DIOGENES VILLAREAL, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL SANTOS, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

Villareal versus Santos

The Case

This is a quo warranto case. Diogenes Villareal, a councilor of Pasay City, sued Manuel Santos to test who is legally entitled to the office of Vice-Mayor of Pasay City and, in turn, to act as Mayor when that office is temporarily vacant. The case matters because it fixes the moment at which a right to succeed to a vacant local office is determined, and it settles the order of succession among local officials under the decentralization statutes: the vice-mayor succeeds the mayor, the premier councilor takes over the functions of the vice-mayor, the councilor with the second highest number of votes succeeds the premier councilor, and so on.

Procedural History

Villareal filed a petition for quo warranto against Santos before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, assailing Santos's right to the office of Vice-Mayor of Pasay City. The trial court ruled for Villareal. It declared that Villareal is the only person legally entitled to succeed to the office of Vice-Mayor, to continue holding it, to enjoy all its rights, privileges and emoluments, including the right to succeed the incumbent mayor temporarily; that Santos is not entitled to succeed to or hold the office, nor may he be considered a de facto vice-mayor or acting mayor; that all acts Santos performed as vice-mayor are null and void; and it directed Santos to desist from performing the duties of vice-mayor, particularly from attending or presiding over the meetings of the city council, and dismissed his counterclaim. Santos appealed to the Supreme Court, where the appeal was docketed after the term of the offices involved had expired. The Court held that the case was not entirely moot because of the compensation that may have accrued to the winner from the date of assumption of office to the expiration of the term, and proceeded to decide the merits.

Facts

In the general elections of 1963, Pablo Cuneta was proclaimed Mayor of Pasay City and Jovito Claudio was proclaimed Vice-Mayor. Edgar Ilarde, Wenceslao Trinidad, Junior, and Diogenes Villareal were proclaimed councilors, having obtained the first, second and third highest number of votes, respectively. Ilarde ran for the first congressional district of Rizal and was elected in 1965; upon filing his certificate of candidacy, he was considered resigned from his position as councilor. Trinidad then became the premier councilor.

On September 15, 1967, Vice-Mayor Claudio filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor and Councilor Trinidad filed his for vice-mayor, both of Pasay City, and both were accordingly considered resigned from their respective positions. Thereupon, on September 26, 1967, Villareal assumed the office of Vice-Mayor, took the requisite oath of office, and discharged its duties.

Soon thereafter, on October 9, 1967, the President of the Philippines designated Manuel Santos as Acting Vice-Mayor of Pasay City. Santos took the corresponding oath and began discharging the duties of the office. When Mayor Cuneta went abroad, both Villareal and Santos assumed the office of Acting City Mayor. In two communications dated December 1, 1967, the Assistant Executive Secretary, purporting to act by authority of the President, upheld Santos as the legal Acting Mayor and directed Villareal to desist from discharging the duties of the office of mayor and to recognize Santos as the one legally entitled thereto. On December 5, 1967, Villareal commenced this action for quo warranto.

Issues

• Whether or not Santos's appointment as vice-mayor was valid under Section 21 (b) of the Revised Election Code, on the theory that the Nacionalista Party had a vested right to nominate the successor of the resigned vice-mayor which was preserved by Section 25 of the Decentralization Act.
• Whether or not Villareal may avail of the benefits of Section 7 of the Decentralization Act, given that the councilor who obtained the highest number of votes in the 1963 elections was Edgar Ilarde and not Villareal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 21 (b) of the Revised Election Code, invoked by Santos, provides:

SEC. 21. Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. - (b) Whenever in any elective local office a vacancy occurs as a result of the death, resignation, removal or cessation of the incumbent, the President shall appoint thereto a suitable person belonging to the political party of the officer whom he is to replace, upon the recommendation of said party, save in the case of a mayor, which shall be filled by the vice-mayor.

This is the appointment power Santos relied upon, and which the Court held had already been superseded, insofar as inconsistent, by the later decentralization law.

Section 7 of the Decentralization Act provides:

SEC. 7. Succession to Office of Vice-Governor and Vice-Mayor. - In case a vacancy occurs in the office of Vice-Governor or Vice-Mayor, the board or council member, as the case may be, who obtained the highest number of votes, or in cases of provinces, cities, or municipalities where the provincial, city or municipal board members are elected by districts, the highest percentage of total votes cast in the last election, shall succeed to the office: Provided, however, That such member meets all the requirements for the position: Provided, further, That in case of a tie, the pertinent provisions of the Revised Election Code shall apply.

