G.R. No. L-40490. October 28, 1977
ALFREDO BALQUIDRA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ, BRANCH II, THE INCUMBENT PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF CAPIZ, CORNELIO VILLAREAL, JR. AND THE PROVINCE OF CAPIZ, RE…
GUERRERO, J.:
We set aside the Resolution of the Court of First Instance of
Capiz, Branch II, amending its decision in Civil Case No. V-2709 entitled
“Alfredo Balquidra v. Filomeno S. Villanueva, et al.” rendered on
February 1, 1974, which decision ordered the present respondent Provincial
Governor Cornelio Villareal, Jr. to reinstate the petitioner and the Province
of Capiz to pay his back salaries, whereas the challenged Resolution dated July
15, 1974 and filed with the Clerk of Court on July 17, 1974, while maintaining
the order for reinstatement eliminated the payment of back salaries.
The facts are stated in the appealed decision.
“On August 28, 1963, a petition for mandamus with
damages was instituted in this Court by plaintiff Alfredo Balquidra against
Filomeno S. Villanueva, Rodrigo V. Amistoso and Edilberto Villanueva, to compel
said respondent Governor of Capiz and the respondent Provincial Treasurer, to
reinstate petitioner to the position of watchman, to pay petitioner’s back
salary as well as damages. Respondents
in due time filed their common answer with motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the parties through their respective
counsels submitted to this Court a stipulation of facts which is hereunder
reproduced:
“1. That on June 17, 1961, the petitioner,
Alfredo Balquidra, was appointed watchman in the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Capiz, with compensation at the rate of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
FORTY PESOS (P1,440.00) per annum, vice Jose Adrias, deceased, effective upon
assumption of duty, by the then Governor Atila Balgos, which appointment is
hereto attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part hereof;
“2. That copies of said appointment were
furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila, the Provincial Treasurer
and Provincial Auditor of Capiz, both of Roxas City;
“3. That the appointment (Annex A) of petitioner
bears on its face the following inscription: ‘NOTED: under paragraph 1, Sec. 5 of Rep. Act 2260,
subject to the usual physical and medical examination, by A. Del Rosario,
Commissioner of Civil Service, by:
(Sgd.) L. C. Hipolito,
Supervising Personnel Transaction Examiner’;
“4. That one (1) week after his appointment on
June 17, 1960, or on June 24, 1960, petitioner took his oath of office as such
Watchman in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer before the then Governor
Atila Balgos, which Oath of Office is hereto attached as Annex “B”
and made an integral part hereof;
“5. That immediately thereafter, petitioner
entered into and discharged the duties of his office continuously until his
services were later terminated;
“6. That on August 31, 1962, without advance
notice, nor any formal charge, either administrative, criminal or civil,
respondent Provincial Governor and respondent Provincial Treasurer terminated the
services of the petitioner as such watchman, respondents alleging that the
termination was ‘for the convenience of the government,’ as evidenced by the
letter of the respondent Provincial Governor to the respondent Provincial
Treasurer dated August 31, 1962, and the letter of respondent Provincial
Treasurer to the petitioner dated August 31, 1962, which letters are hereto
attached as Annexes “C” and “D”, respectively and made
integral parts hereof;
“7. That since his dismissal from the government
service as such watchman .cm August 31, 1962, petitioner has not received nor
collected any terminal leave pay nor did he obtain any clearance of any
accountability;
“8. That respondent Edilberto Villanueva was
immediately appointed to, and is presently occupying the position of Watchman
in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Capiz, vice the petitioner, by the
other respondents, who are the incumbent Provincial Governor and Provincial
Treasurer of Capiz, respectively;
“During the course of the trial, however, respondent Governor
Filomeno Villanueva died on April 30, 1965 and Governor Cornelio L. Villareal,
Jr. assumed office as Governor while respondent Rodrigo V. Amistoso was
transferred to Iloilo City and in his
place Provincial Treasurer Tito Montano asssumed office as Provincial Treasurer
of Capiz. With the Motion to Continue
Action against the New Officials, petitioner filed a supplemental petition
substituting the incumbent Governor Cornelio L. Villareal, Jr. for Filomeno S.
Villanueva, deceased and Tito Montano for’Rodrigo Amistoso.”
