REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. LOPE M. LEDESMA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Appeal taken by the Republic of the Philippines from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing its complaint against Lope
M. Ledesma for the collection of a sum of money.

It is
not disputed that on various dates in the year 1943, appellee
obtained several cash loans from the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. at its office in Bacolod City, in the total amount of P8,626.15, evidenced by ten separate promissory notes (Annexes
A to J attached to and made part of the complaint) executed in favor of said
Bank.  The loans were to earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum, computed quarterly, and all of them, except the note
(Annex I) executed on November 23, 1943, bore dates of maturity.

Pursuant
to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, and Executive Order No. 9095 of
the United States, these credits were vested
in the United States.  By virtue of a Transfer Agreement dated July 20, 1954, supplemented by another of June 15, 1957, the Attorney General of the United States transferred to the Re­public
of the Philippines all the rights, title and
interests of the United States government over said
credits.

As
notwithstanding written demands made upon him appellee
failed to settle his obligation, on March 3,
1961
appellant filed the complaint mentioned hereto­fore in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover the total value of the promissory notes, with
accumulated interests and attorney’s fees.

Appellee’s answer admitted all the material aver­ments of the complaint except
those made in the paragraphs pertaining to the Vesting Order, Transfer
Agreement, Executive Order No. 372, and Republic Act No. 477 of the Republic of
the Philippines, and interposed the
affirmative defenses of prescription and force majeure.

After
the admission of appellant’s evidence, appel­lee
waived his right to present his own and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
upon the ground that the sum of money sought to be recovered upon the
promissory notes was not within the jurisdiction of the court.  In its order of August
1, 1963, the lower court sustained the motion and dismissed the
complaint.  Hence the present appeal
based upon the ground that the trial court com­mitted the following errors:

“I

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AMOUNT OF DEFENDANT’S OBLIGATION INCURRED IN JAPANESE
MILITARY NOTES SHOULD BE DETER­MINED AT THE EXCHANGE VALUE OF THE JAPANESE WAR
NOTES ON THE DATES OF MATURITY OF THE PROMISSORY NOTES AND NOT TO BE COMPUTED
AS OF THE DATES WHEN SAID NOTES WERE EXECUTED.

II

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AMOUNT DUE FROM THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT WITHIN ITS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION.

III

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.”

The
total of the monetary loans evidenced by the promissory notes sued upon is P8,626.15.  On the other
hand, the complaint filed in the lower court prayed for judgment as follows:

“(1) Ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P8,100.71, representing the
principal and interest there­on as of December 31, 1959, with interest thereon
at the rate of 67 per annum, compounded quarterly, from the date of the filing
of the complaint until the whole obligation is fully paid and satisfied;

“(2) Ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,810.07,
equivalent to 107 of the total indebtedness, as attorney’s fees; and

“(3)
Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of this suit.”

It is
settled law that in actions for the recovery of a sum of money, the amount
claimed in the complaint is the basis for the determination of whether the
action is within or outside the jurisdiction of the court where the action was
filed.  Generally, the defendant can not
take the case outside the jurisdiction of said court by alleg­ing or proving
that the plaintiff is entitled only to an amount less than the jurisdictional
amount for said court.

In the
case at bar the amount claimed by appellant is clearly within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance and well above the
jurisdictional amount for municipal courts and justice of the peace courts at
the time of the filing of the action. 
There being no claim or pretense that the amount thus claimed was
exaggerated purposely to make the case fall within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, it is our view that the lower court
committed an error in dismissing the case upon the particular ground stated in
the order appealed from.

Without
deciding other issues raised in this appeal, We,
therefore, set aside the order of dismissal appealed from and remand the case
to the court a quo for the ren­dition of judgment on the merits in accordance
with the facts and the law of the case.  With costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL,  Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., on official leave.