G.R. No. L-30868. September 30, 1971
THELMA PIGA BELTRAN, AND RAFAEL BELTRAN, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE HIMERIO B. GARCIA, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT JUDGE, 3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, OLONGAPO CITY AND FISCAL RAYMUNDO M. BLAN…
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction to annul the orders[1]
dated July 31, 1969 and August 5, 1969[2]
of respondent Judge and to stop both respondents in their respective capacities
as Presiding Judge and District State Prosecutor of the Criminal Circuit Court
for the Third Judicial District from further proceeding with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. CCC-III-43-Zambales (1006-0) for Homicide entitled,
“People of the Philippines
v. Rafael Ragadio, et al.,”
Petitioners Thelma Piga Beltran and
Rafael Beltran are the widow and the father, respectively, of Morie Beltran, the victim of the alleged offense in
Criminal Case No. CCC-III-43-Zambales (1006-0).
In their petition dated August 14, 1969 and filed on August 19, 1969,
they charge the respondent with bias and partiality in favor of the accused and
allege, among other things, that the four accused police officers were henchmen
of Mayor Leopoldo Rabanes
of San Marcelino, Zambales,
a “compadre” of respondent State Prosecutor
Raymundo M. Blanco, who in turn was so close to
respondent Judge that his motions and petitions in the case were always
sustained to the prejudice of petitioners; that “on or before June 22,
1969 days (sic) of trial” both respondents harassed the government
witnessed and scolded them in open court whenever they could not answer
questions at once; that the four accused would then join respondent Fiscal in
laughing at the witnesses’ discomfiture, thereby discouraging other government
witnesses from appearing to testify; that in view of the unfavorable court atmosphere,
where government witnesses “were laughed at, harassed and pestered, filed
a formal complaint with the Secretary of Justice against respondent Fiscal on
June 22, 1969; that before the criminal case was called for hearing on July 10,
1969, respondent Judge confronted petitioner Thelma Piga
Beltran and asked her why her lawyer, Atty. David Advincula,
Jr., filed a complaint against the Fiscal and warned her as follows: “if
your lawyer cannot prove his complaint he will see what will happen and worse
might happen to him; ” that without any formal investigation, the
Department of Justice dismissed petitioners’ complaint against respondent
Fiscal for lack of merit; ‘that with the dismiss al of said complaint,
respondent Judge became more “ferocious in abusing the petitioners and
their government witnesses,” compelling petitioners to file a petition
dated July 21, 1969 asking respondent Judge to inhibit himself from hearing the
case, but in a Judge to facilitate the acquittal of the four (4) accused police
officers,” the petition was denied in an order dated July 31, 1969; that
in retaliation respondent Judge on the same date issued an order of arrest
against them and the government witnesses at the behest of respondent Fiscal;
that petitioners and the government witnesses were “being hunted and
arrested” such that the residents of San Marcelino,
Zambales were surprised why they were the first ones
who would go to jail instead of the four accused police officers; that the
accused openly bragged that as long as respondents were handling the criminal
case they mere certain of acquittal; that respondent Fiscal always “barks
inside the courtroom against the petitioners’ and the government witnesses and
always threatens them with arrest; that Mayor Leopoldo
Rabanes had threatened prosecution witness Manuel Laureta with death, according to the latter’s testimony in
court, but respondents did not order the arrest of the Mayor, which
“proved that respondent(s) want to gun down petitioners and their
witnesses in order that the homicide case be dismissed”; that Isabelo Rabadon, one of the
prosecution witnesses ordered arrested by respondent Judge, when asked to
explain his failure to appear, alleged that “Mayor Rabanes
of San Marcelino, Zambales
told him not to appear,” but in spite of said testimony respondent Fiscal
did not move for the arrest of the Mayor nor did the respondent Judge take any
action; that the foregoing circumstances, taken together, proved that said
respondents had conspired and agreed with Mayor Leopoldo
Rabanes to harass petitioners and their witnesses in
order that the four (4) accused police officers would be acquitted; and that
petitioners had exhausted “all available extrajudicial remedies to
disqualify” respondents from proceeding with the trial of the criminal
case but to no avail.
