G.R. No. L-26764. July 26, 1967
BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. RURAL TRANSIT SHOP EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The present appeal by way of certiorari is an offshoot of events,
viz:
Respondent Union, Rural Transit Shop
Employees Association [together with its sister union, Rural Transit Employees
Association] went on strike on April
19, 1964, following the expiration of the 30-day legally prescribed
notice. The strike was called, upon the
unions’ claim that their economic demands failed of acceptance and that unfair
labor practices were committed by petitioner.
Conciliation at the Department of Labor failed.
On May 19, 1964,
upon the authority of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, the President of
the Philippines
certified the labor dispute to respondent Court of Industrial Relations [CIR]
for action. The dispute was docketed as
Case 48-IPA entitled “Rural Transit Employees Association and Rural
Transit Shop Employees Association, petitioners, versus Bachrach
Transportation Company, Inc. (operator
of the Rural Transit), respondents.”
The next day, May 20,
1964, the CIR issued an order directing –
“all the strikers to return to work
immediately upon the receipt of this order and the management to get them back
under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. While this dispute or investigation is
pending before the Court, the respondent company is restrained from dismissing
any employee, unless with the express authority of the Court.”
Not long after the strikers returned to work in obedience to the
two-pronged mandate just recited, petitioner started suspending and dismissing
traffic and shop employees without CIR ‘s express authority, and transferring
shop employees from the shop at the main terminal in Caloocan City
to provincial shops in Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, and Cagayan, and back
again. These acts triggered proceedings
ancillary to the main Case 48-IPA, as follows:
(1) 48-IPA (2) – Petition of the company to discharge
18 drivers, 13 conductors and 12 shop
employees, dated May 29, 1964;
(2) 48-IPA (3) – Petition of the unions against non-
assignment of certain strikers, dated
June
3, 1964;
(3) 48-IPA (4) – Petition of the unions against dismissal
and transfers of certain shop
employees
dated June 3, 1964;
(4) 48-IPA (8) &
48-IPA (14) – Petitions of the unions against the
suspension and subsequent dismissal
of a shop employee, dated June 12, 1964
and June 25, 1964, respectively;
(5) 48-IPA (9) – Petition of the unions against transfer
of certain shop employees, dated
June 12,
1964;
(6) 48-IPA (13) – Petition of the unions against transfer
of certain shop employees, G. Narni
and L. Palileo,
dated June 25, 1964;
(7) 48-IPA (15) – Petition of the unions against transfer
of certain traffic employees, dated
June
25, 1964;
(8) 48-IPA (19) – Petition of the unions against dismissal
of shop employees, dated July 21, 1964;
(9) 48-IPA (37) – Petition of the unions against dismissal
of a traffic employee, dated January 30,
1965;
(10) 48-IPA (38) – Petition of union
against dismissal of a
traffic employee, dated June 12, 1965;
(11) 48-IPA (39) – Petition of company
for dismissal of a
traffic employee, dated July 19, 1965;
(12) 48-IPA (40) – Petition of company
for dismissal of
traffic employees, dated July 19, 1965;
(13) 48-IPA (41) – Petition of unions
against dismissal of
certain traffic employees, dated August
23, 1965;
(14) 48-IPA (42) – Petition of union
against dismissal of a
traffic employee, dated January 31, 1966;
(15) 48-IPA (43) – Petition of union
against dismissal of a
shop employee, dated March 21, 1966;
(16) 48-IPA (44) – Petition of union
against dismissal of a
shop employee, dated March 28, 1966;
(17) 48-IPA (45) – Petition of union
against the transfers
of a shop employee who is
President
of the Shop Employees Union, dated
April 19, 1966.
Came the case of Feliciano R. Cruz, a senior employee, who had
been in petitioner’s service since 1952.
Never assigned except temporarily once in a while to inspect provincial
shops, Feliciano R. Cruz was, on July
14, 1966, transferred from the Caloocan main terminal to Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. This came
about, so respondent union avers, close on the heels of Feliciano R. Cruz’s presence on July 13, 1966 at the hearing of Incidental Case
No. 48-IPA (42) where his son Jose N. Cruz, complainant therein, started
testimony in his own (son’s) behalf.
On July 20, 1966, respondent union went to the CIR on urgent
petition for injunction [incidental Case 48-IPA (46)], this time with a prayer
that the company “be enjoined from transferring Feliciano R. Cruz and
other employees from the Main Terminal to provincial stations or vice-versa at
least during the pendency of the certified Case No.
