial court held that Cirilo P. Baylosis subdivided lots 306-YYY and
306-BB and sold them to many of his co-defendants in the year 1950, as shown by
the dates of the registration of the sales in the Office of the Register of
Deeds, this, after he had been notified by the Rural Progress Administration in
1949 of the intention of the Government to expropriate those lots, and that
furthermore, many if not all of the purchasers of his lots as subdivided were
his relatives, thereby giving said court reason to believe that those sales by
Cirilo were all simulated, intended to frustrate the attempt of the Government
to expropriate. In the first place, Cirilo asserts I that he made the
subdivision and made the sales before he received the notice from the Rural
Progress Administration in 1949 but because it took the Bureau of Lands a long
time to approve the subdivision survey and plan, the sales were not registered
until 1950. In the second place, the mere fact that a land owner subdivides his
land and sells them to his relatives does not mean that the sales are simulated
or fraudulent. It is not unnatural for a person who has something to sell, to
give preference to his relatives; and with respect to lands, to have as his
neighbors and adjoining owners people whom he knows and are related to him. In
the third place, and this is the most important, even assuming that Cirilo P.
Baylosis was previously notified of the intention of the Government to
expropriate his land, said notice by no means could legally prevent him from
disposing of his property; otherwise, the mere announcement or notice of the
intention of the Government to expropriate a parcel of land, however indefinite
and uncertain that intention may be, would as it were freeze said property in
the hands of its owner. Thereafter, the owner may not deal with his own
property, mortgage it, much less sell it and all he could do is to wait
patiently, for any future action of the Government in the way of expropriation.
Said expropriation may come long afterwards or may not come at all because the
Government may change its mind, and in the meantime the landowner is rendered
helpless as regards his own property. In the present case, as already stated,
the petition for expropriation was not filed by the Government until the year
1951, more than two years after the notice of the Government’s intention to
expropriate was served on Cirilo. We hold that mere notice of the intention of
the Government to expropriate lands in the future does not and cannot bind the
landowner and prevent him from dealing with his property. To bind the land to be
expropriated and the owner thereof, the expropriation must be commenced in court
and even then we are not certain that the owner may not deal with his property
thereafter, mortgage or even sell it if he can find persons who would step into
his shoes and deal with the Government, either resist the expropriation if in
their opinion it is illegal or accept the expropriation and remain with what is
left of the property if the entire property is not needed by the Government.
In conclusion we hold that under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution,
the Government may expropriate only landed estates with extensive areas,
specially those embracing the whole or a large part of a town or city; that once
a landed estate is broken up and divided into parcels of reasonable areas,
either thru voluntary sales by the owner or owners of said landed estate, or
thru expropriation, the resulting parcels are-no longer subject to further
expropriation under section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution; that mere
notice of the intention of the Government to expropriate a parcel of land does
not bind either the land or the owner so as to prevent subsequent disposition of
the property such as mortgaging or even selling it in whole or by subdivision;
that tenancy trouble alone whether due to the fault of the tenants or of the
landowners does not justify expropriation; that the Constitution protects a
landowner against indiscriminate and unwarranted expropriation; that to justify
expropriation, it must be for a public purpose and public benefit, and that just
to enable the tenants of a piece of land of reasonable area to own portions of
it, even if they and their ancestors had cleared the land and cultivated it for
their landlord for many years, is no valid reason or justification under the
Constitution to deprive the owner or landlord of his property by means of
expropriation.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed; the motions
for dismissal filed by defendants-appellants are granted; and the petition for
expropriation is dismissed, with costs in both instances.
Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,
concur.
CONCURRING OPINION
REYES, A. J., concurring:
Without subscribing to some of the views expressed in the majority opinion, I
concur in the result, it not being clear that there has been an attempt here to
evade the expropriation while on the other hand the object of the
expropriation—so it would appear—is to take land from small land-holders in
order to give it to other some of whom already have land of their own. As the
Spaniards would say, eso es desnudar a un santo para vestir a otro.
DISSENTING OPINION
PARAS, C.J., with whom concurs PABLO, J.,
dissenting:
I vote to affirm the well prepared and cogently reasoned order of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas which reads in full as follows:
“The original complaint for expropriation in this case was filed with this
Court on February 6, 1951. In order to bring in other defendants, the original
complaint was twice amended, and the second amended complaint substantially
alleges the following: That the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is
represented in this action by the Director of Lands; that the property sought to
be condemned consists of seven parcels of land, with a total area of 674,535
square meters, situated in barrio Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Province of
Batangas, and more particularly described in the second amended complaint of the
plaintiff; that the defendants Nelson V. Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis are the
respective owners of the said property, while the remaining defendants are
alleged purchasers of portions thereof belonging to defendant Cirilo P.
