INTESTATE ESTATE OF RUFINA MERCADO, DECEASED, CATALINA JAVIER, PETITIONER-APPELLE, VS. EULOGIO MAGTIBAY AND SOLEDAD SALES MAGTIBAY DE HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, granting letters of administration and appointing a judicial
administratrix for the estate of the deceased Rufina Mercado.

It appears that Rufina Mercado died intestate on September 20, 1949,
survived by her second husband Eulogio Magtibay, her only living
daughter Catalina Javier and the descendants of her two deceased
daughters—all three daughters being of one first marriage. Shortly
after Rufinafs death, these heirs made an extrajudicial partition of
her properties. But alleging that there were some properties not
included in the partition, one of the heirs, the said Catalina Javier,
on August 15, 1952, petitioned the court for letters of administration
and the appointment of herself as administratrix. The other heirs
opposed the petition on the ground that there was no necessity for
subjecting the estate to judicial administration .since, according to
them, the decedent left no debts, all her properties had already been
partitioned and the heirs were all of age or represented by a guardian.
But the court overruled the opposition and granted the petition. Hence
this appeal.

For the purposes of the appeal, it may be assumed that, as alleged
by the appellees, not all the properties of the deceased have been
divided among the heirs. But there being no question that the deceased
left no debts and the heirs are all of age with the exception of one
who, however, is represented by a guardian, the case comes squarely
under section 1 of Rule 74, which reads:

“SEC. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—”If
the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age,
or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed
in one office of the register of deeds and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir
or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means
of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall
be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two years after the death
of the decedent.”

This rule provides for the partition of the estate of the deceased
where no debts are due from it and the heirs are all of age or properly
represented. But on the theory that the provision is not mandatory and
does not prohibit recourse to ail administration proceeding, one of the
heirs in the present case insists on the issuance of letters of
administration notwithstanding the opposition of the other heirs. The
question, therefore, for determination is whether in a case like the
present where recourse to partition without letters of administration
is authorized, the estate—or what remains of it after the part already
partitioned has been segregated—and nevertheless be subjected to an
administration proceeding despite the opposition of the majority of the
heirs.

The question is not new. Time and again this Court has had to pass
upon it in cases arising; under section 596 (as amended by Act 2331) of the old Code of Civil Procedure, from which the precept embodied in
the above-copied provision of the present Rules of Court was taken.
Resolving that question in those cases, this Court has repeatedly held
that “when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to judicial administration, which is always long and costly,
or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court,” for
in such case the judicial, administration and the appointment of an
administrator, are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.” (Utu.Lo vs. Pasion., 66 Phil. 302) citing Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil. 321; Kalahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil. 434; Bondad vs. Bonad, 34 Phil. 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil. 367; and Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil. 317.)

The words to quotation sum up the doctrine of the cases cited,
which, though rendered under section 596 of the former code of civil
procedure, has equal validity under section 1 of Rule 74, because the
two sections are fundamentally the same. It is, therefore, our view
that, now as before, the rule is that where administration proceeding
is unnecessary because the estate has no debts and the more expeditious
remedy by partition is available the heirs or the majority of them may
not be compelled to submit the estate to such proceeding.

The rule harmonizes with the law of succession contained in the
Civil Code under whose provisions “the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death,” the heirs
succeeding “immediately to all the property of the deceased ancestor *
* * as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death,” so that as co-owners they may
immediately, if the property is not burdened with debts, administer it
jointly or divide it among themselves. (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Prondosa, 17 Phil. 321.) For, as was said in a case, since the property
of the deceased belongs, from the moment of his death, to the heirs,
“what reason can there be,” if there are no debts, “for the appointment
of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to
deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled?” (Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil. 317.)
Withholding the inheritance from the heirs by subjecting it to an
administration proceeding for no useful purpose, would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered as
not infrequently happens.

The rule, in our opinion, is fundamentally sound and should be
adhered to rather than departed from. We cannot allow it to be
overridden by the adverse ruling in Orozco vs. Garcia, 50
Phil. 149, which, as pointed out by counsel for the appellants, would
appear to be the result of a misinterpretation of the following
quotation from the decision in Castillo vs. Castillo and Quizon, 23 Phil. 364:

“* * * it is not a principle authorized by law that
heirs of legal age may not demand by division of a real property, left
them by their predecessor-in-interest and held by a coheir, without
first initiating special intestate proceedings during which a judicial
administrator is to be appointed, who alone is vested with the
personality to claim the property that belongs to the succession. On
the contrary, such heirs are expressly authorized to do so, unless, for
the reason of there being unpaid debts, judicial intervention becomes
necessary, which was not alleged as a special defense in this suit.”

