FRUCTUOSO GARCIA, ALFREDO SUERTE, AND CAMILO SABLAY, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. HON. ABELARDO APORTADERA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI, COTABATO, BR. IV, AURELIO AMPIG, THE DIRECTOR…

Garcia versus Aportadera

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Fructuoso Garcia, Alfredo Suerte, and Camilo Sablay against Judge Abelardo Aportadera, the Director of Lands, and Aurelio Ampig. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to set aside the trial court's order dismissing their complaint, which sought to annul a homestead patent and cancel the patent title issued to Ampig. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: a protestant against a homestead patent must first exhaust his administrative remedies in the Bureau of Lands, and an action to cancel a patent is essentially a reversion suit that only the Solicitor General may bring in the name of the Government.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed their complaint for annulment of the homestead patent and cancellation of the patent title in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The Director of Lands and Ampig raised affirmative defenses, among them failure to exhaust administrative remedies, lack of the proper party, and improper venue. After hearing on those defenses, the trial court, through Judge Aportadera, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and were not the proper parties, the suit being essentially one for reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which only the Solicitor General can initiate. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied the motion. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.

Facts

The petitioners alleged that the land in question formed part of a twenty-four hectare area in Sultan sa Barongis, Cotabato, covered by the homestead application of their father, Marcelo Garcia. After their father's death, Fructuoso Garcia renewed the homestead application in his own name. Because of failing health, he asked Jesus Borres to cultivate the land, and Borres in turn hired tenants, among them Aurelio Ampig.

Ampig then filed his own homestead application over the lot. That application was denied by the Bureau of Lands on the ground that the land had already been applied for by Marcelo Garcia. Yet nine years later, a homestead patent covering four and four tenths hectares was issued to Ampig. Portions of the land were transferred by Garcia to Alfredo Suerte, and later by Suerte to Camilo Sablay, who joined Garcia as co-petitioners.

The Director of Lands answered that Ampig's application had been filed in the ordinary course of official business, that Garcia filed only a telegraphic protest ten years later, and that when advised to file a protest in due form he failed to do so. The Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Lands informed Garcia that for failure to file his protest his claim would be dismissed and disregarded. No reply came, and the patent was issued to Ampig after he complied with the legal requirements.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure of the petitioners to exhaust their administrative remedies in the Bureau of Lands.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that only the Solicitor General may file an action for annulment of a homestead patent and title.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not treating the complaint as an action for reconveyance.

Applicable Provisions

Section 101 of the Public Land Act provides:

Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

This provision identifies the only party who may sue to revert a homestead to the Government, and it defeats the petitioners' claim of legal personality.

Section 4 of the Public Land Act provides:

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the land of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

This provision vests in the Director of Lands, not in the courts, the power to dispose of public land, so a court cannot award the land to the petitioners even if the patent were annulled.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly ruled the action premature. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies with greater force where the Bureau of Lands had not yet rendered a decision on the matter, and a party seeking cancellation of a patent must first pursue his action in the proper department before a court will review it.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly characterized the suit as an action for reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, which must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Government. The Court explained that even if Ampig's patent were annulled for fraud, it would not follow that the land may be awarded to the petitioners, for the Director of Lands holds direct executive control over the disposition of public land. As the Court put it, even if the land were declared reverted to the public domain, the applicant does not automatically become its owner; he is a mere public land applicant like others who might apply for the same land.

On the third issue, the Court refused to treat the action as one for reconveyance, because reconveyance is the remedy of an owner whose land has been erroneously registered in the name of another, and the petitioner is not the owner of the homestead but only an applicant for a homestead patent.

Doctrine

First, a party who seeks the cancellation of a homestead patent must exhaust his administrative remedies in the Bureau of Lands before he may ask the courts to intervene. Second, an action to annul a homestead patent is in substance an action for reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, and only the Solicitor General may institute it, in the name of the Government. Third, even if a patent is annulled, the court cannot award the land to the protestant, because the Director of Lands has direct executive control over the disposition of public land and the protestant is a mere applicant. Fourth, an action for reconveyance is unavailable to one who is not the owner of the land but only an applicant for a homestead patent.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and the trial court's order dismissing the complaint stood.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a suit to annul a homestead patent is a reversion suit that only the Solicitor General may bring, after administrative remedies are exhausted. Examiners use this case to test exhaustion of administrative remedies, the proper party in public land cases, and the distinction between reversion and reconveyance.