48-IPA, without the prior approval of this Honorable Court”, and that they
be afforded “such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
under the premises.” On August 8, 1966, before this incidental Case 48-IPA
(46) could be heard on the merits, respondent union went back to court to
inform CIR that the injunction therein issued as far as Feliciano R. Cruz is
concerned has become moot and academic “in view of his subsequent
dismissal after he testified in his behalf”, which dismissal is the
subject of a new incidental proceeding – Case No. 48-IPA (47). The union then prayed that the petition for
injunction in Case 48-IPA (46) be thus construed to refer “to other
employees.”
On September 8, 1966,
after due hearing, CIR issued in incidental Case 48-IPA (46), the following
order:
“Without passing on the merits of the alleged acts of
harassment and in order to prevent further deterioration in the relationship
between the parties, the Court believes that respondent should refrain from
transferring its employees during the pendency of
Case No. 48-IPA.
WHEREFORE, while Case No. 48-IPA is pending before the Court, the
respondent Company is enjoined from transferring any member of petitioner from
the Main Terminal to the provincial stations or lines and vice-versa, unless
with the express authority of the Court.”
On October 10, 1966,
CIR en banc denied the company’s motion to reconsider the
foregoing order.
The company, in due course, elevated the case to this Court on
appeal by certiorari to set aside the orders of September 8, 1966 and October 10, 1966 of the CIR.
1. Petitioner makes its case along the following lines: CIR is wanting in authority to issue the
injunctive order of September 8, 1966;
therefore, certiorari lies to overturn that order.
The main case (48-IPA) was thrown on CIR’s
lap by presidential directive. It should
go without saying that the controlling statute is Section 10 of the Industrial
Peace Act (Republic Act 875), textually reading as follows:
“SEC. 10. Labor Disputes in Industries
Indispensable to the National Interest. – When in the opinion of the President of the
Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the
national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to
the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a
restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout
the employees, pending an investigation by the Court, and if no other solution
to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and
conditions of employment.”
The overwhelming implication from the quoted text of Section 10
is that CIR is granted great breadth of discretion in its quest for a solution
to a labor problem so certified. It is
within the allowable area of this discretion, that CIR issued its Order of May 20, 1964 in the main Case
48-IPA. Thus, CIR directed “all the
strikers to return to work immediately”, the management “to get them
back under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute
arose”; and, pending investigation of the dispute, the employer was
enjoined “from dismissing any employee, unless with the
express authority of the Court.” This
order was never directly disputed by petitioner.
But when incidental Case 48-IPA (46) [the case of Feliciano R.
Cruz] came, following a number of disturbing incidents, petitioner for the
first time raised its voice in protest.
Petitioner claims that CIR’s injunction
directed against transfer of employees is without authority in law. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that
such order was intended to stop acts that mar the process of solving the labor
problem at hand; to produce the salutary effect of preventing further
deterioration of the already deteriorated relationship between employer and
employees. This order, we perceive, is
but ancillary to the sometimes empiric process of compulsory arbitration. Said order was conceived as aid to the
eventual solution of the labor question in the principal case. To say now that the injunction here disputed
cannot be issued, is to abridge the power granted CIR under the terms of
Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act.
There is nothing new or unique in what we have just said. Talisay Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs.
CIR[1]
forged the doctrine that “where an action is ancillary [injunction of September 8, 1966 in incidental Case
48-IPA (46)] to a main action [48-IPA, the certified case] over which a court
has jurisdiction, no independent jurisdiction is needed to enable the court to
take cognizance of the ancillary action.” And this, because “[t]he
jurisdiction of the ancillary suit or proceeding is referrable
to or dependent upon the jurisdiction of the court over the principal suit or
proceeding. (United States v. Accord,
209 F. 2d 709 [1954]; Accord, Morrel v. United
Airline Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 [1939]).”
But petitioner complains that the injunctive order of September
8, 1966 interferes with the company’s internal operations; that said order
loses sight of the fact that the employees involved were shop and maintenance
employees of a common carrier; and that it could produce as a result the
company’s failure to discharge its duties with efficiency and with safety to
the riding public. Petitioner points
particularly to the injunction that no transfers may be made without court
authority. These, we believe, constitute
no cause for complaint.
