OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2003, June 12, 2003

Administrative Circular No. 07-99. issued by the
Supreme Court on 25 June 1999, stated, “Despite weil-entrenched
jurisprudence and, circulars regarding exercise of judiciousness and
care in the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO) or grant of
writs of preliminary injunction, reports or complaints on abuses
committed by triql judges in connection therewith persist. Xxx”

Despite the issuance of said circular, and the
passage of several laws prohibiting the issuance of TRO or the grant of
writs of preliminary injunctions, complaints against judges with respect
to issuance of TROs remain unabated. Records of the Office of the Court
Administrator show numerous complaints against judges for arbitrary
issuance of TRO and injunctive writ and for violation of the various
laws and” Supreme Court circulars that prohibit such issuance. Records
likewise show that there judges that were in fact administratively
sanctioned for such offense.

Hence, trial judges are once again cautioned
regarding the improvident or irregular issuance of TRO or the grant of
writs of preliminary injunction, and are reminded to be aware of the
cases wherein the issuance of TRO or the grant of preliminary injunction
is s proper, as well as the cases wherein they are not.

For the guidance of the trial judges, the following
is. a list of cases wherein courts are not allowed to issue TRO or
writs of preliminary injunction:

Art. 254 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, or the Labor Code of the Philippines, specifically provides:

Art. 254. Injunction prohibited. — No
temporary or permanent injunction . or restraining order in any case
involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court
or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of
this Code.^[1]

1. l. Enforcement of decision or awards rendered by the NLRC

In Kaisahan ng ruga Manggagawa sa La Cabana vs. Sarmiento, 133 SCRA 221, the Supreme Court declared out.

“xxx

It is therefore crystal clear, that the NLRC which
took the place of the defunct CIR has exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters and incidents prior to ana after a decision has been rendered
arising out of and in connectioawith a labor dispute, thus respondent
Court qt First Instance fnow Regional Trial Court) cannot enioinjhe
enforcement of any decision or awards rendered bv the Commission.”

1.2. Issues involved are interwoven with an unfair labor practices

In Chan Bros., Incorporated vs. Federacion Ohrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas, G.R. No. L-34761, 1974, the Supreme Court said:

 

“xxx that a complaint for injunction
does not course under the jurisdiction of the court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) where the issue involved is interwoven with
an unfair labor practice case pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations (now National Labor Relations Commission of Labor Arbiter),
even if such case involves acts of violence, intimidation or coercion.
Xxx

Construing this provision, [in relation to
section 9 of the same Act], regulating the issuance of injunctions in
labor disputes, we have repeatedly held that courts of first instance
(RTCs) may not enjoin the picketing staged in connection with such
disputes, and that the jurisdiction to entertain a petition to enjoin
said picketing and to issue the corresponding writ of injunction is
vested exclusively in the Court of Industrial Relations (NLRC or Labor
Arbiter), if charges of unfair labor practice in relation to said labor
disputes, are pending before the latter court prior to the filing of
said petition.

Xxx

We even declared, that when the acts against
which the injunction was obtained constitute unfair labor practices,’
the application for injunction would be ‘exclusively cognizable by the
Court of Industrial Relations (NLRC or Labor Arbiter) and beyond the
jurisdiction of the … Court of First Instance’, even if no complaint
for unfair labor practice had been filed, as yet, with the Court of
Industrial Relations (NLRC or Labor Arbiter).

The reason for such exclusive jurisdiction is obvious.
Since the picketing and strikes may be mere incidents or consequences of
the unfair labor practice,.it is but proper that the issuance of
injunction be made by the court having jurisdiction over the main case,
in order that the writ be issued upon cognizance of all relevant facts.”^[2] (underscoring supplied)

Sec. 1 of Presidential Decree 605 provides:

 

Sec. 1. — No court of the
Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction in any case involving or growing out of the
issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any
action whatsoever by the proper
administrative official or body on concessions, licenses,
permits, patents, of public grants of any kind in connection with the
disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development
of the natural resourcea of the Philippines.

