LARAP LABOR UNION AND PEDRO A. VENIDA, PETITIONERS, VS. GUSTAVO VICTORIANO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, PEDRO ILIGAN, DOMINGO BAUTISTA, ET AL., RESP…

On April 19, 1954, Pedro A. Venida on his own behalf and on behalf of the
Larap Labor Union, a duly registered labor organization, filed in the court of
first Instance of Camarines Sur, a second amended complaint for prohibition,
damages and injunction against Pedro Iligan and others, alleging substantially
that on April 4 of the same year, at an election for officers of said Union he
had been duly elected President of the same; that defendants who were the rivals
he had defeated for that post planned and threatened illegally to convene on
April 21 another meeting to elect officers, to his prejudice and damage, because
the constitution and by-laws of the association permitted only one election
every year. Pedro A. Venida asked for preliminary injunction, and prayed that
after a hearing on the merits such injunction be made permanent.

Acting on the petition, the Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, Judge, issued a
temporary injunction. However on April 27 His Honor granted defendants’ motion
to dissolve the injunction, upon the filing of a suitable bond.

Wherefore on May 12, 1954, Pedro A. Venida for himself and for the Larap
Labor Union presented, in this Court, this petition for certiorari to revoke the
order dissolving the preliminary injunction. After alleging the facts
hereinbefore stated, he complained that he had not been heard before the
issuance of the order of April 27, because he was in Manila, and the judge knew
it. He also asserted that the members of the Union were under pressure by the
respondent Aguedo Masocol, general foreman of the Philippine Iron Mines Inc. in
Paracale, Camarines Sur, wherein the laborers forming the Larap Union were
working; and that the attempt of defendants to hold another election had given
rise to a critical situation in the locality, the labor union having declared a
strike and formed picket lines in a dispute with the employer mining
company.

Thru the petitioner’s failure to submit sufficient copies, his petition could
not be taken up until July 2, 1954 when this Court adopted a resolution
requiring the respondents to answer within ten days, and granting the
petitioner’s prayer for preliminary injunction to prevent the holding of another
election of officers of the Larap Labor Union.

On July 26, 1954, the respondents, filed their answer, supported by the
necessary documents.

It appears that the Larap Labor Union is an association of laborers and
employees of the Philippine Iron Mines Inc.; that on April, 1954 it hold a
meeting to elect its officers; that Pedro A. Venida was nominated as candidate
for president, against some of the respondents herein; that Venida’s candidacy
was contested on the ground that he was not employed by the said mining
corporation; that as a spirited discussion ensued and confusion prevailed, the
persons appointed to conduct the balloting resigned en masse and the
officers of the Union decided to postpone the election; that Pedro A. Venida and
his partisans held a rump election which resulted in his asserted majority
votes; that the officers exerted efforts to hold another election but were
prevented by the injunction issued by the respondent judge; but after the
lifting of said injunction order, the members of the Larap Labor Union in an
orderly election, on May 6, 1954, elected the following as their officers for
the year 1954: P. S. Iligan, President; R. de la Paz, Vice-President; E. Pura,
Secretary; F. Bascombe, Treasurer and others as Board of Directors.

There is a certificate before us that the said election proceedings were on
the whole, smooth and orderly, thru the cooperation of the Provincial Governor,
the representative of the Department of Labor, the Constabulary officers and the
company’s security officers.

The fact that at the meeting of April 4, 1954 no set of officers was selected
because the election was postponed, is attested by the minutes of the Board of
Directors’ meeting, Annex 3, properly certified by the President and the
Secretary of the Union.

There is no question that Pedro A. Venida was not and is not employed in the
Philippine Iron Mines Inc., was not a member of the Larap Labor Union and could
not therefore be elected officer thereof. He contends however, that as he could
be appointed as a representative of the Union under section 2(h) of
Republic Act 875 which reads as follows:

“Representative” includes a legitimate labor organization or any officer or
agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employees
whom he represents,

he could be chosen officer thereof, even if he is not employed in the
company. The argument is unsound, because it assumes, mistakenly, that
“representative” of the union and “officer” of the labor association always mean
the same thing.

Wherefore, as Pedro A. Venida was not elected President of the Larap Labor
Union, he had no reason to complain either in the court of first instance of
Camarines or in this Court. On the basis of facts subsequently disclosed, it
must be held that the preliminary injunction was improvidently issued in the
Camarines Court, And it is unnecessary to discuss procedural errors, if any, in
the lifting thereof; although the record yields a sufficient excuse for the
alleged failure to give petitioner a chance to object to the petition to lift
the injunction.^[1] Anyway, dissolution of
a preliminary injunction may even be ordered ex parte. (Ong Su Han
vs. Gutierrez David, 43 Off. Gaz. 95.)

The preliminary injunction issued by this Court in July, 1954 upon the
strength of petitioners’ prima facie representations could not, of course,
affect the election previously held on May 6, 1954,^[2] and respondents are not to blame therefor.
And “an action for a permanent restraining injunction should be dismissed when
it appears upon the trial that the acts, to restrain which the action was begun,
have been fully executed”. (Reyes vs. Harty, 21 Phil. 422.)

For all the foregoing, this petition will be dismissed with costs against
petitioner Pedro A. Venida. So ordered.

Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

^[1] cf. Caluya vs. Ramos, 45
Off. Gaz. 2075; Clark vs. Ready Mix Concrete Co., 88 Phil., 460; Cine
Ligaya vs. Judge of Laguna, 66 Phil., 659.

^[2] Mantile vs. Cajucom, 19
Phil., 663; Reyes vs. Harty, 21 Phil., 422.

CONCURRING OPINION

CONCEPCION, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. For the reasons stated in my separate opinion in the
case of “Epifanio Farrales vs. Antonio Fuentecilla” (95 Phil., 417),
decided on July 26, 1954, I cannot agree with the view that a writ of
preliminary injunction may, consistently with the due process clause, be
dissolved ex parte.

Petition dismissed.