THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE LUIS ARCHILLA ALIAS CHINO SANTOS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. ALFREDA ROBERTS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On March 6, 1959, defendants Jose Luis Archilla and Alfreda Roberts
were charged with bigamy before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
province as follows:

“That on or about the
26th day of May, 1958 in the Municipality of Lucena, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Jose Luis Archilla alias Chino Santos,
being previously united in lawful marriage with the undersigned Luz Mat
Castro de Archilla, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Alfreda Roberts, who likewise has
previous knowledge that her co-accused Jose Luis Archilla’s marriage
with the undersigned is still valid and subsisting.”

After entering a plea of not guilty Alfreda Roberts, through her
counsel, filed a motion praying that the complaint be quashed with
regard to her on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute the offense charged. After the prosecution had filed its
opposition, the court, in sustaining the motion, ruled:

“There
being no allegation in the complaint that insofar as Alfreda Roberts is
concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla was her second marriage,
it is clear that she has committed no offense and should be discharged
from the complaint. The allegation of the complaint that Alfreda
Roberts ‘who likewise has previous knowledge that her co-accused Jose
Luis Archilla’s marriage with the undersigned is still valid and
subsisting’ is not a sufficient, statement of an offense for which this
defendant may be prosecuted and convicted.”

The denial to reconsider the above order precipitated this appeal.

The prosecution contends that the lower court erred in quashing the
information with regard to Alfreda Roberts because although it is not
alleged therein that her marriage to her co-accused was her second the
former being still valid, nevertheless, her act of contracting the
second marriage with Archilla with knowledge of the fact that his
former marriage was still valid constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy which makes her responsible as
an accomplice. But appellee contends that, even if that were true, the
quashing of the information amounts to her acquittal which prevents the
prosecution from taking an appeal as it would place her in jeopardy of
being punished twice for the same offense. She prays that the appeal be
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.

Granting arguendo
that appellee may be prosecuted for bigamy as an accomplice under the
information filed by the government prosecutor because it is alleged
therein that she married her co-accused with knowledge of the fact that
the latter was previously married and the marriage still subsisting and
that it was error for the lower court to quash the information on the
alleged ground that it does not allege all the elements necessary to
constitute the offense against appellee, the latter however cannot now
be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the
trial court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have
committed. In other words, appellee cannot adopt a posture of double
dealing without running afoul with the doctrine of estoppel. It is well
settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt
a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.^[1]
Consequently, appellee is now estopped from invoking the plea of double
jeopardy upon the theory that she would still be convicted under an
information which she branded to be insufficient in the lower court.

There is a parallelism between this case and that of People vs.
Acierto (92 Phil., 534; 49 Off. Gaz., [2] 518). Acierto was accused
before a U. S. Court Martial for having defrauded the government of the
United States, thru falsification of a document within a military base
of the United States in the Philippines. Despite his objection to the
jurisdiction of said court, he was tried and convicted. On review, the
sentence was reversed by the Commanding General, who did not sustain
Acierto’s conviction. Subsequently, accused of estafa and falsification
of documents before one of our courts of first instance, Acierto was
again convicted: On appeal to the Supreme Court, he raised the plea of
former jeopardy and want of jurisdiction alleging that the authority
that had jurisdiction to try his case was the Court Martial of the
United States. In overruling this pretense this Court held:

“This
is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military
trial. As stated, he there attacked the court martial’s jurisdiction,
and thanks to his objection, so we incline to believe, the commanding
general, upon consultation of, the Judge Advocate General in
Washington, disapproved the court martial proceedings.

*           *           *           *           *           *           *

“Construction
of the United States Military Law by the Judge Advocate General or the
United States Army is entitled to great respect, to say the very least.
When such construction is a disclaimer of the jurisdiction under the
Bases Agreement, the Philippine Government certainly is not the party
to dispute it; the fewer the rights asserted by the United States the
more is enhanced the dignity of the Philippines and its interest
promoted.

“Irrespective of the correctness of the view of the Military authorities, the
defendant was estopped from demurring to the Philippine court’s
jurisdiction and pleading double jeopardy on the strength of his trial
by the court martial. A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of
justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result
in brazen deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to
the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith, for an
accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him and, after
he has succeeded in his effort, to the court to which he has been
turned over the first has committed error in yielding to his plea.

“From
another angle, it seems immaterial whether or not the court martial had
jurisdiction of the accused and his crimes under the terms of the Bases
Agreement. Granting that it had, the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City nevertheless properly and legally took cognizance of the
cases and denied the defendant’s motion to quash.” (Italics supplied.)

