DIONISIA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

This petition seeks to set aside the January 30, 1976 decision of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, hereinafter referred to as respondent
Commission, which reversed the October 23, 1975 Award of the Acting Referee of
Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, in R04-WCC Case No. 139123,
granting disability compensation benefits to claimant Dionisia Vda. de
los Santos,
herein petitioner.

In his lifetime, Aniceto de los Santos,
husband of herein petitioner Dionisia Vda. de los
Santos, was employed by San Miguel
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as respondent employer.  He started in 1940 as a laborer and
subsequently became a forklift operator, which position he held up to July 9, 1970 when his services were
terminated by respondent employer.  He
was then only over 50 years old.

On March 12, 1973,
he filed a claim for disability benefits with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit
of the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. IV, claiming in substance that
he suffered hypertension and other illnesses in December, 1964, which illnesses
continued even until the filing of the compensation claim; and that he gave
notice thereof to his manager, orally and in writing, also in December, 1964
(p. 65, WCC rec.).  His SSS medical
certificate dated December 18, 1972, which was made part of his compensation
claim, revealed a final diagnostic finding of hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, congestive heart failure, prognosis – poor, and nature of disability
as permanent total; and exact date of disability as July 9, 1970 (id.,
pp. 66-67).  The physician who prepared
the aforesaid certificate described claimant’s condition as “from bad to
worse and needs complete rest and supplementary treatment” (id., p.
66).

During the pendency of the compensation
claim or specifically on June 1, 1974,
claimant Aniceto de los Santos
died.  Accordingly, his widow, herein
petitioner, moved to amend the claim so as to enable her and her dependent
minor children – Cecilia, Aniceto II, Flordeliza, Marie Anne and Cleotilde
– to claim both disability and death benefits in accordance with the doctrine
laid down by the Court in Vda. de
Calado vs. WCC (38 SCRA 567 [1971]) to the effect
that sickness and death benefits are “distinct, separate and apart from
each other” (WCC rec. p. 37).  The
Acting Referee allowed the amendment and accordingly ordered on December 11, 1974 the corresponding
change in the title of the claim to read as “Dionisia
Vda. de los
Santos, for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, claimants, vs. San Miguel Corporation, respondent”
(id, p. 35).

On October 23, 1974, the Acting Referee, finding the claim not
only uncontroverted, but also sufficiently
established and substantiated by the evidence on record, ordered respondent
employer to pay, among others, disability compensation benefits, but without
death benefits, in the amount of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos to claimant’s
surviving spouse and minor children.  The
Acting Referee did not order the payment of death benefits for the reason that
the death of Aniceto de los
Santos on June 1, 1974 was already more than two years after
his disability on July 9, 1970.  In so deciding, the Acting Referee declared:

“The records show that the respondent was notified by
registered mail on April 23, 1973
of the present claim, but has not controverted the
same.  To expedite this case, the parties
were given the opportunity to settle and the respondent offered the sum of P2,000.00 as settlement which was refused by the claimant,
hence, this Decision.

“Considering that there is no controversion
in this case, an outright award may be given because the failure of the
respondent to controvert the present claim resulted in the ‘loss of all its
non-jurisdictional defenses which include the admission of the compensability
of the present claim, its reasonableness and validity’ (NDC vs. Esteban Galamgam, L-29634, April 29, 1971, citing numerous cases
earlier decided), and as such, claimant is entitled to ‘disability benefits
from date of sickness or forced resignation to the time of his death, where
death took place after two years from date of sickness’ (Vda.
de Calado vs. WCC, L-26149, April 30, 1971).

