SIMEON PATALINGHUD, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FELISA BALLESTEROS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 4356.

Plaintiff Simeon Patalinghud was one of
the heirs of Jose Patalinghud, the original
homesteader of a parcel of land situated in Dumoy, Davao City,
covered by Homestead Patent No. 3887 issued on June 7, 1922.

On April 27, 1959,
plaintiff executed in favor of defendant Felisa Ballesteros a public instrument entitled “Deed of
Conditional Sale,” which provides, among other things, the following:

“The vendor had already agreed to an extra-judicial partition
of the above-described parcel of land with his co-owners thru a public
instrument… whereby the vendor had a definite por­tion segregated in his
favor with an approximate area of one and-a-half (1-1/2) hectares;

“Out of the above segregated portion of one and one-half
(1-1/2) hectares, the vendor sells, transfers, cedes and conveys by way of
conditional sale a portion of one half (1/2) hectare to be segregated later on,
located at the nor­thern end of the lot, or the point far­thest from the
national road and by these presents have sold, transferred, ceded and conveyed
unto the vendee, his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, the above
portion of a portion subject to the following terms and conditions:

“1. That the
consideration for this sale is six hundred pesos (P600.00) for the entire
one-half (1/2) hectare, out of which amount the vendor acknowledges to have
received the sum of three hundred pesos (P300.00) and acknowledges to be
indebted to an uncle of the vendee by the name of Gerardo de Guzman in the
amount of ninety two pesos (P92.00), which amount shall be paid by the vendee
direct to Gerardo de Guzman to be deducted from the balance of three hundred
pesos (P300.00), leaving a net balance of two hundred eight pesos (P208.00);

“2. That the balance
of two hundred eight pesos (P208.00) shall be paid in two equal monthly
installments of P104.00 each, on the months of May and June, 1959;

“3. That the vendee
assume to pay for the expenses of segregating the above-des­cribed portion of a
portion of one half hec­tare, and
which segregation shall be per­formed after the harvest of palay
and corn in order to save from destruction a portion of the crop;

 “4.
That all improvements are included in this sale, including the palay and corn now planted in the same; x x x

On November 7, 1960, after the defendant had made full payment of
the price stated in the above-mentioned deed of “conditional sale”,
and the lot thus sold had been properly
surveyed and identified as lot 344-B-2 B-5 (LRC) Psd-13376, plaintiff executed
another public instrument entitled “Absolute Sale of Land” whereby,
in consideration of P600.00, the receipt of which he acknowledged, he
transferred and conveyed by way or absolute sale to the defendant said Lot
344-B-2-B-5 containing an area of 5,000 square meters.  This latter deed was duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Davao City, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9409
covering said lot was issued to defendant.

On June 23, 1964, plaintiff tendered to defendant the sum of P700
for the repurchase of the lot in question, claiming that the lot being a part of a homestead the homesteader or his
heir who sold the land or a por­tion thereof may repurchase the land sold
within five years from the date of the conveyance, as provided by law.  The defendant refused plaintiff’s offer to repurchase.

So, on June 26, 1964,
plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying, that defendant be ordered to reconvey the lot to him. 
In her answer defendant alleged, among other things, that the five-year
period for the repurchase had already ex­pired when the plaintiff offered to
repurchase on June 23, 1964, the fact
being that the actual conveyance of the lot was made upon the execution of the
“Deeds of Con­ditional Sale” on April 27, 1959 so that the five-year
period had expired on April 27, 1964. 
The defendant further alleged that the ownership of the lot was duly transferred to her upon the execution of the deed on April
27, 1959 and the
conditions contained in the deed refer only to the terms of payment of the
price and do not affect the validity and consummation of the sale.  The plaintiff filed a
reply to defendant’s answer and an answer to defendant’s counterclaim. The
defendant in turn filed a rejoinder to plaintiff’s reply.

During the trial the parties entered into a par­tial stipulation
of facts, agreeing that the lot in question, which is covered by TCT No. T-9409
in the name of the defendant,
once formed part of the share of the plaintiff in the homestead of Jose Patalinghud, plaintiff’s father, covered by homestead
patent No. 3887
which was granted on June 7, 1922.

