G.R. No. L-38512. November 16, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REYNALDO SANTOS, ALIAS “KIRKIR”, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
ANTONIO, J.:
Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac, Branch IV, in Criminal Case No. 598, finding Reynaldo Santos, alias
“Kirkir” guilty of the crime of rape and imposing upon him the
supreme penalty of death, with costs.
The evidence for the prosecution show that at about 2:00 o’clock
in the early morning of July 22, 1973, Ernesto Garcia and his children, Myrna,
Pablo, Pedro, Violeta and Lourdes, were sleeping in their house at Barrio
Nagserialan, Camiling, Tarlac, while his wife, Adelaida Banigued, was still
awake weaving a mat. Suddenly shouts
for help coming from the neighboring house of the spouses Dominador Dancel and
Basilia Dancel awakened them. Responding to the pleas for succor, the Garcias ran out of their house.
The offended party, Myrna Garcia, a young girl almost fifteen
(15) years of age when the incident happened, testified that when she was
awakened by the shouts for help, she ran out of the house and saw her mother,
Adelaida Banigued already in their yard, being hacked with a bolo (Exhibit
“A”) by the appellant. She
recognized appellant because it was a moonlit night. Upon seeing Myrna, appellant, with the bolo still in his hands,
ran after Myrna, her sister Violeta Garcia and Virgilio David, an adopted child
of the Dancels. In the course of the
pursuit Myrna stumbled and was overtaken by appellant in the muddy rice paddies
north of their house. Appellant then
straddled her and threatened her, with the bolo pressed against her neck, that
he would kill her unless she acceded to his carnal desires. As she struggled, she felt the pressure of
the blade of the bolo on her neck and became frightened. In such a situation, appellant, in spite of
the screams of the offended party, was able to consummate his carnal desires.
Upon being awakened by the outcries for help, Ernesto Garcia,
Myrna’s father, immediately ran towards the house of Barrio Captain Julio
Gabriel and Barrio Councilman Felix Corsino for their assistance. The Barrio Captain, the Barrio Councilman
and two other residents of the same barrio accompanied Ernesto to the yard where
he had left his wife and children. They
found the yard already deserted. While
searching the adjacent ricefields with flashlights, they heard someone
calling: “Tatang, tatang”,
and upon running to the place where the voice came from, they saw appellant on
top of his daughter Myrna, and his pants were down and his buttocks
exposed. Upon seeing the plight of his
daughter, Ernesto Garcia tried to grab the bolo near the head of Myrna but the
Barrio Captain took hold of his hand and pacified him. The Barrio Captain took appellant to his
(Barrio Captain’s) house, and from there appellant was brought to town for
investigation.
Julio Gabriel, the Barrio Captain of Nagserialan, Camiling,
Tarlac, corroborated Ernesto Garcia’s testimony. He testified that at early dawn of July 22, 1973, Ernesto Garcia
woke him up at his house, asking for help. In response to the call, he went with him to the scene of the incident,
accompanied by Barrio Councilman Felix Corsino, Artemio Limon and Santiago
Domingo. Upon arrival thereat, they
found the place deserted but when they searched the adjacent ricefields they
heard somebody screaming, “Tatang, tatang”. Proceeding to the place where the voice was coming from, they
found appellant still on top of Myrna, with his trousers pulled down below his
knees. Myrna was then screaming. Ernesto Garcia, who was enraged at what he
saw, attempted to grab the bolo which was near Myrna’s head, but he (Julio
Gabriel) took hold of Ernesto’s
hand and pacified him. Myrna told him
that she ran away, pursued by the appellant, and when she was overtaken, she
was forced, due to fear, to submit to his carnal desires. He ordered appellant to stand up and later
brought him to town and turned him over to the policeman on duty that early dawn
at the municipal building. The bolo was
likewise turned over to the police (Exhibit “A”). As a result of this incident, four (4)
criminal cases were filed against appellant namely, two cases of Frustrated
Homicide (Criminal Cases Nos. 595 and 596), Trespass to Dwelling (Criminal Case
No. 597), and Rape (Criminal Case No. 598). This case refers only to the case of rape.
