ONG SIU, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. HON. ANTONIO P. PAREDES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF BRANCH II OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, CHARLIE FUNG AND BENJAMIN LU, R…

Ong Siu versus Paredes

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Ong Siu, Sy So Ty, Francisco Ong, and Lucio Ong against Judge Antonio P. Paredes of the Municipal Court of Manila, Charlie Fung, and Benjamin Lu. The petitioners seek to restrain the respondent judge from retrying four criminal cases in which a decision had been written by a judge who had already left the municipal court before that decision could be promulgated. The case matters because it fixes the rule on when a judgment may validly be promulgated after the judge who penned it has ceased to hold office, and because it defines when the defense of double jeopardy may be invoked.

Procedural History

The four criminal cases were jointly tried by Judge Andres Sta. Maria of Branch Two of the Municipal Court of Manila, who rendered a single decision. Before that decision could be promulgated, Judge Sta. Maria was appointed to and assumed the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro. His successor, Judge Milagros German, declared the unpromulgated decision a nullity, as if no trial had been had. Before a retrial could be held, Judge German resigned, and Solicitor Lauro C. Maiquez was temporarily assigned to preside over the branch. Acting Judge Maiquez directed the promulgation of the decision of Judge Sta. Maria. Judge Antonio P. Paredes was then appointed to the vacant position and also scheduled the promulgation. The decision was promulgated with respect to the petitioners but not with respect to Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu, who did not appear. Fung and Lu then instituted certiorari and prohibition proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which granted the writ on the ground that since Judge Sta. Maria was no longer a judge of the Municipal Court, the decision he wrote could no longer be validly promulgated. Upon that decision becoming final, Judge Paredes ordered a retrial of the four criminal cases. The petitioners then went to the Court of First Instance of Manila and applied for a writ to restrain the Municipal Judge from retrying the cases, invoking double jeopardy. The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed.

Facts

In August 1961, Ong Siu and Sy So Ty were charged in the Municipal Court of Manila with slight physical injuries, while Francisco Ong and Lucio Ong were charged with light threats. On the other side, Charlie Fung and Benjamin Lu were accused of serious physical injuries and slight physical injuries in two other cases before the same court.

All four cases were jointly tried by Judge Andres Sta. Maria of Branch Two, and a single decision was rendered on July 7, 1962. Two days later, and before the decision could be promulgated, Judge Sta. Maria was appointed to and assumed the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro. Judge Milagros German succeeded him. On the petition of Fung and Lu, Judge German, in her order of August 14, 1962, declared the unpromulgated decision of Judge Sta. Maria a nullity, as if no trial was had before. Before a retrial could be held, Judge German resigned, and Solicitor Lauro C. Maiquez was temporarily assigned to preside over the branch.

Upon the petition of the petitioners, Acting Judge Maiquez directed the promulgation of the decision of Judge Sta. Maria. Judge Antonio P. Paredes was then appointed to the vacant position and also scheduled the promulgation. The decision was promulgated with respect to the petitioners but not with respect to Fung and Lu, who did not appear and were ordered arrested. Fung and Lu then obtained a writ from the Court of First Instance of Manila restraining the promulgation, on the ground that the decision could no longer be validly promulgated because Judge Sta. Maria was no longer a judge of the Municipal Court. When that decision became final, Judge Paredes ordered a retrial of the four cases. The petitioners then sought to restrain the retrial on the ground of double jeopardy, but the Court of First Instance dismissed their petition, and they appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the decision of Judge Sta. Maria, signed by him while he was still the judge of the Municipal Court of Manila, could be validly promulgated after he had ceased to be a judge of that court.
• Whether or not the retrial ordered by the respondent judge would place the petitioners twice in jeopardy for the same offenses.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 120, provides:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.—The judgment is promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. The defendant must be personally present if the conviction is for a grave offense; if for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his attorney or representative. And when the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, his presence is not necessary and the judgment may be promulgated, or read to the defendant by the clerk of court.

This provision is the basis of the petitioners' claim that the absence of Judge Sta. Maria during the promulgation did not render the decision null and void, since it was read in the presence of another judge of the same court.

Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

When a defendant has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

This provision defines the requisites of double jeopardy, which the petitioners invoke against the retrial ordered by the respondent judge.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the provision allowing the dispensability of the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence refers only to the physical absence of the judge, and not to his inability to be present because of the cessation of or his removal from office. This is clear from the use of the disjunctive clause absent or outside of the province or city. In other words, the decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court. Here, what we have is not merely physical absence of the judge who penned the decision, but the cessation or termination of his incumbency as such judge. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

It is well-settled that, to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.

The Court also noted that when the notice for the promulgation of the decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no longer the judge of the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal was delivered to the appellants. With more reason, therefore, there is no judgment validly entered in this case.

On the second issue, the Court held that for the defense of double jeopardy to be invoked, there must be either previous acquittal, or conviction, or the case against the accused was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, or that there is another pending charge against him involving the same offense. In the case at bar, while it is true that there was a valid information, the accused had been arraigned, and the cases were heard by a competent court, there is, however, no valid judgment acquitting or convicting the accused or terminating the cases without their express consent. And neither is there any other criminal charge pending against the accused. In the rehearing being ordered by the respondent judge, no new information is filed. This hearing is made necessary only because of the nullity of the judgment rendered by the judge who heard the cases and by the fact that the trial court is not a court of record. The rehearing thus ordered is actually nothing more than a continuation of the trial of the charges against the accused for the purpose of enabling the respondent judge to properly render the decision in the cases. It is similar to a proceeding for the reconstitution of lost evidence.

Doctrine

A judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. The rule allowing the reading of a judgment by the clerk of court or in the presence of another judge when the judge is absent or outside the province or city refers only to the physical absence of the judge, and not to his cessation from or removal from office. If the judge who penned the decision has ceased to be a judge of that court before promulgation, the decision cannot be validly promulgated, and no judgment is validly entered.

For the defense of double jeopardy to be invoked under Section 9 of Rule 117, there must be a valid judgment of conviction or acquittal, or a dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information, after the accused had pleaded to the charge. Where there is no valid judgment because the decision was not validly promulgated, there is no prior acquittal or conviction that can bar a retrial. A rehearing ordered because of the nullity of the judgment is not a new prosecution but a continuation of the trial for the purpose of enabling the judge to properly render the decision.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the decision appealed from, with costs against the appellants, finding no error in the dismissal of the petition.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a judgment must be signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who penned it, and the absence contemplated by the rule is physical absence, not cessation from office. Examiners like to use this case to test the requisites of double jeopardy and the distinction between a valid promulgation and one made after the judge has left the court.