FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. NARCISO DE GUZMAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On 22 March 1918 this Court affirmed a judgment rendered by the court of
first instance of La Union dismissing the complaint, by which the plaintiff
sought to eject nineteen (19) alleged trespassers or squatters from a tract of
land described in the complaint, “on the ground that plaintiff failed to
establish title in himself to the hacienda upon which he could maintain
an action of ejectment.” Plaintiff claimed title to the hacienda by
virtue of a donation which he failed to accept in a public instrument as
required in article 633 of the Civil Code (Abellera vs. Balanag, 37
Phil. 865). After the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff brought another
action against the same defendants for ejectment (civil case No. 936 of the
court of first instance of La Union). This second action was dismissed, on the
ground that the title to the tract of land from which he sought to eject the
defendants might well be litigated in the cadastral case then pending in the
same court which included the tract of land, divided into lots and claimed by
both the plaintiff and the defendants, the court of first instance being of the
opinion that, should title to the tract of land be confirmed and decreed in the
name of the plaintiff, the latter could bring an action against the defendants
for damages. From this order of dismissal, the plaintiff did not appeal. When in
the cadastral case, however, the answers of the plaintiff claiming the lots,
into which the tract of land claimed by him as his property had been divided,
were striken out and he was prevented from presenting evidence to prove his
title to the tract of land or to the lots into which it had been divided, he
applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
granted (Fabian B. S. Abellera vs. Hon. Meynardo M. Farol, Narciso de
Guzman et al., G.R, No. 48480, 30 July 1943).^[1] This Court in the last mentioned case
reversed the order of the respondent cadastral court and directed it to allow
the petitioner “to present evidence to prove his claim over the lots in
question;” and, commenting on the judgment rendered in the previous case
(Abellera vs. Balanag et al., supra), it made the following
pronouncement: “* * * and we clearly refused to prevent Abellera from
instituting a new action based upon his assertion that he had acquired title to
the estate since the dismissal of his original action.” So the plaintiff’s claim
in the cadastral case No. 5 of the municipality of Aringay, province of La
Union, to the lots into which the tract of land was divided and from which he
had sought defendants’ ejectment in the two previous actions brought by him in
the court of first instance of La Union, was pending when the record of the
cadastral case was destroyed as a result of the battle for liberation; and, in
view of the failure of the interested parties or of the Director of Lands to
institute proceedings for its reconstitution, on 5 February 1946 the plaintiff
in the two previous cases brought the present action for ejectment against the
same defendants in the two previous cases (civil cases Nos. 773 and 936 of the
court of first instance of La Union), or their successors-in-interest, including
new or additional defendants who are the claimants of lots Nos. 5009, 5010 and
5540 in the cadastral case, which lie within the area of the tract of land
claimed by the plaintiff, and prayed for judgment declaring him the owner of the
tract of land from which he had sought defendants’ ejectment in the two previous
cases; for the possession of the lots unlawfully occupied or detained by the
defendants; for the recovery of damages from each and everyone of the
defendants, amounting all in all to P40,000 and costs; and for general relief.
Instead of answering the complaint the defendants moved for its dismissal, on
the ground (1) that it states no cause of action; and (2) that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause. On 18 June 1946,
acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court
sustained the second ground of the motion and dismissed the complaint without
costs. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court was of the belief that in
the certiorari case (Fabian B. 3. Abellera vs. Hon. Meynardo M. Farol,
Narciso de Guzman et al., G. R. No. 48480, supra), this Court directed
the plaintiff “not to file a new action, to have his claim over the lots in
question asserted, but to present evidence to prove his claim over said lots in
the Cadastral Proceedings, Cadastral Case No. 5, of Aringay, La Union.” The
plaintiff has appealed from this order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals.
After reviewing the evidence, the latter court certified the appeal to this
Court for the reason that only questions of law are raised or involved.

Although the present action is entitled “Recurso Declaratorio” and in
paragraph seven (7) of the complaint, reference is made to section 1, Rule 66,
of the Rules, it is really for ejectment and damages. The plaintiff asserts
title to the tract of land which was divided into several lots when it was
surveyed for the institution of cadastral proceedings and he filed answers to
claim the lots as his property in the cadastral case. It is the third action
brought to have the court declare that he is the owner and entitled to the
possession of the tract of land divided into lots in the cadastral case, which
are also claimed by the defendants, and to recover its possession and damages
for the unlawful occupation and detention thereof. The complaint may appear
clumsily drawn up, but there is no question that it is not for declaratory
relief, as provided for in Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, but for ejectment
(reivindicacion) and for damages. So, the first ground of the motion to
dismiss the complaint is not well taken. The court below has made no comment on
it, for it must have been of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of
action.

The second ground for the dismissal of the complaint, to wit: that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, upon which
the order of dismissal appealed from is predicated, is likewise without merit,
because even if the record of the cadastral case, where the lots into which the
tract of land was divided, could be reconstituted, and for that reason plaintiff
could present his claim and evidence to prove his title to the lots,
nevertheless, the cadastral court possesses no authority to award damages, for
its power is confined to the determination as to whether the claimants are
really entitled to the lots, as alleged in their answers; and, after finding
that they are, to the confirmation of their title to, and registration of, the
lots in their name. In the present action for ejectment, not only does the
plaintiff seek to have a judicial pronouncement that he is the owner of the
tract of land which he claims is unlawfully occupied by the defendants but also
to recover damages. After hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff
the owner of the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ
directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot award
damages to the plaintiff. Where there is a case for ejectment between parties
who, one against the other, claim the same parcel of land or lot in a cadastral
case, it has been customary or the practice of courts to hold a joint hearing of
both the ejectment and the cadastral cases in which the same parcel of land is
litigated and to render a decision in both cases in its double role, as court of
first instance of general jurisdiction and as cadastral court of limited
jurisdiction.

The other question which might have been raised is whether the judgment
rendered in the first case between the same parties, as reported in Volume 37,
p. 865, of the Philippine Reports, bars the institution of the present action.
In view of the fact that the defendants did not rely on that ground in their
motion to dismiss, we do not deem it proper to take it up and pass upon it.

The order of dismissal appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., and Paras, J., took no part.

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^[1] 74 Phil., 284.

PADILLA, J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Torres voted for the reversal of the order
appealed from.