In a resolution dated August
21, 1969, this Court ordered respondents to answer the petition and
restrained them from further proceeding with the hearing in Criminal Case No.
CCC-III-43-Zambales (1006-0).
In their Answer, respondents deny the charges of bias and
partiality, misbehavior and lack of proper court decorum; and allege that there
was no ground for respondent Judge to disqualify himself from hearing the case,
and that the order of arrest dated July 31, 1969 was a necessary and legitimate
court process to compel the attendance of prosecution witnesses who had failed
to appear on the date of the trial.
Petitioners filed a reply; making further averments of fact to
show that respondents were biased and partial in favor of the accused in the
criminal case.
Upon motion of respondents and with the conformity of petitioners
this Court appointed a Commissioner to receive the evidence. On July
30, 1971 the Commissioner submitted his report.
In resolving the issue of bias and partiality, it is necessary to
state certain relevant facts and proceedings in connection with Criminal Case
No. CCC-III-43-Zambales (1006-0), based on the evidence presented to the
Commissioner, to wit:
On November 13, 1967
Morie Beltran, the victim of the alleged offense, was
fatally shot. His widow, Thelma Piga Beltran, believed that the killing was politically
motivated, the Pigas of San Marcelino,
Zambales, being supporters of the political rival of
Mayor Leopoldo Rabanes.
The PC authorities investigated the incident. On November
21, 1967 PC Lt. Roberto A. Ambrocio filed
a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in Olongapo City,
charging the Chief of Police and seven (7) members of the police force of San Marcelino, Zambales, in
connection with the killing. With Atty. Natalio Beltran as private prosecutor, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal David Rosete. After more
than ten (10) months, or on October 2,
1968, Fiscal Rosete filed the
corresponding information for homicide against Police Chief Rafael Ragadio, Pat. Ricardo Raguine,
Pat. Cecilio Javier, and Pat. Francisco Jalasco in the Court of First Instance of Zambales Branch I, presided then by Judge Manuel Pamaran and later on by Judge Numeriano
Estenzo. On October 14, 1968 Atty. Natalio Beltran formally entered his appearance as private
prosecutor.
On February 17, 1969
the homicide case, together with several other cases, was transferred to the
Criminal Circuit Court for the Third Judicial District, presided by respondent
Judge. The accused were immediately
arraigned on February 20, 1969
and with the assistance of their counsel, Atty. Valeriano
S. Peralta, they entered the plea of “not guilty”. By agreement of the parties the trial of the
case was set for March 18, 19, 24 and 25.
On March 6, 1969
the records of Fiscal Rosete were forwarded to
respondent Fiscal. The latter discovered
that:
“(a) the accused committed the offense in
conspiracy ‘with others who are still unidentified’;
(b) there is not even a copy of the autopsy
report on the deceased victim Mauro Beltran, and the physician who conducted
the autopsy is not even listed as a prosecution witness;
(c) the information makes mention of another
injured victim, Villamor de la Cruz, who is not even
listed as a prosecution witness nor does it appear that he was ever
investigated in connection with the case;
(d) there are no paraffin test reports which
the PC investigator agreed to produce during the preliminary investigation and
their actual production appear not to have been pursued;
(e) there are no exhibit-firearms used in the
commission of the crime, and no empty cartridges/ shells were recovered at the
scene of the crime, although it appears that the accused were in company with
(5) PC soldiers who were admittedly armed with carbines and garand
rifles.”
On March 18, 1969,
when the case was called for hearing, Atty. Peralta manifested that he had just
learned that morning that as a member of the Provincial Board he was prohibited
under the Decentralization Law from appearing as counsel for the accused police
officers. He therefore asked for
deferment of the hearing and informed the Court that he would request one
Atty. Cardenas to appear for the defense.