“At the trial of this case, petitioner adduced evidence to
support his petition while the respondents waived their right to present their
evidence and the case was submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
adduced by the petitioner.” (Rollo, pp. 17-20)
Upon the facts stipulated
by the parties and other additional evidence presented during the trial, the
lower court made the following additional findings of fact:
“…..
that the position of petitioner as watchman is a provincial plantilla
position created by the Provincial Board of Capiz, and approved by the Department of Finance, with the following duties: to watch the provincial capitol building and
the properties kept therein (testimony of Juan D. Ta-ala, Acting Provincial
Treasurer of Capiz); that petitioner is a member of the Government Service
Insurance System or GSIS with an ID card, and that in connection with his
appointment, petitioner submitted himself to physical examination which he
passed; that as a member of the GSIS, petitioner was insured with the GSIS with
Insurance Policy No. 698193 and he pays premium one-half (1/2) of which is paid
by him while the other half is paid by the government, based on a compulsory
insurance coverage which is extended only to permanent employees; that he was
able to secure a policy and a salary loan from the GSIS; that petitioner is not
a civil service eligible.”
(Rollo,
pp. 21-22)
On February 1, 1974, the
respondent Court of First Instance rendered a decision dated January 28, 1974
declaring that petitioner Balquidra holds a permanent appointment; that his
dismissal is illegal; that the claim for moral damages is untenable; that
“while the Provincial Government of Capiz is not by name included as party
respondent, it cannot be denied that it is deemed included as party respondent
“because respondent Governor and Provincial Treasurer are charged in their
official capacity as officials of the Provincial Government of Capiz. Consequently, the Provincial Government will shoulder
the responsibility for the payment of the sums herein adjudged.” The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the respondent Provincial Governor
to reinstate the herein petitioner to the position of watchman in the Office of
the Provincial Treasurer;
2. Ordering the Provincial Governor and
Provincial Treasurer to pay petitioner back salaries from August 31, 1962, the
date of his dismissal, to the date he is reinstated at P1,440.00 per annum; Provided,
that in the event the petitioner elects not to be reinstated, his back salary
shall be computed up to the time this judgment becomes final;
3. Ordering the respondents to pay petitioner
Eight Hundred Pesos (P 800.00) by way of attorney’s fees.
Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.”
(Rollo, pp. 26-27)
On February 4, 1974,
respondents’ counsel received. notice of the adverse decision and on February
15, 1974 filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was amplified by a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 4, 1974 alleging the
following grounds:
“(a) That the respondent
Provincial Governor cannot be compelled to reinstate the petitioner due to a
memorandum-circular of the Civil Service Commission;
(b) That the decision ordering the Province of
Capiz and/or respondents’ Provincial Governor and Provincial Treasurer to pay
the back salaries of the petitioner is contrary to law and applicable
jurisprudence;
(c) That neither the Province of Capiz and/ or
the Provincial Governor or Provincial Treasurer are liable for Attorney’s fees
of P800.00.”
(Rollo, pp. 29, 36)
By order dated June 20, 1974 the respondent Court of First
Instance denied the said Motion for Reconsideration, and notice of the order of
denial was received by the respondents’ counsel on June 25, 1974. Hence, on July 2, 1974, the respondents again
filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration “on the ground that the decision
on the instant case dated January 28, 1974 ordering the Province of Capiz to
shoulder the responsibility for the payment of wages covering the back salaries
of the petitioner from August 31, 1962, the date of his dismissal, to the date
he is reinstated at P1,440.00 per annum is contrary to law and cannot be made
enforceable against the Province of Capiz.”
On the ground that the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the respondents is a pro-forma motion and thus could not have suspended the
running of the period within which to appeal, petitioner filed a Motion .for
Execution of the original decision alleging that by mere lapse of time the said
decision had become final and executory on July 16, 1974.
On July 17, 1974, the respondent Court of First Instance filed
with the Clerk of Court a Resolution Amending Decision dated July 15, 1974
acting favorably on the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
respondents. Thus, the respondent Court
absolved the Province of Capiz from the payment of petitioner’s back salaries
and damages on the ground that the Province of Capiz was not expressly
impleaded as a party respondent in said case, and declared:
“WHEREFORE, the
dispositive portion of the decision of
this Court is hereby amended to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Provincial Governor of Capiz to
reinstate the herein petitioner to the position of watchman in the Office of
the Provincial Treasurer. No costs.