The court was in the Orozco case apparently led astray by the use of
the double negative in the quotation and without good reason made to
deviate from the doctrine repeatedly followed in its previous
decisions. In any event, the doctrine was reaffirmed in the subsequent
case of Utulo vs. Pasion, supra, and with this admonition:
“We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a
doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had
followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would
not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as
they are now.”

The trial court, however, chose to [depart from the accepted
doctrine in the mistaken belief that it had already been overruled by
our decision in the case of Rodriguez vs. Ian, G. R. No.
L-6044, promulgated November 24, 1952, where the statement was made
that section 1 of Rule 74 “does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons
to an ordinary action of partition.” That statement, it should be
noted, sanctions recourse to an administration proceeding even if the
estate has no debts only if, as therein expressly stated, the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition, arid is
thus a reaffirmance rather than a repudiation of the doctrine, being in
line with its policy that where partition is possible, either in or out
of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good and compelling reasons. This Court, it would
appear, did not have to go into the adequacy of the reasons given for
the issuance of letters of administration in the Rodriguez case because
it there found “that the core of petitioner’s objection is not that the
heirs have erroneously instituted this administration proceeding but
that the (lower) court erred in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez
administrator of the estate” instead of the persons proposed by them.

Proof that the doctrine has not been abandoned is its recent application in the case of Macalinao at al. vs. Valdez et al.,^[*]
50 Off. Gaz., 3041, which is subsequent to the Rodriguez case. It
appears that in that case of Macalinao the hearing of a land
registration case had been ordered suspended until ownership of the
property involved therein could be decided in the intestate proceedings
which one of the heirs to the property (which was conjugal) agreed or
was directed to institute, but that this heir, in conjunction with her
husband, instead of instituting such proceedings, filed an action for
accounting, liquidation and partition. Objected to by the defendants on
the ground that the directive of the trial court was for the plaintiff
to file an intestate proceeding, the action was ordered dismissed, but
upon appeal this Court set aside the order of dismissal, saying:

“Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 3176, provides that: ‘When the marriage is dissolved
by the death of |the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered and liquidated, and the debts: thereof shall
be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the
administration and liquidation of the estates of the deceased persons, or in an ordinary liquidation and partition proceedings, unless
the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves
of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an
extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.’ (Italics
supplied.) Expressly recognized by this legal provision, the ordinary
action instituted herein by the appellants is even preferred to an
intestate proceeding, when the heirs are of age or duly represented,
and the estate has no debts. ‘When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened
with the cost and expenses of an administration.’ (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil. 321; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil. 232; Baldernor vs.
Malangyaon, 34 Phil. 367.) as repeatedly held, ‘when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which1 is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court * * *”. It ‘has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator’ are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings’ (Utulo vs., Pasion, 66 Phil. 302, 306, citing other cases).

“The
fact that the lower court suspended the land registration case upon
appellants’ manifestation that an intestate proceeding would be filed,
did not legally deprive them of availing themselves of the proper
judicial (and for that matter less burdensome) remedy, especially in
the absence of any law requiring that the estates of deceased persons
must always be brought to the courts for administration and
liquidation. At any rate, the essential basis of the order suspending
the registration case was the necessity for determining the ownership
of the controverted land. The theory of the lower court in dismissing
the present case, would prefer form to substance.”

In an attempt to justify these administration proceedings the
appellee confesses in her brief that she has been obliged to institute
the same in order to avoid a multiplicity of suite, because she
proposes to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of conjugal
property made by the surviving husband of the deceased in favor of one
of the heirs, Soledad Sales Magtibay de Hernandez, and the validity of
those transfers could be ventilated in these proceedings without need
of bringing a separate action for the purpose. But if the aim is merely
to avoid a multiplicity o£ suits, that sane objective could be achieved
in an action for partition, where the validity of those transfers could
also be inquired into in line with our decision in Monserrat vs. Ibañez
et al., G.R. No. L-3367, promulgated May 24, 1950, where we said:

“Again the petitioner argues that ‘only when the
heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate
but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rule’s of Court apply’, and that in this case ‘the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because’
respondents ‘succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate’.
The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has
indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs)’may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one
heir.”

Moreover, if appellee’s purpose is really to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, she has herself nullified that objective by actually filing, as
reported by the appellants and admitted by her, a separate action for
the annulment of the property transfers already referred to.

There appearing to be no good reason for burdening the estate of the
deceased Rufina Mercado with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding, not justified in issuing letters of
administration. With this ruling, it is no longer necessary to decide
which, as between the appellee Catalina Javier and the widower Eulogio
Magtibay, should be preferred in the appointment of an administrator.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the appointment
of this appellee Catalina Javier as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Rufina Mercado revoked.

With costs against the appellee.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.