Baylosis; that the said property was originally owned by the Colegio de San
Jose, which sold it to defendant Nelson V. Sinclair, who, in turn, sold portions
thereof to defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis; that this property is presently
occupied by around forty-seven tenants, with around two hundred dependents, for
whose benefit these expropriation proceedings have been instituted; that the
said tenants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
said property from time immemorial, having introduced thereon improvements
consisting of fillings, fences, buildings, fruit trees and other crops; that
defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, in an attempt to circumvent Commonwealth Act No.
539, and with full knowledge of these contemplated condemnation proceedings,
simulated transfer of portions of his property in favor of his co-defendants,
except Nelson V. Sinclair, and caused transfer certificates of title to be
issued in the names of said co-defendants, all for the purpose of defeating
these proceedings; fhat some of the defendants have attempted to eject from, and
disposses the tenants of, the property in question which the latter and their
predecessors-in-interest have held from time immemorial, as a result of which
acts, tenancy cases and other differences have arisen between landlords and
tenants, and that the plaintiff needs to acquire title to and ownership of the
property in question for the purpose of subdividing the same into small lots and
selling the subdivided lots to tenants occupying the property, in keeping with
the social amelioration program of the government to improve the lot of the
tenants, to promote their interest and well-being, and thus to avoid and
forestall social unrest. Premised upon the foregoing gist of the allegations of
the second amended complaint plaintiff prays, among other things, that an order
of condemnation be entered declaring tnat plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned for the public use and purpose already
mentioned upon payment of. just compensation to be determined by the court.“On February 14, 1951, this Court, after first hearing the parties issued an
order placing the plaintiff in possession of the property sought to be
expropriated, after the said plaintiff had made a deposit of P27,105.22,
pursuant to the provisions of section 3 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.“On September 24, 1951, the tenants in whose behalf these proceedings were
instituted by plaintiff, put in a motion for intervention, accompanied by a
complaint in intervention, in which complaint the said tenants take the very
same position of, and make common cause with, the plaintiff in the latter’s
second amended complaint. In view of the fact, however, that the interests of
the said tenants are sufficiently taken care of and defended by plaintiff’s
action, the said intervention is deemed unnecessary.“To plaintiff’s second amended complaint, the various defendants interposed a
total of nine separate motions for dismissal based upon the following principal
grounds stated in brief outline: (1) that the property being expropriated is not
for public use; (2) that by this expropriation, defendants are being deprived of
their property without due process of law; (3) that this expropriation amounts
to the taking of property from one private citizen and delivering it to another
private individual; (4) that Executive Order No. 376 is null and void; (5) that
the Bureau of Lands exceeded its authority when it seeks to. expropriate private
properties of the defendants, instead of the Lian Estate; (6) that the
Constitution authorizes the expropriation of big landed estates, and not of
small areas like those at bar; (7) that this expropriation is intended to
benefit only forty-four persons who do not represent the public; (8) that many
of the said persons are already landowners in Lian; (9) that the said persons
are not law-abiding and do not believe in democratic processes, and they are not
lessees but only aparceros on a year to year contract basis; (10) that the said
persons have not introduced any permanent improvements upon the property in
question; (11) that the various defendants individually own only small portions
of the property under expropriation; (12) that plaintiff’s second amended
complaint does not describe with certainty and definiteness the specific
property sought to bft expropriated; (13) that the current price of irrigated
rice lands in Lian, Batangas, is P3,000.00 per hectare, and plaintiff’s deposit
is insufficient, and (14) that defendants have suffered damages as a result of
these proceedings. To defendant’s motion for dismissal, the plaintiff has filed
a written reply on May 14, 1951.“Upon motion of Miguel Bascuguin, one of the forty-seven tenants mentioned in
the second amended complaint, and without objection on the part of the
plaintiff, this Court by order of October 30, 1951, excluded the said Miguel
Bascuguin from these proceedings on the ground that he has not authorized anyone
to file, and is not interested in, the same.“The pleadings having thus been presented and the issues joined, the case
came on for hearing on the underlying question of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to expropriate the property in question, during which hearing the
plaintiff and the defendants adduced their evidence in support of their
respective stand upon the said question. The salient features of the saia
evidence and the rival claims of the parties arising therefrom will in a moment
be taken up.“The factual background eventuating in the institution of the present
proceedings is disclosed by documentary evidence brought forward by plaintiff.
