THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. EMILIO BENITEZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

In the cadastral proceedings undertaken by the Director of Lands
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte during the period from May,
1925 to April, 1928, Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo were declared
owners of a parcel of land situated in the City of Tacloban known as
Lot No. 2157 for which Original Certificate of Title No. 17507 of the
Register of Deeds of Leyte was issued to them. Said lot was bounded on
the NE by a road and contains an area of 14,548 sq.m. The decision of
adjudication was rendered on December 29, 1932.

However, on June 19, 1958, or 26 years after the adjudication of Lot
2157 was made as above stated, Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo filed
a petition before the same cadastral court for reopening of the
cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931 claiming that through
oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion of said Lot No.
2157 containing an area of 1,805 sq. m. has not been included in the
original survey for which reason they prayed that said portion be
designated as Lot No. 1 of the proposed subdivision plan, and that,
after notice and hearing, it be adjudicated to them pursuant to
Republic Act No. 931.

On July 12, 1958, the court a quo issued an order admitting the
petition, as amended, and setting the same for hearing, and in a
subsequent order issued on September 3, 1958, it likewise ordered that
copies of the original as well as of the amended petition Be furnished
the Solicitor General, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City Fiscal
of Tacloban City, and the Register of Deeds of the province, setting
the case for hearing on October 18, 1958. When this date came, the
court a quo, after hearing the parties, issued an order granting to
Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo the right to claim the portion which
allegedly was not included in their original title while authorizing at
the same time a licensed surveyor to make a survey of the portion that
was then being claimed and submit a report thereon to the Director of
Lands for his approval. Accordingly, the surveyor submitted on July 20,
1960 his report, and on April 14, 1962 the court a quo rendered
judgment declaring Emilio Benitez and his wife owners of the additional
portion which they claimed to be their own in their petition which this
time was declared to contain an area of 3,745 sq.m.

This decision having become final, the spouses moved on June 7, 1962
for a writ of execution of the judgment and of possession of the
additional portion of land that had been adjudicated to them, but
having been informed of the filing of said motion, those who were then
occupying the portion claimed which numbered about 62 by virtue of
permits granted by the Director of Lands registered in due time their
opposition disputing the validity of the decision rendered by the court
on April 14, 1962.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Director
of Lands, filed on July 25, 1962 a motion to set aside the same
judgment on the ground, among others, that said decision was a nullity
for the reason that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to act
on the petition of Emilio Benitez and his wife for the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings for lack of the requisite publication and notice
as required by law. But the opposition, as well as the motion to set
aside the judgment, were denied by the court in an order entered on
August 6, 1962 . The Solicitor General, as well as the counsel for the
62 oppositors who had adverse claims over the portion in controversy,
filed separately motions for reconsideration, but the same were denied.
Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by the Provincial
Fiscal of Leyte on behalf of the Director of Lands and of the 62
adverse claimants already mentioned above.

There is no question that respondents Emilio Benitez and his wife
may file a petition for reopening of the Cadastral Case No. 20 then
pending before the Court of First Instance of Leyte concerning the
survey and registration of all lands within the City of Tacloban
pursuant to Republic Act No. 931 with a view to claiming such portion
of land which they may have failed to include in their original
petition for survey and registration as authorized by the Cadastral Act
provided that the petition be filed within the period prescribed by
said Republic Act No. 931, as amended. Indeed, said Republic Act No.
931 grants to a person claiming title to a parcel of land that has been
the subject of a cadastral proceeding who at the time of the survey was
in actual possession thereof but for some justifiable reason had been
unable to file his claim in the proper court during the time limit
established by law, the right to claim such land within a period of 10
years by filing the necessary petition for reopening under the
provisions of the Cadastral Act. But, as already stated, the petition
for reopening should be filed in the same cadastral proceedings where
the original lands were surveyed and adjudicated and in pursuance of
the procedure laid down in the Cadastral Act. Thus, besides filing the
petition for reopening, it is necessary that notice thereof be given to
those persons who claim an adverse interest in the land sought to be
registered, as well as the general public, by publishing such notice in
two successive issues of the Official Gazette, which shall likewise be
posted in a conspicuous place on the new land to be surveyed, as well
as in the municipal building of the city or municipality in which the
same is situated, as required in Section 1 of the Cadastral Act (Act
No. 2259).

It is for this reason that this Court has held that “An order of a
court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it
include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new
publication is made as a preliminary to such step. Publication is one
of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land
registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be
included by amendment of the plan without new publication” (Philippines
Manufacturing Company vs. Imperial, 49 Phil., 122; See also Escueta vs.
Director of Lands, 16 Phil., 482).

Another factor that should be considered is the reservation which
the very Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant
to have an additional portion of land registered in his name is
concerned in the sense that it can only be entertained if it does not
refer “to such parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted, or authorized provisionally or permanently disposed of
by the Government.” Here it appears that the additional portion of land
claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be
entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to
them by the Bureau of Lands, as may be gleaned from the following
portions of the report submitted by the surveyor appointed by the
court:

“Lot 1, is an integral part of the property of
Attorney Emilio Benitez which was not included in the cadastral survey
of Tacloban, but now occupied by squatters, who claimed that they have
applied under lease applications and some under Revocable Permits which
they have been paying for many years to the Bureau of Lands.

“The
survey of Lot 1 as ordered by the Honorable Court was not finished, due
to the fact that in surveying same it will result to not less than
twenty lots, whose occupants and claimants are holders of permits to
occupy their respective areas issued by the Bureau of Lands, and paid
rentals to the government for many years. The squatters have introduced
improvements (buildings) covering the total area shown as Lot 1 in the
attached sketch.”

Because of these adverse claimants there is need that the matter be
threshed out in an appropriate action with due notice to said claimants
and to the Director of Lands from whom their title thereto is said to
have emanated under the Public Land Act. Such matter, certainly, cannot
be looked into in the present proceeding because of the limited
jurisdiction of the cadastral court.

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. The decision rendered by
respondent court on April 14, 1962, as well as its orders issued to
implement said decision, are hereby declared null and void and without
effect. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.