PERLA C. PACUESA, PETITIONER, VS. SIMEON DEL ROSARIO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.

Rejected by the trial court and thwarted by the Court of Appeal
on certiorari and mandamus, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal, by way of
certiorari, praying that the ruling of the lower courts be reversed and that
she be allowed to intervene in Civil Case 2419-P of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, entitled “Simeon del Rosario,
Plaintiff, vs. The Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc.,
Defendant”.  Petitioner explains
that this appeal is limited to “that portion of the decision [of the Court
of Appeals] dismissing the petition in the court below on the sole ground that
the intervention, if allowed, would ‘unduly delay and prejudice the rights of
the original parties to the case’”.

The factual backdrop is this:

On February 7, 1957,
the Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc. – hereinafter referred to
simply as Equitable – issued two policies:  the first, Personal Accident Policy No. 7136
on the life of Francisco del Rosario, also known as Paquito
Bolero; the other, Master accident Policy No. 7137, covering those of 24
members of the vaudeville troupe of Francisco del Rosario.  Beneficiary under the first policy was Remedios Jayme, one of those who
perished in the accident hereinafter to be mentioned.  Beneficiary under the companion policy is
Francisco del Rosario, the proceeds of which are payable to him “if surviving
the Insured, otherwise to the estate of the Insured”.

On February 24, 1957, Francisco del Rosario, together with the
members of his vaudeville troupe, were forced to jump off the motor launch
“L-lamia” due to a fire that broke out in said vessel while in the waters of Jolo.  Francisco del
Rosario and 21 of his group died of drowning.

Simeon del Rosario (father and heir of Francisco del Rosario)
claimed the proceeds of the two policies. 
A divergence of views arose as to the amount payable for the death of
Francisco del Rosario.  Because of this,
agreement between Simeon del Rosario and Equitable allegedly was entered into whereunder the former would file against the latter a test
case on Personal Accident Policy No. 7136; and that in reference to Master
Policy No. 7137, the parties were to be governed by the result of that judicial
test.

So it is that Simeon del Rosario sued Equitable on Policy No.
7136 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Civil Case No. 1807-P of said court, entitled “Simeon del Rosario,
Plaintiff, vs. The Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc.,
Defendant”.  On September 1, 1958, the trial court’s judgment
declared that the insurer’s liability to Simeon del Rosario was P3,000 on
Policy No. 7136 aforementioned.  On June 29, 1963, on appeal from said
court, this Court affirmed.^[1]

Refusal of Equitable to honor the alleged covenant brought about
the second case, Civil Case 2419-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, instituted on September 6, 1963 by Simeon del
Rosario against Equitable for the collection of the proceeds of Master Accident
Policy No. 7137.

On December 7, 1965, Perla C. Pacursa, “in her behalf and for others similarly
situated”, moved to intervene in Case 2419-P, alleging that she is the sole
heir of her husband Perfecto Pacursa and her son
Adolfo Pacursa, both members of Francisco del
Rosario’ vaudeville troupe; and that “the other intervenors‘
(without naming them) are heirs of other members of the troupe.  All those vaudevilli
who perished in the accident of February
24, 1957 aforesaid – it is claimed – were covered by Master
Accident Policy No. 7137.  That motion to
intervene – to which the complaint in intervention was attached – was set for
hearing by Pacursa’s counsel himself on December 11, 1965, finally submitted
for resolution on December 24, 1965.

Meanwhile, defendant Equitable completed the presentation of its
evidence on December 8, 1965.  Trial of the case ended on that day, i.e.,
one day after the motion to intervene was filed.

On December 27, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order in said Case 2419-P, which
reads:  “Considering the ‘Motion For
Intervention’ filed on December 7, 1965 by counsel for the intervenors
and the opposition thereto and it appearing that the hearing of this case has
already terminated, said motion is hereby denied pursuant to section 2, Rule 12
of the New Rules of Court”. Reconsideration was denied in the trial
court’s order of January 12, 1966.

Perla Pacursa
went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and for judgment to annul the orders of December 27, 1965 and January 12 1966 just mentioned.^[2]

The Court of Appeals, on March
17, 1966, ordered the issuance of a temporary restraining order
upon a P1,000-bond.

Came the judgment of the Court of Appeals on June 27, 1966. Pacursa’s
petition for certiorari and mandamus just mentioned was overthrown, and the
writ of preliminary injunction (should be temporary restraining order)
dissolved.  Reconsideration was refused
on July 20, 1966.

On July 30, 1966,
petitioner Pacursa lodged the present appeal by way
of certiorari adverted to earlier in this opinion.

