A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. FROILAN JAPA, RESPONDENT.

On April 12, 1961,
respondent Froilan Japa filed with the Public Service Commission an
application for authority to operate eight TPU buses on the
Legaspi-Naga City line and vice-versa (Case No. 61-2694). This
application was opposed by petitioners, A. L. Anmen Transportation Co.,
Inc., Bicol Transportation Company, Inc. and Consolidated Auto Line,
Inc., which were under a joint management, upon the grounds that they
have a fleet of buses rendering adequate and satisfactory service over
the line applied for, and that the application, if granted, would only
result to cut-throat or ruinous competition.

During the
trial, applicant and his witness Medardo Alvarez testified that on
their several trips to and from the cities of Naga and Legaspi, they
observed that there were many passengers travelling along the line;
that in order that they could be accommodated on the Alatco buses of
petitioners they had to go to the starting points of said buses and
incur additional expenses because if passengers were to wait in places
other than the starting points they would not be picked up as
petitioners1 buses were almost full to capacity So much so that many
passengers were left behind, especially in the intermediate towns where
the buses passed; that although said buses sometimes stopped to pick up
passengers, not all could be accommodated because there was no more
space. To prove his financial capacity, applicant showed that he has
two stores located at Quezon Boulevard investing therein P150,000.00;
that he has P8,000.00 in the Philippine Savings Bank in Quiapo, and
P30,000.00 deposited in the Bank of Commerce, Hay a Branch; and that he
has a lot in Concha Street, Tondo, Manila, but the same has not as yet
been registered in his name.

Petitioners, on the other hand,
presented one witness, their Assistant to the Operations Manager Felipe
Abaño, who testified as follows: that petitioners are authorized
operators in the Naga-Legaspi line; that the Alateo is operating 34
round trips a day, the Bicol Transportation Co., 18 round trips, and
the Consolidated Auto Lines, 10 round trips; that besides petitioners
there are also other individual operators who make a total of 34 round
trips a day from Naga to Legaspi or other lines passing Naga and
Legaspi; that the first trip of any of the three companies start at
4:00 a.m. and every 15 minutes thereafter; that during the peak hours
the buses of oppositors-petitioners with 47-passenger capacity carry an
average load of 35 to 40 passengers while those 37-passenger capacity,
25 to 30 passengers; that during the lean hours said buses carry 20 to
25 and 15 to 20 passengers, respectively; that the peak hours in Naga
and Legaspi are from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.;
that buses of other operators when leaving Naga or Legaspi carry much
less number of passengers than those of oppositors; that buses of
petitioners, as well as those of other operators, get fully loaded in
the intermediate towns holding market days; that taking into
consideration the combined operations of oppositors and those
individual operators, the service is more than sufficient to serve the
needs of the travelling public along the Naga-Legaspi line. On cross
examination said witness stated that in the different municipalities
lying between Naga and Legaspi they hold market days every day of the
week, and in some instances two towns hold market days on the same day
and twice a week which greatly affected the volume of traffic along the
line applied for as passengers had to travel in order to reach the
market.

It was also brought out during the hearing, that some
of the individual operators on the route applied for had already
abandoned their service or had ceased operation. On the basis of the
evidence presented the Public Service Commission, on February 22, 1962,
rendered decision declaring that the approval of respondent’s
application would not only promote public interests in a proper and
suitable manner but would also serve as replacement of the abandoned
services; and finding applicant financially qualified to maintain and
operate tie proposed line it authorized him to operate four auto-trucks
instead of the eight originally applied for, subject to certain
conditions as stated in the decision.

Dissatisfied
with the foregoing decision, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review, assigning the following errors: (1) that the Public Service
Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the
applicant-respondent is financially qualified to operate and maintain
the proposed service; and (2) that Che Public Service Commission abused
its discretion in declaring that the proposed service would promote
public interest and replace the services of operators who had already
abandoned their operations.

We
believe that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be
sustained. The issues posed in this petition for review relate to
questions of facts affecting the findings made by the Public Service
Commission after considering the conflicting evidence of the parties
and the credibility of the witnesses presented. The record shows that
there is ample evidence that support the conclusions arrived at by the
Public Service Commission. This Court, reiterating rulings made in a
line of decisions, declared:

“It
appearing that the main issues raised by petitioners merely affect
questions of fact which by their very nature involve an evaluation of
the relative weight of the evidence of both parties, or the credibility
of the witnesses who testified before the Commission, following the law
and jurisprudence applicable to the matter in this jurisdiction, said
questions are now conclusive upon this Court, and cannot be looked
into, it appearing that there is sufficient evidence to support said
findings.”^[1] (M) Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. vs. Santiago Pepito, L-10481, September 29, 1962)

“The
only question to be determined is whether or not in the light of the
evidence adduced by both parties the Commission acted properly in
granting respondent a certificate of public convenience to operate a
TPU service on the Finamalayan-Bongabong line. “It is clear that the
issue posed by petitioners as stated above merely disputes the findings
of fact made by the Commission in its decision, and such being the case
it is evident that in the light of the ruling of this Court in a long
line of cases their petition cannot be sustained.” (Central Bus
Corporation, et al. vs. Cunanan,-L-15347, April 29, 1961)^[2]

Petitioners
lay much stress on their claim that respondent is financially incapable
to operate and maintain the proposed service. According to them, while
respondent may have a cash bank deposit of P38,000.00 and an investment
of P150,000.00 in his two stores, such assets cannot qualify him
financially to operate the line, for, possessed of no real property in
that the lot respondent alleged to own at Concha Street is not yet
registered in his name, no motor vehicle dealer or financing
corporation would extend to him credit for the acquisition of the units
because they will require real estate property as collaterals aside
from the motor vehicles.

