THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MACABANGON MANGCOL, AND MASO PANGANDOG, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Macabangon Mangcol and Maso were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of
Lanao, charged with the murder of Datos Ramber and Maniri alleged to have been
committed on or about June 7, 1946, at sitio Talub, municipal district of Masiu,
province of Lanao, in company and in conspiracy with Kobla and Domato who had
not been arrested at the time of appellants’ trial. Having been found guilty,
the defendants were sentenced to reclusion temporal, jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of each deceased P2,000.00 as indemnity, and
costs.

Three witnesses were introduced by the government. Two of them claim to have
been eye-witnesses to the crime, and the other, a deputy governor at large,
claims to have investigated the crime the day following its commission.

The deputy governor, Tago Manalokon, testified in substance that on the 8th
of June, 1946, having been informed of the murders, he went to Talub and saw
Ramber’s and Maniri’s cadavers in Ramber’s house. He described the abounds of
the victims and exhibited in court a jacket with bullet holes which he said
Ramber was wearing and which he ordered taken off and washed. He further said
that three times he sent for the four men who, according to his information,
were the killers, but these, he said, appeared only after the last summon and,
in answer to his query why they had not come sooner, stated that they had work
to do. He declared that Macabangon, Maso and Domato refused to be sworn on the
Koran but admitted to him that they had slain the deceased.

Pandara Pancoga, public school teacher, and Bilia Baurak testified in
substance that they saw Makabangon, Maso, Domato and Cobla kill Ramer and Maniri
in Talub on June 7, 1946. They stated that the accused and their two companions
hid behind a bush and attacked the two deceased as these walked by. According to
them, Macabangon, Domato and Cobla shot Ramber and Maniri with firearms while
Maso hacked them after they fell with a campillan.

The defendants and three witnesses undertook to prove that others killed
Maniri and Ramber in Bacong during the Japanese occupation, about five years
before the trial. The gist of the defendants1 witnesses1 testimony is that one
Lumangkulob killed one Arindig in Bacong, on the opposite side of the lake from
Talub, after a quarrel over corn5 that after Arindig was killed, Mosur Kauring,
one of the defense witnesses, notified Gindolongan, Lumangkulob’s cousin, of the
killing; that Gindolongan, fearing reprisal, started to flee to Dimapatoy but
stopped in Bacong because there was no baroto; that Gindolongan was followed by
Ramber and Hakapunong, Arindig’s brother; that having overtaken Gindolongan,
Ramber told his companion to fire at Gindolongan, which Makapunong did; that
having a rifle, Gindolongan also fired at Ramber; that Maniri was present at the
shooting and was hit by a stray bullet. When the shooting ceased, Gindolongan,
Maniri and Ramber were dead. The witnesses said the duel took place five years
ago, one “Friday followed by Saturday.”

The two accused gave testimony to corroborate their witnesses but denied they
were at or near the scene of the crimes.

Maso Pangandog declared that he was not present at the killing and only knew
by hearsay that Maniri and Ramber had been shot. He said this occurred about
five years ago, according to the way the years are computed in Maranao; that,
besides, he heard from his priest that five years had transpired since Ramber
and Maniri were shot.

Macabangon Mangcol testified that he was at the market in Dansalan when
Maniri and Ramber were killed and so he did not see the killing. He said he
heard of the killing one Friday, about five years ago, and added that he knew
the deceased only by name.

Counsel for appellants has exerted commendable zeal, industry and
thoroughness in the presentation of his clients’ case before this Court. He has
dissected in great detail the evidence for the prosecution and pointed to its
flaws which he thinks are clear manifestation of perjury.

We, too, have thoroughly reviewed the record and checked up on the alleged
contradictions. We are of the opinion that, read as a whole, the evidence fully
sustains the lower court’s findings. The faults to which the appellants call our
attention are not of sufficient weight to destroy the conviction engendered by
other and more reliable test of a witness’ veracity. The alleged discrepancies
have been explained satisfactorily or are unimportant, susceptible of other
interpretations not incompatible with good faith and truthfulness of the
witnesses. Deficiencies of translation and transcription and the lack of
thoroughness in the examination of the witnesses have to be taken into
account.

The conflicting theories of the parties as to the date of the crimes and the
identity of the murderers can not, under the circumstances, be due to mistakes.
The barrio mentioned by the defense witnesses as the place of the killing and
the barrio mentioned by the witnesses for the government are far apart,
separated by a lake and known by different names, and the alleged assailants
named by each side are well known to the witnesses. One of the two sets of
witnesses must have lied deliberately.

As to which side is to be believed, the decision is not difficult. While the
flaws in the prosecution witnesses’ testimony are, as above shown,
unsubstantial, there is one question to which no satisfactory answer can be
found. The question is, why should the relatives of the deceased go after the
appellants instead of the real murderers? Other than to avenge the death of
their kinsfolks, the complaining witnesses had no cause to wish the defendants
harm, and mistaken identity is out of the question. If the killing had occurred,
as the accused would have the court believe, in broad daylight and in the
presence of bystanders, some of them datus, the decedent’s relatives could not
by any possibility have been misinformed as to who attacked their kin. Moreover,
assuming that they, for some reason or other, wanted to implicate the
defendants, it is hard to understand why they would allow the culprits to go
scotfree.

Motives on the part of the three government witnesses to prevaricate are also
absent. The single evidence introduced to discredit their testimony is
defendant’s statements that the said witnesses had demanded of the accused P200
which the latter had refused to give. The alleged extortion was denied and is
not, in our opinion, worthy of serious attention.

Double jeopardy, at least as regards Maso, is pleaded in this instance. The
basis of this assignment of error is the statement of the Provincial Fiscal at
the trial to the effect that sometime in 1947, case No. 277 for murder against
the appellants was dismissed as to Maso, on the motion of said Provincial Fiscal
and for the reason that the witnesses presented by the offended parties was
believed insufficient to convict beyond reasonable doubt.

There is nothing in the record to show that the dismissal was made after the
defendants had been arraigned. This, in the first place. In the second place,
the appellants did not interpose this defense in the court below. By Rule 113,
Sections 1 and 10, of the Rules of Court, and on the authority of U.S.
vs. Perez, (1 Phil. 203), and Quintos vs. Director of Prisons,
(55 Phil. 304-306), the defense of double jeopardy must be interposed in the
court of first instance and can not be raised for the first time on appeal. This
plea must therefore be ruled out.

The appellants are guilty of two separate crimes of murder qualified by
treachery without the presence of any modifying circumstances, and two separate
penalties of reclusion perpetua^[1]
should be imposed on each appellant, it being understood that the combined
imprisonment shall not exceed forty years. The indemnity for each set of heirs
should also be raised to P6,000, as recommended by the Solicitor General.

With the modifications above indicated, the Judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, with costs.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and
Reyes, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Per Resolution in the minutes of August
14, 1950.