ALBERTO VALINO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, HON. NUMERIANO INUMERABLE AND HERMINIO VASALLO, RESPONDENTS.

Original petition for certiorari – seeking the annulment
of an order issued by the herein respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case No. 3295 – with a prayer
for the is­suance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
herein respondent judge of the Muni­cipal Court of San Ildefonso
(same province) to pro­ceed with its Criminal Case No. 817 therein initiated by the herein petitioner against
private respondent, which proceedings were cancelled indefinitely by the municipal
judge pursuant to the order of the former court, secured in an action for
prohibition filed before it by private respondent.

The following facts alleged in the petition and in the answer,
albeit the latter is unverified, appear to be indisputable:

Herein petitioner Alberto Valino was
the tenant or agricultural lessee of certain lands situated in San Ilde­fonso, Bulacan, belonging to
the herein private respond­ent Herminio Vasallo.  Sometime
before January 22, 1964, said private respondent must have filed with the Court
of Agrarian Relations a request for permission to eject pe­titioner, for it
appears that on said date, in CAR Case No. 909-Bul. ’63, the said court
rendered a decision pur­portedly based on an amicable settlement reading as fol­lows:

“The parties, assisted by their re­spective counsel, submitted
to this Court an amicable settlement dated Ja­nuary 22, 1964, the pertinent
portions of which are hereunder-quoted as fol­lows:

‘(1)   That the respondent agrees that a decision be
rend­ered against him authorizing the petitioner to eject him from the
landholding in ques­tion, without admitting bad faith for non-payment of the rentals for
the last two (2) agricultural years to the petitioner on the belief that the
landholding belongs to his parents;

‘(2)   That
petitioner agrees to suspend the execu­tion of the judgment authori­zing him to eject the respondent
from the landholding in question, as long as the here­in respondent complies
with his obligations in the payment of the yearly rental to the petitioner in
the amount of thirty (30) cavanes of palay per agricultural year begin­ning the 1964-1965
agricultu­ral year and thereafter;

‘(3)   That parties agree, in connection with the
deposited sixty cavanes of palay
at the Belen Ricemill, peti­tioner shall receive
forty (40) cavanes of said deposit and respondent
shall receive 20 cavanes of said deposit, thus
leaving a balance of 25 cavanes as indebtedness of
the respondent to the peti­tioner;

‘(4)   That parties agree that the indebtedness of
the respondent to the petitioner in the amount of 25 cavanes
shall be paid to the peti­tioner in two equal install­ments beginning with the
agri­cultural year 1964-1965, in addition to the yearly rental;

‘(5)   That
parties agree that any violation of the respondent, of the above agree­ment,
will entitle the peti­tioner for an immediate execution of the judgment to
eject the respondent.

‘WHEREFORE, parties pray to this Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered in the above-entitled case based on the terms and conditions of the
foregoing amicable settlement.’

“Finding the foregoing amicable set­tlement not to be contrary
to law, mo­rals or public policy, the same is here­by approved; judgment is
rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof, and the parties
are enjoined to comply strictly therewith.”

“SO ORDERED.”

Petitioner having allegedly failed to
comply with the terms of the above amicable settlement, on April 27, 1965, Vasa­llo
dispossessed Valino of the said landholdings and re­placed
the latter with a new tenant, Leonardo Quiazon.  On account of such dispossession Valino sought the interven­tion of the courts.  Under date of 7 May 1965, he filed a criminal complaint against Vasallo, with the aforemention­ed municipal court alleging
that the latter had “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with malice
aforethought, dis­possessed him of his landholding.”

Not content with this criminal complaint, on 31 May 1965,
petitioner also lodged against the same respondent a complaint for damages
before the Court of Agrarian Rela­tions at Malolos, Bulacan, which was docketed as CAR Case No. 1186, alleging, as
main basis thereof substantially the same act of alleged illegal dispossession
as that made the subject of the criminal case.

After the filing of this
latter case, while the People was presenting its evidence in the criminal case,
the accused, herein private respondent, presented a motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground that as the sole question to be resolved in it as
well as in the case be­fore the Agrarian Relations Court was whether or not the
dispossession of petitioner was justified, the determina­tion of such question
by the latter court constituted a prejudicial one which must first be resolved
in the Agra­rian Court, considering that under the Land Reform Act, all
controversies, disputes or money claims arising from agrarian relations fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations. This mo­tion having been denied, private respondent commenced the
action for prohibition above referred to in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which, after due hearing, is­sued an order
enjoining the municipal judge from continu­ing with the hearing of the criminal
proceedings before it until after CAR Case No. 1186 shall have been disposed
of. Respondent superior judge reasoned out his order thus:

“It appears that petitioner here­in is accused before the
municipal court of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
under Criminal Case No. 817 for a violation of Par. 1, Sec. 31, Republic Act
3844 otherwise known as the Land Reform Code; that the complaining witness
therein, Alberto Valino, like­wise filed with the
Court of Agrarian Relations, a complaint against herein petitioner, also for a
violation of the same act.  The latter case is de­signated as Case No. 1186 of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.