As far back as May 4, 1948, upon petition of certain tenants on the property of
defendant N. V. Sinclair, the then manager of now defunct Rural Progress
Administration addressed the following letter, Exhibit “B”, to said
defendant:
“May 4, 1948
Mr. N. V. Sinclair
181 David, Escolta
ManilaSir:
There has been received in this Office a petition for the acquisition by the
Government for resale to the tenants of the following six lots in Binubusan,
owned and/or administered by you:Lot N. 306—CCCC under tax declaration No.
852
Area—13.9125 hectares.
Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land.
Assessed value—P6,400.00Lot No. 306—Z under tax declaration No. 858
Area—8.7762
hectares.
Kind—7.7762 hectares irrigated agricultural land 1.0000
hectare
—riceland.
Assessed value—P4,040.Lot No. 306—YYY under tax declaration No.
864
Area—25.0159 hectares.
Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land.
Assessed value—P9,760. :Lot No. 306—BBBB under taof declaration No.
365
Area—17.9827 hectares.
Kind—Irrigated
agricultural land.
Assessed value—P7,010Lot No. 306—EEEE under tax declaration No.
866
Area—10.4955.
Kind—Irrigated agricultural
land.
Assessed value—P4,090.Lot No. 306—LL under tax declaration No. 350
Owner—
Colegio de San Jose.
Administrator—N. V.
Sinclair.
Area—14.3208 hectares.
Kind—Fish
pond.
Assessed value—P5,730.The reason given by the tenants in presenting their petition is that your
relation with them is not altogether too satisfactory having on previous
occasion tried to disregard the 70-30 crop sharing basis, although later have
yielded to observance thereof upon the insistence of the tenants. They likewise
complain that you are planning to eject them, a plan which if carried out, will
result in untold sufferings on their part, without mentioning the pain of
leaving the premises which they have occupied and tilled since time
immemorial.Before we take action on their petition we will appreciate your favor of
informing us for your willingness to sell said parcels of land, in accordance
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 539 and the conditions of the
sale.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar
Manager“
“To the aforequoted letter, defendant N. V. Sinclair made the following
answer, Exhibit F:“‘May 7, 1948
“‘Rural Progress Administration
Department of Justice Building
Walled
City, ManilaAttention: Mr. Faustino Aguilar, Manager
” ‘Gentleman:
” ‘This will acknowledge receipt today of your communication dated May 4th,
with reference to the petition for your administration to purchase lands of the
writer located in Barrio Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Province of
Batangas.” ‘The reason given by the petitioners are not true and it will be a pleasure
to acquaint you with the facts concerned with each of the lots specified!” ‘This information will be assembled at the earliest possible time and in
order to expedite its submission to your goodselves, your letter is being
forwarded to my representative at Lian.” ‘In the meantime, it is requested that you kindly allow me sufficient time
to submit the true facts pertaining to each lot before you take action on this
Petition.“ ‘Respectfully,
“‘(Sgd.) N. V. Sinclair
Owner’“On November 15, 1948, the following reminder, Exhibit H, was sent to
defendant N. V. Sinclair:
” ‘November 15, 1948
” ‘Mr. N. V. Sinclair
181 David, Escolta
Manila” ‘Sir:
“In connection with your letter dated May 7, 1948, advising us that you will
forward to this Office under separate cover informations regarding your refusal
to sell to certain petitioners your lands in Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as
lot Nos. 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY; 306-BBBB; 306-EEEE and 306- LL, please be
informed that up to the present we have not as yet received said letter. As it
is our desire to apprise the petitioners of the same, the favor of an early
information from you will be appreciated.” ‘Likewise the petitioners again called at this office and have made an
offer to buy said lands at P600 per hectare on a 10-year period to pay. If the
said price is acceptable to you, please advice us accordingly.Respectfully,
“‘(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar
Manager’“On December 14, 1948, the aforequoted reminder was followed up by the
following letter, Exhibit G:
” ‘December 14, 1948
” ‘Mr. N. V. Sinclair
181 David, Escolta
Manila” ‘ Sir;
“‘With further reference to lots 306-CCCC; 306-Z; 306-YYY; 306-BBBB; 306-EEEE
and 306-LL Lian, Batangas, which was the subject of our letter to you dated
November 15, 1948 (enclosed copy) the occupants thereof have again come to this
office informing that you are in the process of disposing of said lands to
persons other than the petitioners and in fact you have already sold to Atty.
