MARGARET MAXEY ASSISTED BY SANTIAGO MAGBANUA; FLORENCE MAXEY ASSISTED BY OFRECINIO SANTOS; AND LUCILLE MAXEY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SPOUSES BEA…

This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties
acquired in 1912 prin­cipally through the efforts of the man she was
living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.

The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both
deceased) lived together as husband and wife in Banganga, Davao; that
out of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein
plaintiffs, namely: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred
and George, all surnamed Maxey; that during the period of their
Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively,
the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of land des­cribed under
Par. 4 of the complaint as evidenced by the documents of sale marked as
Exhibits 4-a and 5-1 (same as Exhibits C & D); that after the death
of Regina Morales (Par. 4, Stipulation of Facts), Melbourne Maxey,
through his attorney-in­-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of
the defend­ants-spouses in 1953 the parcels of land under liti­gation
which fact of sale was not controverted by the parties (Par. 1,
Stipulation of Facts); that since then, the defendants-spouses have
taken immediate possession thereof continously up to the present.

Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before
the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the
documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover
possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses,
alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime
and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the
said lands in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death
of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne
Maxey, without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know
of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.

On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material
allegations of the complaint and assert by way of affirmative defenses
that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the
properties in question having purchased the same in good faith and for
value from Melbourne Maxey during his lifetime in 1953, based upon the
reasonable belief that the latter is the real and exclusive owner of the
said parcels of land and that since then, they have been in possession
thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners.
Defend­ants-spouses further counter­-claimed for damages and attorney’s
fees and in the alternative, for the value of the improvements they have
introduced in the premises.

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903.
Their children claim that their parents were united in 1903 in a
marriage performed “in the military fashion”. Both the trial court and
the appellate court rejected this claim of a “military fashion”
marriage.

The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed
by Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred, and George. Except for the
youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties
were acquired. The father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899
American occupation forces who afterwards held high positions in the
provincial government and in the Philippine public schools system.

As earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed
properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church
marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church
wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the
respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

The court stated that “when a man and a woman lived together as husband
and wife, justice demands that the woman should be entitled to the share
of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or
only for man’s comfort and passion”. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

Evidence, testimonial and documentary considered the Court hereby
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant
declaring that:

1. Declaring the above-mentioned sales as null and void;

2. Ordering defendant-spouses to return the said lands, and to pay
for the value of the use of the same at the rate of P1,000.00 a year
from 1953 until delivered, together with interests corresponding thereto
at the legal rate;

3. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff actual damages
in the sum of P500.00 and attor­ney fees in the sum of P3,000.00.

Defendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.

The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of land to be exclusive
properties of the late Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of
the trial court, declared valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that the
appellants are the absolute owners of the properties in question.

The appellate decision sustained the follow­ing arguments of the respondent spouses:

Plaintiffs’ evidence is completely devoid of any showing that these
properties in question were acquired through the joint efforts of
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales. Indeed, if at all, plaintiffs’
evidence tend to establish the fact that Melbourne Maxey by virtue of
his positions as Deputy Governor of Zamboanga (p. 36, t.s.n. de la
Victoria) School Supervisor in the East Coast of Davao (p. 36, t.s.n.,
id.) was more than in a position to purchase these properties by his own
efforts, his own earnings and without the help of Regina Morales. On
the other hand, we have the declaration of Juana A. Morales, a widow of
68 years of age when she tes­tified, the sister-in-law of Regina Morales
– Juana A. Morales confirmed the fact that Melbourne Maxey held the
positions of teacher, provincial treasurer, deputy governor, district
supervisor and lastly superintendent of schools, respectively (p. 203,
t.s.n., de la Victoria). But more important is her declaration that her
sister-in-law Regina Morales had no property of her own whence she
could have derived any income nor was Regina gainfully employed. (pp.
203-204, t.s.n., id.) It must be remembered that the showing must be
CLEAR that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of these
properties. Here the evidence is not only NOT CLEAR, indeed, there is
no evidence at all that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of
the properties in question. In the case of Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia,
et al., supra, the Supreme Court had before it the common-law wife’s own
testimony – claiming that the properties in controversy were the
product of their joint industry. Her ascertions however, were
completely brushed aside be­cause aside from her claim that she took a
hand in the management and/or acquisition of the same, “there appears no
evidence to prove her alleged contribution or participation in the
acquisition of the properties involved therein.” (Id. p. 1069). In the
case at bar, besides the absence of any evidence showing that Regina
Morales contributed by her efforts to the acquisition of these
proper­ties in controversy, both plaintiffs and defendants’ evidence
show that it was through Melbourne Maxey’s efforts alone that these
properties were acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means at
all to have contributed in any manner to all its acquisition.”