Appellant admits in this case that he had carnal knowledge of the
offended party on the date and time in question. His defense, however, is that the offended party submitted to the
sexual intercourse voluntarily. He
claims that his uncle, Dominador Dancel, had told him to go to his house
“to take advantage of the womanhood” of Myrna, and that he (his
uncle) would kill him if he would not do it. In compliance with his uncle’s order, he proceeded to the house of
Dominador Dancel at about 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of July 22,
1973. Upon finding the door open, he
entered to find out if anybody was sleeping there. He saw someone, whose face was covered by a blanket, sleeping on
the floor, and when he removed the blanket he noticed that it was his aunt,
Basilia Dancel. Upon recognizing him,
his aunt berated and kicked him until he fell on the floor. His aunt then stood up and got a bolo but he
was able to wrest the weapon from her possession. While Basilia was shouting, he went out of the house and upon
seeing Myrna in the yard, he held her hands and told her “come”. They then proceeded toward the fields. About two hundred meters from the house of
his aunt, Myrna inquired: “Why,
Manong”, and he in turn asked her if she liked him and upon answering him
“Yes, Manong”, they lay down: Myrna then removed her panties and they had sexual intercourse. It was while they were committing the act
that the Barrio Captain and his companions arrived. When he was questioned by the Barrio Captain why he did it, he
replied that it was not his voluntary wish
but the order of his uncle Doming.
Since the fact of sexual intercourse is not disputed by
appellant, the only issue for resolution in this appeal is whether or not the
appellant employed force or intimidation upon the victim.
It is argued by appellant that the offended party’s claim of
intimidation and duress was based mainly on the latter’s testimony, without any
corroborating witnesses; that it is replete
with contradictions and inconsistencies; and that the lower court erred in
concluding that he employed force or intimidation.
Crimes against chastity by their very nature usually involve only two persons – the
complainant and the offender. Seldom,
if ever, is there an eye-witness to the commission of the ofrense. As a consequence, conviction or acquittal of the accused depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant’s testimony. It is,
therefore, for a good reason that courts examine with greatest care the
complainant’s story and subject it to a thorough scrutiny to determine its
veracity in the light of human nature and experience.[1] It
has been held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. If the testimony is not improbable, the
defendant may be convicted on the basis of such uncorroborated testimony.[2]
Here, the testimony of the offended party is not only corroborated by the
testimony of Ernesto Garcia but also by the Barrio Captain. Both attested that Myrna was screaming for
help.
Appellant contends that there are serious contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Myrna and her witnesses which should have
precluded the court from giving credence to their testimonies. Thus, he points out that Myrna Garcia
testified that she did not scream
because she was threatened by the appellant that if she screamed for help she
would be killed, while her father, Ernesto Garcia, claimed that he heard Myrna
shout “Tatang, tatang”, and Julio Gabriel, another witness for the
prosecution, heard “a voice calling for help” and saw her screaming.
We do not find any inconsistency between the testimony of Myrna
and the claims of Ernesto Garcia and Julio Gabriel. Myrna’s statement that she did not scream refers to the time before
the appellant had sexual intercourse with her, whereas the testimonies of
Ernesto Garcia and Julio Gabriel refer to a time when appellant was already
sexually abusing Myrna.
Myrna’s testimony on this matter is as follows:
“Q. And that was the time before he committed the
sexual intercourse with you?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT
Q. Why did you not shout or run away?
A. Because he told me that once I will scream
for help, he will kill me, sir,” (t.s.n., p. 35, Hearing on November 5,
1973)
Upon the other hand, Ernesto Garcia and Julio Gabriel’s
statements are:
(a) Ernesto
Garcia:
“Q. Because you did not reach (sic) anybody, what did you do?
A. Because we did not reach (sic) anybody, we tried to search thru lights, then by and by, we
heard somebody calling, ‘Tatang, tatang’ sir.
Q.
And upon hearing those shouts for help, what did you do?
A. We went to search the place where that voice
came from, sir.” (t.s.n., p. 75, ibid.)
(b) Julio Gabrield:
“Q. Because you did not find somebody in those
houses where you went, what did you do?
A. When I was searching that place in using my
flashlight, suddenly I heard a voice calling for help, sir.” (t.s.n., p.
10, Hearing on November 8, 1973)
Appellant also places much stress on the circumstance that at the
time of the incident and/or just after it, when Myrna was asked by her father
why she was in that place, she only answered: “She put it” (Inkabil na) and did not say right away that she
was chased and brought to the fields by appellant. Appellant argues that her failure to relate to her father the
sordid details of what happened to her could only mean that her intercourse
with appellant was with her consent.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General Myrna’s failure to
disclose to her father the details of her defoliation should be viewed in the
light of the mental shock and trauma that must have overwhelmed her. Consider her harrowing experience: she was a girl of tender age, suddenly
awakened from deep slumber by Basilia’s agonizing cries for succor; she
underwent, in rapid sequence, the shocking experience of seeing her mother
being hacked and boloed by appellant, and being sexually abused by force by the
same armed assailant. Under such
circumstances, how could she be expected to have sufficient equanimity to
recall and relate to her father immediately all the details of her harrowing
experience?