SO ORDERED.”
By order dated December 3, 1974 the respondent Court denied both
the petitioner’s Motion for, Execution of the original decision and the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution Amending Decision; hence, this present
recourse on the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court
erred in not holding in its resolution amending decision dated July 15, 1974
that petitioner Alfredo Balquidra is entitled to payment, jointly and
solidarily by the Provincial Governor, Provincial Treasurer, and the Province
of Capiz, of back salaries, damages, and attorney’s fees as a result of his
arbitrary dismissal from service as
watchman in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, Capiz, while at the same
time ruling on the illegality of the dismissal and ordering
the reinstatement of the Petitioner.
II. The lower court erred in holding in its resolution amending
decision dated July 15, 1974 that the province of Capiz cannot be held liable
for payment of petitioner’s back salaries, damages, and attorney’s fees since
the Provincial Board was not included
in the suit, although the Provincial
Governor and Provincial Treasurer were sued in their official capacities, and
in the prayer of the Supplemental Petition of petitioner payment of back
salaries and damages and attorney’s fees were asked expressly against the
province of Capiz jointly and solidarily with provincial officials concerned,
and although it could not be pretended that the province of Capiz was
adequately defended and had had its day in court.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that its decision dated
January 28, 1974 became final and executory on July 16, 1974 because the second
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent provincial Governor on July 2,
1974 being pro-forma, did not stop the running of the period to appeal.
Consequently, the lower court erred also
in rendering the resolution amending decision dated July 15, 1974, by filing it
with the clerk of court on July 17, 19741 without jurisdiction anymore since
its original decision dated January 28, 1974 had already become final.
As a further consequence, the lower court
erred in denying petitioner’s motion for execution filed on July 17, 1974.
IV. The lower court erred in
not awarding petitioner moral and exemplary damages and increased attorney’s
fees.
We hold that the first
assigned error is well-taken. The respondent
Court, in its Resolution Amending Decision, erred in reversing itself by
ordering the reinstatement of the petitioner without, however, awarding him
back salaries. It is undisputed that
petitioner is not a civil service eligible, but this is no legal ground to
dismiss him at anytime, without prior notice or formal charge. The position of watchman falls under the
unclassified service, as shown in the notation of the Civil Service
Commissioner below petitioner’s appointment papers: “Noted: Under par. 1, Section 5 of R. A. 2260,
subject to the usual physical and medical examination.” (Par. 1, Sec. 5 of
said Act speaks of the non-competitive service.) Therefore, the issue of
whether or not the petitioner, belonging to the unclassified service, is protected
by the security of tenure clause provided in the Constitution and the Civil
Service Law, must be answered in the affirmative.’ The lack of civil service
eligibility of an appointee to an unclassified position does not remove him
from the operation and protection of the Civil Service Law. As pronounced by the Court in the case of
Lacson v. Romero, 47 O.G. 1778, Art. XII of the Constitution (1935)
contemplates the entire Civil Service, regardless of whether the employee
embraced therein belongs to the classified or unclassified service. Officers and employees in the unclassified
service like those occupying classified positions are protected by the
aforementioned provision of the organic law.[1] This salutary rule has been reiterated in a
more recent case, Barbero v. Paraguya,[2] wherein this Court declared,
“Employees in the civil service, regardless’of their status
are entitled to security of tenure of office.”
Therewith,
petitioner cannot be removed or dismissed without just cause, much less,
without formal charge or prior notice.
Based on the stipulated facts and applicable law, the original decision
of respondent Court correctly ruled that petitioner’s dismissal is illegal and
that he is entitled to reinstatement with back salaries.
The second assigned error
is also meritorious. Having affirmed
the illegality of petitioner’s dismissal, We see no reason why the Province of
Capiz could not be held liable for the payment of petitioner’s back salaries.