This claim of petitioners cannot be sustained in the light
of the evidence appearing in the record that respondent had actually
acquired and registered the four units authorized by the Public Service
Commission in its decision of 1962 and has been operating the same in
the Naga-Legaspi line since then. And it appearing that when he was
granted the certificate of public convenience his assets was worth
P188,000.00 and was allowed to operate only four auto-trucks, We
believe that the Public Service Commission did not abuse its discretion
in ruling that respondent was financially capable to operate and
maintain the service.

“As to his finances,
the applicant testified that, aside from his farm, he had an annual
income of P5,000 from his business and he also had P10,000 invested in
gasoline which he could readily convert into cash. PANTRANCO argues
Chat P15,000 ‘is not enough to finance the fourteen units he intends to
utilize.’ But it should be noted that although applicant has asked for
fourteen units, the Commission has authorized him only five, and
according to applicant’s testimony, he has already purchased two
Chevrolet trucks from one Bundalan (registration of which is awaiting
the result of the present case) and one new Chevrolet from Liddel,
& Co., having) in addition, concluded an agreement for the
acquisition of ten more trucks from another bus operator, his uncle
Maximo L. Cruz, who is losing in his business. With this unrebutted
testimony, we cannot say that the Commission has erred in holding that
the applicant is financially capable of maintaining and operating the
proposed service.” (Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. De la-Cruz, 95 Phil., 278, 280)^[3]

On
September 28, 1964, during the pendency of this appeal, petitioners
filed a motion before this Court claiming that they have discovered
evidentiary documents which are material and relevant to the issue
regarding the financial capacity of the respondents. The petitioners
alleged that because of the failure of respondent to pay the
installments on the auto-trucks he acquired from the G. A. Machineries,
Inc. civil actions were instituted against him and in the three
decisions rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan it is
stated that some of the buses seized by the company be returned to
respondent provided that he pays dally the outstanding balance of his
obligation; that those buses not seized be surrendered to said company
in case respondent fails to pay the daily installments; and that the
mortgage of the certificate of public convenience issued to respondent
be maintained to secure the aforestated obligation. Petitioners prayed
that certified copies of these decisions be attached to the records of
this case and be taken into consideration in the determination of the
issue regarding the financial capacity of the respondent.

Required to comment, respondent filed his opposition to the aforementioned motion, contending that the alleged “recently discovered
evidentiary documents” should not be admitted and considered in the
determination of this case because even if respondent might have
suffered some reverses in his three years of operation, since the
original issue in this appeal was whether the Public Service Commission
had abused its discretion in declaring respondent financially capable to operate the service, the Court may decide the appeal solely on the
merits of the evidence regarding conditions obtaining at the time of
the hearing of the case and the rendition of the decision by Che
Commission.

We believe that respondent’s contention is
meritorious, these “recently discovered evidentiary documents” are
being introduced in this appeal, and this Court cannot admit them. Well
settled is the rule that “In reviewing a decision of Che Public Service
Commission, this Court is not required to examine the proof de novo
and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence
really justifies that decision. Our only function is to determine
whether or not there is evidence before the Commission upon which its
decision might reasonably be based. This Court will not substitute its
discretion for that of the Commission on questions of fact and will not
interfere in the letter’s decision unless it clearly appears that there
is no evidence to support it.” ^[4]Since the only function of this Court in reviewing the decision of the Public Service Commission is
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence before the Commission
upon which its decision can reasonably be based, as it is not required
to examine Che proof de novo, it is clear that the evidence that
should be considered by this Court should be only those presented
before the Public Service Commission. For, were we to consider this
“new” evidence which is presented only before this Court on appeal, as
suggested by petitioners, notwithstanding the fact that at the time the
Public Service Commission rendered its decision respondent was
financially capable to operate the service applied for, We would be
evaluating an evidence which the trial court did not have before it,
and certainly. We cannot declare that the Commission had abused its
discretion for failing to evaluate this evidence which the Commission
could not have foreseen.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Concepcion, C. J., Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Section 35, Public Service Act; Padua vs. Ocampo, et al., L-7570, September 17, 1955; Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., 104 Phil., 992; A. L. Ammen Transportation vs.
Soriano, L-12350, May 26, 1959; Pineda vs. Carandang, 107 Phil., 369;
Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Nestor, 107 Phil., 1136.

^[2] See also Flash Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Cruz, et al. L-15464 & L-16255, March 30, 1963; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Viluan, L-16243, March 31, 1964; La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. vs. Mendiola, L-19558, November 29, 1963.

^[3] See also Estrella vs. Public Service Commission, et al., L-12641, September 30, 1960.

^[4] Pineda vs. Carandang, L-13270-71, March 24, 1960; Ramos vs. Lat, et al., L-14476 & L-15773, May 23, 1960.