“An examination of the records of this case and the evidence
presented by claimant shows that even without lack of controversion
in this case, the present claim is sufficiently proved, based on the following:

“‘ Aniceto de los
Santos worked with the SMC since 1940 as a laborer and on the date of his
separation on July 9, 1970 due to his advanced sickness of hypertension and
congestive heart disease, after a series of hospitalization at the company’s
hospitals at Makati Medical Hospital, Ocampo Clinic and St. Joseph’s Clinic, he was a forklift
operator earning P15.50 a day working six days a week.  The respondent was required to produce the
medical record of claimant but failed to do so. 
In any event, claimant’s medical evidence (Exhibits B, C, D, D-1 &
D-2) show that claimant is a ‘known case of hypertension’ (Exh.
B); ‘condition is of several years, subject presently is in congestive
heart failure manifested as dyspsea and leg
edema.  This after all may be the result
of a sustained elevation of blood pressure for a long, long time‘ (Exh. C)’

which clearly
shows that Aniceto was sick as claimed and which
sickness supervened during the course of his employment with respondent and
continued until his death (Exh. E).  As held by our Supreme Court in the following
cases where illness supervened during the course of employment, the claimant is
relieved of the burden of proving causation, which is legally presumed and
cannot be overcome by testimony of doctors to the contrary, to wit:

“‘It is now well-settled that once it is established that the
illness supervened during employment, as in this case, there is a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose out of the
employment or was at least aggravated by it; and the employer has the burden of
proving the contrary by substantial evidence. 
The mere opinion of its (employer) plant physician that there is no
causal connection cannot prevail over said presumption’ (Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corp. v. WCC, L-29998, Oct. 21, 1974; Abana
v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278, 1282; Magalona v. WCC, L-21849, Dec. 11, 1967; Justiniano v. WCC, L-22774, Nov. 21, 1966; etc.).

“It being shown, however, that Aniceto
died after two years from the date of his sickness, he is not entitled to death
benefits under Sec. 8 of Act 3428, as amended, but is instead entitled to
disability benefits from July 9, 1970
up to the time of his death on June 1,
1974 (Vda. de Calado v. WCC, supra).

“x       x          x          x          x          x          x          x”
(pp. 22-24, WCC rec.).

On November 28, 1975,
respondent employer filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the claim
was properly controverted and that there was lack of
causal connection between the illness that caused claimant’s death and his
employment (pp. 7-21, WCC rec.). 
Petitioner filed her opposition to the aforesaid motion maintaining that
the claim was compensable and uncontroverted (pp.
30-35, rec.).

Finding the motion without merit, the Acting Referee on December 3, 1975 denied the motion
and ordered the records thereof elevated to the respondent Commission for
review (p. 6, WCC rec.).

On January 30, 1976, the respondent
Commission, treating sub silentio the
issue of controversion, reversed the aforesaid October 23, 1975 award and thereby
absolved respondent employer from liability on the second issue raised – lack of causal connection between injury
that caused claimant’s death and his employment with respondent employer, thus:

“Records show that the instant claim is anchored on the
deceased’s alleged sickness of hypertension and other illnesses allegedly
acquired and/or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of the
employment.  The illness of hypertension
is the transient elevation of blood pressure reading which is controllable by
proper food and medication.  It is the
result of arteriosclerosis or the hardening of the blood vessel attributable to
hereditary and ageing process.  As to his
sickness of heart disease, there is no competent medical evidence to show that
an ECG examination was conducted on him prior to his death.  There being no competent medical evidence to
show that the deceased was suffering from any disabling illness which is
traceable to his employment, this Commission, believes that this claim is not
compensable under the law” (pp. 4-5, WCC rec.).

Hence, this petition.

The records patently show, and WE so rule, that the respondent
Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in reversing the award of the
Acting Referee, which WE find in order as it is anchored on law and the
controlling jurisprudence on workmen’s compensation cases.

