THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO QUIAZON ALIAS TONY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The law condemns with severity, and rightly so, an offense against
chastity.  That is to manifest the high
respect our country accords to its female population.  Any departure from such a norm would be a
betrayal of a deep-seated national tradition. 
At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that an offense of this
character, while “most detestable,” according to Blackstone,”
and * * * ought severely and impartially to be punished * * *; [still]) * * *
is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended
by the party accused, though innocent.”^[1]
When, therefore, the Acting Solicitor General Vicente V.  Mendoza,^[2]
instead of filing a brief for appellee, submitted a
Manifestation recommending “that the judgment of the lower court”
finding appellant Antonio Quiazon guilty of abduction
with rape and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua “be reversed” and another be
entered acquitting him,^[3]
the need for a thorough study of the record became evident.  A careful scrutiny thereof leads us to the
conclusion that the guilt of appellant had not been shown beyond reasonable
doubt.  The appealed decision cannot be
sustained.

In the Manifestation of Acting Solicitor General Vicente V.
Mendoza, he narrated the facts which in his view were entitled to
credence.  It started with the statement
that it was in a chance encounter between complainant, Virginia Salazar de la
Cruz, and appellant while they were passengers in a Baliuag
Transit bus, both of them being residents thereof and bound for San
Jose City, Nueva Ecija, that led to the
train of events culminating in the accusation against him.  She was quite friendly; as a matter of fact
she “was leaning on him.”^[4]
Thus encouraged, he asked her whether “he could visit her in her
house.” She answered in the negative, but quickly added that they could
“just see each other in the public market of San
Jose City.”^[5]
After two days, they did meet in such a place, with the appellant losing no
time to invite her to his house, after noticing that she was quite receptive to
his advances.^[6]
They proceeded on a tricycle to his house, and on arrival, appellant
“introduced [her] to his parents and told them that she will be their
daughter-in-law.  She kissed the hands of
his parents.  She stayed in his house the
whole day.  After taking their lunch, the
accused lay with the complainant, and they had sexual intercourse.  At five
o’clock in the afternoon she left his house and went home.”^[7]
After that day, it was not unexpected for such intimacies to be repeated, with
complainant not only visiting appellant but also bringing “coffee, native
cakes and rice whenever she went to his house. 
Each time she came they had sexual intercourse.”^[8]

The Manifestation continues the narrative thus:  “One day, in May, 1973, the accused was
eating in the public market with his friend Rogelio Vigilia
and the complainant Virginia.  Suddenly Virginia
stood up and left them because she saw her husband.  The following morning, when Rogelio went to
visit his brother-in-law, who is a neighbor of the complainant in Barrio Abar 1st, he saw Virginia
with contusions and a swollen face.  He
asked his brother-in-law what had happened, and was told that complainant’s
husband had beaten her.  Hence, in the
month of May, 1973, the complainant and the accused seldom saw each other.  The complainant told the accused that she
could not see him often because her husband arrived.  She also told him that if she wanted to meet
him, she would just write him.  The
complainant in fact wrote the accused two letters, both of which she sent
through Rogelio Vigilia.  She signed the letters with the numbers 8 and
7.  The figure 8 referred to the name Virginia,
which has 8 letters and 7 referred to the name Salazar, which has 7
letters.  She wrote the letters in the
house of Rogelio Vigilia and Rogelio saw her write
these letters.  On the same occasion, the
complainant informed Rogelio that she was being restricted in their house by
her husband and she was afraid the accused Antonio might get angry with
her.”^[9]

Further, according to the Manifestation:  “The complainant had earlier introduced
herself to the accused as a widow. 
Antonio did not know that Virginia
was in fact married, until sometime during the first week of May, 1973 when
they were eating at the restaurant.  When
he learned that she was married, he told her to avoid him, but she answered
that she could not, because she loved him. 
Antonio did not also try to avoid her because he loved her, even if he
already knew that she was married.  Antonio’s
parents also learned about the fact that the complainant was married and they
strongly objected to their relationship. 
Antonio’s mother actually confronted Virginia
about this, and Virginia answered
that she will rise from where she fell.’ She explained that she is separated
from her husband and that he already has another wife in Cauayan.”^[10]

