THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO LANZA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Criminal Case No. 4626, finding
appellant Teodoro Lanza
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessories of the law; to indemnify the lawful heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; to pay the widow of said deceased the sum of P2,000.00 as moral
damages and P500.00 as hospital and burial expenses; and to pay the costs.

In a complaint filed by the Acting Chief of Police of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte,
dated October 10, 1966,
appellant Teodoro Lanza was
charged with the crime of Murder, as follows:

“That on or during the 8th day of October, 1966, at around 1:00
A.M. at the Poblacion, Dipolog,
Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines and within the
preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed
with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and wound therewith
one LEONARDO ZAMORAS at the back and as a result of which the said Leonardo Zamoras died a few days later.

“ALL CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of
nighttime.”  (CFI Record, p. 1).

Thereafter, or on February
8, 1967, the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga
del Norte filed the corresponding Information against herein appellant, who was
subsequently arraigned on May 2, 1967.  He entered a plea of not guilty.

The prosecution’s primary evidence against herein appellant is
the ante mortem statement of the victim (Exhibit
“A”), taken by Cpl. Fortunato Salaveria on October 8, 1966 at the North General Clinic of
Dipolog, Zamboanga del
Norte, which reads as follows:

“Q. What is your name?

A. Leonardo Zamoras, 34
years old, married and a resident of Galas, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte.

Q. What happened to you?

A. I was stabbed.

Q. Who stabbed you?

A. I was stabbed by a person who followed me from the
Municipal Building.

Q. In what particular place were you stabbed?

A. At the Shell gasoline station.

Q. Do you know the person who stabbed you?

A. I can recognize him by face.

Q. If I present the person to you can you
recognize him?  I am presenting to you Teodoro Lanza; is he the very
person who stabbed you last night, October
7, 1966?

A. Yes, sir.

Q.  Did you have any misunderstanding prior to the
incident?

A. None, sir.

Q. What must have been the motive of stabbing you,
then?

A. I believe he resented (it) when I accidentally
stepped on the shoulder of his wife who happened to be lying on the concrete
floor of the Municipal Building.

Q. How many times did he stab you?

A.  Only once.

Q.  Do you think you will survive as a result of
your wounds?

A. It all depends.”  (CFI Record, pp. 166-168).

Fortunato Salaveria,
Police Sergeant of the Dipolog Police Force,
testified that at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of October 8, 1966, he
was ordered by the Acting Chief of Police, Ciriaco
Gonzales, to take the ante mortem statement of one Leonardo Zamoras, who had been stabbed and was then at the North
General Clinic at Torno, Dipolog,
Zamboanga del Norte. 
Upon arrival at the aforesaid clinic, he found Leonardo Zamoras in critical condition.  He then took the ante mortem statement
of Leonardo Zamoras (Exhibits “A”,
“A-1” and “A-2′) by writing in longhand the questions and
answers of the victim.  This was done in
the presence of several persons, including Jose Zamoras,
brother of the victim.  Afterwards,
Leonardo Zamoras affixed his left and right thumbmarks on the ante mortem statement.  He affirmed that all the answers therein were
given by Leonardo Zamoras.  P.G. Sales, a nurse at the clinic signed the
statement as a witness to its execution (Exhibit “A-8”).

Salaveria further testified that while
taking the victim’s statement, he called up the Chief of Police and requested
him to bring the accused to the clinic for identification by the victim; that
at that time Teodoro Lanza
was already being detained at the municipal jail of Dipolog
as a suspect in the stabbing; that when appellant was brought infront of the victim, the latter identified him as the
very same person who stabbed him.

On cross examination, this witness stated that when he arrived at
the clinic, the victim was still alive and lying in bed, with his eyes closed;
that he called the victim by name, identified himself and when the latter
agreed, he took the statement in the presence of several relatives of the
victim.

Basilia Luna Vda.
de Zamoras, widow of the victim, testified for the
prosecution, stating that in the morning of October 8, 1966, while she was in her house, she was
informed by her brother-in-law, Artemio Zamoras, that her husband was at the North General
Clinic.  When she went to the clinic, she
found her husband lying on the bed.  He
was feverish and his clothes were bloody and he had a wound on the back.  She likewise identified the shirt won by her
husband on the night of the incident, showing the hole (Exhibit “C”) allegedly
caused by the stab wound.

