G.R. Nos. L-48706-07. June 29, 1979
LOURDES E. BENGZON, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AMADO G. INCIONG, AND STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to reverse and set aside the Order
dated July 17, 1978 of the Deputy Minister of Labor in NLRC Cases Nos.
RB-IV-3168-75 and RB-IV-7560-76, entitled “Lourdes E. Bengzon v. Sta.
Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Corporation and Robert V. Hyde.” The following
are the pertinent facts:
On October 24, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor (now Ministry
of Labor) against respondent Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Sta. Ines) and personally against its
Vice-President, Robert V. Hyde (NLRC Case No. RB-IV-3168-75). On the basis of the stipulation of facts, the
documentary evidence and memoranda of the parties the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision on March 31, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the following are the orders in this case:
1. Respondent Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood,
Inc., should be, as it is hereby ordered to pay complainant Lourdes E. Bengzon
the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P2,500.00) PESOS as separation pay; and
2. Respondent Robert V. Hyde is hereby ordered
to pay the complainant the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS as
moral and exemplary damages.”
From the above decision petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission alleging that respondent Sta. Ines should be held
solidarily liable with Robert V. Hyde for moral and exemplary damages. Respondent Hyde likewise appealed from the
foregoing decision, assailing the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over his
person as he was allegedly improperly summoned. Respondent Sta. Ines did not appeal but
filed, on June 2, 1976, a consolidated reply memorandum arguing that it never
authorized or ratified the act of Robert V. Hyde in dismissing petitioner and
that the National Labor Relations Commission was without power to adjudicate
the issue of moral and exemplary damages.
On June 1, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered
a resolution remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings on
the ground that no jurisdiction was acquired by it over Robert V. Hyde as
respondent because of the failure at the start of the proceedings to properly
serve him with summons and a copy of the complaint. Respondent Sta. Ines moved for
reconsideration of the NLRC resolution but the same was denied.
On June 3, 1976, respondent Sta. Ines filed an appeal to the
Secretary of Labor from the aforesaid resolution but the Secretary of Labor
affirmed the resolution in an Order dated September 15, 1976. On November 19, 1976, on appeal by Sta. Ines,
the Office of the President likewise affirmed the resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
During the pendency of the resolution of the NLRC, or on July 6,
1976, petitioner filed an amended complaint with Regional Office No. IV of the
Department of Labor. Said complaint was
transmitted and certified to the NLRC for arbitration on the following
issues: (1) reinstatement with
backwages; and (2) moral and exemplary damages of P400,000.00. This case was docketed as NLRC Case No.
RB-IV-7560- 76 and was subsequently consolidated with NLRC Case No.
RB-IV-3168-75 after the latter case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter.
After due hearing the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on
November 18, 1977, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“Responsive to the foregoing, respondent Sta. Ines-Melale
Veneer & Plywood, Inc., and Robert V. Hyde should be, as they are hereby
ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant Lourdes E. Bengzon separation
pay in the amount of P2,500.00 and the sum of P300,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.”
All the parties in the afore-mentioned consolidated cases
appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
On February 21, 1978, the NLRC rendered a decision en banc,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Commission has resolved to modify, as it
hereby MODIFIED the decision appealed from as follows:
1. Respondent Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood,
Inc. is ordered to pay the complainant P54,394.62 as backwages from September
16, 1975 to February 21, 1978, P2,000.00 as separation pay and P300,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages or the total sum of P354,394.62;
2. The claim for reinstatement of the complainant
to the same position held by her prior to her dismissal is denied;
3. Respondent Robert V. Hyde is absolved from any
liability.”
On May 1, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was promulgated,
amending paragraph (3) of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as follows:
“(a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1) Unfair labor practice
cases;
2) Unresolved issues in
collective bargaining, including those which involve wages, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment; and
3) All other cases arising from
employer-employee relations duly indorsed by the Regional Directors in
accordance with the provisions of this Code; Provided, that the Regional
Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for
moral or other forms of damages.”
On May 24, 1978, respondent Sta. Ines filed with the Secretary of
Labor (now Minister of Labor) a notice and memorandum of appeal from the
decision en banc of the NLRC. The
appeal was opposed by petitioner on June 26, 1978.
On July 17, 1978, respondent Deputy Minister of Labor issued an
Order affirming the decision of the NLRC but modifying the same by setting
aside the award of damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in accordance
with Presidential Decree No. 1367. The
dispositive portion of the said Order reads as follows:
“ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION let the Decision en banc
of the Commission, dated February 21, 1978, be as it is hereby, affirmed with
modification, in that the award of damages is set aside for lack of
jurisdiction.”
Petitioner contends that respondent Deputy Minister gravely
abused his discretion in disclaiming jurisdiction on the issue of damages, as
under Article 217 of the Labor Code prior to its amendment by Presidential
Decree No. 1367, Labor Arbiters had jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
moral damages arising out of employer-employee relations. Petitioner points out that Presidential
Decree No. 1367 was promulgated on May 1, 1978, long after NLRC consolidated
cases Nos. RB-IV-3168-75 and RB-IV-7560-76 were decided by the Labor Arbiter
on November 18, 1978, which decision was in turn affirmed, with modification,
on appeal to the NLRC on February 21, 1978.
Respondent Sta. Ines, however, invoking Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc.,[1]
argues that petitioner’s claim for moral and exemplary damages is properly
cognizable by the regular courts and not by the National Labor Relations
Commission and that Presidential Decree No. 1367 was promulgated on May 1,
1978 “to correct the erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by Labor
Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission on issues of moral and
other forms of damages.”