In the meantime, with the restraining order out (no injunction
was prayed for in this Court), the way was clear for the Rizal
court to proceed with Civil Case 2419-P. 
Judgment was, on November 8,
1966, there rendered ordering defendant Equitable to pay plaintiff
Simeon del Rosario the total sum of P63,000,^[3]
with legal interest attorneys’ fees, and the costs.  Equitable appealed to the Court of Appeals.^[4]

On motion of plaintiff Simeon del Rosario, the Court of Appeals,
on November 11, 1967, dismissed Equitable’s
appeal from the judgment on the merits rendered in said Case 2419-P of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, for failure of the
record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within the
permissible period fixed by the Rules.  A
motion to reconsider was denied by said appellate court on January 17, 1968.

Said case was elevated to this Court on petition for review on
certiorari.^[5]
Petitioner – Equitable – in that case (L-28714) prays that the resolutions of
respondent Court of Appeals of November 11, 1967 and January 17, 1968 be set
aside, and that said court be directed to reinstate Equitable’s
appeal (in Case 2419-P of the Rizal court).

By resolution of this Court of April 1, 1968, Equitable’s
petition for review on certiorari was denied due course.  A move to reconsider is under consideration
by this Court.

Back to the present case (L-26353) – Perla Pacursa’s (in her behalf
arid for others similarly situated) – for intervention.  Did the Court of First Instance of Rizal abuse its discretion in refusing intervention in Case
2419-P?  Did the Court of Appeals err in
sustaining the trial court?  For three
reasons, the answer to both questions must be in the negative.  First, petitioner is guilty of laches; second intervention will cause undue delay
and will prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and third,
the Rizal court is now powerless to grant
intervention.

The controlling provisions of the Rules of Court are:

“SEC. 2.  Intervention.  – A person may, before or during a trial, be
permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other, disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof.

(a)   
Motion for intervention.  – A person desiring to intervene shall file a
motion for leave of court with notice upon all the parties to the action.

(b)   
Discretion of court.  – In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the court, in the exercise of discretion, shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor’s
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

x                    x                      x”.^[6]

1.  A party in interest who
desires to pursue judicial relief – in intervention – must do so within a
reasonable time.  He should not idly sit
by.  He should be diligent.  He should not permit precious time to pass
before he asserts his rights in court. 
He should not allow a litigation in which he has a vital interest to
proceed and then make an eleventh-hour effort to squeeze himself in.  These are guiding principles the purpose of
which is to save parties already in court from undue delay and prejudice in the
adjudication of their right arising out of intervention.

Here is the position of petitioner Pacursa
vis-a-vis the original parties in Case 2419-P of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal:  The accident occurred on February 24, 1957.  By the terms of Master Accident Policy No.
7137, no action shall be brought thereunder (Clause
15, par. VII of the Policy) unless filed within two years from the expiration
of the time within which to give notice of the accident to the insurer.  That notice under Clause 9 should normally be
given within twenty days from the time of the accident.  These covenants in the policy should have
spurred petitioner and others similarly situated to take court action within
the limited period.  And yet, here,
petitioner (and those she purportedly represents) did not seek intervention
until December 7, 1965.  They did not bestir themselves for over eight
years from the date of the accident. 
They sought to intervene only after six years from the lapse of the
stipulated period within which to file an action, and over two years after
respondent del Rosario started suit against the insurance company.  In plain language, they wanted to ride on the
coat tails of del Rosario.  But del
Rosario’s case against Equitable is upon a different cause of
action.  It is predicated on an
agreement with the insurer – without reference to the period of filing suit set
forth in the insurance policy.  It is
quite plain that what petitioner “and others similarly situated”
would want to do is to get hold of the entire proceeds of Master Accident
Policy No. 7137 at the expense of del Rosario, and case out del Rosario from
any judgment the latter might obtain in Case 2410-P.  They will profit.  Simeon del Rosario will be left out in the
cold.  This is certainly not fair.  For this reason alone, we hold that their
delay is inexcusable.  It could work
injustice.  Laches
should be a bar.

 2. On the merits of her motion for intervention, petitioner Pacursa says that she would be able to get through with her
evidence in two or three sittings.  By
this, she infers that no substantial pre­judice to the parties already in the
case would ensue.  Between what a party
says and the realities of court proceedings, there is a quite a distance.  Petitioner’s intervention is not merely for
herself; it is for 19 others.  Under the
terms of the policy, for petitioner’s case and those of others similarly
situated to prosper, they must prove that Francisco del Rosario predeceased
each and everyone of them.  This is a
huge task; it is time consuming. 
Petitioner should not expect that respondent Simeon del Rosario will
take any evidence to that effect hands down. 
Substantial time has passed since the date of the accident.  There is the difficult task to be undertaken
by respondent Simeon del Rosario – search for and marshall his evidence.  How about the tremendous expenses?  The place of accident is Jolo.  The trial court sits in Rizal.