Cirilo Baylosis lot 306-YYY and to Casimiro Balaguiot lot 306-E. In order to
avoid the further complication of the matter, we would request that you refrain
from disposing of the. same during the period of . this negotiation pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 538. It is likewise requested that you
give your comment on our letter to you dated November 15, 1948.
” ‘Respectfully,
” ‘(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilar
Manager’“As defendant N. V. Sinclair had in the meantime sold portions of his
property to his co-defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, the Manager of the Rural
Progress Administration wrote the latter defendant the following letter, Exhibit
I:
” ‘January 17, 1949
” ‘Atty. Cirilo P. Baylosis
Balayan, Batangas” ‘Sir:
” ‘We have been informed that you bought the lands of N. V. Sinclair at
Binubusan, Lian, Batangas, known as lots 306-YYY; 306-LL; 306-Z; 306-CCCC;
306-BBBB and 306- EEEE and that you are at present taking all the crops thereon
including the share due to the tenants with the help of constabulary soldiers.
If the report is true, we request that you refrain from taking such step in
order to avoid any untoward incident that may arise therefrom.“‘The lands which you bought are the subject of a petition for acquisition
and resale to the tenants thereof which ia pending final action by this
Office.” ‘Respectfully,
” ‘(Sgd.) Faustino Aguilab
Manager“On November 14, 1950, the then Secretary of Justice wrote the following
letter, Exhibit K, to the Executive Secretary in connection with the
contemplated expropriation of the property of Atty, Baylosis:” ‘November 14, 1959 ,
” ‘The Honorable
The Executive Secretary
Malacanang
Palace
ManilaSir:
” ‘In the Cabinet meeting for August 18, 1950, you submitted the
recommendation of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration
for acquisition either by direct purchase or expropriation proceedings of lands
owned by Atty. C. Baylosis at Lian, Batangas. On this matter I would like to
advise you that after proper study we have found that the acquisition of the
said estate by the RPA is fully in accordance with law. All the necessary papers
have been prepared and the necessary deposits already made. No further action,
however, has been taken because of the lack of proper authority from the Office
of the President to file the necessary proceedings in Court. To be able to go
on’ with the effectuation of the policy to which the Rural Progress
Administration is committed, we therefore request that the said authority be
given at the earliest possible time.” ‘Respectfully,
” ‘(Sgd.) Jose P. Bengzon
Secretary of
Justice’“The Presidential authority for the expropriation of the property in
question, requested in the letter just quoted, was finally given on November
25,1950, in a first indorsement by the Acting Assistant Executive Secretary
marked Exhibit L of the plaintiff.“From plaintiff’s documentary evidence above set out, it appears that
negotiations for the acquisition by the government of the property in question
from the former owner, defendant N. V. Sinclair, for resale to the tenants
occupying the same, have been afoot since May, 1948, thus disproving defendants’
intimation that the present proceedings were started without prior and proper
investigation. From the same evidence it further appears that both defendants N.
V. Sinclair and Cirilo P. Baylosis were duly notified of, and were therefore
well posted on, the contemplated move of the government either to directly
purchase the said property or to expropriate the same, long before the said
defendants allegedly sold portions thereof to their co-defendants, thereby
legitimately giving rise to the suspicion that the alleged sales were for the
purpose of frustrating the government’s acquisition of the said property. And
the fact that plaintiff actually started exproriation proceedings before this
Court by filing its first original complaint on February 6, 1951, that is,
following the procedure mailed out in Kuie 69 of the Rules of Court, is the
refutation to defendants’ claim that they are being deprived their property
without due process of law.“One of the basic contentions of the defendants is to the effect that no
public utility, convenience or benefit is to be subserved by plaintiff’s action,
that is, that the property in question is not being expropriated for public use.
The contention is met and overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. It is
undenied and undeniable that the plaintiff seeks to expropriate the property in
question for the avowed purpose of subdividing the same into small lots and
selling the subdivided lots preferably to tenants actually occupying the same,
or to other tenants with the requisite qualifications to effect such purchase.
