REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ARTEMIO M. AGONCILLO, LORENZA Q. AGONCILLO, TEOFISTA QUIZON, ARTEMIO AGONCILLO, JR., GRACIANO CALICDAN, WALDEMAR AGONCILLO …

The basic legal question that has to be resolved in this appeal
by the Republic of the Philippines
from a lower court decision is whether or not the constitutional right against
being twice put in jeopardy^[1]
may be relied upon, it being shown that defendants had been proceeded against
in a pre­vious case, which was provisionally dismissed.  Its invocation did suffice to call for an
adverse decision in a state action for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379,^[2]
the first of the basic statutes intended to minimize, if not to put an end to,
the incidence of graft and corruption in the public service.  Such a law, according to this Court, is criminal
or penal in character.^[3]
While the bar against double jeopardy may therefore be invoked by a defendant,
still the lower court, as will be shown, was not sufficiently mindful of
authoritative precedents.  As a result,
its decision is vitiated by an infirmity that calls for its reversal.

The complaint by the Republic of the Philippines
against the principal defendant, Artemio M. Agoncillo, an official of the Bureau of Customs, was filed
on October 18, 1962.^[4]
There was a detailed account of his total cash receipts from 1950 to 1959 and
of his disbursements during such period as well as of the properties allegedly
unlawfully acquired during such incumbency, with the ownership thereof
concealed by being recorded not only in the name of his wife but likewise of
the other defendants, his sons, Waldemar and Artemio Agoncillo, Jr.; his
sister-in-law, Teofista Quizon;
his sister, Rosario Agoncillo; and her spouse, his
brother-in-law, Graciano Calicdan.^[5]
The prayer was for “a writ command­ing defendants to show cause why the
above described properties, presumed prima facie under Republic
Act No. 1379 to have been unlawfully acquired by defendant Artemio
M. Agoncillo as a public officer, should not be
declared property of the State; and after due proceedings, to render judgment
declaring said properties valued in the amount of P130,018.08 was un­lawfully
acquired but concealed in the names of his co-defendants, and which they may
not be able to explain as having been lawfully acquired by them, forfeited in
favor of the State; and by virtue thereof, to adjudge that said properties
shall belong to the State.”^[6]

The defendants duly filed their respective answers, denying the
unlawful acquisition of the aforesaid properties, the main special defense
being the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379 as an ex post
facto law and a bill of attainder. 
Thereafter, on March 4, 1963, defendants Artemio
Agoncillo, Lorenza Q. Agoncillo, Artemio Agoncillo, Jr. and Waldemar Agoncillo filed a manifestation of this tenor:  “1. That on December 10, 1962, the
above-named defendants filed an Answer in the above-entitled case; 2. That the
Answer filed by said defendants alleged grounds for a Motion to Dismiss; 3.
That in addition to the ground therein stated the following is further alleged;
(a) That the defendants are in danger of being put in jeopardy for the same
offense by reason of the refiling of the instant
case.  The Supreme Court has made a
ruling on the fact that R. A. No. 1379 is a penal law.  As such, therefore, all the rights pertaining
to an accused in a criminal case are available to defendants charged under said
law.  In the instant case, the defendants
will be placed in jeopardy for the same offense in that:  (1) Civil Case No. 52002 is the same as Civil
Case No. 44686 which was dismissed pre­viously; (2) The defendants had already
pleaded in the original case in the form of an Answer; (3) That the case was
dismissed after the plaintiff failed to present evidence on the date of trial
which is considered as an adjudication on the merits.”^[7]

It was on the basis of the above manifestation that the decision
of the lower court of September 30, 1966, dismissing the case, was
predicated.  It stated that defendants
having been previously charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 1379, which
was held penal in character under a valid complaint filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction to which they had thereafter pleaded, with such case
having been dismissed without their express consent, the plea of double
jeopardy would lie.  The lower court then
felt it had “no other alterna­tive but to dismiss the instant case, the
same having been barred by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 44686.”^[8]
From this decision, the Republic, as noted, appealed.