Jose Zamoras, brother of the deceased,
corroborated policeman Salaveria’s testimony, stating
that he stayed in the North General Clinic until the following day and was
present when Cpl. Salaveria took the ante mortem
statement of his brother; that while the statement was being taken, he was
about one-half meter from Cpl. Salaveria and Leonardo
Zamoras; that when asked who stabbed him, Leonardo Zamoras pointed to Teodoro Lanza, who was present; that at that time, the condition of
his brother was “not so serious”; that the ante mortem
statement was taken at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of October 8, 1966,
and his brother died on October 9, 1966, at about 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon.

When asked whether his brother was asked each of the questions
appearing on the ante mortem statement and whether his brother answered
the same, this witness replied in the affirmative.

On cross examination, he stated that his brother could not talk
from 1:00 o’clock dawn until he was given dextrose that morning; that at around
9:00 o’clock his brother could already talk a little; and that when their
sister, Elma Zamoras, inquired as to who was
responsible for his wound, he answered that it was a man who had followed him
from the municipal building.

Dr. Jose Noriega, the surgeon who attended to the victim,
testified that the latter was in a state of shock when admitted to the hospital
at about 1:40 a.m. on October 8, 1966; that the victim was able to say that he
was stabbed and to indicate the painful part of his body, but thereafter he
remained incoherent until his condition was gradually improved by blood
transfusion and the administration of medical remedies; that his blood pressure
was revived and returned to normal only at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon
of the same day; that because of such improvement he was immediately operated
upon; that in the course of the four-hour operation, it was found that there
were fatal injuries on the left kidney and fatal injuries on the great vessels
of the mesentery; that the victim died twenty four hours after surgery due to
secondary hemorrhage or cerebral embolism; and that he issued a certificate as
to the cause of death of Leonardo Zamoras.

Ciriaco D. Gonzales, Acting Chief of
Police of Dipolog, confirmed the fact that although
appellant denied having stabbed Leonardo Zamoras, he
nevertheless admitted to him that he followed the victim along Rizal Avenue when his wife
complained to him that the victim had stepped on her while she was lying on the
floor of the municipal building.  Appellant,
however, explained that he was not able to overtake the deceased.

He further testified that shortly before 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 8, 1966, Cpl. Salaveria
informed him by telephone that the victim was conscious and could talk.  Consequently, he brought the accused to the
clinic for identification by the victim. 
When they arrived in the hospital there were several civilians.  He also saw Cpl. Salaveria,
Cpl. Calibo and Pat. Limbaga
in the premises.  He declared that the
victim recognized him.  When he asked the
victim whether he could identify his assailant, the latter answered in the
affirmative.  He then brought the appellant
inside the room, and in the presence of all the people present the victim pointed
to the appellant as the person who had stabbed him.  This witness likewise confirmed that Cpl. Salaveria asked the questions and the victim, Leonardo Zamoras, gave the answers appearing in the ante mortem
statement, and that they both spoke
in Cebuano, which was translated into the English
language by Cpl. Salaveria.  Further,
he attested to the fact that the thumbmarks appearing
on the statement were those of Leonardo Zamoras, and
that he was present when the same were affixed.

Vicente Limbaga, formerly municipal
policeman of Dipolog, Zamboanga
del Norte, testified that he served in such capacity up to October 21, 1967;
that at about 1:30 in the early morning of October 9, 1966, Leonardo Zamoras arrived at the municipal building where he was
detailed as guard and reported to him about the disappearance of his (Leonardo Zamoras‘) car; that after making such report, Leonardo Zamoras went down to the ground floor of the municipal
building; that not long after, he heard a commotion and immediately went
downstairs and found many people lying on the floor of the municipal building
because it was the town fiesta of Dipolog; that when
he inquired what was the cause of the commotion one Luisa, the wife of Teodoro Lanza, told him that a
certain short and stocky man passed by and stepped on her foot while she was
lying on the floor, and he tried to hold her shoulder and signalled
her to go to a room with him and thus caused the commotion.  When he asked her why she did not report the
matter to him so the person could be investigated, she answered:  “Well, anyway, all would be known later
because my husband followed him.” Not long after, Teodoro
Lanza returned and he observed that Lanza appeared restless, kept moving from one place to
another, continued whispering something to his wife, could not sleep and repeatedly
went to the comfort room.  Afterwards, he
received a report that Leonardo Zamoras had been
stabbed near the Shell gasoline station. 
Suspecting that Teodoro Lanza
had something to do with the stabbing, he took Lanza
into his office.  He recorded the
incident in the police blotter and conducted an investigation of the
accused.  The accused was again
investigated by the Acting Chief of Police.

The defense presented in evidence the testimonies of Pat. Edgardo Maginsay and accused Teodoro Lanza, as well as various
documentary evidence.