With regard to the question whether under the information filed against
appellee she can be prosecuted for bigamy even if it does not allege
that her marriage to her co-accused is her second marriage, the
authorities are clear that she can if it is averred that she married
her co-accused knowing that the latter’s former marriage is still valid
and subsisting. (Viada, Codigo Penal de 1870, p. 561; Francisco’s
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 1515, Part 2, Book II; Guevara’s
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, pp. 757-758.)

Wherefore, the order appealed from dated May 5, 1959 is set aside and
the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. No costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Williams vs. McMicking, 17 Phil., 408; Molina vs. Somes, 24 Phil., 49; Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil., 424; American Express vs. Natividad, 46 Phil., 208; Toribio vs. Decasa, 55 Phil., 416; San Agustin vs. Barrios, 68 Phil., 475; Jimenez vs. Bucoy, 103 Phil., 40; Northern Motors, Inc. vs. Prince Line, 107 Phil., 253; Medel vs. Calasanz, 109 Phil., 348.

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BENGZON, ACTING C. J.:

I think the appeal should be dismissed, because appellee has already
been once in jeopardy within the meaning of Rule 118, Sec. 2 and Rule
113, Sec. 9.

The information described an offense, as
rightly found by the majority decision. Is the accused estopped,
because she claimed in the court below that the information described
no offense? With all due respect, I say no, because there is no estoppel on questions of law.

The Acierto case, wherein the accused was held to be in estoppel partly involved one question of fact; whether the accused was in the employ of the army.

And yet, if estoppel is to be applied, why not apply it to the people too? It claimed in the lower court that the information described an offense; and it should be held to that view.

The principle is invoked of impermissible change of Theories. But this accused is not changing
her theory. She merely presents the issue of second jeopardy, which was
not discussable in the court below. She maintained there was no
offense. She still says so now. However, she argues, if the acts described an offense, this appeal may not be entertained, because it would be a second jeopardy.

My point is: she pleaded to a valid information; she may not be
required to plead again through this appeal. That the dismissal was
erroneous, is immaterial. What is the use of the protection against
double jeopardy?

Supposing that the trial was had, that the
prosecution proved that facts alleged in the information and that,
thereafter, defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that no offense
was committed because the facts did not constitute bigamy. Suppose
further, that the judge (erroneously, as we find) dismissed the case
upon that ground. May the fiscal appeal? No, undoubtedly according to
U.S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil., 67. The difference between
such situation and this appeal is that here, no witness has testified;
and yet that is immaterial because under Rule 113, sec. 9, the
declaration of one witness is no longer essential for jeopardy to
attach. (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil., 851.)

This decision, I believe, seriously dents the shield against double jeopardy which in a spirit of liberality, we have enlarged with Rule US, sec. 9, by eliminating the former “one-witness requisite.” (See U. S. vs. Ballantine, 4 Phil., 672 and People vs. Ylagan, supra.)

For these reasons, I dissent.

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BARRERA, J.:

I concur in the dissent of Justice Bengzon in that under the present
prevailing interpretation of Rule 118, Section 2 and Rule 113, section
9, the appeal in this instant case constitutes a second jeopardy. There
is no estoppel on the part of the accused because, as Justice Bengzon
points out, she is not changing her theory, nor is she adopting “a
posture of double dealing.” Her attitude before this Court is entirely
consistent with her stand in the lower court. She merely argues here
that even if her theory is wrong, that the information does not charge
an offense as to her which she still maintains, the appeal should be
dismissed as it constitutes a second jeopardy. In my opinion, the
Acierto case is clearly distinguishable from the present one. There the
military court clearly had no jurisdiction over the accused under the
terms of the U. S. Military Bases Agreement and Acierto was never,
therefore, legally placed in jeopardy before the court martial.

This case and others that have come to the attention of this Court,
where, on the technicality of a double jeopardy, an appeal by the
People had to be dismissed, should serve as a reminder to trial courts
that great care must be taken in dismissing informations on purely
legal questions presented by the accused after his arraignment. Unless
the point of law raised is undoubtedly well-settled in our
jurisprudence, or is so clearly in accordance with law, the better part
of discretion would seem to incline in favor of a denial where the
accused could still bring up the issue on appeal upon consideration of
the ease on the merits, rather than a dismissal, which would preclude
the people from further pursuing the question and thereby may result in
miscarriage of justice.