REYMUALDO BUZON, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, RESPONDENT.

In a letter dated May 6, 1994,^[1]
Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. charged respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 88,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with gross ignorance of the law and alleged
“illegal acts” and/or irregularity in granting bail to the accused

 amounting to gross
partiality in Criminal Case No. Q-89-1707 entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Tan,” alias ‘Ding’ for
murder, which was pending in the said court.

After receipt of the respondent’s Comment, the Court on June 6,
1995, referred this case to Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his report dated December 11, 1995, Justice Vasquez narrated
the facts as follows:

“After a preliminary investigation, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City filed the Information (Exhibits 1 and 2, Formal
Offer) for Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-89-1707 against accused Fernando Tan @
‘Ding’ for the death of Reymualdo Buzon, Sr. 
Apparently, the corresponding warrant of arrest was issued against the
accused but could not be served. On May 31, 1989, the case was ordered archived
(Exhibit 3, supra) and an alias
warrant of arrest (Annex 2, complaint) issued. Notably, no bail was recommended in the warrant.

Sometime in February of 1991, accused Tan surfaced and filed a
motion that he be granted bail on the ground that the City Prosecutor
recommended in the criminal charge sheet against him a P50,000.00 bail for his
provincial (sic) liberty.  Acting on the
motion, on February 20, 1991, the respondent judge granted bail to the accused
in the amount of P50,000.00 (Exhibit 4, Formal Offer) and accordingly recalled
the warrant of arrest (Exhibit 5) on
February 25, 1991 after the accused
had posted the required bond.  It is
worthwhile stating that the Motion for Bail was granted without a hearing nor
comment from the prosecution.

Accused was subsequently arraigned on March 8, 1991 (Exhibit 6, supra) and trial was set for several
postponed hearings at the instance of both the prosecution and the accused
(Exhibits 7, 7-a, 8, and 8-a, supra).

On February 10, 1992, the prosecution submitted a Motion to Cancel
Bail Bond (Exhibit 10, supra) alleging,
inter alia, that the Information
filed was tampered because the Information originally stated ‘No Bail
Recommended.’ However, the word ‘No’ was snowpaked and the figures P50,000.00
added after the word ‘recommended,’ to read: ‘BAIL RECOMMENDED: P50,000.00.’
The prosecution went further asserting that the offense of Murder is punishable
by Reclusion Perpetua where bail is
not a matter of right.

Accused initially filed his opposition through his lawyer H. J.
Pablo, III (Exhibit 11, supra). Later,
Atty. Moises A. Samson posted a Notice of Appearance (Exhibit 12, supra) as co-defense counsel
simultaneously requesting for time to submit supplemental opposition to the
Motion To Cancel Bail and the postponement of the scheduled hearings of the
case.

The supplemental opposition was not at all filed (,) neither was
the Motion to Cancel Bail Bond resolved by the respondent even until after the
prosecution had rested its case on September 23, 1992 (Exhibit 24, supra).

Alongside with (sic) the prosecution’s resting its case, in open
court the accused was granted leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence.
Nonetheless, on October 5, 1992, what
the accused filed was a formal Motion For Leave to File Motion to Dismiss By
Way of Demurrer To Evidence (Exhibit 25, supra)
which surprisingly was met by the prosecution with an ‘Opposition to Demurrer to Evidence’. Adding to the
miscommunication, the respondent denied the Demurrer to Evidence in its Order
of October 15, 1992 (Exhibit 27, supra).

Anyway, on November 12, 1992, the accused filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Exhibit 29, supra) stating
that: 1) he has not yet filed a Demurrer to Evidence as what he had submitted
was only a simple Motion For Leave to file one (Demurrer to Evidence); and 2)
that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to convict the
accused. The prosecution opposed the motion claiming that the accused tried to
put one over the court when he stated that he has not yet filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and that the defense allegation that the prosecution’s evidence is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is
contrary to the facts on record. On December 2, 1992, (Exhibit 32, supra) the Motion for Reconsideration
was granted in such a way that the accused was given ten (10) days to file a
Demurrer to Evidence which was ultimately filed on December 19, 1992 (Exhibit
33, supra).

Eventually, the Demurrer to Evidence together (with) its Motion for
Reconsideration were respectively denied on January 21, 1993 (Exhibit 36, supra) and on March 5, 1993, (Exhibit 43, supra).
In the meantime, previous settings for defense evidence were cancelled for
failure of receipt of the denial of the Demurrer to Evidence.

On May 11, 1993, the reception of defense evidence was held in
abeyance (Exhibit 46, supra) pending
final resolution by the Court of Appeals on the Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus filed by the accused in CA-G.R. SP No. 30667, assailing the denial of
the Demurrer to Evidence.  On August 23,
1993, CA-G.R. SP No. 30667 was dismissed (Exhibit 50, supra) and its Motion for Reconsideration denied on January 5, 1994 (Exhibit 57).