This is the provision that governs who succeeds to a vacant vice-mayoralty, and it is the basis of Villareal's claim.

Section 8 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 8. Filling of Special Vacancies in Local Legislative Bodies. - Vacancy occurring in Board or Council as a consequence of the preceding Section shall be filled automatically by the Board or council member who obtained the second highest number of votes, or if the provincial, city or municipal board members are elected by districts, the second highest percentage of total votes cast in the last election. Succeeding vacancy or vacancies as a result of such succession shall be filled automatically by other members as ranked on the basis of the number of votes or percentage of votes received.

This provision explains how Villareal rose to the rank of premier councilor, and thus to the vice-mayoralty.

Section 7 of the Local Autonomy Act provides:

SEC. 7. The city, municipal, and municipal district vice-mayor and succession to the office of mayor. - The vice-mayor of every city, municipality or municipal district shall assume the office of mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of permanent vacancy in the office of mayor. If for some reason the vice-mayor is incapacitated from assuming the office of mayor or refuses to assume such office, the councilor who obtained the largest number of votes in the local elections immediately preceding shall assume the office of mayor. If for some reason the councilor who obtained the largest number of votes in the local elections immediately preceding is incapacitated from assuming the office of mayor or refuses to assume such office, the councilor who obtained the next largest number of votes in the local elections immediately preceding shall assume the office of mayor, and so on until the permanent vacancy in the office of mayor is filled.

This is the principle of succession that the later decentralization provisions merely adopt and apply.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Santos's pretense is manifestly untenable. A vested right is some right or interest which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; it is an immediate fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to be distinguished from a right that is expectant or contingent. The Court quoted the rule that a right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and that a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest founded on the anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. No such right can be fixed and established before a vacancy has come into existence. The office of vice-mayor did not become vacant until September 15, 1967, when Claudio filed his certificate of candidacy and was deemed automatically to have resigned. Before that date, on September 8, 1967, the Decentralization Act was approved and became effective. Hence no right to nominate Claudio's successor could have vested in the Nacionalista Party on September 15, 1967 under the Revised Election Code, which had already been superseded by Section 7 of the Decentralization Act insofar as inconsistent with it.

On the second issue, the Court held that there is no merit in the claim that Villareal may not avail of Section 7 because Ilarde, not Villareal, obtained the highest number of votes in 1963. Santos overlooked that upon the filing of Ilarde's certificate of candidacy in 1965, Ilarde vacated his office as premier councilor, and that vacancy was filled automatically by Trinidad as the councilor who obtained the second highest number of votes. When Trinidad was deemed resigned upon filing his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor on September 15, 1967, his rank as premier councilor was automatically filled by Villareal under Section 8. As such premier councilor, Villareal succeeded to the office of vice-mayor, which became vacant upon Claudio's filing of his certificate of candidacy. The Court noted that Sections 7 and 8 merely adopt and apply the principle of succession incorporated into Section 7 of the Local Autonomy Act, and that since the approval of that Act the policy of graduated succession had been in force for permanent or temporary vacancy or incapacity. The Court adhered to its rulings in Javellana versus Tayo and Luciano versus Provincial Governor, which refused a literal and exclusive reading of the succession provision where it would defeat the purpose of the law.

Doctrine

A vested right is a right or interest that has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; it must be absolute, complete and unconditional, independent of a contingency. A mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest founded on the anticipated continuance of existing laws, is not a vested right. The right to fill a vacant local office is determined at the moment the vacancy comes into existence, for no such right can be fixed and established before a vacancy exists. Where the vacancy arose after the effectivity of the later succession statute, the appointing power under the earlier election law is superseded insofar as inconsistent. Succession to local elective offices follows the order fixed by law: the vice-mayor succeeds the mayor, the premier councilor takes over the functions of the vice-mayor, the councilor with the second highest number of votes succeeds the premier councilor, and so on, and vacancies in the council are filled automatically by ranking on the basis of the votes received.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, with costs against Santos, holding that Villareal is the person legally entitled to the office of Vice-Mayor of Pasay City.

Remember This

Memorize this line: no right to succeed to an office can vest before the vacancy itself comes into existence. Examiners use this case to test the concept of vested rights and the order of succession in local elective offices under the decentralization laws.