UNIVERSAL CORN PRODUCTS INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. RICE AND CORN BOARD, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal from a judgment of
Judge Guillermo Torres of Pasig, Rizal dated August 6,
1962, dismissing an
amended petition for declaratory relief seeking a judicial declaration of
illegality of the construction placed by respondent Rice and Corn Board of its
Resolution No. 10 in connection with Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No.
108.  What was sought, without success,
was a ruling that peti­tioner Universal Corn Products, Inc. could retain its
co-petitioners, all aliens, in its employ, contending that a dismissal from
employment on the strength of the aforesaid construction by respondents would
be to give it a retroactive, and under the circumstances, an un­constitutional
effect.

The amended petition of
February 8, 1961 after the averments as to the petitioners and respondents
alleged that pursuant to the power vested in respondent Rice and Corn Board by
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3018, Resolution No. 10 was promulgated dated
November 21, 1960, a particular regulation of which specifically provides:
“No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines shall be
employed in any capacity in any Filipino-owned establish­ment engaged in any of
the lines of activity in the rice and/or corn industry except technical
personnel whose employment may be authorized by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Rice and Corn Board.”^[1]
Then came a paragraph that petitioner Universal Corn
Products, Inc. “is a corporation the capital stock of which is wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines
and is engaged in certain lines of activity covered by Republic Act No. 3018
and Resolution No. 10 of the Rice and Corn Board.”^[2]
It was then stated that all its employees numbering over 200 are Filipinos,
with the exception of co-petitioners, then holding the positions of executive
vice-president, comptroller, sales manager, chief warehouseman, assistant plant
superintendent, cashier, and sales supervisor,^[3]
and that such alien employees “have been with the Universal Corn Products,
Inc. long before the enactment into law of Republic Act No. 3018 and the
promulgation of Resolution No. 10 of the Rice and Corn Board.”^[4]
The next two paragraphs would impugn the construction placed on Resolution No.
10 for its retroactivity insofar as it would be made to apply to the alien
petitioners with the result that their dismissal would be called for and for
its unconstitutionality insofar as such individuals and other persons similarly
situated would be deprived of their means of livelihood without due process of
law and would be denied the equal protection of the law.  The amended petition next stressed the pro­priety
of a judicial
declaration as to the interpretation that must be placed on the aforesaid
Resolution No. 10 and Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 to avoid the
taint of retroactivity and unconstitutionality.^[5]

Respondents, the National
Rice and Corn Board and its chairman as well as members, in their answer of March 9, 1961, in effect admitted the
allegations of the petition but denied the legal conclusion asserted by
petitioners to flow therefrom.  More specifically, they disputed the alleged
retroactive character of the construction, the truth according to them being
that regardless of the date of employment, “upon the passage of Republic
Act No. 3018 and the regulation in question,” which is a mere reproduction
of Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No.
108 as amended by Republic Act No. 134 “employment of aliens in the
regulated industry has become unlawful and contracts of employment entered
prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 3018 have become legally impossible of
performance * * *.”^[6] Respondents likewise denied the allegation
of unconstitutionality on due process and equal protection grounds, the statute
being a valid measure under the police power of the State * * *.^[7] There were likewise allegations as to the
impropriety of the action for
declaratory relief and the
absence of a cause of action.^[8] After invoking special defenses centered
mainly on the validity under American constitutional law doctrines of the
action taken by respondents, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, with costs, which, as
above pointed out, was granted
by the lower court in the decision, now the subject of this appeal.

The decision must be
affirmed.  There is no valid ground for
reversal.  The contention that the
interpretation by respondents of Resolution No. 10 and Section 2-A of
Commonwealth Act No. 108 suffers from the vice of retroactivity or afflicted
with the taint of unconstitutionality is far from persuasive.

On the question of the
retroactivity of the construction placed by respondent Rice and Corn Board on
its Resolution No. 10 in connection with Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No.
108, it is undeniable of course that if such be the case petitioners could
successfully impugn the appealed decision. 
For as early as 1913, this Court with Justice
Moreland as ponente announced:
“It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless
the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the
language used.  In every case of doubt, the doubt must be re­solved against the retrospective
effect.  The cases supporting this rule
are almost without number.”^[9] Subsequently in 1925, this Court through
Justice Malcolm reiterated the doctrine. 
Thus: “A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms
of the statute or by necessary implication. 
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the
rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it
act retroactively, unless the words are so clear, strong, and imperative that
no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legis­lature
cannot be otherwise satisfied.  No court
will hold a statute to be
retroactive when the legislature has not said so.”^[10] That is still the rule; it has stood the test of time.^[11]

It suffices to refer to
the pertinent provision of
Republic Act No. 3018 to show
that the imputation of retroactivity
lacks support in law.  The act was approved on August 2, 1960 and
made to take effect on January 1, 1961, except as to certain
provisions specifically desig­nated. 
More precisely, with reference to rules and regu­lations, it is provided
that they could be issued by the Rice and Corn Board within thirty (30) days
from the date of approval, namely, August 2, 1960; such rules and regu­lations
which may be necessary to carry out its provision shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation printed in Manila.^[12] Barely two months ago, where it was shown that
the collection of interest on a
deficiency income tax assessment
dated only from the effectivity of the applicable
Republic Act, such deficiency income taxes in question having been assessed and
unpaid before such a date, this Court,
speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, sustained the Court of Tax Appeals in
its holding “that said Section 51(d), as amended, is not being applied retroactively as
contended by petitioner herein.^[13]
To the same effect is this citation from Salcedo and
Ignacio v. Carpio:^[14] “We are sorry to say that this
contention is not correct.  To apply the
provision of Republic Act No. 546 to the petitioners is not to apply it
retrospectively, because to do so is to
make said Act merely effective, not before, but after the date it was
approved or became effective, and it will affect their continuance in office,
not before but after the approval of Republic Act No. 546.  The fact that they have been appointed prior
thereto does not make said Act of retroactive effect.”