For one, petitioner’s argument that rests on the proposition that
it is engaged in public transportation can work the other way. In an effort to break the back of a union, a
common carrier may resort to suspensions, transfers and dismissals of employees
without any regard at all to efficiency in service and safety to passengers. And this is not impossible either. Replacements are not usually
unavailable. To do away with such
danger, CIR, after presidential certification, should have the power to
effectively oversee the labor dispute to the extent that it can take care that
no further prejudice to national interest shall be caused.
And then, we prefer to think that the CIR Judges are not
insensible to legitimate representations made in line with efficient service
and the interest of the riding public, and to act thereon with dispatch. And, if, as in this case, CIR, after weighing
the evidence before it, and inspite of the fact that
petitioner is a common carrier, issued the order – to arrest “further
deterioration in the relationship between the parties” – then we must say
that we should not interfere with CIR’s discretion. It is impermissible for us to do so; we
should not tamper with the statutory scheme.
2. Petitioner’s posture is vulnerable, viewed from another
direction.
The presidential certification under Section 10 of Republic Act
875, brings the dispute under the operation of Commonwealth Act 103. For, the case is one for compulsory
arbitration.
Pertinent to be borne in mind is that Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act 103 accords CIR jurisdiction –
“to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and/
or affecting employers and employees.”
Section 20 thereof grants CIR –
“powers as generally pertain to a
court of justice; Provided, however, That in hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities.”
CIR’s jurisdiction here is not limited
to the prevention of strikes and lockouts, to fix the terms and conditions of
employment. Rather, we say that the
broad sweep of the statutory precepts just quoted unquestionably gives CIR
power to explore ways and means to enhance solution of a labor dispute. This is but in pursuance of CIR’s duty – in a specific case
certified by the President under Section 10,
Republic Act 875 – to channel its attention to disposal of the dispute, in the
public interest. There is no reason then
why the hands of CIR should be unduly shackled; as there is no reason why it
should be prevented from stopping transfers, suspensions or dismissals of
employees by the employer without court approval while the main labor case
remains pending. And again, to reach a
solution of the certified labor dispute, wide powers and jurisdiction are
granted CIR.[2]
What will happen if, pending solution of such a labor controversy,
piecemeal dismissals or suspensions or indiscriminate transfers are resorted
to? The ills sought to be remedied by
presidential certification will surely be aggravated. One of the parties may even be forced out of
existence. National interest will suffer
thereby.
Legalistic and practical considerations prop up the questioned
order of September 8, 1966. Because, that order does not deny the
employer’s right – if properly exercised – to transfer its employees; said
order simply requires court approval.
Evidently, court approval was intended to forestall unjustified
transfers; to protect the union members from harassment; and then, too, to
prevent the use of a strong arm in retaliation against, if not to bust, the
union itself. That order, indeed, has
but the beneficent effect of simply maintaining the parties in their status
quo until the labor dispute shall have been disposed of. And jurisdiction stands.
3. Petitioner presses the argument that there is no showing of
unfair labor practice on petitioner’s part; and that, accordingly, the order of
September 8, 1966 should be
set aside.
It will be recalled that the disputed order expressly states that
CIR did not pass on the merits of the alleged acts of harassment the unions
imputed upon petitioner. Nothing in the
record would show that the numerous incidental cases heretofore listed have
been disposed of. But, the fact that
unfair labor practice has not as yet been conclusively established did not take
jurisdiction away from CIR. For, CIR’s jurisdiction under Section 10 is separate and apart
from its jurisdiction in unfair labor practice cases.
The unifying expositor of the law on the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations, following the passage of the Industrial Peace
Act, is Campos vs. Manila
Railroad Co., L-17905, May
25, 1962. The language we
there employed was:
“We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the bench and
the bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire
jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. 875, the
following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the parties
an employer-employee relationship, or the claimant must seek his reinstatement;
and (b) the controversy must relate to a
case certified by the President to the
CIR as one involving national interest, or must
have a bearing on an unfair labor
practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or
under the Minimum Wage Law. In default
of any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.”[3]
The foregoing pronouncement in Campos,
made after a review of previous cases on CIR jurisdiction,[4]
was echoed and reechoed in subsequent cases.[5]
It is well to note that, by settled jurisprudence, the
jurisdiction of CIR in labor cases certified by the President under Section 10,
Republic Act 875, is totally independent of its jurisdiction in
cases involving unfair labor practice.
This clinches respondents’ submission that there is no necessity for a
showing of unfair labor practice in order that CIR can provide for injunctive
relief upon the powers granted under Section 10, Republic Act 875.