Respondent Judge remarked that the postponement might delay the early
disposition of the case, whereupon respondent Fiscal manifested that after going
over the evidence the prosecution had on hand he thought he would need time to
reinvestigate the case. Respondent Judge
decided to call the case in the afternoon.
When the case was called again, respondent Fiscal said that he
was joining the defense in its motion for postponement so that he would have
time to reinvestigate the case. Atty.
Cardenas, who appeared for the defense, then manifested that he was not
prepared for trial and that he had requested the Fiscal to join him in his
motion for postponement, adding “that a reinvestigation of this case x x x would probably change the
situation as far as my clients are concerned.” After ascertaining the
number of witnesses to be presented by both parties, respondent Judge postponed
the hearing of the case until the next session of the Court in Zambales sometime in the second half of May or June.
On June 16, 1969
Atty. David R. Advincula, Jr. filed a “Notice of
Appearance as Principal Counsel in behalf of the Offended Party.”
When the case was called for hearing on the following day, June
17, Atty. Advincula, Jr. entered his appearance
“as private prosecutor in collaboration with the Fiscal.” Having noted the absence of the defense
counsel, respondent Judge inquired from the accused as to what happened to their
lawyers. Accused Ragadio
replied that they had decided the day before to change their attorneys of
record with another counsel in the person of Atty. Samuel B. Farrales. Thereafter the following dialogue between the
Court and accused Ragadio took place:
“Q. Why
did you not get your lawyer right away? Is that one way of delaying this case?
A. No,
your Honor.
Q. Since
when has this case been pending before this Court?
A. The
information was filed on October 2,
1968, your Honor.
The Court then asked the Fiscal if he was ready with his
witnesses. Answering in the affirmative,
the latter further manifested:
“x x x. I would
like to inform the Court that last March 18, 1969, I started conducting the
reinvestigation of this case because there are facts and circumstances that I
would like to clarify before proceeding in the further prosecution of this
case. Since it happened to be the last
days of our stay in Olongapo
City, I was not able to terminate
the same. Now that we are here, I intend
to terminate said reinvestigation in order to ascertain the facts, which to
me, are all material in the prosecution of this case… and considering further
that the crime charged is serious, I would like to be sure of my stand.”
The Fiscal intimated that he needed at least two weeks to finish
the reinvestigation. After being assured
by accused Ragadio that their lawyer would be ready
on July 10, 1969, the Court
set the case for trial on that date.
On June 22, 1969
private prosecutor David R. Advincula, Jr. filed a
letter-complaint with the Secretary of Justice seeking the relief of District
State Prosecutor Raymundo M. Blanco as prosecutor of
the homicide case on the following grounds:
1.
That despite the fact that the four accused
policemen had been arraigned already for homicide on an information filed by
Assistant Fiscal Rosete, the state prosecutor at his
own behest conducted a re-investigation of the case and had been making
comment that there was no prima facie evidence against the
accused and that the case should have not reached the court.
2.
That the case could not be tried because of too
much technicalities on the part of State Prosecutor Blanco, thus helping much
the defense.
3.
That the State Prosecutor Blanco is a “compadre” of Mayor Leopoldo Rabanes of San Marcelino, Zambales.
4.
That there was a tendency on the part of State
Prosecutor Blanco to whitewash the case.
In view of the aforesaid complaint private prosecutor Advincula filed a pleading styled as “Motion to Adjust
Date of Hearing,” asking for postponement “until the Department of
Justice can designate a new prosecutor.”
When the case was called for hearing on July 10, 1969 the Court called the attention of
the State Prosecutor to the motion of Atty. Advincula
asking for the postponement of the hearing.
When asked to comment, the State Prosecutor vigorously objected to said
motion, thus:
“I vigorously object to the said motion, your Honor, because
my duty as District State Prosecutor is to prosecute cases specially assigned
before this Court, regardless of whoever the parties are, and regardless of
whatever kind of complaint the lawyer may have lodged against me with the
Department of Justice – much less the administrative complaint, until I am
legally relieved to prosecute this case; although, personally, your Honor, I
feel that this private prosecutor might have certain reasons of his own in
asking for the postponement.”