And then, time has a way of inducing treachery of memory; it
works to obliterate important evidence. 
Surely enough, it is clearly past the time when intervention should be
allowed.  The original parties and the
court will be enmeshed in divers claims which will no doubt retard disposition
of the case.  And yet, to petitioner, a
pointless and frustrating result is not improbable at all.  Really, not even an allegation was made
either in the motion to intervene or in the complaint in intervention that the
21 persons insured survived Paquito Bolero, the
beneficiary under the policy, in that accident of February 24, 1957.  The other parties should not, therefore, be
saddled with a burden of meeting petitioner’s complaint in intervention.  That complaint is denuded of equitable
grounds.  It is not arguably protected by
the Rules.  To repeat, by the
intervention sought, not only will undue delay ensue, but grave prejudice will
visit upon respondent Simeon del Rosario at least.  Intervention is improper.

3.  We pause to mull over
the reason of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in refusing petitioner’s intervention in Case 2419-P.  His Honor’s order of December 27, 1965 correctly states that by the
time that order was issued, the hearing of the case had already terminated.  As we look back at the facts, we find that
the motion for intervention was registered on December 7.  That motion did not ask
the trial court to stop the trial of the case pending resolution thereof. Said
motion was not brought to the lower court’s attention until December 11 when it
was set for hearing.  On December 11, the
trial had already terminated since defendant in
that case (Equitable) closed its evidence on December 8.  The lower court was thus powerless to grant
the intervention.  For, its authority to
permit a person to intervene is delimited by the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 12, Rules of Court – “before or during a trial”.  And trial is here used in a restricted sense
and refers to “the period for the introduction of evidence by both
parties”.^[7]

On top of all these is the fact that the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, on November
8, 1966, had already rendered its judgment on the merits in favor
of Simeon del Rosario and against Equitable in the principal case (Case
2419-P).  It is to be remembered that Equitable’s appeal therefrom was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 37347-R), and on further appeal
to this Court (L-28714; was likewise dismissed. 
Although, of course, the insurance company motion for reconsideration is
still under advisement.  The point to be
stressed is that the Court of First Instance of Rizal
is now bereft of authority to grant intervention.  Said court may no longer motu
proprio reopen the case.  There is no more principal proceeding in the
trial court wherein petitioner can intervene. 
All that is incumbent upon the lower court is to wait for this Court’s
final decision on the matter. 
Thereafter, said Case 2419-P enters into the stage of execution of the
judgment.  After all, “intervention
is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the
existing litigation”.^[8] The
lower court having lost jurisdiction over the case, intervention therein
certainly is out.

As we close, we find that there is absolutely nothing in the
record that would permit this Court to tag the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in its Case 2419-P denying
intervention as an improvident exercise of discretion.  The Court of Appeals correctly overturned
petitioner’s petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Upon the record as it stands, we vote to dismiss the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 27, 1966 in CA-G.R. No. 37247-R dismissing the
petition for certiorari and mandamus, and its order of July 20, 1966 denying recon­sideration of said
judgment.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
L-16215, entitled “Simeon del Rosario, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. The Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant.

^[2]
CA-G.R. No. 37247-R, entitled “Perla C. Pacursa, Petitioner vs. Simeon del Rosario and The
Honorable Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
VII, Respondents”.

^[3]
This sum of P63,000 is the total indemnity for 21 members of Paquito Bolero’s vaudeville troupe at P3,000 each.

^[4]
Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 39819-R, entitled “Simeon del Rosario Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. The Equitable Insurance & Casualty
Co., Inc., Defendant-Appellant”.

^[5]
L-28714, entitled “The Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc.
Petitioner, vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Simeon del Rosario,
Respondents”.

^[6]
Section 2, Rule 12, Rules of Court.

^[7] Bool vs. Mendoza, 92 Phil. 892, 895; Trazo vs. Manila Pencil Co., Inc., 1 Supreme Court
Reports Anno. 403, 405.

^[8]
Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil, 279, 282; Clareza vs.
Rosales, 2 Supreme Court Reports Anno. 455, 457.  See: 
Reliance Com­mercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Board of Tax Appeals,
97 Phil. 1001 1002.