4. Petitioner assails the order of September 8, 1966 also because of non-compliance with the
terms of Section 9 (d), Republic Act 875, reproduced as follows:
“(d) No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, as herein defined except after hearing the testimony of
witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross examination) in support of
the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition
thereto, if offered, and except after finding of fact by the Court, to the
effect:
(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will
be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued
unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be
issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or
persons, association, or organization making the threat or committing the
unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s
property will follow;
(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be
inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon
defendants by the granting of relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) That the public officers charged
with the duty to protect complainant’s property
are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.”[6]
We cannot conceive of any justifiable reason for reading the
foregoing statutory provision as controlling CIR’s
jurisdiction to issue the injunction under the next succeeding section –
Section 10, Republic Act 875. The two,
Section 9 (d) and Section 10, both of Republic Act 875, are separate and
entirely distinct legal precepts. The
one is not an adjunct of or dependent on the other. Section 9 (d) treats of injunctions in
ordinary labor disputes; Section 10 deals exclusively with special labor cases,
– “Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to
the National Interest” – which require certification
by the State’s Chief Executive.
Then, Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act gives CIR authority
to issue restraining orders apart from, and without any reference to, the
requirements in Section 9 (d). The
absence of such requirements in Section 10 is reason enough to show legislative
intent: no such requirements need be
shown. Section 10, written in clear
language, precludes resort to legal hermeneutics. This Court may not intrude into the
legislative domain.
Furthermore, Section 9 (d) speaks of unlawful acts. The words unlawful acts mean
violence, breaches of the peace, and similar criminal acts; but do not include
a general reference to anything that may be considered illegal.[7]
This definition finds support in the fifth requisite in Section 9 (d), which
requires as a condition the inability of public officers to furnish adequate protection. And adequate protection is summoned where
violence, breaches of the peace and allied acts are resorted to.
Finally, if the rule were as petitioner would want it to be, then
no injunction may issue under Section 10 unless “unlawful acts [as thus
defined] have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or have
been committed and will be continued unless restrained.” Such a
construction does violence to the wording of Section 10, and will substantially
curtail CIR’s power to create a favorable climate for
the proper determination of labor disputes certified by the President. Because then a strike or lockout if carried
on in an orderly manner – without the attendant “unlawful acts” – can
never be restrained. The overriding
consideration in the issuance of injunctions under Section 10 aforesaid, is
national interest. It would suffice
under that statutory provision if injunction is issued as an aid to the
disposal of a certified labor dispute in industries indispensable to national
interest.
We are thus left under no doubt that CIR may exercise the powers
conferred upon it by Section 10 of Republic Act 875 independent of whether or
not the conditions set forth in Section 9 (d) of the said Act are present.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we vote to affirm the
orders of September 8, 1966
and October 10, 1966 under
review, and to deny the petition for certiorari by way of appeal therefrom.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on leave, did not take part.
[1]
L-21582, November 29, 1966.
[2]
PAFLU vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, 860-862; Philippine Maritime Radio Officers
Association vs. CIR, 102 Phil. 373, 382-383; Bisaya
Land Transportation Co., Inc. vs. CIR, 102 Phil. 438, 442; Hind Sugar
Co., Inc. vs. CIR, L-13364, July 26, 1960; Feati
University vs. Bautista, L-21278, L-21462 and L-21500, December 27,
1966.
[3]
Underscoring supplied.
[4]
PAFLU vs. Tan, supra, at p. 862; PRISCO vs. CIR, L-13806, May 23, 1960; Sy
Huan vs. Bautista, L-16115, August 29, 1961.
[5] Naguiat vs. Arcilla,
L-16602, February 28, 1963; Araullo vs. Monte
de Piedad Savings Bank, L-17840, April 23, 1963; Barranta vs. International Harvester Company of the
Philippines, L-18198, April 22, 1963; National Mines & Allied Workers’
Union vs. Philippine Iron Mines, Inc., L-19372, October 31, 1964;
Mercado vs. Elizalde & Co., Inc., L-18962,
December 23, 1964; Oriental Tin Cans Workers’ Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, L-17695, February 26, 1965; Edward J. Nell Corporation vs.
Cubacub, L-20842, June 23, 1965; Bay View Hotel,
Inc. vs. Manila Hotel Workers’ Union, L-21803, December 17, 1966.
[6]
Underscoring supplied.
[7]
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 229
F. 2d 901, 905. See: Wilson
& Co. vs. Birl, 105 F. 2d 948, 950-951.