The new defense counsel, Atty. Farrales,
also asked the Court to set the case for hearing on another date because he was
not yet prepared. Then the following
dialogue took place:
COURT:
Now, if
this case is set for another date, will you be ready by then?
ATTY. FARRALES:
Yes, your
Honor. I need at least two (2) weeks time.
COURT:
Because
the Court does not like to (see) this case pending indefinitely. This case, according to the records, was
filed last September, 1968 and it has been pending for more than a year now and
the trial has not yet begun.
And
now, there is the motion asking for the indefinite postponement of the hearing
of this case. The Court views this
motion in a different way, because as long as there is a public prosecutor,
this Court will proceed with the trial of this case; unless, of course, if the
private prosecutor has cogent reasons to disregard the public prosecutor or
the District State Prosecutor.
So
you will be ready by next week?
ATTY. FARRALES:
Yes, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Are the
offended parties here?
FISCAL BLANCO:
Mrs.
Beltran is here, your Honor.
COURT (to Mrs. Beltran):
Are you the
widow?
MRS. BELTRAN:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
The Court
would like to tell you that regardless of the fact that you have your own
private counsel, it is the desire of the Court to have your case tried
immediately, especially you are the offended party, because there is a public
prosecutor or fiscal who can prosecute the case for you.
Do you
have any idea when your counsel will be ready?
The Court would like to emphasize upon you, being the offended party,
that as much as possible, I want to dispose this case immediately.
Because
the nature of the motion of your counsel does not even specify any date when
the case will be heard, and the Court will not leave the dates of hearing at
the disposition of the parties.
Escribano, will you check up in the calendar the available
date next week for this case.
ATTY. PREGRINO:
July 31st,
your Honor.
ATTY. FARRALES:
Then we
can have this case set for successive dates so that we can finish this case,
your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x
COURT: (to the Widow, Mrs. Beltran):
Will you
inform the Court whether your lawyer, Atty. Advincula,
will be available on the 31st of this month?
The Court
would like to finish your case as soon as possible, and the Court believes that
that is also your desire; but your lawyer’s desires, maybe, otherwise.
MRS. BELTRAN:
May be,
sir.
COURT:
We cannot
let the disposition of this case on the wishes of one party only; we have to
observe also the rights of the other party.
So, we
will schedule this case on the 31st?
MRS. BELTRAN:
Yes, sir.
Thereupon, the Court dictated the following
order:
“When this case was called for hearing, the District State
Prosecutor called the attention of the Court to the motion filed by the private
prosecutor, Atty. David R. Advincula, attached to the
records, for postponement of the hearing of this case until such time when his
complaint for relief of the prosecuting fiscal with the Department of Justice
is resolved, to which motion the District State Prosecutor vigorously
objected. On the other hand, defense
counsel, Atty. Samuel Farrales, manifested that his
services were just retained by the accused and he would need sometime within
which to go over the records before he could enter into trial.
“The Court believes that the prayer for indefinite
postponement of the hearing of this case will unduly delay disposition of this
case, and in case the party concerned shall not be able to secure the remedy
sought in his pleadings the hearing on this case shall continue as scheduled
herein. However, to afford the parties time
to work out their respective positions, the trial of this case is set on July 31, 1969 and August 1, 1969, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, August 4, 1969 at 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and August 5, 1969.”
Having failed to obtain an indefinite postponement of the
hearing, private prosecutor Advincula filed a motion
dated July 21, 1969, asking
the presiding Judge to inhibit himself from conducting the trial. In an order dictated in open court on July 31, 1969, the Court denied the
motion for lack of merit, thus:
“For resolution is the petition of Private Prosecutor Atty.
