THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PORFIRIO DUMDUM, JR. AND RENATO PERALTA, DEFENDANTS WHOSE DEATH SENTENCES ARE UNDER REVIEW.

People versus Dumdum

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Porfirio Dumdum, Junior and Renato Peralta, two prisoners of the national penitentiary who, by their own confessions, waited for and then stabbed to death a fellow prisoner in the prison compound. They pleaded guilty to murder, were sentenced to death, and the records were elevated to the Supreme Court for review because the penalty imposed was death. The case matters for two reasons. First, it teaches how far a trial court must go to guard against an improvident plea of guilty. Second, it fixes the rule that quasi-recidivism, a special aggravating circumstance, drives the penalty for murder to the maximum, and that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender cannot pull it back down.

Procedural History

A special prosecutor filed an information for murder against Dumdum and Peralta in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. At their arraignment, assisted by a counsel de oficio, the information was read to them in Tagalog, and both pleaded guilty. The trial judge questioned each of them separately, warned them that under the law the death penalty was the only alternative, and then pronounced judgment of conviction in open court. Only afterwards did the court hold a hearing and receive the prosecution's evidence, namely the two confessions, the necropsy report, the photographs of the wounds, and the two improvised bladed weapons. The two accused did not appeal. Because the sentence was death, the case came to the Supreme Court on automatic review, and counsel de oficio filed a brief on their behalf.

Facts

At about one o'clock in the afternoon of September 7, 1971, Dionisio Macadangdang, thirty eight years old, was stabbed inside the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal. He had come from the hospital and was on his way to the vocational school when he passed in front of the Four Square Chapel. He fell into the gutter with a bladed weapon sticking in his back. He sustained three incised wounds, on the neck, the right arm, and the left hand, and eight stab wounds, four on the chest, one on the abdomen, one on the right shoulder, and two in the lumbar region. The chest wounds, which affected his heart, lung, liver, and stomach, were fatal, and he died at the prison hospital.

Dumdum, twenty four years old, a native of Bacolod City serving sentence for theft, and Peralta, twenty one years old, a native of Iloilo City serving sentence for robbery, were both members of the Happy Go Lucky gang. They were investigated that same afternoon. In their confessions they declared that they waited for the victim and assaulted him as he passed the chapel. Dumdum stabbed him three times on the chest and abdomen with an improvised bladed weapon. Peralta stabbed him five times with an improvised double bladed weapon, which he left in the victim's back as he ran away.

The killing was planned an hour before it was carried out, and the motive was revenge. The two purposed to avenge the stabbing of Lolito Fabella, the mayor of their gang, by the Tagalog group belonging to the Komando and Bahala gangs. The information alleged that the two accused, while confined in prison and as confederates armed with improvised weapons, treacherously assaulted Macadangdang, who was unarmed, and that premeditation attended the crime.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of their plea of guilty, there being no showing that they were properly arraigned and aware of the gravity of the offense charged.
• Whether or not the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt, and the crime properly qualified as murder.
• Whether or not the death penalty was correctly imposed despite the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender.
• Whether or not the irregularity of pronouncing judgment immediately after the plea, before receiving the prosecution's evidence, vitiates the judgment of conviction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The Court held that this provision does not reach the confessions in this case, because they were taken before the Constitution took effect, and the accused never impugned their voluntariness.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the contention has no merit. The trial court complied with its duty to see to it that the accused did not make any improvident plea of guilty. The information was read to them in a dialect they knew, they were assisted by counsel, and the judge asked each of them separately whether they understood that they would be punished. Their judicial confessions were in any event confirmed by the prosecution's evidence, which was sufficient for conviction even had they not pleaded guilty.

On the second issue, the Court held that guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. The crime is murder, qualified by treachery, which absorbs abuse of superiority, because the two deliberately carried out a surprise assault on an unarmed victim without giving him a chance to defend himself.

On the third issue, the Court held that even setting aside evident premeditation, the penalty would still be death because of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, which justifies the imposition, in the maximum period, of the penalty for murder, ranging from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. For that same reason, the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender could not preclude the death penalty.

On the fourth issue, the Court acknowledged that the trial court committed an irregularity in pronouncing judgment in open court immediately after the plea and only later requiring the prosecution to present evidence. That irregularity, however, does not justify setting aside a conviction supported by the judicial and extrajudicial confessions and by other evidence. The Court advised trial judges not to follow that erroneous, reverse procedure: the evidence of the prosecution should be presented after the arraignment, and judgment should be rendered and promulgated only after the fiscal has presented his evidence and the court has ascertained that the defense is presenting none.

Doctrine

A plea of guilty is not improvident where the information is read in a language the accused understands, counsel assists them, and the judge ascertains that they know the consequences of the plea. Even so, the trial court should receive the prosecution's evidence after the arraignment and before judgment, and a judgment rendered in reverse order is irregular but not void where the evidence independently supports conviction. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance that compels the penalty for murder to be imposed in its maximum period, and it neutralizes the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. Finally, the exclusionary rule in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to confessions taken before its effectivity.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting both accused of murder and sentencing each to death, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize this line: quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance that pushes murder to the maximum penalty and is not offset by plea of guilty or voluntary surrender. Examiners use this case to test the improvident plea of guilty and the correct order of arraignment, evidence, and judgment.