Two recent decisions
speak, similarly, People v. Yu Bao^[15] and People v. Ong
Tin.^[16] According
to the former: “Lastly, appellant would have us declare the penal
provisions of Republic Act No. 1180 in the nature of an ex post facto law and, therefore, unconstitutional, if
applied to his case, upon the argument that although he was not yet engaged in
the retail business on May 15, 1954, he was issued a license to engage therein and had entered the
retail business on May 22, 1954, prior to the approval of the Act on June 19,
1954; and yet his having so engaged, although legal at its inception has been
penalized and made criminal by the law. 
We also find this argument unattainable. 
An ex post facto law is one that ‘makes an act
done before the passage of a law, innocent when done, criminal and punish (es) such act * * (Mekin v. Wolfe,
2 Phil. 74).  Applied to appellant’s
case, Republic Act No. 1180 does not penalize this alien appellant for
having engaged in the retail business prior to its approval; what the law
penalizes is his having done so thereafter.” According to the
latter: “The next issue raised by defense counsel refers to the
proposition that even assuming that Republic Act No. 1180 is constitutional,
yet the same does not apply to the accused inasmuch as he has obtained his permit and license to
engage in the retail trade before said law was approved and before
it became effective.  We find no merit in
this contention because the acts constituting the crime for which appellant has
been convicted in the case at bar were all executed after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 1180, and by no means can We consider appellant’s conviction
as the result of the application to him of an ex post facto
law.”

Petitioners are vocal in
their fears that to construe Resolution No. 10 in connection with Section 2-A
of Commonwealth Act No. 108 as to require the dismissal of alien personnel
would be to run the risk of an unconsti­tutional interpretation.  Such doubts and misgivings are
unjustified.  A recent decision of this Court, King v. Hernaez,^[17] of far-reaching significance, ought to have
stilled such misplaced apprehension. 
Thus: “It is hard to see how the nationalization of
employment in the Philippines can run counter to any provision of our
Constitution con­sidering that its aim is not exactly to deprive a citizen of
a right that he may exercise under it but rather to promote, enhance and
protect those that are expressly accorded to a citizen such as the right to life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness.  The
nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy
cannot be branded as unjust,
arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is
merely to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of the
country.  This is what we expressed in no
uncertain terms in the Ichong case when we declared
constitutional the nationalization of the retail trade.  Indeed, we said there that it is a law ‘clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself,
and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, through which and by
which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of
its citizens.’ True, this fundamental policy was expressed in a decision the
subject of which concerns the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Act, but
since the Anti-Dummy Law is but a mere complement of the former in the sense
that it is designed to make effective its aims and purposes and both tend to
accomplish the same objective either by excluding aliens from owning any retail
trade or by banning their employment if the trade is owned by Filipinos, and
the target of both is ‘the removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination’ thru the nationali­zation of the retail trade
both in ownership and employment, the pronouncement made in one regarding its
constitutionality applies equally if not with greater reason to the other both
being complementary one to the other. 
Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its sphere is
merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other
nationalities.”

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.  With costs against petitioners.

Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official leave.

Castro, J., in the result.

^[1]
Paragraph 3, Petition.

^[2]
Paragraph 4, Petition.

^[3]
Paragraph 5, Petition.

^[4]
Paragraph 6, Petition.

^[5]
Paragraph 13, Petition.

^[6]
Paragraph 4, Answer.

^[7]
Paragraphs 5 & 6, Answer.

^[8]
Paragraphs 6 & 9, Answer.

^[9]
Montilla v. Augustinian Corp.
(1913), 23 Phil. 220, 222.

^[10]
Segovia v. Noel (1925), 47 Phil. 543, 546.  An earlier opinion to the same effect is In
re Will of Riosa (1918), 39 Phil. 23.

^[11]
Thus Justices Street (Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Llanes
[1926], 49 Phil. 466, 469-470; De Mesa v. Collector of Internal Revenue
[1929], 53 Phil. 342, 345), Imperial (La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.,
Inc. v. Bordman & Iloilo Commercial &
Ice Co. [1938], 65 Phil. 401, 406-407; La Previsora
Filipina v. Ledda [1938], 66 Phil. 573, 577;
The Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos [1938], 66 Phil. 237,
239-240), Recto (China Ins. & Sty. Co. v. Judge [1936], 63 Phil.
320,327), Villa-Real (Hosana v. Diomano [1927],
56 Phil. 742, 746), Padilla (Tolentino v. Angeles
[1956], 99 Phil. 309, 316), Reyes, A. (Tamayo v.
Manila Hotel Co. [1951], 101 Phil. 810, 813) Paredes
(Buyco v. PNB, L-14406, June 30, 1961; Billones v. Court, L-17566 & Villardo
v. Court, L-17567, July 30, 1965) and Chief Justice Concepcion
(Valencia v. Hon. Jose T. Surtida, L-17277,
May 31, 1961).

^[12]
Section 6, Republic Act No. 3018.

^[13]
Central Azucarera de Don Pedro v. Court, L-23236 & L-23254, May 31, 1967.

^[14]
89 Phil. 254, 258 (1951).

^[15]
103 Phil. 271, 276 (1958).

^[16]
103 Phil. 476, 480 (1958).

^[17]
L-14859, March 31, 1962.