Firstly, petitioner’s
dismissal was admittedly “for the convenience of the Government.” In
Other words, it was the Province of Capiz which benefited in the termination of
petitioner’s services. Whatever personal
motives the original respondent officials had in dismissing him are not shown
in the whole record of the case; thus, We cannot pass upon them. We note the contention of the respondents,
citing previous rulings, that illegal dismissals should be made the personal
liability of the erring official, the rationale behind of which is,
“There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein
local elective officials, upon assumption of office, wield their new-found
power indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges,
regardless of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should not be taken as
authority for the commission of such
illegal acts.” (Nemenzo v. Sabillano, L-20977, September 7, 1968)
However,
We cannot apply the doctrine in this instant case for the reason that the
respondents have failed to show evidence that petitioner’s dismissal was for
causes directly imputable to the personal caprice of respondent Governor
Villanueva, or respondent Treasurer Amistoso.
The record stands that the dismissal was “for the convenience of
the government” and We cannot speculate otherwise.
Secondly, the respondent Court in its Resolution Amending
Decision, erred in reversing itself by holding that “because the
Provincial Board has not been impleaded as respondent the decision insofar as
it orders the Province of Capiz to pay back salaries of petitioner is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,” the Province of
Capiz was deprived of its day in court, not having been impleaded as party
litigant, either in its corporate capacity or through the Provincial Board and
the Provincial Auditor. The
non-inclusion of the Provincial Board or the Provincial Auditor in the present
case is of no importance. Such
non-inclusion is no basis to declare that the Province was not heard, nor had
no opportunity to defend itself. That
the Provincial Government can act only through its officials, either thru its
Provincial Executive alone, or thru the Provincial Board, or thru other
officials exercising discretion, cannot be disputed. The record of the case shows that the
complaint was directed against the respondent officials not in their personal
but official capacities, the illegal act complained of being done in the course
of official function. Furthermore, the
respondents were represented by the Provincial Attorney, whose arguments
against the liability of the said respondents as well as that of the Province
of Capiz are well researched and ably presented. These facts alone belie the contention that
the Province of Capiz was not afforded its day in court.
This Court has declared in Albert v. University Publishing Co.,
Inc., 14 SCRA 285 that “since the purpose of formally impleading a party
is to assure him a day in court, once the protective mantle of due process of
law has in fact been accorded a litigant, whatever the imperfection in form,
the real litigant may be held liable as a party.” Restating the position
of this Court in Gonzales v. Osmeña,[3]
the ends of justice and equity would be served best if the inclusion of the
Province of Capiz, as one of the respondents were considered a mere formality
and deemed effected, as if a formal amendment of
the pleading had been made in the proceedings below. Moreover, whatever objections respondents
have raised in their Brief concerning the non-inclusion of the respondent
Province of Capiz and its -provincial officials have become moot and academic
by the Resolution of this Court dated
August 20, 1975 “(a) to require the petitioner to implead in an amended
petition as additional respondents the Provincial Board, the Provincial
Treasurer and Provincial Auditor, all of the Province of Capiz, and to furnish
copies thereof to the new respondents,” in accordance with which the
Amended Petition was filed on September 20, 1975 impleading the Provincial
Board, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Auditor, all of the Province of
Capiz. (Rollo, pp. 98-110)
Apropos the
third assigned error relative to the alleged lack of jurisdiction to amend its
decision rendered on February 1, 1974 on the ground that said decision has
become final and executory, considering that the Second Motion for
Reconsideration is pro-forma and thus could not have suspended the running
of the period within which to appeal which has lapsed in due time, We hold that
the said assigned error is impressed with merit.
The record shows that the
Supplementary. Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents pointed out, among others, the
following ground: “(b) That the decision ordering the Province of Capiz
and/or the respondents Provincial Governor and Provincial Treasurer to pay the
back salaries of the petitioner is contrary to law and applicable
jurisprudence.” (Rollo, p. 29)
On the other hand, the
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 28, 1974 is based “on the
ground that the decision
on the instant case dated June 28, 19.74 ordering the Province of Capiz to
shoulder the responsibility of the payment of the sums covering the back
salaries of the petitioner from, August 31, 1962, the date of his dismissal, to
the date that he is reinstated at ‘1,440.00 per annum is contrary to law and
cannot be made enforceable against the Province of Capiz.” (Rollo, p.
39). In support of this ground, the
respondents submit the argument that the’Province of Capiz, the Provincial
Board; and the Provincial Auditor were not included as party respondents in the
case. Insofar as the Province of Capiz
is concerned, this argument had already been raised in the Supplementary Motion
for Reconsideration as adverted to above.