“Considering that the contro­versy between the complainant and
herein petitioner subject of the
two cases falls within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Re­lations
to pass upon the question of the legality of dispossession and that
whatever resolution of the latter Court on the said ques­tion will necessarily
have a bear­ing on the criminal case
pending before the municipal court
of San Ildefonso, Bulacan;

“WHEREFORE, upon plaintiff’s filing of a bond in the sum of
P500.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the Municipal
Judge of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
from continuing with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 817 until after CAR Case
No. 1186 shall have been disposed of.”

Petitioner, however, was not made a party to the said action for
prohibition; so, immediately after he came to know of the issuance of the
above-quoted order, he filed an urgent motion to intervene in the case which
was granted, but when he moved to have the said order reconsidered, his motion was denied, hence the instant
petition.

It is now charged by petitioner that respondent superior judge
acted without or in excess of jurisdic­tion or with grave abuse of discretion
when he enjoin­ed the respondent inferior court from proceeding with the
criminal case, considering the circumstances that: (1) private respondent’s
petition for prohibition which led to the issuance of the order in question was
not even sufficiently verified as required by Sec. 6, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, since said respondent had only stated in his verification that “all
the allegations therein (the petition) are true and correct of my own knowledge
and belief”; (2) petitioner
was not joined as a party defendant with the municipal judge in the action for
prohibition – in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court – so that
he was not notified of the hearing of the petition for the writ of preli­minary
injunction and he, therefore, was not given his day in court; (3) the petition
for prohibition is, in effect, an appeal from the interlocutory and unappealable order of the municipal court denying
petitioner’s mo­tion therein to suspend the hearing of its Criminal Case No.
817; and (4) the issuance of the order in question is improper because the
institution of the criminal case and the case before the agrarian court, separately and inde­pendently of
each other, is sanctioned by Section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, or, in other words, that the CAR Case is not a
prejudicial question.

The first three points thus raised by appellant de­serve very
little consideration.  As regards the
alleged defect of the verification supporting the petition in the court below,
suffice it to say that assuming
that the rule on verification, Section 6 of Rule 7 has not been strictly
complied with, it has been held anyway that ab­sence of verification is a mere
formal, not jurisdictional defect,^[1]
particularly when the facts alleged are more or less indisputable or borne clearly by
the records.  Thus:

“First, respondents claim that the petition, not being
verified, is fatally defective.  We do
not think so.  It is true that Rule 67, sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court, requires that the petition for certiorari be verified, the appar­ent object
thereof being to insure good faith in the averments of the petition.  Where, however, the ma­terial facts alleged
are a matter of record in the court below, con­sisting in pleadings filed or
pro­ceedings taken therein, and the questions raised are mainly of law, a
verification as to the truth of said facts is not an ab­solute necessity and may be waiv­ed (42 Am. Jur.,
sec. 42, p. 177), as this Court has
done in this case when we gave due course to the present petition.  In fact, many authorities consider the
absence of verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional, defect, the ab­sence
of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to al­low and act in
the case (71 C.J.S., 744-745).”

Anent the intimation of petitioner that he was not given a day in
court because he was not made a party de­fendant with the respondent municipal
judge in the case of prohibition filed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, in violation of sec. 5,
Rule 65, it may not be said that the said rule had been disregarded, for the re­cord
shows that petitioner’s motion to intervene
was granted by the respondent judge and his motion for recon­sideration
of the order complained of was thereafter con­sidered, albeit it was denied for
lack of merit.  And as regards the point
that the petition in the court below was virtually an appeal from an
interlocutory order, all that need be said is that it cannot be disputed that
the case filed by petitioner in the court of respondent superior judge was a
special civil action of certiorari, precisely the appropriate remedy,
inasmuch as the ques­tioned order of the respondent inferior judge denying
petitioner’s motion for suspension of the criminal proceeding was an
interlocutory one and not appealable.

Indeed, the more important question to consider in this case is
whether or not the respondent superior judge acted in accordance with law in
enjoining the respondent municipal judge from continuing with the hearing of
the criminal case
until after the CAR case shall have been disposed of.  We sustain the injunction, but on a dif­ferent ground – definitely not on the ground that the de­termination
by the CAR of whether or not the ejectment is justified
under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 36 of the Land Reform
Code is a prejudicial question
as to the criminal liability of a landowner who disposses
his tenant or lessee without prior judicial
authority.  This Court would like
to make it clear that the language of Sec. 31 of the Land Reform Code which pro­vides pertinently that:

“SEC. 31.  Prohibitions to the Agri­cultural Lessor.  – It shall
be unlaw­ful for the agricultural lessor:

‘(1)   To disposses the agri­cultural lessee of his landhold­ing
except upon authorization by the Court under Section thirty-six.  Should the agricultural lessee be
dispossessed of his landholding without authoriza­tion
from the Court, the agri­cultural lessor shall be
liable for damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment
– prescribed in this Code for unauthorized dispossession;