The accused did not stop there. The matter was elevated to the
Supreme Court under G.R. No. 11355 (Exhibit 58,
supra). On September 26, 1994 (Exhibit 67, supra) the Supreme Court denied with finality the Motion for
Reconsideration of the resolution dated August 3, 1994 denying the Petition for
Review.

In the meanwhile, on November 23, 1993, prior to the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 30677 and the filing of G.R. No.
11355 before the Supreme Court, the prosecution submitted before the respondent
Judge a Motion to Cancel Bail (To Reiterate Motion dated February 7, 1992)
(Exhibit 52, supra) duly opposed by
the accused (Exhibit 54, supra) and
met with a Reply (Exhibit 55, supra) by
the prosecution. On December 20, 1993, the Motion to Cancel Bail was denied (Exhibit 56, supra) by the respondent, ruling:

‘For resolution before this Court is the MOTION TO CANCEL BOND filed
(by) plaintiff thru the Assistant City Prosecutor, the Opposition (To Motion to
Cancel Bail) filed by accused thru counsel, the REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION
TO CANCEL BAIL and the reasons relied upon by the parties which this Court
DENIES for lack of merit.

‘The bail bond which the accused has posted was pursuant to the
recommendation of the prosecution which the Rules of Court allows to be posted
as long as it is in accord with the amount fixed by the court or recommended by
the fiscal who investigated or filed the case. 
The amount recommended was P50,000.00 which this Court finds as
appropriate for purposes of the motion in question and under the present
circumstances, and since the foregoing is in accord with Section 11, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, ACCORDINGLY this Court finds no merit in the aforesaid MOTION
TO CANCEL BOND and must perforce DENY the same.

‘SO ORDERED.’

On June 23, 1994, the private complainant filed a Motion for
Inhibition (Exhibit 62, supra) of the
respondent Judge because of this Administrative case.

In the Order of August 9, 1994 (Exhibit 65, supra) the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the
Motion to Cancel Bail Bond was denied while the Motion for Inhibition was
granted. Said the respondent:

‘In the instant case, the posting of the bail bond was approved
pursuant to the recommendation of the filing Prosecutor. Sec. 2, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court provides for the conditions imposed on the bailbond which
upon approval remains in force at all stages of the case until its final
determination, unless the proper court directs otherwise. Considering that the
accused has not violated any condition imposed therein and has submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by regularly appearing at the hearings
of the case, this Court finds no cogent reason to reconsider the questioned
order.

‘With regards the Motion for Inhibition, likewise filed by the
private complainant, finding that he has clearly lost his trust and confidence
in the Presiding Judge of this Court in the impartial disposition of this case,
for the peace of mind of the complainant, this Court grants the motion and the
Presiding Judge hereby voluntarily inhibits himself from hearing this case.’

To complete the picture, the case was re-raffled to Judge Agustin
S. Sison of Branch 80 of the same court but who likewise inhibited himself due
to close family relations with a member of the law firm appearing as private
prosecutor.

Re-raffled to Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi of Branch 79 the Motion To
Cancel Bail was granted in an Order dated March 20, 1995 (Exhibit 68-a, supra). 
Then again, after issuing the Order, Judge Legaspi voluntarily
inhibited himself from hearing the case without acting on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the accused to the Order cancelling his bail bond.

The case was reassigned to Judge Lucas P. Bersamin ‘of Branch 96
who, on April 20, 1995 (Exhibit 68-b, supra),
who (sic) reconsidered Judge Legaspi’s Order cancelling the bail bond of
the accused increasing, however, the bail to P100,000.00 for the provisional
liberty of the accused.

Ultimately, on June 1, 1995, complainant Romualdo (sic) Buzon, Jr.
showed his disgust by filing a motion to inhibit Judge Bersamin (Exhibit 68-c, supra). 
After favorably acting on the motion, Judge Bersamin sent the
records of the case to the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for re-raffle to another branch.

Under the aforementioned environmental facts, respondent Judge is
now administratively charged with gross partiality and gross ignorance of the
law.”

Justice Vasquez found no basis for the charge of gross
partiality, reasoning out that:

“The procedural facts of the case as earlier chronologically listed
down in this report betrays the accusation of partiality.  All proceedings were apparently conducted in
the most usual and regular manner.  While
there maybe some delays, the same are equally attributable to both the accused
and to the prosecution and, more importantly in the observance of due process
of law.  When specifically the respondent
ordered for the suspension of the defense evidence in deference to whatever
resolution the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court will issue on the pending
certiorari proceedings, it was only cordially exercising judicial courtesy to a
higher court. And that is not partiality.”

