REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. POLICARPIO GONZALES AND AUGUSTO JOSUE, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

The Republic of the Philippines
is the owner of two (2) parcels of land situated in Tañong,
Malabon, Metro Manila and designated as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
MR-1018-D.  Lot 1
which adjoins F. Sevilla
Boulevard has an area of 605 square meters; Lot
2, an interior lot abutting F. Sevilla
Boulevard only on its northern portion, is 664
square meters in area.  This piece of
property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants thereof, among them
appellants Policarpio Gonzales and Augusto Josue, started filling
it.  Each of appellants who are
brothers-in-law, constructed a mixed residential and commercial building on the
interior part of Lot 2.

On 14 April 1955,
then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 144, entitled “Reserving for Street Widening and Parking Space
Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipality
of Malabon,
Province of Rizal, Island
of Luzon.”^[1]
Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved
for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation.

The Municipal Council of Malabon then
passed Resolu­tions^[2]
authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against
appellants so that Proclamation No. 144 could be implemented.  On 23
June 1955, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal
filed separate complaints against appellants for the recovery of the portions
of Lot 2 they were occupying.

Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover the
land occupied by them.  In his answer, Policarpio Gonzales claimed (1) that Lot 2 was covered by a
lease application, and later a miscellaneous sales application, filed before
the Bureau of Lands; (2) that he had a municipal permit to construct a building
as well as a business license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon; and (3) that the lot occupied by him was not
needed by the Municipality of Malabon in the widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard.  The defenses interposed by Augusto Josue were substantially
similar to those raised by Policarpio Gonzales.

Upon agreement of the parties, the separate cases were tried
jointly.  On 28 January 1967, the trial court, presided over
by then Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma, rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:

“WHEREFORE, finding the complaints to be justified and
meritorious, this Court orders defendants Policarpio
Gonzales and Augusto Josue
and/or their agents, representatives, successors-in-interest to vacate Lots 1
and 2 of Plan MR-1018-D as described in the complaint, and to remove at their
expense their respective buildings and/or improvements erected and existing on
said lots, and restore the possession thereof to the Republic of the
Philippines, and to pay the corresponding costs in the respective cases.

SO ORDERED.”^[3]

Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In a Resolution dated 1 December 1976, the
Court of Appeals, speaking through Mr. Justice Luis B. Reyes, certified the
consolidated cases to this Court since the appeals raised only a question of
law, that is, whether Presidential Proclamation No. 144 was valid or not.^[4]

Although appellants filed separate briefs before the Court of
Appeals, their common defense was presented and discussed in very similar
language:

“Stripped of surplusage, it is respectfully submitted that Proclamation
No. 144 dated April 14, 1955 of the President of the Philippines, more
particularly that portion which withdrew from sale and settlement the land in
question and reserving [the] same for parking space purposes, is not in
accordance with Section 83 of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
and therefore, invalid.  Under said law
“parking space” is not one of those reservations for public benefit
which the President of the Philippines may designate by proclamation from any
tracts of land of the public domain.  The
reservation for “parking lots” under the presidential proclamation in
question is not required by public interest, nor it is for the benefit of the
public, because only those who have cars can use the parking lot.  Public use or public benefit must be for the
general public and not a use by or for particular persons.  The essential feature of public use is that
it should not be confined to privileged individuals, but open
to the general public.  This is not so of
the parking space as contemplated by the presidential proclamation in
question.” (Citations omitted.)

Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land
Law provides:

“Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce [now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources], the President
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservation for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
[now Republic of the Philippines] or of any of its branches, or of the
inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this
purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for
railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales,
public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen’s village and other
improvements for the public benefit.” (Underscoring supplied)

Appellants urge this Court to declare Proclamation No. 144
invalid.  They contend that the setting
aside of the lots occupied by them for parking space purposes does not redound
to the public benefit as required
under Section 83 of the Public Land Act. 
They claim that only certain privileged individuals, i.e., those who
have cars, can avail of the parking facility without any advantage accruing to
the general public.

As observed by the trial court, Proclamation No. 144 was issued
by then President Ramon Magsaysay in response to
several resolutions passed by the Municipal Council of Malabon,
Rizal, which had become particularly aware of the
increasing vehicular traffic and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard.^[5]
The Municipal Council had proposed to widen F. Sevilla
Boulevard and at the same time, to reserve an area
for parking space to ease up traffic problems, in anticipation of the
completion of the then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the west
of F. Sevilla Boulevard.  In this day and age, it is hardly open to debate that the public has much to
gain from the proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and from
establishment of a municipal
parking area.  Indiscriminate parking
along F. Sevilla Boulevard
and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the build
up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort and inconvenience
of the public who use the streets.  Traffic
congestion constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and convenience
of the people and it can only be substantially relieved by widening streets and
providing adequate parking areas.

Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in
designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed^[6]
which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a useful
purpose.  In other jurisdic­tions where
traffic is at least as voluminous
as here, the provision by
municipal governments of parking space is not limited to parking along public
streets or highways.  There has been a
marked trend to build off-street parking facilities
with the view to removing parked cars from the streets.  While the provision of off-street parking
facilities or carparks has been commonly undertaken
by private enterprise, municipal governments have been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where private
enterprise had failed to keep up with the growing public demand.  American courts have upheld the right of
municipal governments to construct off-street parking facilities as clearly
redounding to the public benefit.^[7]

Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that may
be derived from the proposed street-widening and parking space will be confined
to people who have cars, hence there would be lacking the essential feature of
property reserved for public use or benefit. 
Appellants would restrict property reserved for public use or benefit to
include only property susceptible of being utilized by a generally unlimited
number of people.  The conception urged
by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the number of users is not the
yardstick in determining whether property is properly reserved for public use
or public benefit.  In the first place,
Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of
“quasi-public uses or purposes.” To constitute public use, the public
in general should have equal or common rights to use the land or facility
involved on the same terms, however limited in number the people who can
actually avail themselves of it at a given time.^[8]
There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from
using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact happen to be
driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for the
public in general.

Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not
determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No. 144.  What is important are the long-term benefits
which the proposed street widening and parking areas make available to the
public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly transportation on land.  This is the kind of public benefit envisioned
by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal and which was sought to be promoted by the President
in issuing Proclamation No. 144.

We believe and so
hold that Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.

Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the withdrawal of
Lots Nos. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing private rights, if any there
be.  Prior to the issuance of
Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for miscella­neous sales
applications over the lots respectively occupied by them.  Insofar as appellant Policarpio
Gonzales is concerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the
ownership of the National Government of the land applied for by him.^[9]
Although not expressly stated, Augusto Josue must be deemed to have similary
admitted that ownership by the National Government since he filed a
miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands, an agency of the
Government, an application which can only be filed in respect of tracts of
public land, not private land.

The miscellaneous sales application, however, of appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the Bureau of
Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was issued; the land therefore retained
its character as land of the public domain. 
Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already been
rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8 January 1954.^[10]
Accordingly, no private rights had accrued and become vested in
appellants.  In both cases, the lots remained
public lands and were in fact subject to the free disposition and control of
the Government.

Appellants allege having built mixed residential and commercial
buildings on Lot 2. 
The evidence of record discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate
municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for
the construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of business
therein.  However, since the lease, sale
or any other form of concession or disposition and management of lands of the
public domain was directly under the executive control of the Director of
Lands,^[11]
and not of local government officials, the Malabon
Municipal Mayor must be held to have exceeded his authority in allowing the use
of lands of the public domain to appellants by constructing thereon commercial
and residential use buildings, or any other kind of building for that matter.

Sometime after Proclamation No. 144 was issued by the President,
appellants brought their predicament to the attention of the President.  The then Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee (“PCAC”) conducted an investigation on the basis of which
it eventually recommended the exclusion from the reservation of the lots
affected, in line with the “Land for the Landless” policy of
President Magsaysay’s administration.^[12]
The then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources similarly recommended
the exclusion of the portion of Lot 2 occupied by
appellants and forwarded to the Office of the President a draft of a proposed
amendment of Proclamation No. 144 specifically excluding Lot
2 from the scope of application thereof. 
The amendment, however, remained merely a proposal for failure on the
part of the President of the Philippines
to act favorably thereon.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.  The Decision dated 28 January 1967 of then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch 1 is hereby
AFFIRMED.  Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Bidin, and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Record, pp. 54-55.

^[2]
Id., pp. 35 and 50.

^[3]
Record on Appeal of petitioner Augusto Josue filed before the Court of Appeals, pp. 42-48.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 177-181.

^[5]
Record, pp. 52 and 53.

^[6]
See Sections 46 and 52 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.

^[7]
See, e.g., Denihan
Enterprises vs. O’Dwyer, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 326
(1950); Ermels vs. City of Webster City, Iowa,
71 N.W. 2d 911 (1955).

^[8]
Cf. US v. Tan Piaco, 40 Phil. 853 (1920); Iloilo
Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utility Board, 44 Phil. 551 (1923);
Palmyra Telephone Co. vs. Modesto Telephone Co., et al., 167 N.E. 860
(1929).

^[9]
TSN, 7 February 1964, pp.
2-3.

^[10]
Record, pp. 58-59.

^[11]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, Section 4.

^[12]
Record, pp. 28-29.