SPOUSES VERMONT T. DY AND LUZVIMINDA L. DY, PLAINTIFFS–APPELLANTS, VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND ORLANDO CORUÑA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Dy versus Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
The Case
This is a civil action for the nullification of an extrajudicial foreclosure, brought by the spouses Vermont and Luzviminda Dy against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company and its officer Orlando Coruña. The spouses sought to stop the bank from proceeding against their mortgaged property. The case matters not for the foreclosure question itself, which the Court never reached, but for what it teaches about the twin duties of litigants: the plaintiff's duty to prosecute with reasonable diligence, and the plaintiff's duty to move that a defendant who fails to answer be declared in default. It is a study in mutual inaction, and in who bears the consequences when both sides sleep on their rights.
Procedural History
The spouses filed their complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Their application for a temporary restraining order was heard and denied. Almost a year later, the trial court directed the spouses to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The bank then filed its own motion to dismiss on the same ground. The spouses opposed, claiming that negotiations for the restructuring of their loan were ongoing and that the bank had never filed an answer. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, and denied the spouses' motion for reconsideration. The spouses appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The matter reached the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, and the Supreme Court likewise affirmed.
Facts
On July 17, 1998, the spouses Vermont and Luzviminda Dy filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Their application for a temporary restraining order was heard and, on July 30, denied. After that, the proceedings lay fallow.
Almost a year later, on June 30, 1999, the trial court ordered the spouses to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The bank filed a motion to dismiss on July 12, pointing out that the spouses had done nothing to move the case forward since the restraining order was denied. The spouses opposed, claiming that they were negotiating a restructuring of their loan and that the bank had not filed an answer, so they could not set the case for pre-trial. The bank denied any negotiations and produced a letter confirming that none had taken place.
Another year and a half passed before the motion was resolved. On November 27, 2000, the trial court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. It noted the bank's denial of negotiations, acknowledged that the bank had not filed an answer, but faulted the spouses for not taking the necessary steps to have the case resolved. The spouses' motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.
Issues
- Whether or not the plaintiffs may be non-suited for failure to prosecute where the defendant has itself failed to file an answer.
- Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.
Applicable Provisions
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
If the defendant fails to answer within the time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default.
This provision is central because it shows that the court cannot declare a defendant in default on its own motion; the plaintiff must ask for it, and the spouses never did.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides:
If for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
This is the provision under which the spouses were dismissed, and it makes clear that dismissal may proceed even without any motion from the defendant.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the spouses could indeed be non-suited despite the bank's failure to answer. The bank was in a state of default for not filing its answer, but the rules required the spouses to move to declare it in default. No such motion was ever filed, so the bank was never legally in default. The Court stressed that the court cannot motu proprio, that is, on its own initiative, declare a defendant in default. What the court may do is put an inactive plaintiff on notice that he may be non-suited, prodding him by indirection to file the motion. The trial court did exactly that when it issued its show cause order, and the spouses still did nothing.
On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time rests on the sound discretion of the court, and what constitutes an unreasonable length of time depends on the circumstances of each case. That discretion will not be disturbed absent patent abuse. The Court found the spouses' claim of negotiations to be untrue, and it noted that they did nothing for a year after the bank's answer was due, and nothing for another year and a half after the motion to dismiss was filed. The bank's own failure to answer was inexcusable, but that was not the question. Under Rule 17, what is in issue is the dismissal due alone to the fault of the plaintiff, and the court may even act on its own motion.
Doctrine
A plaintiff who fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, without justifiable cause, may have his complaint dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. The determination of what is an unreasonable length of time is preeminently the function of the trial court, and its discretion will not be disturbed absent patent abuse.
A defendant who fails to answer is not automatically in default. The court cannot declare him in default on its own motion; the plaintiff must file a motion with notice to the defendant and proof of the failure to answer. A plaintiff who sleeps on this right cannot later use the defendant's inaction as a shield against his own failure to prosecute.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint and dismissed the appeal. The bank won.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing: the court cannot declare a defendant in default on its own motion, and a plaintiff who fails to move for default cannot complain that the defendant's inaction excuses his own. Examiners like to use this case to test the interplay between Rule 9, Section 3 and Rule 17, Section 3, and the rule that dismissal for failure to prosecute lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.