This purpose has both consitutional and statutory sanction. Section 4 of Article
XIII of the Constitution provides that “The Congress may authorize upon payment
of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots and conveyed at costs to individuals.” And section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 539 provides that ‘The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire
private lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to
subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices
and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants
or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are
qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines’. It would thus seem plain
that, in condemnation proceedings like the one at bar, public use, benefit,
convenience, necessity, is inevitably and necessarily present as long as the
purpose thereof and the property involved are those contemplated by the
constitutional and stautory provisions just quoted. In other words, public
purpose, etc., is inseparably bound up with the expropriation of property by the
government for the purpose of subdividing the same into lots and selling the
same to bona fide tenants, etc., the only material inquiry being whether or not
the said property is that which the framers of the Constitution and the
legislators had in mind when they drafts and approved the said constitutional
and statutory provisions. This is so because the very purpose of the said
expropriation, to wit, the subdivision of the property into lots and the sale
thereof to tenants, is essentially and fundamentally public in nautre, being
backed up by and founded upon the benign policy of the government to ameliorate
the lot of a certain sector of our underprivileged population and thus, to some
extent or degree, ease up, if not totally eradicate, the sources of social
tension and upheavals.“As above, intimated, the next question that calls for answer is whether or
not the property here involved is that contemplated by the Constitution and the
law. In this connection, and taking our cife from the decision of the Supreme
Court in Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration, G. R. No. L-2089 (hereafter to
be referred to as the. Guido case for short), we pose the following question:
‘What lands does this provision- (section 4 Artcle XIII of the Constitution)
have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location, nature
and area? It is admitted on all sides that the property in question is irrigated
agricultural land situated in barrio Bihubusan, Lian, Batangas. As to its area,
plaintiff’s second amended complaint places the same at something over
sixty-seven hectares, while defendants, on page 3 and 4 of their memorandum
makes the following admission with respect to said area:“‘The areas sought to be expropriated from the defendants are as
follows:
Maria Lunesa…………………………… Pastora Baylosis ……………………… Spouses Marcelo Basit and Magdalena Bayungan
……………….Spouses Tomas Asuncion and Bonifacio Bayungan
………………Spouse Raymunda Hernandez and Juan Gonzales
………………Spouses Tirso de Padua and Maria Dolores Bayungan ………… Spouses Luis Baylosis and Manuela Pineda ……………………….. Spousea Benito Baylosis and Macaria L. Torres ………………….. Spouses Alejandro Abellera and Juliana Camellon ………………. Spouses Roberto Capoon and Gavina Baylosis…………………….
…………………………………
…………………………………………….
……………………………N. V. Sinclair (Order—Civil Case No. 84 Republic of the Philippines vs. C. P. Baylosis et
al.)Summing up defendants’ figures, it appears that the said area is 77.9018
hectares. It may therefore be safely stated that the total area of the property
in question is from sixty-seven to seventy-seven hectares. In the Guido case, it
is intimated that the lands contemplated in section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution have reference to ‘large estates’, in the light of the explanatory
statement of the Delegate Miguel Cuaderno who was the sponsor of the said
provision, for which reason, among others, the Supreme Court did not give its
sanction to the expropriation of the property there involved which measured
22,655 square meters, or a little over two hectares only. However, as the
property here in question is from sixty-seven to seventy-seven hectares, an area
which cannot be considered as small, this Court is of the opinion that the
decision in the Guido case may not be invoked against, and does not stand in the
way of, the expropriation of the property at bar. Moreover, aside from the
standpoint of area, other considerations of weight, presently to be taken up,
militate in favor of the present condemnation proceedings.“The first of these considerations is the undeniable fact that the tenants
for whose benefit the present proceedings have been instituted, and their
predecessors-in-interest before them, have been in possession of the property in
question from time immemorial, and that in the course of the said possession,
they have cleaned, cleared and introduced improvements upon the said property.