It thus appeared that she was predisposed to continue the
relationship.  For three days and three
nights after July 3, 1973,
complainant stayed in the house of the parents of appellant.  Because of their love for “each other,
and [because they] were afraid that people may have already seen them together,
they went to Barrio Isla in Cabanatuan City.  From Barrio Isla,
they went to Balivag, Bulacan
and there stayed in the house of an old couple for more than a week.  From Baliuag, Bulacan the accused and the complainant went to Tarlac, Tarlac and stayed in the
house of a relative of the accused, Doc Quiazon, at Romulo Blvd.  They stayed there for three nights and each
night, the accused had sexual intercourse with her.  Then the mother of Doc Quiazon
took them to her house in Barrio Armenia,
Tarlac, Talac, where they
stayed for more than a week.”^[11]

Then the Manifestation proceeded to explain why notwithstanding
these antecedent facts, appellant was prosecuted.  Thus: “They were still in Barrio Armenia
during the referendum on July 27, 1973.  On that day, the relatives of the accused
went to the house where the accused and the complainant were staying.  They invited the complainant to go out and
vote with them.  She went with them to
the polling place which was located near the P. C. Detachment post in Armenia.  When they arrived there, a P. C. soldier,
Sgt. Daton, stopped them because he noticed that they
were new in the place.  Sgt. Daton asked Virginia
where she was from, and why she happened to be in Barrio Armenia.  She answered that she was from San
Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and pointed to
Antonio Quiazon as her companion.  The P. C. Officer asked her whether Antonio Quiazon was her husband, and she answered in the
negative.  Thereafter, the P. C. advised
the complainant together with Antonio Quiazon and
their other companions, to go to the headquarters at Camp
Macabulos.  When they arrived at the P. C. Headquarters, Virginia
was asked who her husband was, and she answered that her husband is Sgt. Gaudencio de la Cruz, an army man.  It was then when the P. C. soldiers became
interested in asking her why she was in Tarlac.  The complainant answered that she was brought
there by the accused and that Antonio abducted and raped her.  In Cabanatuan City
the accused Antonio was detained in jail, by virtue of the complaint brought by
Virginia against him.  When he was in jail, Virginia
visited him and brought him cigarettes and tupig.  She apologized to him and told him that she
did not want what had happened to him, but she had to do it because she was
afraid of her husband.”^[12]

It was on the basis of a careful and thorough evaluation of the
evidence, certainly much more detailed and much more analytical than the
narration of less than two pages in the brief submitted for appellant, that
Acting Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza was led to conclude that the
conviction must be set aside.  With that
conclusion, as set forth at the outset, we are in agreement.  Appellant must be acquitted.