David Advincula for inhibition on the ground that the
Court had scheduled the trial of this case on July 31, August 1, 4 and 5, 1969,
even before said Private Prosecutor could work out with the Department of
Justice his position in relation to his complaint for the relief of the
District State Prosecutor. Finding the
grounds alleged in the petition not to be a just and valid reason for inhibition
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, the same,
for lack of merit, is hereby denied; the trial of this case shall continue as
scheduled even as the defense counsel insisted on an early trial for his
clients.
“There is nothing in the Order of this Court, dated July 10,
1969, that upholds the position of the District State Prosecutor, and as
decreed therein ‘the Court believes that the prayer for indefinite
postponement of the hearing of this case(as prayed for by the private
prosecutor) will unduly delay disposition of this case, and in case the party
concerned shall not be able to secure the remedy sought in his pleadings the
hearing of this case shall continue as scheduled therein,. Verily, as
manifested by the District State Prosecutor, the Department of Justice, in a
letter to Atty. Advincula, dated July 17, 1969, copy of which is asked to be
attached to the records of the case, dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The Court is not concerned with
who prosecutes this case as long as delay is avoided, it appearing that this
case has been pending since September 30, 1968 and the accused, who are all
members of the police department of San Marcelino,
are under suspension from October 2, 1968 up to the present time, and there are
only three remaining policemen doing police duty in said municipality.”
During the hearing on July
31, 1969 the prosecution presented Isabelita
P. Espiritu, former NBI Ballistician, and Dr. Servando Gutierrez, the physician who performed the autopsy
of the victim. After Dr. Gutierrez had
testified, the Court called for the next witness. Whereupon, the Fiscal made the following
manifestation:
“Your Honor please, the private prosecutor had been trying to
look for the other witnesses who he said were in Court earlier before the hearing
this morning but they were not around according to him. I even called out the names of these
witnesses but they were not here except Miss Espiritu
and Dr. Gutierrez who came later. In
view of this development, I will be constrained to move for their
arrest.”
After some inquiries, the Court issued the following order:
“In view of the absence of the prosecution witnesses namely,
PC Sergeants Orlando Acierto, Isabelo
Rabadon, Florentino Malinis, and Villamor de la Cruz,
Rafael Beltran and Thelma Piga Belgran
who, according to the records, were duly notified of the hearing for today, and
upon petition of the District State Prosecutor, let a warrant for the arrest
of all these witnesses be issued.
“Considering that this case has been previously scheduled for
trial on August 1, 4 and 5, 1969, the continuation of the hearing of this case
on those dates as previously scheduled shall continue.”
The hearing scheduled for August
1, 1969 was cancelled by the trial court in view of the absence of
the prosecution witnesses and of Atty. Samuel B. Farrales,
counsel for the defense. The latter was
cited to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for his
non-appearance.
The hearing set for August
4, 1969 was cancelled by the trial court motu
proprio.
After the case was called for hearing on August 5, 1969 the trial court immediately asked
Atty. Farrales to explain his non-appearance in court
on August 1, 1969. Finding
the explanation to be satisfactory, the court lifted its order of August 1
against said counsel. At this juncture,
Atty. Natalio Beltran asked the court to relieve him
as private prosecutor because his clients allegedly failed to pay him and
“besides, they have engaged the services of another private
prosecutor.” Since the motion was without the conformity of his clients
who were not yet present at the time, the court denied it.
Sgts. Ancierto,
Rabadon, and Malinis were
also required to explain why they were absent on August 1, 1969.
Sgt. Rabadon made the following explanation:
“I was here, sir, downstairs together with Mayor Rabanes from 8:00
to 9:30 o’clock in the morning. But when Mayor Rabanes
informed me, after coming up here, that the case was already postponed, I went
home already, sir.”
The other two PC sergeants also explained their absence to the
satisfaction of the presiding Judge. After admonishing all of them to see the
Fiscal first before leaving the court whenever they were cited as government
witnesses, the trial court lifted the order of arrest against the three PC sergeants.
Sgt. Rabadon was placed on the witness
stand during the morning session, but his testimony had to be suspended because
the firearm allegedly recovered from the weapons carrier had not been brought
to court. Before adjournment Atty.