This is all but admitted on page 8 of defendants’ memorandum wherein it is said,
‘The mere fact that these few occupants made temporary improvements, by
constructing canals, dikes and irrigation dams, did not give any right to the
government to expropriate the properties of the defendants who are entitled to
the same protection under our laws.’ The said occupation has been long
continued, and the said improvements have been introduced, Under promise to, and
in the reasonable belief, of, the. tenants that eventually their respective
portions will be sold to them at cost or reasonable price. In view of the
failure of the tenants to directly acquire the said property from the
defendants, either because they cannot see eye to eye on the reasonable purchase
price thereof or because of past and deep-rooted misunderstandings between them,
it would appear that the only logical and legal course to take, in promotion of
peace and in recognition of the tenant’s preferential rights, is the
expropriation by the plaintiff of the property in suit.“Another equally potent consideration in favor of these condemnation
proceedings is the further fact, likewise undeniable, that the defendant Cirilo
P. Baylosis, has been far from harmonious, and that they have been perennially
at loggerheads with respect to the division of the crops and other conflicting
rights. A picture of the situation may be gleaned from page 1 of defendant’s own
memoran- dum reading as follows:“‘It has been proven that these occupants, who petitioned for the
expropriation of these properties, are not law-abiding citizens because they
refused to recognize property rights and the democratic processes of the
Philippines, refusing to recognize the Tenancy Law. They refused to deliver to
the owners, the defendants herein, their shares in the crop harvest. The owners,
who are the defendants herein naturally had no other recourse but to bring the
matter to the Courts of Justice for their grievances against the tenants and to
recover their share in the harvest of the lands occupied by them. The plaintiff
himself proved that there was no agrarian trouble on the properties in question,
and there was no question whatsoever, on crop sharing, because the sharing is in
accordance with the Tenancy Law. The only question involved on the lands in
question is the refusal of the occupants to recognize the defendants as owners
of the land occupied by them because of their desire to own and purchase the
same. * * *’The foregoing quoted portion of defendants’ memorandum is a clear admission
that all is not well between the tenants, on the one hand, and the defendants,
on the other. Of course, defendants would throw the whole blame for the strained
relation upon the tenants, but if the latter, in turn, are to be believed, it is
the defendants who are the source of trouble. However, whoever is at fault is
beside the point. The fact of the matter is that there is no love lost between
the tenants and the defendants; that controversies between them have reached the
courts, and that future disagreements may flare up into untoward incidents. In
the teeth of these facts, as fertile imagination is necessary to predict the day
when this situation may come to a critical head. Hence, the wisdom, if not the
imperative necessity of giving due course to these condemnation proceedings in
order to nip in the bud and put an end to an explosive source of agrarian
trouble. To say that such an objective is not for a public purpose is simply
beyond us.“Still a third consideration that these expropriation proceedings are in
order is the fact, also undenied, that defendants N.V. Sinclair and Cirilo P.
Baylosis, who own the bulk of the property in question, had originally intended
to resell their respective portions to others, possibly for a proat. This is
shown by the admitted fact that the defendant N. V. Sinclair sold portions of
the property to defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, while the latter, in turn, had
sold portions of what he purchased to his other co-defendants. It is lurtner
shown by the following admission found on pages 3-4 of Exhibit 15-Caylosis of
defendant Cinlo P. Baylosis:“‘ That the actual occupants of his lands were offered by undersigned :
‘1. To stay as tenant under the same conditions before his acquisition; 2. To
purchase the lands under the cash basis; and 3. To buy the lands on the
installment basis for a period of 50 years or at the period to be agreed upon.
This offer which was made in writing and sent to Atty. Miguel Tolentino was
rejected by the petitioners and their lawyer.’Otherwise stated, the said defendants are ready and willing to resell their
respective positions to others under such terms and conditions as they
(defendants) may fix. This being the case, there seems to be no point and
validity to their tenacious objection to these proceedings, the primary purppse
of which is to buy the property from them through expropriation and thereafter
to sub-divide the same into small lots for resale to bona fide tenants or other
qualified persons.“Finally, it is conceded on all side that portions of the Hacienda Lian, of
which the property in question also used to be a part, had heretofore been
acquired by the Government from the Colegio de San Jose, divided into lots and
thereafter resold to tenants. It is evident therefore that, by its nature,
lo-ation and destination the propertv in quest’on is suitable for the purpose
for which it is being expropriated, and that these proceedings are in keeping
with what the Government had already done with respect to other portions of the
Hacienda, if the action for its expropriation prospers, would be broken up into
small lots and sold to some forty-seven tenants with about two hundred
dependents. This. Court does not overlook defendants’ contention that at least
four of the said tenants have already lands of their own aside from those
portions of the property in question which they occupy. These alleged
land-owning tenants, however, were included by plaintiff among those for whose
benefit these proceedings were instituted, because they actually are tenants of
portions of the property in question, hence, it would not seem fair or just that
they be left out. In any event as observed by counsel for the plaintiff during
the trial, when plaintiff is actually declared entitled to expropriate the
property in question, it is for plaintiff to screen and process the tenants
qualified to purchase the subdivided lots thereof, and if land-owning tenants
are found disqualified to make said purchase, then the aforesaid four tenants
may be ruled out from making said purchase. In fine, the fact that four of the
forty-seven tenants have properties of their own aside from those portions
occupied by them in the property in question, is no argument against these
expropriation proceedings.“The point is also stressed that defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis had a.ready
sold portions of his property to his other co-defendants (except N. V.