In Datiles and Company vs. Sucaldito, 186 SCRA 704 (1990), the Supreme Court ruled that:

 

“As to the prohibition dictated by PD
No. 605, the same pertains to the issuance by courts of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts on controversies which
involve facts or exercise of discretion in technical cases, because to
allow courts to judge these matters could disturb the smooth functioning
of the Y administrative machinery, xxx.”

Secs. 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 provides that::

 

Sec. 55. No Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction. — No court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, or writ of preliminary
injunction against the PARC or any of its duty authorized or designated
agencies in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to,
or in connection with the application, implementation, endorcementm, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform.

Sec 68. Immunity of Government Agenaes from
Undue Interference. – No injunction, retraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of
Agrarian Reform (D/.RJ, the Department of Agriculture (DA), the
Department of Environment, and Natural Resources (DENR), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.

Sec. 2 of Presidential Decree No. 385
entitled “Requiring Government Financial Institutions to Foreclose
Mandatorily All Loan with Arrearages, Including Interest and Charges
Amounting to at Least Twenty Percent (20%) of the Total Outstanding
Obligation” provides:

 

Sec. 2. No restraining order, temporary
or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court any government
financial institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure
provided in Section 1 hereof, whether such restraining order, temporary
or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third party
or parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the
borrower and admitted by the government financial institution concerned
that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages has been paid
after the filing of foreclosure proceedings.

In case a restraining order or injunction is
issued, the borrower shall nevertheless be legally obligated to
liquidate the remaining balance of arrearages, paying ten percent (10%)
of the arrearages outstanding as of the time of foreclosure, plus
interest and other charges, on every succeeding thirtieth (30th) day
after the issuance of such restraining order or injunction until the
entire arrearages have been liquidated. These shall be in addition to
the payment of amortizations currently maturing. The restraining order
or injunction shall automatically be dissolved should the borrower fail
to make any of the above-mentioned payments on due dates, and no
restraining or injunction shall be issued thereafter.

All restraining orders and injunctions existing
as of the date of this Decree on foreclosure proceedings filed by said
government financial institutions shall be considered lifted unless
finally resolved by the court within sixty (60) days from date hereof.

Sec 50 of Republic Act No. 8291 (The Government service Insurance System Act of 1997) provides that:

 

Sec. 50. Development and Disposition of Acquired Assets.
– The GSIS shall have the right to develop and dispose of its acquired
assets obtained in tie ordinary course of its business. To add value to,
improve profitability on, and/or enhance the marketability of an
acquired asset, the GSIS may further develop/rerovate the same either
with its own capital or through a joint venture arrangement with private
companies or individuals.

The GSIS may sell its acquired assets in
accordance with existing Commission on Audit (COA) rules, and
regulations for an amount not iower than the current market value of the
property. For this purpose, tho GSIS shall conduct an annual appraisal,
of its propeity or acquired assets to determine its current market
value. All notices of sale shall be published in newspapers of general
circulation.

No injunction or restraining order issued by any
court, commission, tribunal or office shall bar, impede or delay the
sale and disposition by the GSIS of its acquired assets except on
questions of ownership and national or public interest.

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides that:

 

Sec. 1. No court in the Philippines
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction, ‘or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or
controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,
forest, or other natural resource development project of the government,
or any public utility operated by. the government, including among
others public utilities for the transport of the goods, or commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons,
entity or government officials from proceeding with, or continuing the
execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of
such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such
execution, implementation or operation.

Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act, provides that:

 

Sec. 2. Policy. – It is hereby
declared the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and
balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of tfye Clark and
Subic Military Reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station,
Wallace Air Station, OTJonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval
Communications Stations and Capas Relay Station) to raise funds by the
sale of portions of military camps and to apply said funds as provided
herein for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of
the lands covered under the 1947 Military” Bases Agreement between the
Philippines’ and the Unted States of America, as amended.

