ANTONIO A. NIEVA, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, HON. JUAN L. BOCAR AND SHERIFF OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition
for certiorari with preli­minary injunction to declare null and void an order of the former Court of First
Instance of Manila which allegedly modified a decision already final and executory.

Civil Case No.
73863, entitled Manila Banking Corporation versus Antonio Nieva and Ignacio
Arroyo was an action to recover P10,897.78 with interest at 14 percent per
annum until fully paid. The pro­missory
note evidencing the debt was originally for P8,000.00 only but because of
accrued interests, the alleged debt had increased to P10,897.78 when the action
was commenced. Ignacio Arroyo was
included in his capacity as guarantor for the payment of the amount in the
promissory note.

In addition to the defendants’ obligation on the note, the
plaintiff bank asked for the payment of attorney’s
fees allegedly incurred due to the refusal of the defendants to pay their
obliga­tion despite repeated demands. Costs of suit and incidental expenses for collection were also included.

The defendants admitted
the existence and due execution of the note. However, they denied the alleged refusal to pay the loan. According to them, their representations for
extension of pay­ment had been granted by the bank. They alleged that their outstanding obligation was less than
P10,897.78 inclusive of interest.

After hearing the case,
the respondent court issued its decision, the entirety of which is as follows:

“When this case was called for hearing this morning, a
document was submitted for the consideration of the Court which is a proposal
on the part of defendant Antonio Nieva to liquidate his obligation in favor of
the plaintiff in the following manner:

“a)  Payment of interests due on or before April 10, 1969;

“b)  Payment of the principal at the end of April,
or at the latest by the first week of
May, 1969.

“Plaintiff expressed its conformity to the proposal subject to
the condition that if said defendant fails to pay the interests on or before April 10, 1969, the full liability will be
final and executory.

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in accordance
with the terms above set forth and orders the parties to abide faithfully
therewith.”

Defendant Nieva filed a
manifestation question­ing the court’s jurisdiction considering that the
principal demand of the plaintiff was only P8,000.00. Nieva prayed for the setting aside of the decision and the
dismissal of the case. After
considering the manifestation and the opposition of the respondent bank,
the court denied Nieva’s prayer. No
appeal was taken from the decision.

After the decision had
already become final and executory, the plaintiff bank filed a motion for
execution which was granted by the court.

Thereafter, Manila
Banking Corporation filed an urgent ex-parte motion to clarify the decision
under execution. The respondent court
issued the questioned order and granted the motion. The order states:

“Upon consideration of plaintiff’s motion, the Court calls attention to the third paragraph of said decision, which
states as follows:

“‘Plaintiff expressed its conformity to the proposal subject
to the condition that if said defendant fails to pay the interests on or before
April 10, 1969 the full liability will be final and executory.’

“This part of the decision is based on the agreement submitted
to the Court, marked as Exh. ‘A’, where the following notation appears:

“‘Conforme upon the condition that in case of failure to pay
interest on or before April 10, 1969, let judgment
be rendered against defendant NIEVA for the full amount stated in the
complaint.’

“The decision, therefore, of March 25, 1969, includes
attorney’s fees, costs and other incidental expenses, said sums to earn
interest at one percent (1%) per month
as stated in plaintiff’s complaint.”

Nieva’s motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant
petition.

After the petitioner had
posted a bond of P2,000.00, we issued the preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition.

The petitioner attacks
the respondent court’s decision on two grounds: 1) lack of jurisdiction to try the case and 2) grave abuse of discretion in the court’s amending its decision
through the questioned order.

The issue of lack of
jurisdiction is premised on Section 44(c), Republic Act No. 296, as amended
which provides that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction:

“x x x in all cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more
than ten thousand pesos.”

The petitioner argues
that the principal amount sought to be recovered is P8,000.00
exclusive of interest, hence it is obvious that the respondent court had no jurisdiction to try the case.

The petitioner’s
arguments appear to be meritorious. However, considering that the petitioner had actively participated in
all stages of the proceedings in the trial court, he cannot, at this stage,
question the court’s jurisdiction. As a
matter of fact, Nieva was the one who
proposed what amounted to a
compromise agreement, which formed the basis of the decision after the
respondent bank agreed to the proposal. Only after the court had promulgated the decision did Nieva have second
thoughts which led to the manifestation raising the issue of jurisdiction. And when his manifestation was denied, he
did not pursue the denial and raise the matter to an appellate tribunal. Nieva allowed the decision to become final
and executory.

We ruled in Tajonera v. Lamaroza (110
SCRA 447):

“The rule is that jurisdiction is conferred by law and the
objection to the authority of the tribunal to take cognizance of a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the attendant
circumstances in the case at bar, petitioners are now barred from claiming lack
of jurisdiction at this stage with their active participation. They never questioned the authority of
respondents Leogardo, Jr. and Estrella throughout the duration
of the proceedings when they have the chance to do so. They never men­tioned lack of jurisdiction
in their memorandum of appeal, in their
motion for reconsideration or in their position paper. They are now estopped from raising such objection. It has
been held that a party cannot invoke
the juris­diction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and after failing to ob­tain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 35) The Court frowns
upon and does not tolerate the undesirable practice of some litigants who
submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when favorable to
them and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.”

The resolution of the
second ground raised by the petitioner hinges on whether or not the questioned
order altered the terms of the decision it was supposed to merely clarify. If it did, the respondent court in modifying
the decision exceeded its juris­diction (Concha v. Divinagracia, 107 SCRA 667).

The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in accordance
with the terms above set forth and orders the parties to abide faithfully
therewith.”

An examination of the
meaning of the aforesaid dispositive portion in the context of the decision
shows that the petitioner’s liability includes only:

1)  Payment of interests due on or before April
10, 1969; and

2)  Payment of the principal at the end of April
or at the latest by the first week of May, 1969,

and
in case the petitioner failed to pay on or before April 10, 1969, then the full liability becomes final and executory. The
loan was granted on August 11, 1965.

Accordingly, the full liability within the meaning of the decision has to be confined to the cited liability of the petitioner which, to
reiterate, are: 1) payment of the
interests due on or before April 10, 1969; and 2) payment of the principal at
the end of April or at the latest by the first week of May, 1969.

The decision as
“clarified” by the questioned order would in effect widen the scope
of the peti­tioner’s liability vis-a-vis the private respondent. The questioned order states:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“The decision therefore, of March 25, 1969, includes
attorney’s fees, costs and other incidental expenses, said sums to earn
interest at one percent (1%) per month
as stated in plaintiff’s complaint.”

The basis of this
“clarification” is an alleged notation supposedly based on an
agreement submitted to the court.

May the respondent court
after the decision had already become final and executory amend the same in the
manner it was amended?

It is hornbook doctrine
that “a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be
amended or corrected by the court except for cleri­cal
errors or mistakes and however erroneous it may be, cannot be disobeyed,
otherwise litigations would be endless and no questions could be considered
settled.” (Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474)

In the instant case, the
clarification granted by the lower court clearly altered substantially
the terms of the declaration. The
clarificatory order introduced new matters which were never touched upon in the
decision. In short, the challenged
order modified the original decision and in so doing, the respondent court
exceeded its jurisdic­tion. (Vda. de
Alcantara v. Somera, 106 SCRA 200)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned order is SET
ASIDE and the original decision REINSTATED. The petitioner is ordered to pay his liability under the promissory note
covering the loan in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00 PESOS with
interest at the rate of Twelve Percent (12%) per annum from
August 11, 1965 until fully paid. The
preliminary injunction issued in connection with the instant petition is made
PERMANENT. Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and Relova, JJ.,
concur.