MAGDALENA OBRERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EFREN TAGALA, RESPONDENT.

The offense of grossly immoral conduct^[1]
was imputed to respondent Efren Tagala,
a member of the Philippine Bar, in a complaint dated February 20, 1971.  Complainant Magdalena Obrero
alleged that under scandalous circumstances, she being then a clerk in his
office as Registrar of the Commission on Elections at Paracale,
he embraced and fondled her breasts, at
the same time touching her private parts. 
Such acts, according to her, were repeated on other occasions, her
inability to complain being due to the threat of dismissal hanging over her
head in case she would do so.

There was a denial in the
answer filed by respondent, dated April 5, 1971.  He
pointed out that the office where the acts were alleged to have been committed,
at the most having a floor area of twenty-four square meters, was also occupied
by a Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, who was then holding
office in the same room.  Moreover, it
was accessible to anyone who had business to transact.  He likewise stated that such room was
adjacent to or beside other governmental offices, including that of the
Municipal Treasurer and the Chief of Police. 
The public library was likewise in such area.  He stressed that it took complainant six
years to file the complaint when the acts imputed to him occurred in 1965.  At the same time, he did admit that in 1967,
when she was still unmarried, she filed a similar complaint using her maiden
name of Magdalena U. Verin, but that it was dismissed
in a resolution of this Court.^[2] He prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.

The matter was then referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation.  For the convenience
of the parties, the Provincial Fiscal was designated to conduct the
hearings.  It was not a routine but a
thorough investigation that was held, complainant testifying on her own behalf
and respondent doing likewise but also calling as witnesses his wife, Segundina E. Tagala, Emerenciana Mandill, Alfredo Bacuño and Vicente Elnar.  Alfredo Bacuño was
the Bureau of Internal Revenue Collection Agent at the time of the alleged
acts, occupying the same room as that of respondent.  Thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor
General went over the records of the case and on May 11, 1976, its report was submitted.^[3] It is quite exhaustive being contained in
eighteen pages and discussing in detail the evidence for complainant as well as
that for respondent.  The recommendation
is “that there are no sufficient grounds to proceed against respondent
Atty. Efren Tagala, and
accordingly, the complaint of Magdalena Obrero should
be dismissed.”^[4]

This Court, in the light
of the records of the case as well as of the above report, agrees with such
recommendation.

1. Respondent did not insist on the matter having partaken of the
nature of res judicata
in view of the previous dismissal of such complaint against him.  Even had he done so, there is still merit to
the approach taken by the Office of the
Solicitor General that in matters of this character, the previous dismissal on
the ground of lack of interest could not be considered a conclusive bar to the
investigation subsequently ordered by this Court.  That is to accord deference to the doctrine
of In re Cunanan,^[5] where the plenary power of this Tribunal
over admission to and thereafter termination of membership in the legal
profession was accorded impressive recognition. 
Thereby, there is full compliance with an explicit mandate of the
Constitution.^[6] Such an approach is likewise commendable
insofar as it vitalizes further the constitutional right to petition.^[7] A member of the bar being an officer of the
Court and as such, in the language of In re MacDougall,^[8] he should be “competent, honorable, and
reliable; [one] in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.”^[9]

2. In this instance,
moreover, the inquiry into the merits of the complainant redounded to
the benefit of respondent.  Even a
cursory perusal of the records reveals clearly why the recommendation cannot be
other than its dismissal.  The alleged offended
party woefully failed to substantiate her accusation.  Thus respondent’s name has been cleared.