Sinclair,) and that the said co-defendants individually own only small portions
thus sold tQ them, hence, the present expropriation in effect amounts to the
taking of property from one private citizen and delivering it to another private
citizen. The point loses much force when it is considered that all the said
sales in favor of the co-defendants were made by defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis
long after the latter was officially notified that the Government was
contemplating to expropriate his property. The notice was served on him sometime
on January 17, 1949, whereas the sales made by him are respectively dated as
follows:
…………………………………
..
………
…..
……………
Apacible….Add to what had just been said the further fact that most of the purchasers
are close relatives of defendant Cirilo P. Baylosis, the striking proximity of
the respective dates of sale, and the circumstances that the said defendant
litigated alone with respect to said property in the tenancy cases which he
filed with the Office of the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division—and mere suspicion
crystalizes into strong persuasion that the said sales were simulated and
calculated to head off and defeat the expropriation proceedings.“Defendants’ further claim that the property authorized to be expropriated is
the Lian Estate, and not the property in question, is decisively answered by
Exhibit K for the plaintiff, elsewhere quoted in this decision wherein it is
stated that the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration
recommended the ‘acquisition either by direct purchase or expropriation
proceedings of lands owned by Atty. C. Baylosis at Lian, Batangas.’ It is also
argued that under section 3 of Lands Administrative Order No. R-3, approved on
November 15, 1951, ‘Except in special cases, no proceedings shall be initiated
for the appropriation of an estate unless the area, thereof be * * * at least
100 hectares if for agricultural purposes.’ In the first place, this section
came into force on November 15, 1951, whereas these proceedings were started on
February 6, 1951. In the second place, the cited section makes exception of
special cases, of which these proceedings may be o.ne in the light of the
consideration above set out. And, in the third place, an administrative order
has hardly the force and effect of law that is binding and controlling upon the
courts. Defendants’ claim that Executive Order No. 376 is null and void, has not
been pressed or touched upon in their memoranda, and may therefore be deemed as
abandoned.“The facts of the Guido case which is cited in full and relied upon by
defendants in their memoranda, are a far cry from those in the case at bar.
There the land involved is commercial and measures a little over two hectares
while here the property in question is irrigated agricultural land with an area
of from sixty-seven to seventy-seven hectares. The property sought to be
expropriated in the present proceedings have been occupied by tenants (for whose
benefit it is being condemned) and by their predecessors-in-interest from time
immemorial, having admittedly cleaned, cleared and introduced improvements
thereupon, while these circumstances do not obtain in the cited Guido case. In
the present case, one of the principal grounds for expropriation is to prevent
the strained relation between the defendants and the tenants from degenerating
into open disturbances of law and order, a situation which is not even intimated
in the Guido case. Finally, as this Court grasps it, expropriation was denied in
the Guido case because the proceedings therein were not clothed with a public
purpose, whereas in the present case, as above stated, the condemnation of the
property in question is not only in pursuance of constitutional and statutory
provisions, but also in promotion of public peace and order.“In view of all the foregoing, the separate motions to dismiss filed by the
defendants are hereby overruled, and the plaintiff is hereby declared entitled
to take the property sought, to be condemned for the public use described in
plaintiff’s second amended complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be ascertained by commissioners to be appointed by the Court for this purpose,
with the costs against the defendants.”
For the rest it is sufficient to state that the above quoted order is in
complete accord with our decision promulgated on October 12, 1953 in G. R. No.
L-4703, Rural Progress Administration vs. Clemente G. Reyes, wherein the lot
expropriated is “much smaller than the parcels involved in the case at bar, the
fundamental reason of the Court being that it formerly formed’ part of a big
landed estate and that “La extension del terreno no ese el unico factor que
determiria su expropiabilidad. Para interpretar dicha ley hay que buscar
inspiration en esta disposicion de la ley fundamental: ‘El Estado cuidara de
premover la juaticia social a fin de asegurar el bienestar y la estabilidad
efionomica de todo el pueblo/ (Art. 5, Titulo II).” The majority may be correct
if the basis of the present expropriation proceedings is merely the inherent
power of the State to condemn private property for public use, and in the
absence of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that
“the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.’ It should furthermore be remembered that the Government is buying
the lots in question for the benefit of some 244 actual occupants and,
considering that barrio Binu-> busan has a population of only about 1,000
inhabitants, said number is obviously substantial.