Beltran reiterated his motion to withdraw as private prosecutor, but the trial
judge did not act on the motion in view of the manifestation of the victim’s
widow that she would agree to his withdrawal if the other private prosecutor
was available.
The Court then inquired from the Fiscal if he had other witnesses
besides the PC troopers. The Fiscal
replied that there were other prosecution witnesses, namely, Jose Bacod, Villamor de la Cruz, and
Manuel Laureta but they had not appeared yet and
intimated that he would be constrained to ask for their arrest. When reminded
by the Clerk of Court that there was an order of arrest against the three
witnesses, the trial court directed the Clerk to give the warrants of arrest to
a certain Sgt. Garcia for the apprehension of said witnesses. At this juncture, the defense counsel moved
to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute but was turned down. Then the following dialogue between the trial
court and fiscal took place:
COURT:
What is the testimony of the complaining witnesses here about?
Is her testimony not yet in order?
I remember that there was a warrant for her arrest.
FISCAL BLANCO:
Yes, your
Honor.
COURT:
What are we
going to do?
She will be
lodged in jail until such time when she will be testifying, because she may not
appear in Court again at the next hearing of this case.
FISCAL BLANCO:
For the
moment, she will not testify yet; and we ask for the issuance of a subpoena to
her, and that the warrant for her arrest be lifted with the promise that she
will appear in Court on subsequent hearing of this case.
COURT:
Are you making
that assurance to the Court that her appearance will be available…
FISCAL BLANCO:
I might as
well confer with her, your Honor.
COURT:
If not, the
Court will be constrained to put her in prison.
FISCAL BLANCO:
Yes, your
Honor, she will appear on the subsequent hearings of this case. She promised me that she will appear.
COURT:
Motion
granted. We will just call this case at 4:00 o’clock this afternoon.
At the resumption of the hearing in the afternoon, private
prosecutor Natalio Beltran was allowed to conduct
the direct examination of Sgt. Florentino Malinis upon motion of respondent Fiscal. In the course of the examination respondent
Judge observed that the witness was getting hostile and he called the attention
of both respondent Fiscal and Atty. Beltran to his observation. The Fiscal did not make any counter move,
while Atty. Beltran continued with his direct examination.
Before Sgt. Malinis was cross-examined,
Atty. Beltran manifested that Rafael Beltran, one of the prosecution witnesses
ordered arrested, was ready to explain his non-appearance in court on July 31, 1969. After hearing the
explanation, the respondent Judge asked the Fiscal for his comment. Then the following dialogue took place:
FISCAL BLANCO:
May I request,
your Honor, that the warrant issued for his arrest be lifted?
COURT:
Is there any
assurance to the Court that this witness will come to court to testify, because
this Court would not like anymore excuses next time; otherwise, we will
incarcerate this witness until such time he can testify.
Upon hearing that Rafael Beltran would testify on the civil
aspect of the case only and that the victim was a farmer, respondent Judge
remarked that the maximum compensation that could be awarded was P12,000.00,
with or without the testimony on said aspect. Atty. Beltran then manifested
that since the sum of P12,000.00 as compensation was acceptable to them, he would
dispense with the testimony of Rafael Beltran.
With the manifestation of the private prosecutor and with the
explanation of Rafael Beltran, the court lifted the warrant issued for his
arrest.
After the cross-examination of Sgt. Malinis,
Atty. Beltran asked for postponement of the hearing on the ground that the
other prosecution witnesses were not available.
Sustaining the motion, the court reset the hearing for August 18, 1969, thus:
“For lack of material time it being already 6:30 o’clock in
the evening, and upon petition of the prosecution on the ground that its
witnesses who were ordered arrested have not been apprehended, and upon
agreement of the parties, the continuation of the hearing of this case is
hereby set at 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon of August 18, 1969 and to continue
in the afternoons of the succeeding dates.”
At the hearing of this case on August 18, 1969 the prosecution presented only Villamor de la Cruz.