On February 6, 1979, respondent Sta. Ines manifested before this
Court that it has fully satisfied the claim of petitioner with respect to
backwages and separation pay, in the total amount of P56,394.62, as evidenced
by a cash voucher dated February 2, 1979, duly signed by petitioner.
At the crux of the controversy is the jurisdictional authority
of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC prior to the enactment of Presidential Decree
No. 1367, over damages grounded on the dismissal per se of petitioner,
since in fact, she asks for reinstatement with backwages.
At the time when the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in
consolidated cases Nos. RB-IV-3168-75 and RB-IV-7560-76 on November 18, 1977,
the applicable law was Article 217 of the Labor Code, which provides as
follows:
“ART. 217. Jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
– (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice
cases;
(2) Unresolved issues in collective bargaining
including those which involve wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment duly indorsed by the Bureau in accordance with the
provisions of this Code;
(3) All money claims of workers involving
non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation,
maternity or service incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims
arising from employer-employee relation, except claims for employee’s
compensation, social security and medicare benefits and as otherwise provided
in Article 128 of this Code;
(4) Cases involving
household services; and
(5) All other cases arising
from employer-employee relation unless expressly excluded by this Code.
(b) The Commission
shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters, compulsory arbitrators, and voluntary arbitrators in appropriate
cases provided in Article 263 of this Code.”
There is here a manifest intent of the Labor Code to expand the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations.
Unlike the Court of Industrial Relations whose jurisdiction was limited
to unfair labor practice cases, representation cases, and national interest
cases, the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission was expanded
to accommodate all cases involving employer–employee relations.[2]
Applying Article 217 of the Labor Code, this Court, in Garcia v. Martinez,
et al.,[3]
ruled that:
“The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 317 are broad
and comprehensive enough to cover the claim of an employee for damages allegedly
arising from his unjustified dismissal * * *.
His claim was a consequence of the termination of their
employer-employee relation.”
The Court in Garcia declared that
the Court of First Instance of Davao erred in denying the motion to dismiss the
claim for actual and moral damages as a result of the arbitrary dismissal of
employee, on the ground that the case falls “within the exclusive
jurisdiction” of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) pursuant
to Article 217 of the Labor Code.
Although this decision was later reconsidered, the reconsideration was
based on the fact that the case could not be refiled with the Labor Court,
since the latter had already been deprived of any jurisdiction to hear claims
for moral damages by Presidential Decree No. 1367.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint was filed directly
with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor where the case was heard and
decided. At the time the case was heard
and decided, the Labor Court had jurisdiction over the case. Neither can private respondent rely upon Quisaba
v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer Plywood, Inc., supra, to justify the action
taken by respondent Deputy Minister of Labor.
In Quisaba, the complaint for damages was based on tort, the
violation of a private legal right independent of contract. Thus, Quisaba did not ask for reinstatement
or backwages, but predicated his claim of damages on the manner of his
dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal. Here, petitioner’s action is based on her
contract, and her desire to reinstate their employer-employee relations,
hence, she prays for her reinstatement with backwages. Unlike section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
21, which was the law involved in Quisaba, Article 217 of the Labor
Code confers broader powers on Labor Arbiters and the Commission by vesting
upon them exclusive jurisdiction to hear “all other cases arising from
employer-employee relation unless expressly excluded by this Code.”
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal.[4]
The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending
before its enactment.[5]
Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect,
it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute.[6]
We find the principles applicable to the case at bar. To require petitioner to file a separate suit
for damages in the regular courts would be to “sanction split
jurisdiction, which is prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice.[7]
WHEREFORE, in view hereof, certiorari is granted
and the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor is hereby directed to decide the
appeal on the question of moral and exemplary damages, inviting attention to
the fact that in their “Notice and Memorandum of Appeal”, private
respondent raised only questions of law and did not impugn the findings of fact
of the NLRC as to the amount of damages.
Costs against private respondent.
Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771.
[2]
“Unlike the Court of Industrial Relations which had jurisdiction
only over unfair labor practices, representation cases, and national interest
cases, the jurisdiction of the proposed National Labor Relations Commission is expanded
to accommodate all cases involving employer-employee relations, including
situations arising from the temporary suspension of the right to strike and
the right to lockout, namely:
1.
Unfair labor practices;
2.
Unresolved issues in collective bargaining;
3.
Pure money claims, including violations of the
law on household helpers; and
4.
All other matters arising from
employer-employee relations.“
(Prepared by the Department of Labor
Staff Committee on Labor Code. Italics
supplied.)
[3]
L-47629, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 577.
[4] Iburan
v. Labes, L-2671, Aug. 30, 1950, 87 Phil. 234; Insurance Company North
America v. United States Lines Company, et al., L-21021, May 27, 1966, 17
SCRA 301.
[5]
20 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 150.
[6] Mullen
v. Renzleman, 31 Okla. 53, 119 P. 641.
[7] Progressive
Labors Asso. v. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp., L-27585,
May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 349, 355; Leoquenco v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of the
Phils. Inc. Employees Asso., L-28621, Feb. 22, 1971, 37 SCRA 535; Associated
Labors Union v. Cruz, L-28978, Sept. 22, 1971, 41 SCRA 12; Associated
Labor Union v. Central Azucarera de La Carlota, L-25649, June 30, 1975, 64
SCRA 564; Guevara v. Gopengco, L-39126, Sept. 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 236; Goodrich
Employees Association v. Flores, L-30211, Oct. 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 297; Holganza
v. Apostol, L-32953, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 190; Manila Cristina
Fertilizer Plant Employees Association v. Tandayag, L-29217 & L-33935,
May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 56.