3. Complainant would have this Court believe that the
“immoral acts were repeated on several occasions inside [respondent’s]
office;”^[10]
that such acts lasted some “fifteen to twenty minutes” on several
occasions;^[11]
and worse they allegedly occurred “almost daily the moment he enters the
office.”^[12]
As was pointed out by the Solicitor General, if such were the case, why did she
not report the repeated commission of such acts to the proper authorities
“to bring to task respondent for his misdeeds * * *.”^[13]
After noting that complainant “could not give any detail as to when
the ‘immoral acts’ were committed,” the Solicitor General further
observed: “What is worse, however, is the fact that complainant had not,
even for one instance, reported respondent’s actuations to the police when the
police department was just 3 or 4 steps away, or just within shouting distance,
from the room occupied by the Comelec.”^[14]
An even graver objection to the testimony of complainant being accepted, in
view of its “highly unbelievable and improbable
character” was explained in the Report in this wise: “The room
occupied by respondent and complainant is more or less a 24-square meter
affair, and is also occupied by 2 other persons, a BIR
Collection Agent and another Election Registrar.  It is one of several other government offices
housed in the municipal building of Paracale, the
other offices being the police department which is just opposite the Comelec office, the municipal treasurer’s office, the
public library, the PACD, APC.  The Comelec office
in particular is so situated that in going to the comfort rooms, one has to
pass by the narrow corridor separating the Cornelec
office from the police department.  There
are two windows of the room through which one could see below the ALATCO Bus Terminal on one side and a street on the other
side along which are private houses and the post office building * * *.  The year 1965, being an election year, was a
busy year for the Comelec, and the Paracale Comelec office was no
exception.  The same office was indeed a
beehive of activity with the registration of voters, with several political
leaders following up important papers, and with other people transacting
business with the BIR Collection Agent in the matter
of the payment of internal revenue, taxes and forest charges, buying of
documentary stamps, securing of residence certificates, * * *.  The office was always open * * *.  The location of the Comelec
office in relation to other government offices, particularly the police
department, and the varied activities therein, create reasonable doubt as to
the possibility that the respondent may have committed the acts of kissing,
embracing, fondling, [and] holding of private parts, complained of.”^[15]

3.  What other conclusion could there be then than that the
complaint must be dismissed.  That is to
defer to what was so clearly stated in the In re Tionko
opinion of Justice Malcolm,^[16]
a 1922 decision.  Thus: “The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a
clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.  The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of
the court in accordance with his oath.”^[17]
The authoritative character of such a doctrine is undeniable.  So many later cases have been decided in
conformity with its dictate.^[18]
There is no justification then for failing to show adherence to such a norm.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Attorney Efren Tagala is dismissed.  Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
The complaint is based on Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which read
as follows:  “Attorneys removed
or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.  The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.”

^[2]
This Court, on April 29, 1971,
dismissed Verin v. Tagala,
Adm. Case No. 760, upon recommendation of the Solicitor General for lack of
interest on the part of complainant.

^[3]
It was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza. 
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and Solicitor Oswaldo D. Agcaoili.

^[4]
Report and Recommendation, 17-18.

^[5]
94 Phil. 534 (1954).

^[6]
According to Article VIII, Section 13
of the 1935 Constitution, in force and effect when this complaint was
investigated: “The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law.” Such provision is now found in Article X, Section
5, par. 5 of the new Constitution.

^[7]
Cf. Tobias v. Ericta, Adm. Case No. 212-J, July 29, 1972, 46 SCRA 83; Bartolome v. de Borja, Adm. Case No. 1096-CFI, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 153; Lim v. Salvador, Adm. Case No. 1426-CFI,
February 28, 1977.

^[8]
3 Phil. 70 (1903).

^[9] Ibid, 78.

^[10]
T.s.n., 37.

^[11]
Ibid, 38.

^[12]
Ibid., 69.

^[13]
Report and Recommendation, 11.

^[14]
Ibid.

^[15]
Ibid, 13-14.

^[16]
43 Phil. 191.

^[17]
Ibid, 194.

^[18]
Cf. Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 (1936); De
Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554 (1939); In re
Attorney C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 (1958); Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm.
Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1; Magno v. Gellada, Adm.
Case No. 767, Dec. 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 549; Misamin v. San Juan, Adm. Case No. 1418, Aug. 31,
1976; Maderazo v. Del Rosario, Adm. Case No.
1267, Oct. 29, 1976.