I

1.  In proceeding to reverse
the October 23, 1975 Award of the Acting Referee, without passing upon the
decisive issue of whether or not the finding of non-controversion
is factually and/or legally supported, the respondent Commission gravely abused
its discretion.  With the Acting
Referee’s finding of non-controversion undisturbed,
respondent Commission was without jurisdiction to look into the substantial
merits of the claim, especially its compensability.  For it is basic that the decisive point of
every compensation claim is its controversion or lack
of it as the issues and defenses that can be raised or availed of by the
employer in the proceedings are dependent on said controversion
or non-controversion. 
In a case of a controverted claim, the
employer is entitled to raise and present evidence on the issue of compensability;
while in a non-controverted claim, the employer,
unless its right to controvert is successfully reinstated, is barred from
raising that issue as the same is deemed waived or renounced by its aforestated failure to controvert.  Consequently, the respondent Commission had
no authority and therefore exceeded its jurisdiction when it proceeded to favorably
consider respondent employer’s defense of non-compensability of the
illness of claimant without a priori finding of a valid controversion.

The records reveal that the respondent employer failed to timely,
properly and effectively controvert claimant’s right to compensation.  And the Acting Referee made an express
finding on this matter, which on review by the respondent Commission was not
disturbed, as it passed upon it sub silentio
despite the fact that the respondent employer squarely raised said question as
it claimed that it had controverted the claimant’s
right to compensation.

In its comment before this Court, the respondent employer had
reiterated its claim that it controverted the
claimant’s right to compensation.  In its
memorandum submitted pursuant to the resolution of this Court, however, it did
not pursue the matter.  Instead, it
posited the ingenious theory that since the respondent Commission had found
that the claimant did not suffer from any compensable illness or disease while
in the course of his employment with respondent employer, it was obvious that
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission felt it unnecessary to discuss whether
the claim has been duly controverted or not since in
any compensation claim, the decisive factor is the existence of some illness or
disability on the part of the employee. 
Reduced simply, what respondent employer’s counsel is saying is that controversion or lack of it is material or important only
when there is some compensable illness or disability.  Respondent employer’s counsel is patently
wrong.  For precisely, that controversion is the medium by which the employer must make
known its position on the claim — whether it admits liability or disclaims
any.  It thus serves to join the issue of
the compensation case.  The controversion, to be exact, stands as the answer of the
employer to a compensation claim filed by an employee, which corresponds to the
complaint in an ordinary civil case. 
Thus, it has been said that the language of Section 45 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, on controversion, may
appear very sweeping and perhaps arbitrary to those who do not get the idea
behind it.  The provision proceeds from
the assumption that as the employer has all the facilities which enable him, better
than the injured, to determine whether a claim against him would lie under the
circumstances attending any accident or ailment befalling the worker, it is his obligation to
apprise the Commission of his determination whether to contest or not the injured
worker’s right to receive the benefits of the Act.  If he sleeps on his right, he cannot
subsequently be heard to complain that the law is hard against him (Morable and Inton, The Workmen’s
Compensation Act, p. 194).

Furthermore, the argument of counsel for respondent employer
smacks of absurdity.  For to follow his
theory is to permit an incongruous situation whereby an employer, suffering
from the predicament of non-controversion, is allowed
to cleanse himself thereof, by the simple expedient of permitting him to prove
a defense which in the first place had been foreclosed by his failure to
controvert.  As previously stated, the failure to
controvert results in the renunciation of defenses available to the employer,
including the defense that the illness subject matter of the claim is not
compensable.

Moreover, the theory posed by counsel for respondent employer
will have the effect of relieving the defaulting employer of the effects and
consequences of non-controversion without complying
with the strict requirements of the Act on the matter.  Under the law, the employer’s right to controvert, lost by non-compliance,
can be reinstated only upon a verified petition to that effect, specifying
therein the reason for its failure to controvert the right to compensation and
the grounds relied upon to defeat the claim if its right is restored (Sec. 45,
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; Sec. 3, Rule 10, 1973 Rules of the
WCC).  The records of the instant case do
not show any petition to that effect. 
Neither does the respondent Commission refer to any; nor does the
respondent employer claim that it had successfully filed one.  Consequently, the respondent employer’s right
of controversion cannot be motu proprio reinstated or assumed
by the respondent Commission absent any motion for reinstatement; nor can it
look into the question of compensability of the illness of claimant without a
priori determination that the Acting Hearing
Officer’s finding that the claim for compensation was uncontroverted
is erroneous.  As long as the claim is uncontroverted, the issue
of compensability is barred.  The
issue of compensability cannot be revived unless and until the right to
controvert is reinstated and exercised.