After
trial, the Court of First Instance of Davao
rendered a decision, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.  In his decision the trial judge ruled that
the deed of “conditional sale”, executed on April 27, 1959, rep­resented
a perfected contract of sale between the parties, and that the conditions
embodied therein simply referred to the manner of payment of the price and the
payment of expenses of survey, so that the period of five years within which to
repurchase should be counted from April 27, 1959, and not from November 7, 1960
when the other document — the
deed of absolute sale — was executed.  The trial judge held
that the “deed of absolute sale” was executed on November 7, 1960 only to meet the
formal requirements of registration and for the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title.

The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above-mentioned decision, but the trial court denied the same.  Hence this appeal by the
plaintiff.

The plaintiff-appellant makes only one assignment of error, as
follows:

“The trial court erred in fixing the period of repurchase to
be April 27, 1959, and in
holding that the plaintiff’s right to repurchase has prescribed.”

The provision of law invoked by the appellant in claiming the
right to repurchase the lot in question from the appellee
is Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141 (The Public Land Law), as amended, which
provides as follows:

“Sec. 119 – Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or home­stead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of conveyance.”

It is the contention of the appellant that the lower court erred in reckoning the five-year period, within which he may repurchase, from April
27, 1959, the date
when the “deed of conditional sale” (Exhibit 1) was executed.  The appellant submits that the “deed of
conditional sale” did not convey to appellee
title over the one-half hectare of land mentioned in said instrument, because
the deed did not contain a description of the land that was sold, and that at
most the instrument was only an
agreement to buy and sell. The appellant asserts that the five-year period
should be counted from November 7, 1960 when the “deed of ab­solute sale” (Exhibit A) was executed
and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Davao
City.

The stand of the appellant can not be sustained.

The ruling of this Court in the case of Monge,
et al., vs. Angeles, et al.^[1]
is very pertinent in the resolu­tion of the question before Us.  This Court said:

“The question to be determined is whether the period of five
years which Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 allows a homesteader to
repurchase a home­stead sold by him should be counted from the date of the sale
even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership
of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the
homesteader’s failure to repurchase it.

“Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides: ‘Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within the period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.’  The language of the law is clear.  It provides that the period of five years
shall be counted from the date of
conveyance, regard­less
of its nature.  The word conveyance is of
American origin.  It may refer not only
to an absolute sale but also to mortgage or
any other transaction.  It has
been de­fined as signifying ‘every instrument by which any estate or interest
in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned, (13 C. J., 900;
18 C. J. S., 92).  When the law is clear,
it admits of no interpretation.  It
follows therefore that the pretense of appellants to the ef­fect that the
5-year period should be counted from the date the ownership of ap­pellees over the land had become consolidated is
untenable.

“The above interpretation finds sup­port in recent decisions
of this Court.  In
Blanco vs. Bailon, G. R. No. L-7342, April 28, 1956, the question raised
was whether the 5-year period of redemption began from the date of the
execution of the contract or from the date of its registration in the office of
the register of deeds, considering that the homestead was registered under the Torrens
system.  This court held that it is the former
because in so far as the owner of the homestead is concerned,
the conveyance mentioned in Section 119 of the Public Land Law is the actual date thereof, and not the date of registration of
the deed of sale. (Citing Galasinao
vs. Austria, 97 Phil., 82, 51 Off. Gaz., 2874.”

The deed of conditional sale (Exhibit 1) that was executed on April 27, 1959 is a conveyance
covered by the foregoing ruling of this Court, and the five-year period within
which to repurchase must be reckoned from April 27, 1959 when the instrument of conveyance was executed.  The deed in question shows that there was an
executed contract of sale.  It provides
that a spe­cific portion of land
was sold, transferred, ceded and conveyed by the appellant to the appellee.  Thus, the
deed recites:

“Out of the above segregated por­tion of one and one half
(1-1/2) hec­tares the vendor sells a portion of one half (1/2) hectare to be
segregated later on, located at the northern end of the lot, or the point
furthest from the national road….”