1. It is certainly worth stating that the Office of the Solicitor
General equally took pains to scrutinize rigorously the evidence for the
complainant, a lady in her early thirties, hardly an unsophisticated person in
the first bloom of youth, a married woman at that.  As noted in the aforesaid Manifestation:  “After a careful perusal of the case,
the undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence presented by the
prosecution falls short of the required standard of sufficiency to hold the
accused guilty of the crime charged. 
Several circumstances argue against the credibility of Virginia Salazar
de la Cruz, as well as the probability of her story.”^[13]
Then came this appraisal of what was testified to by the complainant regarding
the alleged abduction:  “The
complainant alleges that on July 3,
1973 the accused, whom the complainant had never met before,
suddenly grabbed her while she was in the public market of San
Jose City and
forced her to board a tricycle.  Then he
took her to the house of his parents where he ravished her.  The abduction occurred in broad daylight, or
at about 10:00 in the morning.  The improbability of the complainant’s charge
is immediately visible from the time and locus where the crime was supposed to
have been committed.  The public market
is hardly the place, for a person intending to commit abduction, to pick as the
place to commit the crime.  Especially
so, at 10:00 in the morning, as in this case, when the market place was at its
busiest and the smallest incident could easily cause a commotion.  It is therefore unusual that no one noticed
the complainant when she was allegedly abducted, despite her claim that she
struggled and vigorously resisted the accused, and her niece, Victoria Bengaño, supposedly cried for help.  The complainant claims she was then inside
the market place, and the tricycle where she was boarded was parked on the road
outside the market.  This means
that the accused must have pulled the complainant to the tricycle for some
distance.  It is notable that the
complainant did not shout, when the accused pulled her.  There was a policeman stationed near the
market, but she did not call for his help. 
The complainant claims her mouth was covered by the accused when the
accused grabbed her, so she was not able to shout.  But, the complainant’s niece was with her and
she claims that she saw the incident. 
Why then did the complainant’s niece not immediately report the incident
to the authorities, or seek the help of the many people in the market?  The complainant herself admits there were
many people in the market during the incident in question.  If the complainant struggled as hard as she
claims she did, surely, there must have been someone who must have noticed the
incident.  Yet, there is no evidence of
anyone at all who noticed or reported the incident to the authorities.  Nor is there any claim that the accused was
armed.  The complainant states that she
was shoved into the tricycle.  If the
complainant was struggling, then the tricycle driver must have seen her.  Yet, he did not do anything to help her.  Instead, he unquestioningly took the accused
and the complainant to the house of the accused.  If the complainant’s version is to be
believed, then the tricycle driver must also be guilty of having aided the
accused to commit the crime.  And, yet,
the complainant does not charge that he was in conspiracy with the
accused.  The house of the accused in
Santo Niño 1st, San Jose
City was some distance away from
the public market.  The road leading to
the house of the accused passed through a bus station, a bridge where a
policeman directs traffic, and several houses. 
In fact the house of the accused was in a squatter’s area and the
complainant admits that there were many neighbors and it was a crowded
place.  In short, the complainant had all
the opportunity to cry for help and many would have to come to her assistance
if she did.  But she did not ask for
help.  When they reached the house of the
accused, the complainant met the father of the accused sitting on the stairs of
the house.  Again, she could have asked
for his help, but she did not.  Even
without her shouting, the mere sight of her struggling to be free, and
resisting the accused, would have been enough to lead the father of the accused
to intervene and suspect that his son had done something wrong.  Instead, the complainant would have this
Honorable Court believe that the accused’s father
merely looked on them, and did not do anything under the circumstances and that
he was afraid of the accused, his own son, so he allowed and tolerated him to
commit a crime in his presence and in their house, without question.”^[14]

The Manifestation then proceeded to affirm categorically:  “The incidents which followed after that
according to the complainant herself, are equally incredible.”^[15]
It explained why it could employ that tone of certainty:  “The complainant contends that when they
arrived at the house of the accused, the latter started boxing her for no
apparent reason, so that she was rendered unconscious.  And when she woke up, it was already
dark.  That was the time the accused asked
her to have sexual intercourse with him and they had sexual intercourse for
the first time.  This is
incredible.  Why would the accused abduct
the complainant in broad daylight, render her unconscious, wait for her to
regain consciousness, and then ask her permission to have sexual intercourse
with her! * * * The complainant’s version is clearly illogical and
improbable.  Several other incidents show
that the complainant’s claim that she was constantly in fear of the accused so
she submitted to sexual intercourse with him, is without basis.  The circumstances which she described as
accompanying her trip to Cabanatuan City, then to Baliuag, Bulacan, then to San
Vicente, Tarlac, and finally to Barrio Armenia, Tarlac, Tarlac, show that the
complainant was free from restraint. 
There is no evidence that she was subjected to constant threats or that
violence was inflicted upon her by the accused. 
In the bus trip to Cabanatuan
City, the mother of the accused was
with them.  The complainant and mother of
the accused was seated at the back of the bus, while the accused was
near the driver. * * * The accused introduced her to his cousins and other
relatives.  She also met the friends of
the accused to whom she was introduced by the accused as his wife, and to which
the complainant did not object.  She was
also introduced by the accused to her parents as their future
daughter-in-law.  In fact, on Referendum
Day, the complainant was even invited by the cousins of the accused to go out
and vote with them which she accepted without any restraint from the
accused.  As noted in the defense brief,
she did not voluntarily report the incident charged to the authorities.  When she went out on Referendum Day, it was
not her intention to complain to the authorities that the accused had abducted
and raped her.  She went to the polling
place to vote.  However, the authorities,
noting that she was a stranger in the palace, asked her where she was from, who
her husband was, and why she was in Bo. Armenia,
Tarlac, Tarlac on
Referendum Day.  It was only then after
she was questioned by the authorities that in panic she charged Antonio Quiazon of having abducted and raped her.  Clearly, the circumstances show that if she
had not been questioned thus by the authorities she would not have charged the
accused with abduction and rape.  It is
notable that no medical certificate was offered in evidence to support the
complainant’s charge of ‘force and intimidation’ accompanying her sexual intercourse
with the complainant.  Significantly, she
did not deny that she visited the accused and brought him cigarettes and tupig, when he was detained in jail in Cabanatuan City.”^[16]