Unfortunately such a decision failed to take into account that
the complaint alleged that the 1960 previous action for forfeiture, docketed as
Civil Case No. 44686 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, was
“dismissed without prejudice * * *.”^[9]
Such an allegation was expressly admitted in the answer of defendant Teofista Quizon,^[10]
and of defendants Artemio Agoncillo,
Lorenza Q. Agoncillo, Artemio Agoncillo, Jr., and Waldemar Agoncillo.^[11]
It appeared that in the previous case, the lower court judge taking note that
the Solicitor entrusted with the prosecution needed additional time for a more
thorough study of the case took such a step, the parties thus being chargeable
with knowledge that a new action could thereafter be filed.  Such dismissal, being without prejudice, the
lower court in the present suit instituted after­wards ought not to have
sustained the claim of twice being put in jeopardy.  It could not have been the basis of a
favorable judgment for defendants.  We
must, as mentioned, reverse the appealed decision.

1.  This Court adheres to its
pronouncement in Cabal v. Kapunan,^[12]
Speaking through the then Associate, now Chief Justice, Concepcion,
it was categorically held:  “As a
consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the
obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.”^[13]

2.  Nor can there be any
difference of view as to the significance to be attached to the jeopardy clause
of the Constitution on which insistence is laid by defendants.  The assumption is that after a trial, the
accused is either found guilty or freed of the criminal charge against
him.  If the former, he should expiate
for his offense.  If the latter, the law
leaves him alone to enjoy the liberty that is his by right.  In its solicitude for the welfare of every
human being, there is the further protection that this constitutional provision
affords.  He is safeguarded from the risk
entailed by a new prosecution upon his being acquitted or convicted to follow
the express language of the Constitution or upon the case against him being
terminated in any other manner without his consent.  Thus he is spared from the anguish and
anxiety as well as the expense unavoidable in any new indictment for that
offense.  The constitutional mandate is
thus a rule of finality.  A single
prosecution for any offense is all the law allows.  It protects an accused from harassment,
enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life,
either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is
imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and
expense-producing for the state as well. 
It has been referred to as “res judicata dressed in prison grey.”^[14]
The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it
pleases the state to do so.

It is the peril of being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense that the Constitution guards against, not for the same act,
except where it is punishable by law or ordinance in which case, conviction or
acquittal under either bars another prosecution thereof.  As to when such is the case, the answer as
supplied by the then Chief Justice Moran speak­ing for the Supreme Court in Melo v. People.^[15]
The rule is that “not only [must] the second offense charged [be] exactly
the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical.”^[16]
He went on to state:  ”There is identity
between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other.”^[17]
So the “same-evidence” test requires. 
That criterion has been restated and expanded in the Rules of Court with
the express mention of “any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”^[18]

3.  Nonetheless, the reliance
by defendants, now appellees, on this constitutional
right is misplaced.  It is true jeopardy
had attached with a valid complaint having been filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction and defendants having been thereafter arraigned and pleaded.^[19]
It had not terminated, though.  There was
neither conviction nor acquittal.  There
was thereafter a dismissal without prejudice. 
Defendants knew, or ought to have known, that the complaint could thus
be filed again.  They could have
objected; they did not.  Had they stood
fast on what they conceived to be their rights as defendants, things might have
been different.  Matters could have
definitely ended then and there.  The
jeopardy clause could have been there­after appropriately invoked.  The dismissal would have been unconditional
in character.^[20]
That is not however how things developed. 
What transpired instead was a dismissal clearly without prejudice.  At the very least, defendants were in estoppel.^[21]