Xxx

Sec. 21. Injunction and Restraining Order.
– The implementation of the projects for the conversion into
alternative productive uses of the military reservatios are urgent and
necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order
issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Pena 159 SCRA 557 (1988), the
main issue is whether regional trial courts have jurisdiction over the
Presidential Commission on Good Government and the properties
sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its
powers under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended and whether
said regional trial courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside
the orders and actions of the Commission. The Court, in this case, held
that regional trial courts do not have jurisdiction over the Commission.
The Court upheld the primacy of administrative jurisdiction as vested
in the Commission and held that jurisdiction over all sequestration
cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and properties under the past
discredited regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review exclusively by the Supreme
Court. Thus, the Supreme Court declared:

 

“On the issue of jurisdiction squarely raised, as above indicated, the Court sustains petitioner’s stand and holds that regional
trial courts and the Court of Appeals for that matter have no
jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the
exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Article
XVIII. section 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere
with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Xxx” (emphasis supplied)

In the case of Kabushiki Kaisha, et. al. vs. San Diego, et. al., 16 SCRA 406 (1966),
the Supreme Court declared that the Philippine Patent Office and the
Public Service Commission are of the same rank or category as Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts”) and reiterated the well
settled doctrine that “a writ of injunction or of prohibition or of
certiorari may be issued against a. court only by another court superior
in rank to the former.” The Court, thus said:

 

“The law in this jurisdiction vests
upon Us. the authority to review final orders and decisions of the
Public Service Commission. In Iloilo Commercial, etc. vs. Public Service
Commission (56 Phil. 28), in denying jurisdiction to the trial court to
issue injunctive relief againsth the Public Service Commission, We
held:

“Any order made by the Commission may be n the
application of any person or public service affected thereby, by
certiorari in appropriate cases or by petition, to the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court is given jurisdiction to review any order of the
Commission and to modify or set it aside (Sec. 35). Xxx In the
absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to the Court of First
Instance to grant injunctive relief against orders of the Public Service
Commission, it would appear that no court, other than the Supreme
Court, possesses such jurisdiction.”

On the other hand, under Rule 44 on the Revised
Rules of Court (now Rule 43) and Section 33 of Republic Act No. 166, as
amended, appeals from orders and decisions of the Director of the Patent
Office must likewise be taken to us. It is, therefore, undeniable
tha<: the : Philippine Patent Office (now Bureau of Patents) and the
Public Service Commission are similarly situaced and that both are, to
say the least, of the same rank or category as Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts). Consequently, no one of the latter has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against them.” (emphasis supplied)

In the case of Poblete Construction Company & Poblete vs. Social Security Commission, 10 SCRA 1 (1964), the
Supreme Court held that the Social Security Oommission, in exercising
its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with thi Public Service Commission and
the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court), thus the latter has
no jurisdiction to entertain tr,e petition for certiorari filed against
the Commission. The Supreme Court said:

 

“In taking cognizance of the petition
filed by Judith Asiais (Case No. 78), the Social Security Commission was
exercising its quasi-judicial powers granted by Sec. 5 (a) of Republic
Act No. 1161as amended. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that the
claim aforementioned was not within the jurisdiction of the Commission,
and it would be proper to issue a writ of certiorari or injunction to
restrain it from hearing and deciding the same, a Court of First Instance has no iurisdiction to issue either said writs against the Commission.

It must be observed that in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (c) of Republic Act no.
1161, as amended, the decisions of said Commission are reviewable both
upon law and facts by the Court of Appeals^[3],
and that if the appeal from its decision is only on questions of law,
the review shall be made by Us. It is clear from these provisions that
the Commission, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the
Public Service Commission and the Court of the First Instance. As the
writs of injunction, certiorari and prohibition may be issued only be a
superior court against an inferior court, board or officer exercising
judicial functions, it necessary follows that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, where appellants filed their petition for certiorari,
had no jurisdiction to entertain the same.” (emphasis supplied)

In the case of Utleg vs. Area, 40 SCXA 597 (1971), the Supreme Court stressed that:

 

“Only the Bureau of Forestry has
jurisdiction to grant licenses for the taking of forest products,
pursuant to Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code, winch
states:

“Jurisdiction of Bureau of Forestry.—
The Bureau of Forestry shall have jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management reproduction reforestation,
occupancy, and use of all public forests ana forest reserves and over
the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest
products, incradmg stone and earth therefrom.”