2. Likewise on claimant’s
side is the presumption of compensability which verily obtains in his favor as
it is undisputed that his illness supervened in the course of his employment
with respondent employer.  The award of the Acting Referee has
adverted to this, laying as well the applicable law and jurisprudence on the
matter which, however, was conveniently overlooked by the respondent
Commission.  With this presumption,
respondent is burdened with the duty to overcome the same by substantial
evidence which it failed to do.  This
failure of respondent employer rendered the presumption of compensability, rebuttable at its
inception, conclusive (Parian vs. WCC, G.R.
No. L-42433, August 23, 1978; Cañonero
vs. WCC, 3 PHILAJUR, 236;
81 SCRA 712 [1978]; Gonzales vs. WCC, 3
PHILAJUR 229; 81 SCRA 703 [1978]; Santos vs. WCC 75 SCRA 365, 370 [1977]).

Moreover, the disability of the late Aniceto
de los Santos
and its linkage to his employment are demonstrated by the evidence which was
never rebutted by respondent employer.

The late Aniceto de los
Santos was hired as a laborer in
August, 1940 by respondent employer, presumably in good health as he was then
only over 20 years old.  Later, he became
a forklift operator.  Over twenty-four
years thereafter, or in December, 1964, he got sick of hypertension; despite
which he persisted working so as to feed his family, although intermittently he went on sick leave, by reason of which his
condition became worse as his illness was finally diagnosed as hypertension
cardio-vascular disease, causing him to go on extended leave of absence until
he consumed all his sick leave.  Finally,
the respondent employer terminated his services at age 50 on July 9,
1970, because he was
no longer capable of pursuing his work as forklift operator as he was already a
total wreck.  This fact is clear even
from the respondent employer’s letter of termination to Aniceto, thus: 
“x x x You have
already exhausted all your accrued sick leave credits having taken a total of
438 days of sick leave during the period of your employment.  In view thereof and pursuant to Article VII
of our Health, Welfare and
Retirement Plan, we are constrained to retire you from the service effective July 9,
1970.  x x
x” (p. 27, WCC
rec.).  In the same letter,
respondent employer likewise expressed its “x x
x appreciation for the loyal and satisfactory service
x x x” of Aniceto de los Santos, who on
July 28, 1970 received from respondent employer the total amount of Twelve
Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Seven and 50/100 Pesos (P12,787.50)
“x x x in full and
complete payment of all my retirement benefits” (p. 28, WCC rec.;
underscoring supplied).

