ESPERANZA BAPTISTA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, ARTURO VILLANUEVA, PETITIONERS, VS. URBANO CARILLO, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Baptista versus Carillo

The Case

This is a simple forcible entry case. Urbano Carillo, who had bought a residential lot in Quezon City from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation under a conditional contract of sale, sued Esperanza Baptista, her husband Arturo Villanueva, and a certain Attorney Loreto Abella to recover possession of that lot. The case matters to a reviewee because it is the cleanest statement of a rule that examiners love: in forcible entry, the only question is physical or material possession, possession de facto, and never ownership or the validity of title. It also teaches the finality of the Court of Appeals' findings of fact on a petition for review on certiorari.

Procedural History

The action began on June 14, 1963 in the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Branch Three. That court rendered judgment for Carillo on December 6, 1963, ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and to pay rentals while in possession. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, then presided by the late Judge Nicasio Yatco. In a decision dated March 19, 1964, that court affirmed the judgment ejecting the defendants, but without awarding rentals, and dismissed the complaint as against Attorney Loreto Abella. The defendants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, in a decision promulgated on April 6, 1970, affirmed the lower court in full. A motion for reconsideration was denied, and the defendants came to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari filed on July 27, 1970.

Facts

On December 23, 1958, the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation awarded to Urbano Carillo, under a conditional contract of sale, lot 6, Block E-154, with an area of 600 square meters, in the East Avenue Subdivision of Quezon City. Soon after that contract was executed, Carillo took possession of the lot by fencing it with bamboo poles and barbed wire.

In April 1963, upon visiting the place, Carillo saw two men working on what appeared to be the foundations of four posts. He reported the matter to the City Engineer of Quezon City, who sent official communications to the City Mayor asking that action be taken against the intruders and that their construction, for which no building permit had been secured, be stopped. No action was taken by the authorities.

Carillo was therefore compelled to file the complaint for forcible entry on June 14, 1963. The petitioners claimed they had occupied the lot since 1956. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found, however, that they entered and occupied the lot only in May 1963, after the property had been awarded to Carillo.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioners occupied the premises only in May 1963, and whether or not its findings of fact may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the finding that Carillo is entitled to possession of the lot in question.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding the petitioners' alleged preferential right to acquire the lot, and in not declaring Carillo disqualified to acquire lots from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statute. It applies the settled rule on the conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as stated in the jurisprudence it cites. The rule, as the Court restates it, is this:

On an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court the latter may not review the findings of fact of the former.

This rule bears on the first issue, because the date of occupation is a question of fact that the Court of Appeals had already resolved against the petitioners.

The decision also applies the settled doctrine governing forcible entry, as stated in the early case of Mediran versus Villanueva:

In a forcible entry case the primary issue to be decided is the physical or material possession of real property, possession de facto, and not possession de jure.

This doctrine bears on the second and third issues, because it confines the action to possession and excludes questions of ownership, title, and the validity of the contract of sale.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. The date when the petitioners occupied the lot is a question of fact, and the appellate court's finding is supported by testimonial and documentary evidence in the record. The Court acknowledged that the rule is not absolute, and among the accepted exceptions are that the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation and conjecture, that the inferences made are manifestly absurd or impossible, or that there is abuse of discretion because the findings of fact are without competent evidence to support them. None of these obtains here. The petitioners submitted new documents as annexes to their petition, but the Court refused to consider them because they were never presented during the trial below and Carillo was never given the opportunity to test their materiality, relevancy, and genuineness. In any event, the Court said, those documents would not improve the petitioners' position, and one of them in fact bolstered the finding that the petitioners occupied the lot only around May 1963.

On the second and third issues, the Court held that the Court of Appeals rightly resolved the appeal solely on the question of possession. A forcible entry case is summary in nature, and its purpose is to protect the person who is in fact in actual possession and, where the right is controverted, to preserve the status quo until a court of competent jurisdiction decides the question of ownership. The Court quoted Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion in De la Cruz versus Burgos:

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession. The legal right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of action, for no one may take the law into his own hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable or actually disputed in another case.

The Court therefore held that the validity of the conditional contract of sale between Carillo and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, the alleged lack of qualification of Carillo to purchase the lot, and the alleged preferential right of the petitioners to acquire it are all beyond the scope of a forcible entry case, especially since the corporation is not a party to it. The validity of that contract cannot be collaterally attacked in this proceeding, and until it is declared null and void by a competent court in an appropriate action, it stands to support Carillo's cause of action. The Court noted that the petitioners had in fact filed a separate complaint before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City seeking to annul that contract and to compel the corporation to sell the lot to them, and that this separate case is the proper forum for those issues.

Doctrine

First, in a forcible entry case the only issue is physical or material possession, possession de facto, and not possession de jure. The court protects prior possession and restores it when lost through force, stealth, or violence, regardless of title or ownership.

Second, questions of ownership, the validity of a contract of sale, the qualification of a buyer, and preferential rights to acquire property are beyond the scope of a summary action for forcible entry. They must be ventilated in a separate and appropriate action, and a contract of sale stands until annulled by a competent court.

Third, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari, save for the accepted exceptions, and evidence not presented during the trial below will not be received for the first time on appeal.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered the petitioners and all persons claiming under them to vacate the lot and return it to the possession of Urbano Carillo or his successors in interest, with costs against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line: in forcible entry, the only issue is possession de facto, not possession de jure, and no one may take the law into his own hands even against a questionable title. Examiners use this case to test whether you will confine an ejectment action to possession and refuse to entertain ownership, validity of title, or preferential rights, which belong in a separate action.