After the Fiscal had manifested that for the moment he had no other
witness to present, the defense counsel reiterated his motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute but the Court immediately denied it. Before adjourning the session, the Judge
warned the Fiscal that the case had been dragging for a long time and that the
evidence for the prosecution should have been completed by that time. The Judge further observed that the
prosecution witnesses were coming one by one, to which observation the Fiscal
readily agreed. The hearing would have been resumed on September 8 and 11, 1969
but for this Court’s restraining order of August 22, 1969.
From the foregoing narration of facts the following conclusions
may be drawn:
1. The motions or petitions of respondent Fiscal
were sustained by respondent Judge because the same were meritorious and not
because of the alleged close personal relationship between them.
2. There was no occasion for the two respondents
to harass and scold government witnesses “on or before June 22, 1969 days of trial”
because the first prosecution witness was presented only on July 31, 1969.
3. The prosecution witnesses who had testified
so far were NBI Agent Isabelita Espiritu,
Dr. Servando Gutierrez of the Olongapo
City General Hospital, Sgts. Rabadon
and Malinis of the Philippine Constabulary and Villamor de la Cruz.
If those witnesses were “laughed at, harassed and pestered” by
respondents, certainly such abusive acts would have elicited a protest from
private prosecutor Beltran, who was present in court whenever there was a
hearing, but no such protest was made.
5. There is no indication whatsoever that with
the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Fiscal, respondent Judge
became more against in abusing the petitioners and their witnesses.” In
their motion asking respondent Judge to inhibit himself from hearing the case,
petitioners did not allege that he had abused them or their witnesses.
6. The order of arrest dated July 31, 1969 was a
necessary and legitimate court process to compel the attendance of witnesses
who had failed to appear on the date of trial despite due notice. It was not a retaliatory move against
petitioners. As a matter of fact, not
one of the prosecution witnesses was actually arrested and jailed because respondent
Judge, upon hearing their explanations readily lifted said order.
7. The allegation that “petitioners, Thelma
Piga Beltran, Rafael Beltran, together with
government witnesses PC Sergeants Malinis, Villamor and de la Cruz, are being hunted and
arrested” is a misrepresentation of fact, since the order of arrest
against them was lifted by respondent Judge.
8. The allegation that Manuel Laureta testified in court that Mayor Rabanes
had threatened him with death is belied by the fact that said Laureta has not yet testified in the case.
9. The alleged explanation of Sgt. Rabadon to the effect that he failed to appear in court on July 31, 1969 because Mayor Rabanes told him not to appear is not substantiated; hence,
there was no basis for any action to be taken against said Mayor.
As observed by the Commissioner appointed by this Court,
“the petitioners by their testimonies, have markedly toned down their
accusation from one of positive assertion to merely one of suspicion.” But
mere suspicion that respondents are partial to the accused is not enough. There should be evidence to prove the
charge. On this point the Commissioner’s
findings are as follows:
“With respect to the respondent Judge, x x
x the charge of partiality in favor of the accused is
not supported by evidence. The orders of
postponement were all made either at the instance of the prosecution or without
the objection of the prosecution and were deemed necessary in the interest of
fairness and justice. In fact, the
respondent Judge’s interest in the early termination of the case, whatever its
outcome, is shown by his repeated warnings to both parties not to delay the
case. The order of July 31, 1969 calling
the prosecution’s attention to the fact that the case be expedited inasmuch as
the accused “are under suspension from October 2, 1968 up to the present
time, and there are only three remaining policemen doing police duty in said
municipality,” is not a proof of the respondent Judge’s partiality towards
the accused but of the Judge’s concern that the rights of the accused may be
safeguarded. That the Judge was impartial
is further shown by the fact that when witness Sgt. Florentino
Malinis turned hostile, the respondent immediately
called the fiscal’s and the private prosecutor’s
attention to the witness’ hostility.”
Likewise, there is no truth to the petitioners’ accusation of
respondent Fiscal’s partiality to the accused.”