‘(2)   To require
the agri­cultural lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of the
taxes or part thereof levied by the govern­ment on the landholding;

‘(3)   To require the agri­cultural lessee to
assume, directly or indirectly, any part of the rent, “canon” or other
consideration which the agricultural lessor is under obligation
to pay to third persons for the use of the land;

‘(4)   To deal
with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in cases
where the crop has to be sold in processed form before payment of the rental;
or

‘(5)   To discourage, directly or indirectly, the
formation, maintenance or growth of unions or organizations of agricultu­ral
lessees in his landholding, or to initiate, dominate, as­sist or interfere in
the formation or administration of any such union or organization.”

and Section 36 thereof which says:

“SEC. 36. –
Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.-
Notwithstanding any agreement as to
the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession
of his landholding except when his dis­possession
has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final
and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

‘(1)  The
agricultural les­sor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landhold­ing, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equi­valent
to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twen­ty-five and
thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case
instead of distur­bance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced
notice of at least one agricul­tural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should
the landholder not cul­tivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substan­tially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith
and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession;

‘(2)  The agricultural les­see failed to
substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;

‘(3)  The agricultural les­see planted crops or used
the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;

‘(4)  The
agricultural les­see failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under
paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;

‘(5)  The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has un­reasonably
deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

‘(6)  The agricultural les­see does not pay the
lease ren­tal when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of
the rental shall be due to crop failure to
the extent of seven­ty-five per centum
as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-­payment shall not be a ground
for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

‘(7)  The
lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholdings in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.'”

is definite and unmistakable as to the
spirit, intent and purpose of the lawmakers that under no circumstances may a
tenant or lessee be deprived or dispossessed of his land­holding without a
prior final and executory judgment of the Court of
Agrarian Relations rendered after proper hear­ing where, understandably, the
tenant or lessee has been given an opportunity to be heard.  In other words, once a landowner or lessor dispossesses his tenant or lessee of his landholding
without prior permission of the CAR and a criminal case is filed for violation
of Section 31 in re­lation to Section 167 of the Land Reform Code, the criminal
case
may proceed
to judgment irrespective of whether or not another case is filed with the CAR
whether by the landowner or lessor or by the tenant or
lessee.  Any sub­sequent or independent
finding of the CAR that the eject­ment may be
authorized under Section 36 cannot cure the criminal
liability that already attaches upon the actual dispossession without previous
court authority.

In the case at bar, however, the situation of respondent Vasallo stands on a different footing.  Here there was authority given by the CAR
upon petition of said respondent in CAR Case No. 909-Bul. ’63, as stated earlier above.  Precisely, this is the circumstance that was
seemingly overlooked in the proceedings in the court below.  Said authority, of course, was qualified in
the sense that it would take effect only upon violation of the petitioner of the terms and conditions contained
in the decision.  The issue to be decided
in this case, therefore, is not
whether or not there was permis­sion of the CAR but whether or not such authority could already be taken
advantage of or utilized by Vasallo upon the
failure of the petitioner to comply with the terms and conditions of the
decision granting said au­thority as alleged by him.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that the compromise
judgment aforequoted expressly states that the
parties agreed “that any violation of (sic) the re­spondent of the
above agreement, will entitle the petitioner for an immediate execution
of the judgment to eject the respondent.” Still the question would be what the parties meant in
their stipulation with the phrase “will entitle the petitioner for (sic)
an immediate exe­cution”. 
Had the agreement stipulated that the petitioner would be entitled
“to secure a writ of execution” or “to seek immediate
execution”, it would have been clear enough that even on the assumption
that petitioner might have failed to comply with his obligations under the de­cision, the landowner or lessor could not dispossess pe­titioner without first
securing a writ of execution.  In any
event, it is not for this
Court to pass on these questions in this case. 
All that We hold now is that
until the CAR which rendered the decision on the amicable compromise has
determined whether or not the authority granted by it to respondent to
dispossess petitioner has been properly exercised by respondent, it is but logical and proper that the
criminal case be held in abeyance.  We reiterate that this is not a case where the landowner has
absolutely no CAR authority or permission to eject his tenant or lessee; rather, the question here is whether
or not the authority given has been properly
exercised.  Whether or not respondent can
be held criminally liable under the
circumstances can be fairly decided only after it is known whether or not he has acted in accordance with the
authority given to him by the CAR in Case No. 909-Bul. ’63.  In the result, the respondent superior
judge acted properly in enjoining the
criminal proceedings before the respondent
municipal judge.

ACCORDINGLY, the
herein petition is denied.  No costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor,
and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
The Phil. Bank of Commerce vs. Macadaeg, et al., L-­141174,
Oct. 31, 1960; See also, I Francisco,
The Re­vised Rules of Court, p. 374, citing 71 C.J.S. 744-745.