The petitioners raise the following issues in this petition:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LATE SPOUSES
MELBOURNE MAXEY AND REGINA MORALES WERE MARRIED ONLY IN 1919, BECAUSE
THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY MARRIED AS EARLY AS 1903.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LIKEWISE, ERRED IN DECLARING THE PROPERTIES
IN QUESTION AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF THE LATE MELBOURNE MAXEY, TO
THE EXCLUSION OF HIS WIFE REGINA MORALES, BECAUSE THE MENTIONED
PROPERTIES WERE ACTUALLY ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY OF
BOTH OF THEM AND THEREFORE, THESE PROPERTIES ARE COMMON PROPERTIES.

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN UNREASONABLY GIVING THE
TERM “JOINT EFFORTS” NOT ONLY A VERY, VERY LIMITED MEAN BUT A CONCEPT
WHICH IS ENTIRELY ABSURD AND UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IN CONSTRUCTING THE
TERM, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN INTERPRETATION WHICH
IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH COMMON PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS AS WELL AS IN
ACCORD WITH THE BEST TRADITION OF THE FILIPINO WAY OF LIFE.

The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected
the argument that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized
“military fashion” marriages as legal. Maxey and Morales were legally
married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act
No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months
thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in
1903 and legitimized in 1919 through a marriage per­formed according to
law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no
provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which
would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a
so-called “military fashion” ceremony or arrangement.

The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were married only in 1919. This is a
finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of the case.
There is no showing that this factual finding is totally devoid of or
unsupported by evidentiary basis or that it is inconsistent with the
evidence of record.

The other issue raised in this petition questions the Court of Appeals’
finding that the parcels of land in question were exclusive properties
of the late Melbourne Maxey.

The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne
Maxey and Regina Morales took place only in February 17, 1919, still the
properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the two
because the acquisition of the said properties was through their joint
efforts and industry. The second and third errors mentioned by the
petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation given by
the Court of Appeals to the phrase “joint efforts”. The petitioners
suggest that their mother’s efforts in performing her role as mother to
them and as wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution
to constitute the parcels of land in question as common properties
acquired through the joint efforts to their parents.

The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to the properties in question citing
the case of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on
non-retroactivity of codal pro­visions where vested rights may be
prejudiced or impaired. And, assuming that Article 144 of the Civil
Code is applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the disputed
properties were exclusively those of the petitioner’s father because
these were not acquired through the joint efforts of their parents.
This conclusion stems from the interpretation given by the Court of
Appeals to the phrase “joint efforts” to mean “monetary contribution”.
According to the Court

“x x x This view with which this ponente personally wholeheartedly
agrees for some time now has been advocated by sympathizers of equal
rights for women, notably in the Commission on the Status of Women of
the United Nations. In our very own country there is strong advocacy
for the pas­sage of a presidential decree providing that ‘the labors of a
spouse in managing the affairs of the household shall be cre­dited with
compensation.’ Unfortunately, until the happy day when such a
proposal shall have materialized into law, Courts are bound by existing
statutes and jurisprudence, which rigidly interpret the phrase ‘joint
efforts’ as monetary contributions of the man and woman living
together without benefit of marriage, and to date, the drudgery of a
woman’s lifetime dedication to the management of the household goes unremunerated,
and has no monetary value. Thus, in the case of Aznar vs. Garcia
(supra) the Supreme Court held that the man and the women have an equal
interest in the properties acquired during the union and each would be
entitled to participate therein if said properties were the product of
their joint effort. In the same case it was stated that ‘aside
from the obser­vation of the trial court that the appellee was an
illiterate woman, there appears no evidence to prove appellee’s
contribution (in terms of pesos and centavos) or participation in the
acquisition of the pro­perties involved; therefore, following the
aforecited ruling of the Court, appellee’s claim for one-half (1/2) of
the properties cannot be granted”.