“x x x. The
repeated postponements of the case, the re-investigation of the case and the
stern warnings given to absent witnesses were all made in the interest of
justice. The alleged fraternization by
the respondent Fiscal with the accused, x x x, even if true, would only show that the respondent is
friendly with the accused and not necessarily partial to them. There is no provision of law that requires
the prosecuting Fiscal to be unfriendly with the accused. The constant presence of the Mayor of San Marcelino at the hearings of the case and the amicable
relationship between the Mayor and the respondents, even if true, are no
proof of the alleged conspiracy existing between the Mayor and the respondents
to exonerate the accused. The
questionable order of arrest of petitioners may have been a cause of
embarrassment for petitioners and a source for jubilation of the accused but
it certainly is not conclusive proof of respondents’ partiality towards the
accused. The potion for the order of
arrest, the threats to put petitioners in jail and the passive attitude shown
by respondent Fiscal when a prosecution witness turned hostile could be
attributed to the hurt feelings of the Fiscal as a result of the complaint
filed against him by the petitioners with the Department of Justice. Such conduct, on the part of the Fiscal,
though censurable could perhaps be understandable in the light of the Fiscal’s frustrations and difficulties in prosecuting the
case due to lack of cooperation of the investigating authorities and the
belligerent attitude of petitioners themselves and Private Prosecutor David Advincula.” (Commissioner’s Report, pp. 41-42).
We find the foregoing findings of the Commissioner to be
substantiated by the evidence presented in the investigation he conducted.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed and the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court is lifted, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Fernando, and
Makasiar, JJ., concur
in this opinion and that of Justice Teehankee.
Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J.,
concurs in a separate opinion.
[1]
Order of arrest of prosecution witnesses, including petitioners.
[2]
Order postponing the hearing of the case in view of the failure to apprehend
the prosecution witnesses who were ordered arrested.
Clean
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CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This case should impress upon respondents the intangible
imperatives of not only being actually impartial but also maintaining the
appearance of strict impartiality, so as not to arouse needlessly the suspicions
of either of the parties, as in the case of herein petitioners.
While bias and prejudice are not to be presumed especially if
weighed against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person,[1] the
Court has at the same time admonished judges to so conduct themselves and
exercise their discretion in a way that the people’s and litigants’
“all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary” is ever
nurtured and upheld.[2]
Considering that the killing was believed to be politically
motivated, petitioner-widow of the deceased victim and her family being
supporters of the political rival of the mayor of San Marcelino,
Zambales, whose four police officers are accused in
the case of having gunned down the victim, petitioners had reason to be
apprehensive about the mayor’s constant presence at the hearings and his
“amicable relationship” with respondents.[3]
Under such circumstances, their apprehension was justifiably heightened by
respondent judge’s order for the arrest of petitioners and the prosecution
witnesses, which was “a cause for embarrassment” for them and a
“source of jubilation for the accused,”[4]
when an admonition to them that their non-appearance at the continuation might
cause dismissal of the case might have served as well.
Respondent fiscal’s seeming zeal in the
prosecution of the case to the extent of securing the respondent court’s order
for the arrest of the offended party and the prosecution witnesses is not borne
out by the Court’s commissioner’s report to the effect that “the motion for the
order of arrest, the threats to put petitioners in jail and the passive
attitude shown by respondent fiscal when a prosecution witness turned hostile
could be attributed to the hurt feelings of the fiscal as a result of the complaint
filed against him by the petitioners with the Department of Justice.”
Under these circumstances and “the alleged fraternization by respondent fiscal
with the accused,”[5] I
believe that petitioners’ recourse properly lies in going back to the Department
of Justice and requesting the designation of another prosecutor vice respondent
fiscal to handle the prosecution of the criminal case below.
[1] Arteche vs. de la Rosa, 58 Phil. 589.
[2] Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA
165; Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160.
[3]
Commissioner’s report, cited at p. 18 of the main opinion.
[4] Idem.
[5] Idem.