The “deed of conditional sale” was embodied in a public
instrument, and so it can be considered that there was a constructive delivery
to the vendee of the land upon the execution of the instrument, there being no
stipulation in it from which it may be in­ferred that delivery was not intended^[2].
In fact the deed provides that “all improvements are included in the sale,
including the palay and corn now planted in the
same.” The deed also provides that the segregation of the one-half hectare
that was sold
“shall be per­formed after the harvest of palay
and corn in order to save from destruction a portion of the crop.” There
is no mention at all in the instrument that at the time it was executed
that portion of land which was sold was in the possession of a third person,
and so there was no impediment to actual physical delivery of the land thus
sold^[3].
That contract was binding between the parties thereto, even if the subject
matter was a por­tion of a
registered land, and even if the deed was not registered as provided in Act
496.  That deed of con­ditional sale has
all the essential elements of a con­tract
of sale; there was consent between the parties, there was price certain in
money, and there was deter­minate thing sold.^[4]
The contention of appellant that that deed of conditional sale should
be considered simply as a mere agreement to buy and sell, because the land that
was the object of the sale was not definitely described and its boundaries are not stated, is
untenable.  The legal requisite that the
object of the sale must be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract
is entered into the thing sold is capable of being made determinate without the
necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties.^[5]
The deed of sale con­tains a
sufficient basis, at the time it was entered into, for determining the one-half
hectare that was sold.  The deed provides that the vendor had a
definite por­tion consisting of one-and-one half hectare out of the homestead
of his late father which was segregated from the portions that corresponded to his
co-heirs; and out of the said segregated portion of one-and-one-half hectare
the vendor sold a portion of one-half hectare to be segregated later on,
located at the northern end of the lot, or at the point furthest from the
national road.  So, the property sold was
determinable because it was part of what was already a segregated portion of a
definite parcel of land, at its northern side and farthest from the national
road.

We, therefore, agree with the view of the lower court that the
deed of conditional sale (Exhibit 1) shows that it is only the manner of
payment of the price and the payment of expenses of survey that were subject to
a condition, but the passing of title or ownership could be gleaned from the
contract, and that the intention of the parties was manifest at the time of the
execution of the said deed of conditional sale, and so on April 27, 1959 when
that deed of conditional sale was executed there was already a perfected
contract of sale between the parties. 
The conditions embodied in the deed re­ferred simply to the manner of
paying the balance of the price.  It was
agreed that the balance of P300.00 should be paid in this manner: P92.00 to be
delivered to Mr. Gerardo de Guzman, the creditor of the vendor, and the
remaining P208.00 to be paid into two equal monthly installment of P104.00 each
in the months of May and June, 1959.  The
conditions regarding the payment of the balance of the price and expenses for
the survey in the segregation of the lot sold were all accomplished, because in
the deed of absolute sale executed on Novem­ber 7, 1960 the vendor acknowledged
that the sum of P600.00 was “paid in full to me”; and the land sold
was already identified as lot 344-B-2-B-5 (LRC) Psd-13372 and technically
described therein.  Even if We consider
those conditions regarding the payment of the balance of the price as well as
the payment for expenses in the survey as suspensive
conditions, the fulfillment of the conditions retroacted to April 27, 1959 when
the deed of conditional sale was executed^[6].
We also agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the deed of ab­solute
sale (Exhibit B) was executed
on November 7, 1960 only to
meet the formal requirements of registration and for the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title in favor of the vendee, the appellee herein.

The fact that the deed of conditional sale, executed on April 27, 1959, was not registered
did not have a prejudicial effect upon the rights of the appellee
here­in because that transaction was perfectly binding bet­ween the appellant
and the appellee who were the parties therein, and no
right of third person had been affected.

In the case of Monge, et al., vs.
Angeles, et al., supra, this Court said:

“In Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, 50 Off. Gaz., 4213, the question that arose was ‘whether the period
to repurchase the land in question shall be counted from the execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase or from the issuance of transfer certificate of title to
the herein defen­dant’ and the Court held that appellant’s title had already
become absolute because of appellee’s failure to
redeem the land within five years from the date of sale.  The Court added: ‘Both under Section 50 of the Land Registration Law and under
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, the owner of a piece of land is neither
prohibited nor precluded from binding himself to an agreement whereby his right of
repurchase is for a certain period starting from the date of the deed of sale.’
In other words, the date of the sale is of paramount consideration.”

We, therefore, hold that the lower court did not err in declaring
that the five-year period within which the appellant could have repurchased the
land in question from the appellee begun on April 27,
1959 and ended on April 27, 1964, and that when appellant of­fered to
repurchase the land on June 23, 1964 his
right, to repurchase had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant, Simeon Patalinghud.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
101 Phil. 563, 564.

^[2]
Article 1498, Civil Code.

^[3]
Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil. 404.

^[4]
Article 1458, Civil Code.

^[5]
Art. 1460 of the Civil Code; Melliza
vs. City of Iloilo, et al., L-24732, April 30, 1968, 30 SCRA 477,
482).

^[6]
Article 1157, Civil Code.