Pat. Edgardo Maginsay
of the Dipolog Police Force testified that since
February 1966, he has been the custodian of the police blotter of the Dipolog Police Force; that he was the one who recorded the
entries in the police blotter for October 8, 1966; that said entries were made
from the records of the night blotter, which was in the care of the building
guard; and that therefore, the entries in the night blotter and of the police
blotter are the same.

Appellant Teodoro Lanza
alleged that on the night in question he was sleeping, together with his
family, inside the municipal building of Dipolog, his
livelihood being that of a “feriante” and
he was there to maintain the shooting gallery and some gambling devices inside
the plaza where the “feria” was being held.  He declared that after midnight, he was
awakened by two policemen and brought to the office of the Chief of Police
where he was asked whether he had gone out of the building or not.  When he replied that he had not, he was
brought and confined inside the municipal jail. 
Later the following morning he was investigated by the police sergeant
after which he was brought to the hospital by the Chief of Police and one Pat. Centino.  He was
taken inside the operating room, presented before a wounded man for
identification, but the latter, whose eyes were closed, could not identify
him.  After staying inside the operating
room for half an hour, he was returned to the municipal building.

In his brief, appellant stated that the alleged ante mortem statement could not have been given by the victim as he was not
in a position at the time of the alleged confrontation either to talk to the
investigators or to identify his alleged assailant, and assuming that the ante mortem statement is genuine, the same is inadmissible as evidence of a
dying declaration because at the time of its execution, the victim had
expectations or hopes of recovery. 
Appellant makes capital of the testimony of Dr. Jose Noriega that from
8:00 o’clock in the morning to 12:00 noon of October 8, 1966, the victim was
still bleeding and in a state of shock; the declaration of the widow, Basilia Luna Vda. de Zamoras, that her husband could not talk to her while he
was on the hospital bed; and the statement of Jose Zamoras
that upon seeing his brother he called his name but the latter did not answer.

These arguments are not supported by the record.  Counsel for the appellant cited portions of
testimonies out of context of the entire declarations.  Thus, while Dr. Jose Noriega admitted that
the witness was “semi-conscious” at the time of his admission, he was positive
that the victim was able to tell him that he was stabbed.  He even complained of pain on the
abdomen.  He likewise stated that the
condition of the victim improved to such a degree that he was strong enough
after the blood transfusion to be operated on at around noontime of the same
day.^[1]
As testified to by the other witness, he was able to talk by mid-morning.  Thus, his brother, Jose Zamoras,
testified that he was able to talk intelligently some hours before the
operation, although in the beginning he could not.  He testified on cross examination as follows:

“Q.  Up
to 9:00 o’clock of the same day,
October 8, the same condition — could not still talk?

A. He could talk already but not yet clear.

Q. Do you mean to say he will just murmur?

A. Yes, sir.

* * *                                 *
* *                              * * *

Q. At. 9:30 o’clock,
October 8, 1966, what
happened right in the bedroom of the deceased?

A. Leonardo Zamoras was
still lying in bed but could talk.

Q. Do you mean to say he could just talk by him
self, nobody asking?

A. No, after he was asked.

Q. How do you know that at 9:30 o’clock, October
8, 1966, he talked?

A. Because we asked him some questions,

Q. Who asked the deceased some questions?

A. My sister, Elma Zamoras.

Q. What was the statement (sic) asked?

A. My sister inquired as to who was the person
responsible for his wound.

Q. What was his answer?

A. He answered that (it was) the man following him
from the municipal building.

Q. There was no name mentioned?

A. No name mentioned.

Q. And that was in a harsh voice?

A.  In a natural voice.”^[2]

Likewise, the testimony of the widow, Basilia
Luna Vda. de Zamoras to the
effect that her husband did not talk to her on October 8, 1966, does not necessarily preclude the
possibility that at some other time that day the deceased was able to reveal to
the police investigators the identity of his assailant.  In fact, this witness stated on cross
examination that on October 8, 1966,
her husband could talk to other persons.^[3]

In addition, it will be recalled that when the ante mortem statement was taken by
Cpl. Salaveria, there were several persons present,
including relatives of the victim, as well as the Acting Chief of Police who
brought appellant from the jail to the bedside of the victim.  These police officers positively declared
that they were present when the victim pointed to appellant as his
assailant.  No possible motive has been
advanced why these witnesses should falsely incriminate the appellant.