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the majority. The reasons set
forth by it against the validity of the proposed expropriation strike me as
arguments against the wisdom of the expropriation policies adopted by the
government rather than reasons against the existence and application of the
condemnation power in the present case.
The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII,
section 4 of our Constitution can not be determined on a purley quantitative or
area basis. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of
landed estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its
quest for social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to
conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable number of individuals,
and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem
before taking remedial action.
With due respect, the majority opinion proceeds on two assumptions, neither
of which I consider justified: first, that section 4, Article XIII, is an end in
itself, when actually it is but one of the jneans chosen by the framers of the
Constitution to attain social justice, amelioration and tranquility; second,
that the constitutional policy is attained by the breaking up of landed estates
into smaller portions, entirely disregarding the constitutional directive that
the lands condemned are to be “subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost
to individuals”, i.e., the tenants and occupants. Expropriation, subdivision and
resale to tenants and occupants are inseparable components of the constitutional
scheme. Plainly, agrarian discontent can not be quelled, nor peace and security
achieved while tenants must continue to labor for others, and are not converted
into small owners themselves. There is no magic solution in the transformation
of a conflict between many tenants and one landlord into a series of conflicts
between many tenants and several landlords. The wasteful controversy will
remain, and in fact will become more troublesome and expensive to settle,
because each landowner will demand individual treatment of his own case.
Even if we adhere strictly to the views adopted in the Guido decision, that
the constitution aimejl solely at breaking up large landed estates, the
propriety of the proposed condemnation in the instant case is evident, since it
is unquestioned that the lands here involved were originally part of the Lian
Estate in 1935, when the Constitution was adopted. What large estates could have
been contemplated by the constitutional provision if not those in existence at
the time of its adoption? The conclusion must be that (as held in R.P.A. vs.
Reyes, G. R. No. L-4703, October 8, 1953), all lands of the Lian Estate since
1935 became liable to condemnation for the benefit of the tenants, and any
subsequent acquirer of these lands took them subject to that burden or
infirmity. The reasons why these new landlords should not be allowed to escape
expropriations have been previously stated and need not be repeated.
The majority says that the fact that the tenants and occupants of the land
have by themselves and their ancestors been occupying and cultivating the same
for many years is not sufficient justification for the expropriation. This is
not the place to discuss whether actual producers deserve preferential treatment
by the State, nor the demerits of absentee landlordism. It is enough to recall
that this sense of injustice of the tenants is of ancient vintage and was
already expressed through the symbolic “Cabesang Tales” in Rizal’s “El
Filibusterismo” :—
“Podeis hacer lo que querais, señor Gobernador, yo soy un ignorante y no
tengo fuerzas. Pero he cultivado esos campos, mi y mi hija han muerto ayudandome
a limpiarlos, y no los de ceder sino a que 61 que pueda hacer por ellos mas de
lo he hecho yo. Quelos riegue primero con su sangre y que entierre en ellos a su
esposa y su hija;”
Legally justified or not, such a feeling has in the past led to “impairments
of public tranquility”, and the records of the constitutional convention leave
no doubt that in enacting Article XIII, section 4, the Convention precisely
sought to avoid its resurgence.
The Constitution considered the small individual land tenure to be so
important to the maintenance of peace and order and to the promotion of progress
and the general welfare that it not only provided for the expropriation and
subdivision of lands but also opened the way for the limitation of private land
holdings (Art. XIII, section 3). It is not for this Court to judge the worth of
these and other social and economic policies expressed by the Constitution; our
duty is to conform to such policies and not to block their realization.
I am willing to concede that where the Legislature delegates to subordinate
agencies the selection of lands to be expropriated, without setting up adequate
standards to guide official action, the Courts may intervene to prevent abuses;
but I am unable to see in the present case any warrant for judicial
intervention. The objection that the areas sought to be expropriated are not
defined can be corrected by resort to a motion for particulars under Rule 16;
and the allegedly low price that the tenants wish to pay for the lands involved
is not controlling on Courts that are sworn to award just compensation.
Concepcion, J., concurs.
Order reversed.