Appellant further contends that the claim of Myrna that she
“stumbled” and was “overtaken” by appellant was revealed
only on November 5, 1973, when she testified in court, or over three (3) months
after the incident. This is not
true. The records show that on July 22,
1973, Myrna gave a statement before the Municipal Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
when the first stage of the preliminary investigation was conducted, narrating
how she was raped by appellant. It must
be noted that Myrna filed the complaint for rape against appellant with the
Municipal Court of Camiling immediately the following day, July 23, 1973. Said statement is similar to her testimony
in court on November 5, 1973.
In seeking to disprove the victim’s allegation that she has had
no previous sexual experience, appellant points to the medical certificate
(Exhibit “C”) which shows that immediately after the incident her
hymen had “old healed lacerations” and her organ could admit
“one and two fingers with ease”. As an intact hymen does not of itself always and unequivocably signal
virginity, an absent hymen does not always point to sexual intercourse.[3]
Besides, as correctly found by the
trial court, the presence of bloodstains (Exhibits “B-1” and
“B-2”) on the dress shows that this was Myrna’s first sexual experience.
Even if we were to assume that Myrna was no longer a virgin on
July 22, 1973, this does not necessarily mean that the crime of rape could not have been
committed. Virginity of the offended party is not an essential element in
the crime of rape. The fact that the
offended party may have been of an unchaste character constitutes no defense in
a charge of rape, provided that the sexual act was committed with force and
violence.[4]
In any event there are sufficient data in the medical and police findings to
corroborate the testimony of the offended party that she was forcibly sexually abused — thus, the presence “of
abrasion at the left iliac region” and of “leaves of grass” at
the “vaginal canal” and in the pubic hair (Exhibit “C”). Aside from the foregoing, her dress was
stained with blood and partly covered with mud.
Further, appellant claims that the testimony of Myrna that the
bolo was continuously pressed against her neck is contradicted by the testimony
of her own father who stated that when he saw appellant on top of Myrna, he
noticed a bolo on the lateral side of Myrna’s head, stuck on the ground, in a
slanting position.
We do not find any inconsistency between Myrna’s and her father’s
statements. Myrna’s testimony, that the
bolo was continuously pressed against her neck referred to the time when appellant threatened her before
the intercourse. Her testimony reads as
follows:
“Q. According to you, before the accused
committed intercourse with you, he was holding your neck and shoulder, is that
right?
A.
Yes, sir,
Q.
He was holding your shoulder by what arm?
A. The right hand, sir.
Q.
How about your neck, what arm?
A.
He is only holding my neck and shoulder
with one hand, sir.
Q.
So not at the same time?
A.
No, sir.
COURT
Q.
How was that done, will you try to demonstrate now – the
interpreter as the specimen. Do not be
ashamed.
A. The witness demonstrating by placing the bolo
at the Adam’s apple and at the sime time, his four (4) fingers has been
extended to the shoulder of the subject specimen.
ATTY. LLOBRERA.
Q.
Your hands at that time are free, is that
right?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And also your body, you could move your body if you want to?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And how about the left hand of the accused, what was it doing at
that time?
A. The right hand of the accused Reynaldo
Santos was holding my shoulder and neck and the left hand was holding my
private part, sir.
Q.
And that was the time before
he committed the sexual intercourse with you?
A.
Yes, sir.
COURT
Q.
Why did you not shout or run away?
A.
Because he told me that once I will
scream for help, he will kill me, sir.
Q. But he was not
holding a bolo at that time?
A.
He was pulling the bolo that time and it
was at that time when he placed the bolo into my neck, sir.
Q. How could he then
holding this bolo when he was pressing your neck and the left hand was holding
your private parts?
A. After holding my neck and shoulder, it was at
that time he laid down the bolo on my neck and pressed it, sir.
Q. In other words,
when he was pressing your neck and shoulder the bolo was there at the same
time?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. How did he hold
the bolo, you try to demonstrate again, making the gavel as the bolo. You make this clear to the Court, because
the Court is confused?
A.
The witness is demonstrating that the
supposed bolo is being held across the neck while pressing the shoulder.
ATTY. LLOBRERA
Q. And was there any occasion for him to drop the
bolo?
A. None, sir.” (t.s.n., pp. 33-37, Hearing
on Nov. 5, 1973. Italics supplied.)
Her father’s testimony has reference to
the time when appellant was already in the final stage of the sexual act.
Another alleged inconsistency pointed out by appellant is the
fact that Myrna testified that her hands were free while her father said that
appellant held Myrna’s hands while he was on top of her.
Again, Myrna was here referring to the time before appellant had
intercourse with her, while her father’s statement refers to the time when they
arrived at the place and found appellant was already consummating the sexual
act.