The next question that arises centers on the admissibility of the
ante mortem statement as
a dying declaration so as to constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.  An ante
mortem statement is a declaration made by a victim of a homicide
while about to die, and without any hope of recovery, concerning the facts and
circumstances under which the fatal injury was inflicted, and offered in
evidence at the trial of the person charged with having caused the death of the
declarant.^[4]

In order that a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence,
four (4) requisites must concur, to wit: 
(1) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death;
(3) the declarant was competent as a witness at the
time the same was executed; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant
was the victim.^[5]

It is imperative, for a dying declaration to be admissible, that
the same had been made under a consciousness of impending death.^[6]
This is so because dying declarations, made when the declarant
had no more hope of recovery, are admissible by reason of necessity and
trustworthiness.  Necessity because the declarant’s death renders impossible his taking the witness
stand, and it often happens that there is no other satisfactory evidence as to
the cause of his death; and trustworthiness because the declaration is made in
extremity and every motive of falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by
the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.  “A situation so solemn and so awful as
to be considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is
imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice.”^[7]

The fact that death of the declarant
did indeed occur shortly after the declaration was made is not sufficient to
render the declaration admissible, absent the requisite proof that the victim
was under the consciousness of impending death at the time the declaration was
made, and he had no more hope of recovery. 
A belief in the mind of the declarant, at the
time the declarations are made, that death is near is indispensable to the
admission of such statements as dying declarations.  Where the text of the declaration shows that
the deceased himself was in doubt as to whether he would die or not, the dying
declaration is not admissible.^[8]

In the instant case, the victim, when asked whether he believed
he was going to die as a result of his injuries, replied:  “It all depends.” Also, it appears
from the records that his condition had progressively improved from the time he
was admitted to the time the statement was taken by the police so much so that
a short time thereafter he was considered strong enough to undergo an
operation.  Under these circumstances, it
can be concluded that the deceased was, himself, hesitant to accept the fact of
his impending death and entertained hopes of recovery, obviously depending on
the result of the scheduled operation and further medical treatment.

Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the victim’s statement
may not be admitted as a dying declaration, it is nevertheless admissible as
part of the res gestae
against herein appellant in People v. Tumalip,^[9]
this Court held that the positive identification of the accused by the victim,
made a few hours after he had been shot and while suffering from the agonies of
his injuries, although not an ante mortem declaration, may, however, be considered as part of the res gestae, for it
was made almost immediately after the startling occurrence.

“It is well-settled that as an exception to the hearsay rule,
such evidence must comply with these requisites, an occurrence both startling
and unusual in character and an utterance made before the declarant
could have any opportunity for falsification or distortion, one moreover
limited to such event as the immediate attending circumstances.”^[10]

Briefly stated, the spontaneous declaration must have been made
while the nervous excitement caused by the startling occurrence was still working
on the declarant’s mind.  This may be a short time after the incident
or some hours later, as long as the influence of the startling occurrence still
persists.  What is important is that the declarant must have had no opportunity to devise or
contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred.  What the law distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought.^[11]

“There are no limits of time within which the res gestae can be arbitrarily confined.  These limits vary in fact with each
particular case.  The acts or
declarations are not required to be contemporaneous with the primary fact, but
they must be so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the
main fact practically inseparable, or be generated by an excited feeling which
extends, without break or letdown, from the moment of the event they
illustrate.  In other words, if the acts
or declarations sprang out of the principal transaction, tend to explain it,
were voluntary and spontaneous, and were made at a time so near it as to
preclude the idea of deliberate design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous
in point of time, and are admissible.”^[12]

The clement of time is, therefore, not
controlling, but merely of importance, on the question of spontaneity.^[13]

The general rule is that where declarations are unconsciously associated
with and related to the homicidal deed even though separated from it by a short
time, they are evidence of the character of the deed and a part of the res gestae.  No inflexible rule as to the length of the
interval between the act of killing and the act or declaration of the person
killed can be formulated; in such matter, the facts of each case stand alone
and must speak for themselves.^[14]

From the circumstances of the case, the victim could not have had
time to concoct or devise a story different from what actually transpired, and
his narration, at the first opportunity, of the incident and his identification
of his assailant must be considered as part of the startling occurrence, the
influence of which was still working on his mind.  Moreover, it is significant that the victim
did not name a specific person, as his assailant was a person not familiar to
him, but merely described him as the one who followed him from the municipal
building after an altercation which arose when he (victim) accidentally stepped
on appellant’s wife while she lay on the floor of the municipal building.  Appellant has failed to advance any reason or
motive why the victim, who did not know him prior to the incident, would
identify him as the perpetrator of the offense if this were not true.  It must be recalled that there were many
persons sleeping in the municipal building and yet he was singled out by the
police, as a consequence of the series of events that transpired, starting from
the commotion that ensued when the victim accidentally stepped on appellant’s
wife and appellant’s suspicious actuations after he returned to the municipal
building.  It was shortly after
appellant’s return that the police received information of the stabbing of the
victim.

