GENOVEVA R. JABONETE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, VS. JULIANA MONTEVERDE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, ANTONIO LEGASPI, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER …

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, dated March 11, 1960, finding the respondent-appellant, Antonio
Legaspi, guilty of contempt of court, and imposing upon him a fine of
P100.00.

On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao, in view of
its finding in Case No. 824, entitled Jabonete v. Monteverde et al.,
that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge
that a “gravamen” or easement of right of way existed thereon,
promulgated a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

“Ordena al demandado Antonio Legaspi la demolicion
de la parte del corral construido a lo largo de su terreno que impide a
lote demandantes tener acceso con la vereda que communica con la
carretera principal, Tomas Claudio.

“Declara que los
demandantes tienen derecho el uso de la vereda (Exh. A-3), de 3 metros
de ancho, unico paso que disponen para communicarse con la Calle Tomas
Claudio, para el paso de sus jeeps, y los vehiculos, reparados que
entran y salen del taller de reparacion de aquellos.”

The respondent-appellant received a copy of the above decision on
May 12, 1954. Two days later, May 14, 1954, he filed his notice of
appeal therefrom. On May 21, 1954, however, upon a previous motion of
the plaintiffs, the lower court issued an order granting discretionary
execution of the said decision. In view of this last mentioned order,
the plaintiffs immediately proceeded to the premises in question and
opened in the fence of the defendant Antonio Legaspi a sufficient
opening for the passage of men and vehicles. Even then, however, the
defendant filed with the court below on that very same day, May 21,
1954, a motion for the reconsideration of the order granting
discretionary execution. Thereafter, and upon the lower court’s
suggestion, the parties entered into an amicable agreement which was
later embodied in an order or “auto” dated May 24, 1954, to wit:

“A raiz de la mocion del demandado pidiendo entre
otras cosas, la reconsideracion de la orden de ejecucion de la decision
dictada en esta causa, el 22 del May de 1954, el Juez que preside esta
sala se constituyo para una inspeccion ocular en el lugar en conflicto.

“Durante la inspeccion ocular, los demandantes y demandado, Antonio Legaspi, llegaron a un acuerdo:

“1. Los demandantes no instalaran en su terreno su taller de reparacion de vehiculos de motor.

“2.
Los demandantes pueden construir su garaje dentro de su terreno para su
jeep (AC), pero no los tendran parados en la calle privada del
demandados construida por este en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de
los demandantes;

“3. Los demandantes contribuiran a prorata
con el demandado los gastos de reparacion de la calle privada
construida por el referido demandado en su terreno a lo largo del
terreno de los demandantes.

“4. El demandado, Antonio
Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la calle privada construida por el
en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de los demandantes, a estos, su
familia, sus amigos, chofers, servidumbre y de sus jeeps.

“5.
Para los fines del uso de la calle, el demandado permitira a los
demandantes, frente de la casa de estos, abrir una puerta de 4 metros
de ancho en el corral construido por el demandado que separa la calle
privada y el terreno de los demandantes, a su (demandantes) costa; sus
hojas tendran por dentro, que los demandantes tendran cerradas para
evitar que los niños, hijos de los inquilinos del demandado tengan
acceso a los jeeps de los demandantes, cuyo garaje tendran dentro de su
(demandantes) terreno.

“El Juzgado ordena a las partes
litigantes cumplan estrictamente con lo estipulado; de los contrario,
los mismos estaran sujetos a las ordenes de este Juzgado.”

As a result of the above agreement and Order of May 24, 1954, the
defendant abandoned the prosecution of his appeal. At the same time,
both parties complied with its terms until the plaintiffs, unable to
continue with their repair shop, transferred to another place in
December 1959 whereupon the defendant reconstructed his fence and its
footing, closing thereby the opening previously made by the plaintiffs.

In the course of time, the plaintiffs’ lot was foreclosed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which, later still, conveyed
it under a conditional sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla. On her acquisition of
the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the defendant the re-opening of
the fence in question as it was her plan to construct her house in the
said lot. When the defendant refused, the Development Bank filed with
the lower court a petition to hold the said defendant in contempt. To
this petition, Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened and was so allowed by
the lower court. The Development Bank of the Philippines and Mrs. Luz
Arcilla contended that the refusal of the defendant to cause or allow
the making of an opening in his fence was a defiance of the said
court’s decision of March 11, 1954 and was, therefore, contemptuous.
After due hearing, the lower court sustained the petitioners and found
the defendant guilty of contempt with orders “to pay a fine of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and to open the vereda or alley leading to the
lot owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines and conveyed to
Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla under a conditional deed of sale, otherwise he
should be imprisoned until he does so.” Thus, the instant appeal.

The respondent-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of contempt because:

1. The decision of March 11, 1954 was novated by the order of
   May 24, 1954. Consequently, he could not have violated the former
   decree since with its novation it ceased to have any legal effect.

2. Even assuming that the said decision was
   not novated by the subsequent order of May 24, 1954, still he could not
   be deemed to have violated the said decision because the same never
   became final and executory. The respondent appellant argued that since
   the decision of March 11, 1954 ordered the opening of a right of way in
   his property without providing for the corresponding compensation to
   him, contrary to Article 649 of the Civil Code^[1],
   there was in the said decision “a void which ought to be filled or to
   be done in order to completely dispose of the case. It was not clear,
   specific and definitive,” and consequently, a judgment that could not
   have acquired finality.

3. The right to file contempt
   proceedings against him, with respect to the decrees contained in the
   decision of March 11, 1954, has prescribed. The respondent-appellant
   conceded that there is no prescriptive period for the institution of
   contempt proceedings. However, he contended that inasmuch as contempt
   under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is punishable by arresto mayor, it
   should prescribe in five years just as crimes for which the said
   penalty is imposed prescribe, under the penal code, in five years.

Without passing on the merits or demerits of the foregoing
arguments, this Court believes that the order finding the
respondent-appellant guilty of contempt should be reversed. It is clear
that the order of May 24, 1954 superseded and was fully intended by the
lower court to modify or stand in substitution of the decision of March
11, 1954. More than the expression of the parties’ amicable agreement
on the dispute, the said order was the lower court’s resolution of the
respondent-appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of
March 11, 1954. In the determination, therefore, of the said
appellant’s obligation relative to the easement in question, the latter
and not the decision of March 11, 1954 is the proper point in
reference.

Under the aforesaid order of May 24, 1954, the easement awarded or
secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal
one. The right of way granted was expressly limited to the latter and
their “family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps.” In the very
language of the agreement the following appears:

“El demandado, Antonio Legaspi, permitira el use y paso en
la calle privada construida por el en su terreno a lo largo del terreno
de los demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus amigos, chofers,
servidumbre y de sus jeeps.”

The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the
plaintiffs and the persons above enumerated and it is clear that the
lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said order, did
not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs’
successors-in-interest. In other words, the right acquired by the
original plaintiffs was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the
Civil Code, and not a predial servitude that inures to the benefit of
whoever owns the dominant estate.

In resisting the extension of the aforementioned easement to the
latter, the plaintiffs’ successors-in-interest, the
respondent-appellant, therefore, was not defying the decision of March
11, 1954 which was then no longer subsisting, nor the order of May 24,
1954 since the said successors-in-interest had no right thereunder.

Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the
plaintiffs is the fact that the same was granted to the latter without
any compensation to the respondent-appellant.

Wherefore, the order of the lower court dated March 11, 1960 finding
the respondent-appellant guilty of contempt is hereby reversed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion , Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

^[1] Art. 649. “The owner or
any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to
demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after the
payment of the proper indemnity.”