GELACIA PINILI LAGRITO, LOURDES TIA, CRISTINO PINILI, FAUSTINO PINILI, FELIXBERTA PINILI ASUNIO, DEMETRIO SY, JR., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. MA. LUISA PINILI DE GUIA AND SPOUSE…

Lagrito versus De Guia

The Case

This is a case about a right of way. The plaintiffs, the Lagrito group, are owners of interior lots carved out of a larger parcel of land in Dumaguete City. They sued the defendants, Ma. Luisa Pinili de Guia and her son Emmanuel de Guia, to compel the grant of an easement of right of way over Emmanuel's lot, and they insisted they should pay nothing for it. The case matters because it draws a bright line between two kinds of servitude: the no-indemnity right of way under Article 652 of the Civil Code, which arises only among co-owners or their successors in a sale, exchange, or partition, and the compulsory right of way under Articles 649 and 650, which demands payment of proper indemnity. It also teaches how to compute that indemnity when a permanent passage is sought.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs filed a complaint for specific performance, easement of a road right of way, and damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City. The trial court rendered its decision on 29 March 2010. It found that three of the four requisites for a compulsory easement were missing, yet it still ordered a right of way to be constructed on the northern side of Emmanuel's property, covering about 267 square meters, and directed the plaintiffs to indemnify Emmanuel in the total amount of 421,390 pesos. It also held that Article 652 did not apply and that no voluntary easement by agreement had been proven.

The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, which the trial court gave due course. They then filed their appellants' brief raising two assigned errors, both turning on the non-indemnity clause of Article 652. The defendants did not file an appellees' brief, and the case was deemed submitted for decision. The appeal went up to the Supreme Court, which denied it but modified the award of indemnity.

Facts

The parties' lands were formerly part of one lot, Lot Number 2916 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, which was partitioned into eight sub-lots, lettered A to H, and adjudicated to the respective predecessors-in-interest of the Pinili family. The plaintiffs became owners of the inner sub-lots: the Lagrito group as heirs of Geronimo Pinili over sub-lot B, Lourdes Tia over sub-lot D, and Demetrio Sy, Junior over sub-lot C, which he bought from the heirs of Deogracias Pinili.

Ma. Luisa inherited sub-lot A from her father, Demetrio Pinili. She subdivided it into three lots. One of them, sub-lot 2916-A-2-A, was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Tanjay, later foreclosed, and sold at public auction. In 1990, her son Emmanuel bought that lot from the bank, not by redemption but by purchase. That lot is the servient estate in this case.

On 10 November 2006, the plaintiffs sued, invoking Article 652 and claiming that the original owners had agreed to establish a common road right of way, evidenced by a sketch plan they had signed. They demanded that Emmanuel formalize the right of way without indemnity. Emmanuel refused, countered that an existing and nearer right of way already served the inner lots, and argued that Article 652 did not apply because he was never a co-owner of the plaintiffs.

Issues

• Whether or not Article 652 of the Civil Code, with its non-indemnity clause, applies to Emmanuel de Guia as a subsequent owner of a partitioned lot.
• Whether or not a voluntary easement of right of way was established by agreement of the original co-owners that would bind Emmanuel.
• Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, and if so, how the proper indemnity should be computed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 652 of the Civil Code provides:

Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity. In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of a right of way.

This is the provision the plaintiffs relied on to escape payment, and the Court held it inapplicable because the grantor and grantee must have been co-owners.

Article 649 of the Civil Code provides:

The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damages caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

This is the provision that actually governs, and its second paragraph fixes the measure of indemnity for a permanent passage.

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides:

The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

This governs where the passage is placed, and the Court found the chosen route to be the shortest and least prejudicial.

Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides:

Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.

This is why the unnotarized and unrecorded sketch could not bind Emmanuel as a third person.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Article 652 does not apply. The provision presupposes that the grantee and the grantor were co-owners, because the servitude without indemnity is a tacit condition of the partition, the surrounding of the grantee's lot having depended on the will of the parties. Here, the mother lot had already been partitioned, and Emmanuel acquired the servient estate from the bank by purchase, so he and the plaintiffs were never co-owners at any given time. The Court refused to stretch the law to subsequent owners, distinguishing the Dioso case, which rested not on Article 652 but on a prior voluntary agreement embodied in a sworn statement.

On the second issue, the Court held that no voluntary easement was established. The document presented was not signed by all the co-owners and was not notarized, so it remained a private document without the presumption of regularity. Even granting an agreement, it would not bind Emmanuel, since a real right over immovable property must appear in a public document and must be recorded to prejudice third persons, and this one was neither recorded nor annotated on the title. Worse, when Ma. Luisa signed it in 2001, she was no longer the owner, the lot having been foreclosed and sold to the bank in 1983.

On the third issue, the Court held that Articles 649 and 650 govern. Three of the four requisites were present: the existing access was inadequate for motor vehicles, the isolation was not due to the plaintiffs' own acts since they merely inherited their lots, and Emmanuel's lot offered the shortest and least prejudicial route. The missing requisite was payment of proper indemnity, which the plaintiffs must now satisfy. On the amount, the Court held that the trial court erred in basing indemnity only on market value, because the second paragraph of Article 649 requires the value of the land occupied plus the damage caused to the servient estate when a permanent passage is established.

Doctrine

First, the non-indemnity clause of Article 652 applies only where the grantor and grantee were co-owners, or parties to a sale or exchange, of the surrounding estates; it is a tacit condition of partition and does not extend to a subsequent purchaser who never shared co-ownership with the dominant owner. Second, a voluntary easement, being a real right, must appear in a public document and be recorded to bind third persons. Third, a compulsory easement under Articles 649 and 650 requires four requisites: the dominant estate is surrounded and without adequate outlet to a public highway, there is payment of proper indemnity, the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts, and the route is at the point least prejudicial and shortest. Fourth, where a permanent passage is established, the indemnity consists of the value of the land occupied plus the damage caused to the servient estate.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision with modification, holding that the award of indemnity must include the damage caused to the servient estate, and remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of that amount.

Remember This

Memorize this line: Article 652's no-indemnity right of way is a tacit condition of partition and binds only co-owners or their successors by sale or exchange, never a stranger who bought the servient lot at a bank auction. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the no-indemnity easement under Article 652 and the compulsory easement under Articles 649 and 650, and to test the correct measure of indemnity for a permanent passage.