The lower court found that the crime was committed with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, offset by the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, hence it imposed upon the herein
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, among others. 
We find no proof that evident premeditation and treachery accompanied
the commission of the crime.

Evident premeditation could not have existed because immediately
after the commotion caused by the accidental stepping on his wife, the
appellant followed the victim and stabbed him. 
As the trial court observed, the Shell gasoline station where the victim
was stabbed was “not far from the municipal building”,^[15]
and, in the few minutes it took to follow and overtake the victim, the
appellant could not have had sufficient opportunity to meditate upon and
determine the killing.  It is settled
that where a previous incident preceded the assault, evident premeditation is
not present,^[16]
and that in the absence of reflection and persistence of criminal intent, said
circumstance cannot be appreciated.^[17]

Similarly, treachery cannot be appreciated against the herein accused
because there is no showing whatsoever that the mode of attack employed by him
was calculated to insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself,
arising from any defense that the victim may put up.  As a matter of fact, the mode of attack is
not known at all, there being no eyewitness to the stabbing incident.^[18]
Treachery must be shown by convincing evidence,^[19]
and the same degree of proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before any
conclusion may be reached respecting its attendance, whether as a qualifying or
an aggravating circumstance, in a criminal case.^[20]
Moreover, consistent with the finding that the killing was not premeditated,
there can be no treachery in the instant case because the decision to attack
was arrived at on the spur of the moment.^[21]

In addition, the factual circumstances obtaining in the case
indicate that the victim knew that he was being followed from the municipal
building.  Thus, he was able to state in
the ante mortem statement that the person who stabbed him was the one
who had followed him from the municipal building.  This being the case, and considering that he was
well aware of the previous altercation between them, the victim must have been
on his guard and aware that the appellant meant him harm.

Considering the foregoing, We hold that due to the absence of any
qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is not murder but homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, unattended
by any aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

We are not convinced that passion and obfuscation should be appreciated
in favor of herein appellant so as to mitigate his criminal liability.  The accidental stepping by the victim on
appellant’s wife was insufficient cause for passion or obfuscation to so affect
appellant’s reason that he commits a vicious crime as a result thereof.  In order for such mitigating circumstance to
be appreciated, it is necessary to establish the existence of an act both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind that the culprit is
precluded from a sober realization of the wrongfulness of the course of action about
to be taken.^[22]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified;
appellant Teodoro Lanza is
hereby found guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN
(17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided
by law.  The awards of P12,000.00 as
civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment, P2,000.00 as moral damages
and P500.00 as hospital and burial expenses are hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.

^[1]
t.s.n., Hearing on February 26, 1968, p. 43.

^[2]
t.s.n., Hearing on December 22, 1966, pp. 17-18.

^[3]
Ibid., p. 7.

^[4]
40 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 348.

^[5]
People v. Sagario, L-18659, June 29, 1965, 14 SCRA 468.

^[6]
People vs. Cortez, L-13968, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 408; People v. Rogales, L-17531, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 830.

^[7]
U.S. v. Gil, No. 4704, April 26, 1909, 13 Phil, 530, 549.

^[8]
People v. Dominguez, L-22474, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 59.

^[9]
L-28451, Oct. 28, 1974, 60
SCRA 303.

^[10]
People v. Tiongson, L-29569, Oct. 30, 1972, 47
SCRA 279, 285, citing 5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 edition, p.
360 (1971); People v. Ricaplaza, L-25856, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 374.

^[11]
Vickburg R. Co. v. O’Brien, 199 US
99; State v. Mc Daniel, 47 SE 384 Louisville,
etc. R. Co. v. Buck, 19 NE 453; US v. King, 34 Fed. 314; Traveler’s Ins.
Co. v. Sheppard, 12 E. 18.

^[12]
1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (11th Ed.), pp. 755-756.

^[13]  92 C.J.S. 49.

^[14]
40 Am. Jur. 2d, 601.

^[15]
p. 11, CFI Decision.

^[16]
People v. Sagayno, L-15961-62, Oct. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 360.

^[17]
People v. Cadag, L-13830, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 388.

^[18]
People v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA
1027.

^[19]
People v. De Leon,
L-28480-81, Sept. 30,1971,
41 SCRA 120.

^[20]
People v. Torejas, L-29935, Jan. 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 158.

^[21]
Perez v. Court of Appeals,
L-13719, March 31, 1961, 13
SCRA 444.

^[22]
People v. Gervacio, L-21965, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960; People
v. Layson, L-25177, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92; People v. Pareja, L-21937, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693.