In mentioning the Provincial Board and the Provincial Auditor,
respondents did not raise an additional ground for the addition is merely an
amplification of or an additional
argument supporting the same ground that the decision is contrary to law and the applicable jurisprudence. In fact, the respondents have treated these
allegations as mere arguments to support the said ground. They are but different approaches in their
attack to one legal issue. The fact that
the argument set forth in the Second Motion for Reconsideration is different in
phraseology from the argument in the first motion cannot traverse the conclusion
that the second motion is pro-forma where such argument was available
and could have been known in support of a ground already existing, available
and extensively discussed in the first motion.[4] Such succeeding motion should not interrupt
any procedural period fixed by the Rules of Court. The reason is that by requiring litigants and
counsel to be exhaustive in their motions and pleadings and avoid repetitiousness,
courts may eventually reduce unnecessary delays that are the curse of judicial
litigation since time immemorial.[5]
From the receipt of
notice of the adverse decision by the respondents on February 4, 1974 to the
time they filed the first motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1974, ten
(10) days of the 30-day appeal period had lapsed. The notice of the order of denial was
received by respondents’ counsel on June 25, 1974 and from this date started
the running of the remaining 20 days, which is computed in accordance with Rule
28, Revised Rules of Court, by excluding the day of receipt and including the
twentieth day. Thus by mathematical
process, the last day of the remaining period to appeal available to the
respondents fell on July 15, 1974 because the second motion for reconsideration
filed on July 2, 1974, being pro-forma, did not have the effect of
suspending the running of the period within which to appeal.[6]
Since the Resolution
Amending Decision is dated July 15, 1974 but it was only filed with the Clerk of
Court on July 17, 1974, it is clear that the Resolution Amending Decision was
filed two (2) days past the 30-days period to appeal thereby rendering the
original decision final and executory, no appeal having been interposed within
the period. As a consequence, the
respondent court lost all jurisdiction to make substantial amendments to the
same, and it had no alternative but to order the execution of the final
judgment as prayed for by the winning party, the petitioner herein.
Respondents cite a rule that
“Where a judgment is amended, the date of the amendment should be
considered as the date of the decision for the computation
of the period for perfecting the appeal therefrom.” (Board of Liquidators
v. Ricma Trading Corporation, 29 SCRA
397) Under this rule, “date of the amendment” refers to the date of
the rendition of the amended decision.
As correctly contended by the petitioner, it is the filing of the
signed decision, with the Clerk of Court that constitutes the rendition of a
judgment. It cannot be construed
otherwise because it is basic that an amended decision is a distinct and
separate judgment and this being so, it must follow the established procedural
rule embodied in Section l, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
“Sec. 1. All judgments
determining the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.”
(Underscoring ours)
Anent the last assigned
error, We hold that petitioner
is not entitled to moral
damages, malice and bad faith not having been shown. In accordance with Our ruling in Cristobal v.
Melchor, G. R. No. L-43203, July 29, 1977, We grant back salaries to the petitioner
at the rate last received by him which is ‘1,440.00 per annum, for a period of
five years without qualification and deduction.
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the Resolution
Amending Decision promulgated by respondent court on February 1, 1974 is hereby
reversed and another one entered, ordering the respondent Provincial Governor
to reinstate the petitioner, subject to age, medical and physical requirements
to his former position as watchman in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer,
directing the Provincial Board (now called the Sangguniang Panlalawigan) to
appropriate the necessary amounts adjudged herein, and the Provincial Treasurer
and Provincial Auditor to pay petitioner back salaries from August 31, 1962 up
to and for a period of five (5) years computed at the original salary of
01,440.00 per annum without pronouncement as to costs.
Petition granted.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Martin, and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., reserves his
vote.
[1] Arcel v. Sergio Osmeña, Jr., 1 SCRA
581.
[2] 58 SCRA 603.
[3] 3 SCRA 841.
[4]
Rule 37, Sec. 4, R.C. Ysip, 81 Phil. 218 (1948); Medran v. CA, 46 O.G.
4277, 1350, March 26, 1969; Hill v. Chunaco, 48 O.G. 614, October 23,
1950; Phil. Airlines Inc. v. Arca, 19 SCRA 300).
[5]
Phil. Airlines Inc. v. Arca, supra.
[6]
Lonario v. De Guzman, 21 SCRA 349; Dacanay v. Alvendia, 30 SCRA
31.