So it has been held repeatedly by this Court.  In Jaca v. Blanco,^[22]
Justice Ozaeta, who penned the opinion, after setting
forth Sec. 9 of Rule 113, now Sec. 9 of Rule 117, stated:  “We hold that the dismissal contemplated
in the above-quoted section of the rule is a definite or unconditional dismissal
which terminates the case, and not a dismissal without prejudice as in the
present case.  In the absence of any
statutory provision to the contrary, we find no reason why the court may not,
in the interest of justice, dismiss a criminal case provisionally, i.e.,
without prejudice to rein­stating it before the order becomes final or to the
subsequent filing of a new information for the same offense.  If the accused should deem such conditional
or provisional dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him because he has
been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, as for instance where the case
has dragged on for an unreason­ably long time without his fault, he could and
should object to such dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided
on the merits.  Upon such objection and
insistence of the accused, if the prosecution does not present its evidence and
if its failure to do so is unjustified, the court should dismiss the case for
failure to prosecute.  Such dismissal
would come under the purview of section 9, Rule 113.”^[23]
Then came Co Te Hue v. Encarnacion,^[24]
where this Court, through Justice Bautista Angelo, after referring to People v.
Romero,^[25]
declared:  “There is more weighty
reason to uphold the theory of reinstatement in the present case than in that
of Romero considering the particularity that the dismissal was provisional in
character.  In our opinion that is not
the dismissal contemplated by the rule that has the effect of barring a
subsequent prosecution.”^[26]

At any rate, the authoritative pronouncement in the relatively
recent case of People v. Obsania,^[27]
with Justice Castro as ponente, had made clear
beyond doubt that for a dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the
Constitution, it must have the effect of an acquittal.  Thus: 
“The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under
consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the
dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed
that the Government did not have a case against the accused, who, in the first
place, is presumed innocent.”^[28]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of September
30, 1966 dismissing this complaint, is hereby reversed and the case is remanded
to it for appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, and
Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., in the result.

Barredo and
Makasiar, JJ., did
not take part.

Dizon, J., on official leave.

^[1]
According to the Constitution:  “No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.” Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 20.

^[2]
Enacted in 1955, Republic Act No. 1379 decrees forfeiture in favor of the state
of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee.  Thereafter, Congress, in 1960,
enacted Republic Act 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifying
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike that can be so
characterized.

^[3]
Cabal v. Kapunan, L-19052, Dec. 29, 1962, 6
SCRA 1059.

^[4]
His wife, Lorenza Q. Agoncillo,
was likewise named as one of the defendants.

^[5]
Complaint, Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13.

^[6] Ibid,
pp. 13-14.

^[7] Ibid,
p. 30.

^[8] Ibid,
p. 49.

^[9] Ibid,
p. 13.

^[10]
Answer of Teofista Quizon,
par. 8, Ibid, p. 16.

^[11]
Answer of aforesaid defendants, par. 22, Ibid, p. 23.

^[12]
L-19052, Dec. 29, 1962, 6
SCRA 1059.

^[13] Ibid,
p. 1064.  The concluding paragraph of the
opinion of the Chief Justice reads: 
“We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda v. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962), in which
the theory that, after the filing of respondents’ answer to a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to
substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this
Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature.  This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural
aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the
respondents therein, particularly their constitutional right against
self-incrimination.” Ibid, p. 1067.

^[14]
Cf. Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale Law Journal 262, 277 (1965).

^[15]
85 Phil. 766 (1950).  This decision is
authority for the view that an amended information for homicide may be filed
after the death of the victim, even if in the mean while the accused had
already pleaded not guilty to a frustrated homicide charge.

^[16] Ibid,
p. 768.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18]
Rule 117, Sec. 9, Rules of Court.  There
is this further clarification in the Rules: 
“An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged
in the complaint or information, consti­tute the latter.  And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.” Rule 120,
Sec. 5.

^[19]
Cf. People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933).

^[20]
According to Sec. 9 of Rule 117, Rules of Court:  “When a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of
competent juris­diction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the con­viction or acquittal of the
defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
there­of, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”

^[21]
Cf. People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534
(1953).  The said Acierto
ruling, according to Justice Castro in People v. Obsania,
L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249, “was reiterated in People v.
Amada Reyes, et al. (96 Phil. 827, April 30, 1955); People v. Reyes, et
al. (98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956); People v. Casiano
(L-15309, February 16, 1961), and People v. Archilla
(L-15632, February 28, 1961).” Ibid, p. 1261.

^[22]
86 Phil. 452 (1950).

^[23] Ibid,
pp. 454-455.

^[24]
94 Phil. 258 (1954).

^[25]
89 Phil. 672 (1951).

^[26]
94 Phil. 258, 261 (1954).

^[27]
L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23
SCRA 1249.

^[28] Ibid,
p. 1273.