Thus the Manifestation would reiterate the lack of persuasiveness
of complainant’s version:  “The
totality of her testimony is clearly not in accord with the natural run of
events.  Not only is the testimony of the
complainant incredible, but she herself, is not a credible witness.”^[17]

2. It is precisely because of such notorious lack of any persuasive
force in the testimony of complainant that the Manifestation asserted most
emphatically that appellant could rely on the constitutional presumption of
innocence,^[18]
one of the most valuable rights of an accused person.  Accordingly, there was the citation therein
of this relevant excerpt from People v. Dramayo:^[19]
“Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime has been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction.  It is thus required that every circum­stance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.  The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.  The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.  Moral certainty is required.”^[20]
The Dramayo decision has been cited with approval in
the following cases:  People v. Palacpac;^[21]
People v. Zamora;^[22]
People v. Alvarez;^[23]
People v. Reyes;^[24]
People v. Beltran;^[25]
People v. Roa;^[26]
People v. Padirayon;^[27]
People v. Ordonio;^[28]
People v. Ramirez;^[29]
People v. Godoy;^[30]
and People v. Berame.^[31]

3. The accusation that appellant committed abduction with rape is
thus devoid of any factual foundation. 
The teaching of applicable decisions is definitely to the contrary.  Only by a deviation from what has been so
long and so consistently held by this Court can the lower court decision
finding appellant guilty be sustained. 
There would be no justification for such a move.  It would be an affront to reason.  It can truly be said that words have lost
their meaning if the facts duly established can be characterized as
constituting forcible abduction.  The
element of consent was always present. 
With complainant’s complaisant attitude, not to say enthusiastic
cooperation, coercion was definitely unnecessary.  So the leading cases starting from United
States v. Santiago,^[32]
with the illustrious Justice Moreland as ponente,
to People v. Ilagan,^[33]
would clearly indicate.  The quantum of
proof required to justify a conviction for this particular offense has not been
met.^[34] As
was pointed out by Justice Concepcion in Iligan:  “Crimes
against chastity by their very nature usually involve only two persons – the
complainant and the offender.  Seldom, if
ever, is there an eyewitness to the commission of the offense.  As a consequence, conviction or acquittal of
the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony.  It is therefore for a good
reason that courts examine with the greatest care the complainant’s story and
subject it to a thorough scrutiny to determine its veracity in the light of
human nature and experience.  Tested by
these standards, we find valid reasons to reject Benilda
Lejano’s claim of having been forcibly abducted and
raped.”^[35]

4.       As much, if not more,
can be said of this case.  There was no
rape.  It is true that carnal acts did
take place but only under circumstances of mutual consent and, considering
their having been repeated on several occasions, in all probability, of mutual
gratification.  Whatever moral
disapprobation may be visited on the mode of conduct of the accused cannot
justify a conviction under this indictment. 
The practices he did engage in could not be held subject to the
liability sought to be imposed upon him. 
He is entitled to an acquittal. 
This Tribunal, in several recent decisions, has had occasions to reverse
lower court decisions under an analogous state of facts.^[36]

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of April 12, 1976, finding the accused
guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is reversed and another judgment entered
acquitting him of such offense.

Barredo, (Acting Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

^[1] United
States v. Flores,
26 Phil. 262, 269 (1913).  Justice
Carson, the ponente, citing 2 Chitty’s Blackstone, 165.

