BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND LEONARDO KALAW, RESPONDENTS.

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company versus Workmen's Compensation Commission

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to review a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, the employer, challenges the award of disability compensation to its former conductor, Leonardo Kalaw, who contracted Hansen's disease, or leprosy, during his employment. The case matters because it settles two questions that recur in social legislation: whether a disease not listed as occupational may still be compensable when the nature of the work contributed to it, and whether compensation may be awarded beyond the date the employee actually stopped working.

Procedural History

Leonardo Kalaw filed his claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Unit at San Pablo City. After hearing, the Acting Chief of the Unit rendered a decision ordering the bus company to pay compensation benefits, a fee, and attorney's fees. The bus company appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which affirmed the decision but increased the disability benefits to the maximum allowed by law, raised the attorney's fees, and adjusted the administrative costs. From that decision, the bus company came to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.

Facts

Leonardo Kalaw entered the service of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company on October 31, 1963, as a conductor. His working hours were from one in the afternoon to eight in the evening. He was first assigned the San Pablo City to Santa Maria, Laguna route and back, and later the San Pablo City to Manila route. As a conductor, his duty was to give tickets to passengers and to help carry their baggage.

On June 19, 1966, he applied for sick leave of twenty-nine days, submitting a medical certificate stating that he was suffering from a generalized dermatitis. On March 28, 1967, he again applied for sick leave of ten days, this time for an allergy. On August 25, 1967, he stopped working because of his illness. On October 3, 1967, he consulted a specialist on skin diseases, who diagnosed his illness as Hansen's disease, or leprosy.

On March 17, 1969, Kalaw filed his claim for compensation, alleging that his illness was the result of or was aggravated by the nature of his employment. The Compensation Rating Medical Officer of the regional office found that as of July 8, 1971, Kalaw was still positive of the disease. As of the date the Commission decided the case, there was no showing that the illness had been cured or arrested.

Issues

• Whether or not Hansen's disease, or leprosy, is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act when it was allegedly aggravated by or was the result of the nature of the employee's employment.
• Whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding disability benefits beyond the date of the claimant's actual retirement and even after he had allegedly fully recovered from his illness.

Applicable Provisions

Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides:

In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act.

This presumption is the foundation of the ruling: the employee is freed from the burden of proving that his illness was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work.

Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as discussed in the decision, fixes the period for filing a claim for compensation. The Court held that failure to file within that period does not affect the jurisdiction of the Commission, because compensation is a liability vested by statute.

Article 1144, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code provides:

They must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues.

This is the period the Court applied to the claim, treating the compensation as a liability vested by statute that prescribes in ten years.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the contention that leprosy is not compensable is without merit. The claimant's evidence showed that his illness was traceable to his employment. The skin specialist testified that leprosy, like tuberculosis, is a systemic disease; that its specific cause is bacteria, which can be acquired through body contact with a person harboring the germs; and that among the precipitating factors are exposure to sudden changes of environment and temperature and the lessening of the body's resistance. As a conductor, Kalaw inevitably came into contact with different passengers, was exposed to persons harboring the germs, and suffered the strain and stress of his work, which lessened his body resistance. These factors could have contributed greatly to his affliction and could have led to its aggravation.

The Court relied on its earlier ruling in the Francisco case, quoting it with approval:

The Workmen's Compensation Act which governs the present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act.

And further:

In fact, the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Commission neither erred nor committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding benefits beyond the date of actual retirement. The claim was filed only about one year and seven months after Kalaw retired. Citing the Cañonero case, the Court held that failure to file a claim within the period provided in Section 24 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Commission, and that compensation under the Act is a liability vested by statute which prescribes in ten years under Article 1144, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code. The Court also found no showing that the illness had been cured or arrested, and upheld the Commission's computation of four hundred thirteen weeks of disability, reduced to the maximum of six thousand pesos allowed by law.

Doctrine

Under Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of the Act. The employee is thereby freed from the burden of proving that his illness or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. The cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation. A disease need not be occupational to be compensable. Failure to file a claim within the period fixed in Section 24 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Commission, because compensation is a liability vested by statute that prescribes in ten years under Article 1144, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed and the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission was affirmed in its entirety, with the bus company ordered to pay the disability benefits, attorney's fees, and administrative costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation. Examiners use this case to test the Section 44 presumption of compensability and the ten-year prescriptive period for claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act.