RODNEY ABEDEJOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND CONTINENTAL MARINE PHILS. CORPO…
SABIO, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are: (1) The April 7, 2005 of the Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, through then Acting Secretary Danilo P. Cruz in Case No. OS-POEA-0504-2004-0619 (POEA Case No. DAW (M) 99-04-0203); and (2) the October 10, 2005 order of said public respondent, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on its earlier decision.
Finding public respondent’s portrayal of antecedent facts instructive and graphic, we quote the same thus:
“Complainant, in its complaint-affidavit, alleged that it is the duly accredited manning agent of Rassport Lines Co., LTC. (Rassport for brevity), which is engaged in the operation of ocean-going vessels, including the vessel MV PRINCE NICOLAS. As such, it regularly secures the services of Filipino seamen to man its vessels. Rassport, through the complainant, hired the services of the petitioners on various dates which employment were covered by POEA-approved contracts, which in turn was also subject to the Cyprus Collective Bargaining Laws. Complainant claimed that MV PRINCE NICOLAS was not enrolled into any union and all the petitioners were to be paid in accordance with their respective POEA Standard Employment Contracts and/or CYPRUS Collective Bargaining Laws, whichever is more beneficial to the seafarer.
On or about December 16, 1998, while the vessel was about to make port in Sauda, Norway, the whole complement, numbering twenty (20), including petitioners, in blatant breach of their POEA contracts and CYPRUS Collective Bargaining Laws, gave notice that they would “stage a peaceful standing strike” upon the vessel’s arrival at Sauda Port, Norway, for the purpose of negotiating a new agreement based on International Transport Federation (ITF) standards. Thereafter, petitioners and their companion displayed a banner on the vessel’s starboard railing seeking the help of the ITF to negotiate for a new agreement.
Complainant claimed that petitioners refused to do any work and to open the vessel’s hold for discharging cargo and as soon as the vessel’s gangway was lowered, the ITF Inspector came on board and conferred with petitioners. While negotiation was going on, complainant’s representative pleaded to the petitioners to commence working to avoid prejudice to the owner of the vessel. Petitioners refused to work unless and until the complainant agreed to sign a new agreement and pay them wages based on the ITF prescribed rates. The impasse continued until the complainant finally acceded to the demands of the petitioners, who continued to refuse to work until the completion of the computation of their backwages. Finally, on December 19, 1998, complainant was coerced to sign new ITF contracts with the petitioners. However, the petitioners did not get the benefits based on the agreement because the vessel did not have enough funds. Thus, on the next port of call, the ITF representative was again on board seeking to impose more demands upon the complainant. It was at that time that several members of the crew due to be repatriated for contract completion refused to be discharged unless they were paid the compensation obtained with ITF’s assistance. On March 8, 1999, when the vessel made port in Singapore, petitioners were paid off the amounts exacted with the ITF’s assistance and only then, did they accede to be repatriated.
In their Answer with counter charge, petitioners denied the material allegations raised in the complaint. By way of affirmative defense, they averred that granting without acceding that there was ITF intervention and union activities, the same is not actionable being a valid exercise of their constitutional right. Petitioners claimed that when they received a letter of indemnity for seafarers duly signed and notarized in Sauda, Lenmannskontor, Norway on December 21, 1998 as executed by Panagiotis Koronvanis, the owner’s representative, the same waived any disciplinary action against them for the acts charged. They added that their acts are legal and justified because of the unbearable condition on board and the failure of the employer to pay allotments on time and other benefits due them.
In their Position Paper, petitioners reiterated their position in their Answer and further averred that if there was ITF intervention, said action was a legal exercise of the seaman’s democratic and constitutional rights. Petitioners further averred that the alleged strike was not really a strike, and that they did not abandon their work but instead negotiated peacefully with the captain and the owner’s agent with the ITF’s.
On the other hand, complainant reiterated its allegations on its position paper and alleged that petitioners acted in violation of the terms and conditions of their POEA-approved contracts of employment. Complainant claimed that the petitioners’ act of seeking the ITF intervention forced it to give in to their demands in order not to prejudice the vessel’s operations. Complainant further claimed that the obtaining situation prompted it to sign the letters of indemnity for seafarers in favor of the petitioners in order to end the raucus on board the vessel. Further, said letter was conditioned on the fact that the petitioners would continue to respect the terms of their original contracts and to forego the implementation of the ITF contract. Complainant insisted that the acts of the petitioners were in sheer violation of the terms and conditions of their employment contracts.”
(Rollo, pp. 18-20)
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, thru its adjudication office, based on the pleadings filed and the evidence adduced by the parties, rendered a decision which decreed, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find and so hold the respondents liable for concerted action to breach valid government-approved contract and, pursuant to the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties of the Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seafarers (Appendix 2), are hereby meted the minimum penalty of Two (2) years suspension from participating in the overseas employment program of this Administration effective upon their personal receipt of this Order.
Respondents’ names shall remain in the POEA watchlist for the duration of the suspension period.
The other charges are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines.”
(Rollo, p. 156)
Unconvinced, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment anchored on the following grounds, namely:
“GROUNDS FOR THE APPEAL
THE POEA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS BREACHED THEIR POEA CONTRACTS WHEN THEY SOUGHT FOR BETTER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.
THE POEA GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSPENDING PETITIONERS FROM OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT FOR A MINIMUM OF TWO (2) YEARS.”