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Justice Vasquez stated
“that respondent judge committed an error in granting bail to the accused
without a hearing” and recommended the imposition of a fine of one (1) month’s
salary. Said Justice Vasquez:

“The law on bail mandates that all persons in custody are entitled
to bail as a matter of right except those charged with capital offense or an
offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application to bail is punishable by Reclusion
Perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong (Section 3 Rule 114, Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure). And in the event of an application for admission
to bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
is strong (Section 5, supra).

       xxx                                  xxx                                  xxx

“Ironically, in the administrative case at bench, the respondent
judge not only committed the mistake of granting bail to the accused without
hearing.  He likewise practically
reversed the original and alias warrants of arrest issued by him against the
accused where no bail was recommended. 
Furthermore, despite his denial of the Demurrer to Evidence submitted by
the accused, respondent judge insistingly refused to cancel the bail of the
(accused,) taking refuge and shelter from a mere recommendatory statement (of)
the Office of the City Prosecutor that accused maybe admitted to a P50,000.00
bail. It is therefore imperative to find guilty (sic) against the respondent in
this respect.”

We agree with the foregoing findings.  It is basic that in indictments for capital
offenses like murder, bail shall not be granted when the evidence of guilt is
strong.  When admission to bail is a matter
of discretion, the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of
such hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit his recommendation.

In concerned Citizens vs.
Elma,^[2] we emphasized the extreme necessity of
conducting hearings in applications for bail, especially in capital offenses:

 “x x x It is a rule of long
standing that bail is not a matter of right in cases involving capital offenses
or where the offense for which the accused stands charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong. It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 
However, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty.  At the hearing,
the court should assure that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to
adduce evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the
right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.  In the
case at bench, however, no formal hearing was conducted by respondent
judge.  He could not have assessed the
weight of the evidence against accused Gatus before granting the latter’s
application for bail.

“The necessity of hearing an application for bail has been stressed
by this Court in the early case of People
vs. San Diego, (No. L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522) thus:

‘The court’s discretion to
grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of
the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled
and might be capricious or whimsical. 
Hence, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong. x x x’”

Truly, a judge would not be in a position to determine whether
the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong unless a hearing is first conducted:^[3]

“To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt
the prosecution must also be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.  People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489).  Further, the court’s discretion to grant bail
in capital offenses might (sic) be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution, otherwise, it could be uncontrolled and
might be capricious or whimsical.  Hence,
the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.  (Resolution issued in A.M. No. 92-10-884-RTC – Re: Report of Pasig RTC Judges about the case of
Judge Armie Elma, RTC, Branch 153, Pasig, M. M.).’

       xxx                                  xxx                                  xxx

“It is indeed regrettable how respondent Judge Francisco ignored
the clear import in People vs. Dacudao where
we clearly stated that ‘a hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s
evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecution’s request to
adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is
equally entitled as the defense.  A
hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence
of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec. 6.’”

And failure to conduct such hearing is inexcusable:

“Respondent cannot grant an application for admission to bail in a
capital offense without hearing, on the ground 
that the opposition thereto was based merely on the affidavit of the
defense witnesses (See Medina vs. De
Guia, 219 SCRA 153 [1993], in connection with A.M. No RTJ-89-306).  The hearing is precisely to give the
prosecution the opportunity to present these witnesses in court to affirm the
contents of their affidavits.  By
granting the bail application on such a flimsy reason, respondent effectively
denied the prosecution the opportunity to be heard and to establish that the
evidence of the accused’s guilt was strong.

“His failure to conduct the hearing required is inexcusable and
reflects either gross ignorance of the law or a cavalier disregard of its
requirements (Pico vs. Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421 [1992]), thus, warranting
severe sanction.”^[4]

In the face of this established rule on bail hearings, respondent
judge, citing Lim, Sr. vs. Felix,^[5] averred that “a judge may rely upon the
fiscal’s certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis
thereof issue a warrant of arrest.” This argument is misplaced and totally
unacceptable.  The cited case involves
the issuance of warrants of arrest, NOT the grant of bail. We held in Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco^[6] that:

“Verily, it was patent error for him [trial judge] to base his
order granting bail merely on the supporting affidavits attached to the
information since those were merely
intended to establish probable cause as basis for the issuance of an arrest
warrant, and not to control his discretion to deny or grant bail in all
situations -i.e., with or without a motion from the accused and even without
conducting a hearing on the matter.  Such
error cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore,
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.”

In the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 1.01), a “judge should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.” Respondent judge
fell short of this basic canon and, by his conduct, did not inspire confidence
on the part of the litigants in his competence and knowledge of the law. In
fine, we are of the firm conviction that respondent is guilty as found by
Justice Vasquez.

In Bay/on vs. Sison,^[7] where the judge therein granted bail
with neither notice to the prosecution nor hearing on the application for bail,
this Court imposed “a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will definitely be
dealt with more severely.”

Similarly, in Aurillo, Jr.
vs. Francisco,^[8] this Court imposed on the respondent
judge a fine of P20,000.00 with stern warning, etc.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court
finds respondent Judge GUILTY of IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and hereby imposes upon
him a FINE of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with the STERN WARNING that
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Francisco, and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., no part. Close relation to a
party.