In so concluding, the respondent Court of Appeals accepted the private
respondents’ argument that it was unlikely for the petitioners’ mother
to have materially contributed in the acquisition of the questioned
properties since she had no property of her own nor was she gainfully
engaged in any business or profession from which she could derive income
unlike their father who held the positions of teacher, deputy governor,
district supervisor, and superintendent of schools.

We are constrained to adopt a contrary view. Considerations of justice
dictate the retroactive application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to
the case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which
provides that changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by the
Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect,
the Code Commission stated:

“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. The ques­tion of how far the new Civil Code should be made
applicable to past acts and events is attended with the utmost
difficulty. It is easy enough to understand the abstract principle that
laws have no retroactive effect because vested or acquired
rights should be respected. But what are vested or acquired rights?
The Commission did not venture to formulate a definition of a vested or
acquired right seeing that the problem is extremely complicated.

What constitutes a vested or acquired right will be determined by the
courts as each particular issue is submitted to them, by applying the
transitional provisions set forth, and in case of doubt, by observing
Art. 9 governing the silence or obscurity of the law. In this manner,
the Commission is confident that the judiciary with its enlightenment
and high sense of justice will be able to decide in what cases the old
Civil Code would apply and in what cases the new one should be binding.
This course has been preferred by the Commission, which did not
presume to be able to foresee and adequately provide for each and every
question that may arise.” (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 165-166).

Similarly, with respect to Article 2253 which provides inter alia that
if a right should be declared for the first time in the Code, it shall
be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior
legisla­tion, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right, of the same origin, the Code Commission
commented:

“x x x But the second sentence gives a retroactive effect to newly
created rights provided they do not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right. The retroactive character of the new right is the
result of the exercise of the sovereign power of legislation, when the
lawmaking body is persuaded that the new right is called for by
consider­ations of justice and public policy. But such new right must
not encroach upon a vested right.” (Report of the Code Commission, p.
167).

The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the
opinion of the Court of Appeals that vested rights were prejudiced. We
do not think so.

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950,
the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife
not legally married and their correspond­ing right to an equal share in
properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during
cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. (Aznar et
al. v. Garcia 102 Phil. 1055; Flores v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation 94 Phil. 451; Marata v. Dionio L-24449, December 31, 1925;
Lesaca v. Lesaca 91 Phil. 135.)

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law
established through judicial precedents but with the modification that
the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works,
the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs
through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.

This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust
and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship
except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home
and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to
earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership
would apply. This article is par­ticularly relevant in this case where
the “common-law” relationship was legitimated through a valid marriage
34 years before the properties were sold.

The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and
existing, the normal and customary gender roles of Filipino men and
women. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to
that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of
running the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator
of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not
legally married at the time does not change the nature of their
respective roles. It is the woman who tra­ditionally holds the family
purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds.
As pointed out by Dean Irene R. Cortes of the University of the
Philippines, “in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands
hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife
manages the affairs of the household. x x x And the famous statement
attributed to Governor General Leonard Wood is repeated: In the
Philippines, the best man is the woman.” (Cortes, “Womens Rights Under
the New Constitution”. WOMAN AND THE LAW, U.P. Law Center, p. 10).

The “real contribution” to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay v. Torres (28
SCRA 489) must include not only the earnings of a woman from a
profession, occupation, or busi­ness but also her contribution to the
family’s material and spiritual goods through caring for the children,
administering the household, husband­ing scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional
duties of a housewife.

Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our
answer is “Yes” because there is no showing that vested rights would be
impaired or prejudiced through its application.

A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become
fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; an
immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished
from an expectant or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
v. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711; Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot
be said of the “exclusive” right of Melbourne Maxey over the properties
in question when the present Civil Code became effect­ive for standing
against it was the concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a
share thereof. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code
was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the
rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the
questioned properties are con­cerned as this was still open to
controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a
share under the applicable law.

The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the
estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.
Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the
P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the
properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out
rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside insofar as
one half of the disputed properties are concerned. The private
respondents are ordered to return one-half of said properties to the
heirs of Regina Morales. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Escolin, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., reserves his vote.

Melencio-Herrera, J., no part.