Appellant further argues that since Myrna’s hands were free at
that time she could have readily extricated herself from appellant, if not
avoided the intercourse, and her failure to do so could only mean that she
cooperated with the appellant in the act or consented thereto. Such speculations fail to consider the fact that appellant
was physically superior in strength to the complainant. It must be remembered that after appellant
had placed the bolo at Myrna’s throat and threatened to kill her, the girl was
already in a state of fear. Under such
circumstances, the fact that although the hands of the victim of rape were
free, appellant was still able to consummate the sexual act does not necessarily
imply that she consented to the act if, as shown in the case at bar, the
offended party had to submit to appellant’s carnal desires due to fear.[5]
Appellant, in denying that he used a bolo to intimidate Myrna,
asserted that he left the bolo, which he wrested from Basilia Dancel, some four
feet away from where he had sexual intercourse with Myrna. This claim is belied by the fact that both
Barrio Captain Gabriel and Ernesto Garcia positively declared that they saw the
bolo near the head of Myrna when they saw appellant on top of the victim on the
rice paddies.
The version of appellant that this young girl of 15 years, whom
he knew only casually would readily yield to his carnal desires, after seeing
him attack and bolo her mother, appears highly incredible. It is an imposition on human credulity. It is not in accord with the natural promptings
and instincts of human nature. Indeed,
the natural reaction of a daughter upon seeing her beloved mother attacked
would be a feeling of revulsion against the attacker.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation
and experience. Whatever is repugnant
to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of juridical cognizance.[6]
When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering
that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[7]
We find no important fact or circumstance which detracts from these findings of
the court a quo.
We hold, however, that the lower court erred in appreciating
nocturnity and uninhabited place as aggravating circumstances in this case.
In default of any showing or evidence that the peculiar
advantages of nighttime were purposely and deliberately sought by the accused,
the fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. It must concur with the interest or design
of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the
darkness of night.[8]
Admittedly, the time and date of the incident in question was a moonlit
night. It cannot be said, therefore,
that, appellant chose or took advantage of the darkness to conceal his
act. It is to be noted, too, that appellant
ran after the victim only when he saw her as he went out of the house of
Basilia Dancel. Obviously, their
meeting was merely accidental.
The circumstance of uninhabited place should not have been
appreciated because aside from the failure to show that the isolation of the
place was purposely sought by appellant to enable the attainment of his
objective without interference or to secure himself against recognition and
punishment,[9]
the place of the commission of the crime could be seen or the voice of the
victim could be heard from a nearby house.[10]
Since the prosecution witnesses, Ernesto Garcia and Barrio Captain Gabriel,
while at a place 300 to 400 meters away from the former’s house heard the
victim’s call for help, said circumstance cannot be appreciated in the
imposition of the penalty. Moreover, it
will be recalled that the rice paddies where the intercourse took place was
the very spot where the victim, who was running away, stumbled and was overtaken
by the appellant, hence, the latter could not have deliberately chosen the spot
in which the crime was perpetrated.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.[11]
In view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon the appellant
instead of the supreme penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the penalty is reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
People v. Ilagan, L-36560, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 170, 175; People v.
Quiazon, L-44299 August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 513, 523.
[2]
U. S. v. Ramos, 1
Phil. 81; People v. Dazo and
Tingzon, 58 Phil,
420; People v. Royeras,
L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666.
[3]
Tedeschi, Eckert & Tedeschi, Forensic Medicine, Vol, II, p. 948.
[4]
People v. Blance, 45 Phil. 113.
[5]
People v. Modelo, 35 SCRA 639.
[6]
People v. Dayag, L-30619, Mar. 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 439,
citing Vreeland v. Vreeland, 21 A 627, 631; People v. Lacson, 53
O. G. 1823, 1838; People v. Nicanor Alvarez, L-34644, Jan. 17, 1974, 55
SCRA 81.
[7]
People v. Gargoles, L-40885, May 18, 1978, 83 SCRA 282, citing People
v. Espejo, L-27708, Dec. 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400; People v. Carandang,
et al., L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259; People v. Cardenas,
L-29090, Apr. 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 631; People v. Boduso, L-30450-51, Sept.
30, 1974, 60 SCRA 60; People v. Ancheta, L-29581-82, Oct. 30, 1974; 60
SCRA 333; People v. Pascual, L-27569, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 1.
[8]
People v. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88.
[9]
People v. Tarrayo, L-26489, April 21, 1969, 27 SCRA 953.
[10]
People v. Laoto, 52 Phil. 401.
[11]
Article 335, Revised Penal Code.