^[2]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael
P. de Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan.

^[3]
Manifestation, 19.

^[4]
Manifestation, 3 citing T.s.n., Session of January 28, 1975, 2-5.

^[5] Ibid,
citing T.s.n., Session of April 8, 1975, 4-6.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ibid,
3-4.

^[8] Ibid,
4.

^[9] Ibid,
4-5, citing T.s.n., Session of January 28, 1975, 11-14 and Session of November 19, 1974, 6-9.

^[10] Ibid,
5, citing T.s.n., Session of January 28, 1975, 16-18.

^[11] Ibid,
5-6, citing T.s.n., Session of January 28, 1975, 19-23 and Session of August 15, 1974, 10-13.

^[12] Ibid,
6-7, citing T.s.n., Session of January 28, 1975, 22-28 and Session of August 15, 1974, 13-17.

^[13] Ibid,
9.

^[14] Ibid,
10-12.

^[15] Ibid,
12.

^[16] Ibid,
12-14.

^[17] Ibid,
14.

^[18]
According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, * * *.”

^[19]
L-21325, October 29, 1971,
42 SCRA 59.

^[20]
Manifestation, 17 citing that portion of the opinion in People v. Dramayo, at 42 SCRA 64.

^[21]
L-27822, February 28, 1973,
49 SCRA 440.

^[22]
L-34090, November 26, 1973,
54 SCRA 47.

^[23]
L-34644, January 17, 1974,
55 SCRA 81.

^[24] L-36874-76,
September 30, 1974, 60 SCRA
126.

^[25]
L-31860, November 29, 1974,
61 SCRA 246.

^[26]
L-35284, January 17, 1975,
62 SCRA 51.

^[27]
L-39207, September 25, 1975,
67 SCRA 135.

^[28]
L-33829, December 19, 1975,
68 SCRA. 397.

^[29]
L-30635-6, January 29, 1976,
69 SCRA 144.

^[30]
L-31177, July 15, 1976, 72
SCRA 69.

^[31]
L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72
SCRA 184.

^[32]
29 Phil. 374.  Justice Moreland cited
United States v. Rodriguez, 1 Phil. 107 (1902); United States v.
Alvarez, 1 Phil. 351 (1902); United States v. Tagle,
1 Phil. 626 (1903); United States v. Mendoza, 2 Phil. 429 (1903); United
States v. Ysip, 6 Phil. 26 (1906); United
States v. Cecilio, 8 Phil. 24 (1907); United
States v. Maneses, 14 Phil. 151 (1909); United
States v. Reyes, 20 Phil. 510 (1911); and United States v. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 (1912).

^[33]
L-36560, May 28, 1975, 64
SCRA 170.

^[34]
Cf. U. S. v. Santiago 29 Phil. 374 (1915); U.S. v. Evangelista,
32 Phil. 321 (1915); U.S. v. Eugenio, 36 Phil.
794 (1917); U.S. v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919); People v. Columna, 44 Phil. 134 (1922); People v. de Loyola,
45 Phil. 799 (1924); People v. Crisostomo, 46
Phil. 775 (1923); People v. Tisbe, 48 Phil. 1
(1925); People v. Cosca, 52 Phil. 361 (1928);
People v. Bustos, 54 Phil. 887 (1930); People v.
Mañgon, 60 Phil. 821 (1934); People v. Oso, 62 Phil. 271 (1935); People v. Zenarosa, 62 Phil. 487 (1935); People v. Torres, 62
Phil. 942 (1936); People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 (1946).

^[35]
64 SCRA 170, 175.

^[36]
Cf. People v. Alvarez, L-34644, Jan. 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 81; People v.
Barbo, L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 459; People v.
Castro, L-33175, Aug. 19, 1974, 58 SCRA 473; People v. Reyes, L-36874,
Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 126; People v. Ilagan,
L-36560, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 170; People v. Ramirez, L-30635, Jan. 29,
1976, 69 SCRA 144; People v. Godoy, L-31177,
July 15, 1976, 72 SCRA 69; and People v. Poblador,
L-44129, April 29, 1977.