As a laborer and forklift operator, the late Aniceto
de los Santos
was always exposed not only to the elements — dust, heat and rain — but also
to the gas from the forklift engine as well as to the heat emanating therefrom.  Thus, as
described by his surviving spouse in her affidavit:  “x x x 4. Na bilang forklift operator,
siya ay palaging nakabilad at nauulanan, nalalanghap niya ang usok ng
forklift motor; palaging basa
ang likod at pagod dahilan sa maraming trabaho sa opisina
hanggang sa siya’y magkasakit ng hypertension; 5. Bagaman may sakit na si
Aniceto siya ay nagpatuloy pa rin sa trabaho dahilan
siya lamang ang naghahanapbuhay sa pamilya at noong
1968 siya ay inatake habang nasa forklift nagmamaneho at nasobsob na lamang at dinala
ng San Miguel sa Makati Medical Center at ipinagamot,
at nagmula noong siya mayat-mayat nagkakasakit at nagpapahospital sa Makati Medical Center, sa Ocampo Clinic, St. Joseph’s Clinic,
hanggang sa siya’y alisin sa
trabaho dahilan sa siya’y wala
ng leave of absence at nagleleave
dahilan sa kanyang sakit na
hypertension; 6. Na noong magkasakit
sa puso, hypertension at naospital, ang San Miguel ang nagbayad noon sa Makati Medical Center and Ocampo Clinic ngunit nang alisin siya
sa trabaho noong Hulyo 9, 1970, siya ay hindi binigyan
ng tulong at bagkos lumala ng
lumala ang kanyang sakit, ng siya’y tanggalin
sa trabaho ng walang tulong
na ibinigay; 7. Na ang kanyang sakit
no hypertension ay lumala ng
lumala at nagpaospital siya sa
PGH ng hung saan napatunayang siya ay ‘known case
of hypertension’ at madaling mapagod,
napaparelitico at ang kanyang puso ay masamang-masama na (Exhibit B); na pinatunayan ni Dr. C. Y. Santiago
ng Phil. General
Hospital; 8. Na pinatunayan
din ni
Dr. Marcial Cenido na si
Aniceto ay isang casong hypertensive cardio-vascular disease at congestive
heart failure, with manifest dyspsea and leg edema; na ang kaso
niya ay pagrabe nang pagrabe (Exhibit C); 9. Na ng siya’y maospital
sa Phil.
General Hospital, siya ay binigyan ng clinical records
doon na nagpapatunay
sa kanyang sakit at mga gamot na ibinibigay (Exhibit D, D-1
& D-2); x x x”
(Exhibit I, pp. 58-59, WCC rec.).

Verily, the nature of Aniceto’s work as well as the pressure and the
environmental circumstances of his work caused the weakening of his body until
he developed hypertension and cardio-vascular disease that led to his
separation from the service by reason of disability and ultimately to his
death.

3.  It is not true as
declared by the respondent Commission that there was no competent medical
evidence to show that the deceased was suffering from any disabling illness
which is traceable to his employment. 
Claimant’s medical evidence was even mentioned by the Acting Referee in
his award as Exhibits B, C, D, C-1 & D-2 (pp. 23, 24, 42-47, WCC rec.),
upon which he relied as respondent employer failed to produce claimant’s medical record in the possession of
the company’s hospitals.

Parenthetically, this
Court hereby expresses its displeasure over the unexplained failure of
respondent employer to produce the medical record of the late Aniceto de los Santos, despite the request of the Acting Referee
(Decision of the Acting Referee, p. 23, WCC rec.; pp. 12, 24 and 61,
rec.).  Counsel for petitioner charged in
his pleadings before the respondent Commission that Aniceto
de los Santos’ “x x x medical records at the company hospitals of Makati Medical Center, Ocampo
Clinic and St. Joseph’s Clinic cannot be released or certified to claimant
because of instructions from respondent x x
x.” (p. 31, rec.; p. 40, WCC
rec.).  No denial of this charge
came from respondent employer and its counsel. 
While this matter was not brought out squarely before US, WE noted it in
passing to impress upon employers and their lawyers that such actuations, if
true, serve to aggravate the sad plight of the lowly workers as well as to
hamper the prompt disposition of compensation claims, demanded by the social
justice guarantee enjoined by the supreme law of the land.

4.  The Acting Referee denied
the additional claim for death benefits for the reason that the death of the
late Aniceto de los Santos
on June 1, 1974 took place more than two years after his
disability on June 9, 1970. 
Under Section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, death
benefits may be awarded if the disease contracted or injury received by the
employee as provided by Section 2 causes his death within two years from the
date of such injury or sickness (disability). 
His heirs, herein petitioners, were however granted disability benefits
from his disability on June 9, 1970 up to the time of his death on June 1,
1974.  Petitioner did not dispute the
award as aforestated.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS
HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION IS
HEREBY ORDERED

A.         
TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY BENEFITS;

B.        
TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER THE MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL
EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE DECEASED CLAIMANT, DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;

C.        
TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN PERCENT
(10%) OF THE RECOVERABLE AMOUNT; AND

D.        
TO PAY THE SUCCESSOR OF THE DEFUNCT RESPONDENT
COMMISSION ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.