That the authority for the cutting, gathering or
removal of forest products shall only be upon license to be issued by
the Bureau of Forestry, is further stressed by Section 1831 of the said
Code, thus:

“License required for taking or removal of forest products.—
Except as herein provided, forest products shall be cut, gathered or
removed in or from any forest only upon license from the Bureau of
Forestry.”

Xxx

Xxx [T]he writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the respondent court would allow the respondent corporation to
continue cutting, gathering and removing timber from the concession area
in question without license duly issued by the Director of Forestry, in
violation of the aforequoted provisions of Section 1831 of the .
Revised Administrative Code. The said writ, being against the law, is
null and void. The respondent court, in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction and thus allowing the respondent corporation to
conduct logging operations in the timer concession area in question, had
in effect arrogated unto itself the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry xxx. Clearly, it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in granting the issuance ; of the writ of preliminary injunction
complained of.”(emphasis supplied)

In the case of Bureau of Customs and the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EBB) vs. Ogario and
Montetibano, G. R. No. 138081, March 30, 2000, the Supreme Court held
that Regional Trial Courts have nq jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture
proceedings in the Bureau of Customs. Thus, the Court declared:

 

“There is no question that Regional
Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the Validity or
regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedines conducted by the Bureau
of Customs and to enioin or otherwise interfere with these proceeding.
The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine ail questions touching
on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial
Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

Xxx

The rule that Regional Trial
Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the
policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive,
not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import
and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry
out the functions it has been instituted to perform.

Even if the seizure by the
Collector of Customs’ were illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have
said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs jurisdiction
thereon.”^[4] (emphasis supplied)

Section. 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that:

 

Sec. 14. Restrictions. – No writ of
injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

In the case of Mariano F. Ocampo IV vs. The Honorable Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 1034-647, August 30, 1993, the Supreme Court said that:

 

“[T]he courts cannot interfere with the
discretion .of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity
and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss
the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or
substance or if he otherwise finds no grounds to continue with the
inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is,
in his view, in due and proper form.

Xxx xxx xxx

[Tlhe rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before
it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if
they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.” (emphasis supplied)

In the case of Asutilla vs. Philippine National Bank, 141 SCRA 40 (1986), the Supreme Court held that:

 

“xxx It is a long-standing doctrine
that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution for the
reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately
investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society except in
specified cases among which are to prevent the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection
to constitutional rights.” (emphasis supplied)

The ruling in the Asutilla case was reiterated
in the case of P/Insp. Rodolfo Samson, et. al. vs. Hon. Teofisto
Guingona, G.R. No. 123504, December 14, 2000, where the Supreme Court said:
 

“xxx

The issue is whether or not the Court may enjoin
the Secretary of Justice from conducting a reinvestigation of the
charges against petitioners, as ordered by the trial court for
determination of probable cause.

Xxx

As a general rule, the Court will not issue
writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or
restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will mmnction not lie
when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. However.In extreme case, we have laid the following
exceptions;’ (1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused’ (2) when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or avoid oppression
or multiplicity of action; (3) wnen there is a prejudicial question
which is subjudice-(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under’an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it
is a case of prosecution rather then prosecution; (9) where the charges
are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10)
when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

Xxx xxx xxx

We find [petitioners’] plea for writ of
injunction or temporary restraining order utterly without merit. As a
rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations
and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information
against an offender.”

Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 7832,
otherwise known as “An Act’.; Penalizing the Pilferage of Electricity
and Theft of Electric Power Transmission Lines/Materials, Rationalizing
System Losses by Phasing out Pilferage Losses as a Component Thereof,
and for Other Purposes” provides that:

 

Section 9. Restriction on the Issuance of Restraining Orders or Writs of Injunction.
— No writ of injunction or restraining order shall be issued by any
court against any private electric utility or rural electric cooperative
exercising the right and authority to disconnect electric service as
provided in this Act, unless there is prima. facie evidence that the
disconnection was made with evidence bad faith or grave abuse of
authority.

If, notwithstanding the provisions of this
section, a court issues an injunction or restraining order, it shall be
effective only upon the filing of a bond with the court which shall be
in the form of cash bond or cashier’s check equivalent to “differential
billing”, penalties and other charges, or to the total value of the
subject matter of the action; Provided, however, That such injunction or
restraining order shall automatically be refused or, if granted shall
be dissolved upon filing by the public utility of a counterbond similar
in form and amount as the above required: Provided finally, That
whenever such injunction is granted the court issuing it shall, within
ten (10) days from its issuance, submit a report to the Supreme Court
setting forth in detail the grounds or reasons for its order.”

Sees. 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 8975,
otherwise known as the “An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation
and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects” provides that:

 

Sec. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions.— No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue
any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, of any of its subdivisions,
or any person or entity, whether public or private, Sting under the
government’s direction to restraxn, prohibit or compel the following
act:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of oie national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/projectr and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases,
disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but
not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights
through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant
shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond
shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the
award of the contract is null and void, the court may if appropriate
under the circumstance, award the contract to the qualified and winning
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.

Sec. 4. Nullity of writs and orders. — Any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and
of no force and effect.

Proclamation No. 50-A^[6] provides that:

 

Sec. 31. No Injunctions. — No court w
administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction
against the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it pursuant to this Proclamation.
Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of
assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking
possession of any asset purchased by him.

This Circular shall take effect immediately. Strict compliance hereby enjoined.

June 12, 2003.

Art 218. Powers of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the power and authority:

Xxx xxx xxx

(c) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not
restrained of performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage
to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code
shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with
opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a
complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if
offered, as only after a finding of facr by the Commission xxx.

Art 264 of the Labor Code on the other hand
enumerates the prohibited activities where the Secretary of labor can
enjoin and restrain the commission of such acts.

^[2] Citing
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Quicho, 47 SCRA 11
(1972); Philippines vs. Calauag 103 Phil 1032 91958): Reyes, et al. vs.
Tan, et al., 99 Phil. 880; Erlanger and Galinger Inc. vs. Erlanger and
Galiger Exployees Association, 104 Phil., 17 (1958)

^[3] Republic
Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, amending for the purpose Sec. 9 of BP 129, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, , provides
that:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.— The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

Xxx

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees’ Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under PD 412, as amended, the
provisions of thisAct, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph
and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragaph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948

^[4] citing Jao vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA, 35, 42-43 (1995)

^[5] Under
Proclamation No. 50 the President created the Committee on Privitization
and Asser Privitization Thrust. Under Republic Act No. 8758, the term
of the Committee on Privitization and Apt was extended until December
31, 2000. Them under Executive Order No. 323 dated December 6, 2000, a
Privitization Council was created to pursue the mandate of the Committee
on Privitization and Asset Privitization Thrust, Article II, Sec. 3 of
EO 323 provides that “xxx the Council shall assume all the powers,
functionsm duties and responsibilities, all properties, real or personal
assets, equipment and records, as well as the obligations, liabilities
previously held or exercise by the Committee on Privitization under
Proclamation No. 50, as amended, which have been devolved to the
National Government pusuant to Republic Act No. 8758.” The provisions
under Proclamation No. 50 and 50-A, not inconsistent with RA 8758 and EO
323 apply to this new Office (Privitization Council) under the Office
of the President as well as the Privitization and Management Office
under the Department of Finance.