(Rollo, p. 142)
On appeal, public respondent modified the POEA’s decision, in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review filed by the petitioners is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The POEA Order dated December 27, 2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners are hereby suspended from participating in the overseas employment program of the government for a period of one (1) year, for concerted action to breach valid government approved contract.”
(Rollo, p. 22)
In modifying the judgment appealed from, public respondent raciocinated thus:
“The POEA-approved contract of employment, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, states that all claims, complaints, or controversies relative to the implementation and interpretation of the employment contract shall be exclusively resolved through the established Grievance Machinery in the Revised Employment Contract for Seafarers, the adjudication procedures of the Philippine Employment Administration (POEA) and the Philippine Courts of Justice, in that order. Clearly, it is mandated that the grievance machinery must first be exhausted in addressing the complaints of the petitioners. In this case, there is no evidence to show that the petitioners’ grievances had gone through the required process.
Instead, the petitioners used coercive measures to obtain their demands. This in itself is a violation of the specific provisions of the petitioners’ respective contracts. And though the petitioners were exercising their constitutional right in organizing, with the intention to improve the terms and conditions of their employment, this right should also be weighted against the right of the complainant. Settled is the rule that rights are never without boundaries.
It is a long-established principle of law that parties are bound by the terms and conditions of their contract. Since it is a meeting of minds, it can be presumed that parties to a contract entered into their agreement on their own volition. And with their consent freely given, parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated in the contract but also to the natural consequences thereof.
In the case at bar, each employment contract passed through the basic rudiments of inspection and processing of the POEA. Their terms and conditions were determined to be not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
However, in view of humanitarian considerations, this Office is not unmindful of the fact that the petitioners need to work abroad to support their families, not to mention the fact that this is their first offense on record. Consequently, this Office finds it proper to mitigate the penalty imposed upon petitioner from two (2) years to one (1) year suspension from participating in the overseas employment program of the government.”
(Rollo, p. 21)
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending and arguing that:
(1) Petitioners did not violate the terms and condition of their POEA approved contracts of employment;
(2) The execution of the “Letter of Indemnity for Seafarers” effectively bars the charge of contract violation against herein petitioners.
Undeterred by the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner now comes to Us arguing on the following submissions, to wit:
“IV. Statement of the Issues
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY HEREIN PETITIONER AND HIS FELLOW EX-CREWMEMBERS OF THE M/V “PRINCE NICOLAS”, AND IN FINDING THEM LIABLE FOR CONCERTED ACTION TO BREACH GOVERNMENT-APPROVED-CONTRACTS
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LETTERS OF INDEMNITY FOR SEAFARERS AS A BAR TO THE INSTITUTION OF THE INSTANT CASE.
(Rollo, pp. 7-8)
Petition denied.
Filipino Seamen are governed by the rules or regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) (Pentagon International Shipping Inc. vs. Adelantar, 435 SCRA 342). Indeed, we are in accord with the raciocination of public respondent in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which we hereby adopt as our own, thus:
“It bears emphasizing that petitioners are bound by the contracts they voluntarily entered and executed which is the POEA-approved Contract of Employment. The said contract embodied the terms and conditions and the rights conferred upon them with corresponding obligations particularly paragraph 4 thereof, which provides that:
‘All Claims, complainants or contorversies relative to the implementation of the overseas employment contract shall resolved through the Grievance Machinery in the Revised Employment Contract for Seafarers. If result of the procedure is unsatisfactory to any of the parties, it may be appealed to the management of the company or with the Philippine Labor Attache or consular officer overseas. This procedure shall be without prejudice to any action that the parties may take before the appropriate authority.’
It is long-established principle of law that parties are bound by the terms and conditions of their contract. In the absence of proof that the parties were coerced or tricked into signing the contract, it can be safely presumed that the parties entered into it on their own free will. Their consent having been freely given, parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated in the contract but also to the natural consequences thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioners, instead of referring their claims to the grievance machinery, used coercive measures to obtain their demands. This in itself is a violation of the specific provisions of the petitioners’ respective contract. And while the petitioners were exercising their constitutional right to organize, in order to improve the terms and conditions of their employment, this right should be weighed against the right of complainant under the contract they freely entered into. The petitioners’ actions hampered the smooth operation of the vessel.
This Office cannot give credence to the petitioners’ contention that the complainant is precluded from instituting any action against them by virtue of the letter of indemnity executed in their favor. The same was issued contrary to the free will of the complainant’s principal, and only to avoid delay, damage and further losses to the ship’s owner’s. The owner’s representative and the master were only compelled to accede to the petitioners’ demands under duress.
In view of all of these, and there being no new matters raised by the petitioners that will warrant the reversal of the Order sought to be reconsideration, this Office finds no cogent reason to reverse or disturb the pronouncement earlier made.”
(Rollo, pp. 24-25)
More so where public respondent, for humane considerations, mitigated petitioner’s breach of obligation by reducing the penalty imposed. Besides, in a petition for certiorari, the petitioner must prove not merely reversible error but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (A.F. Sanchez, Brokerage, Inc. vs. CA, 447 SCRA 427) And by grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction (Estrada vs. Desierto, 445 SCRA 655). There is no such showing in this case. What petitioner questions is an alleged erroneous judgment or conclusion of public respondent which cannot justify this petition.
The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court (Civil Service Commisison vs. Asensi, 433 SCRA 342).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered DISMISSED. With costs to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Asuncion-Vicente and Villon, JJ., concur.