SILVERIO LUMAWAG, SUBSTITUTED BY GABINA CASAMAYOR, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. DOMINADOR SOLIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Lumawag versus Solis

The Case

This is the case of Lumawag versus Solis, an old dispute over a parcel of land in Barrio Tina, Dumarao, Capiz. Silverio Lumawag sued Dominador Solis, claiming the land as his own and complaining that Solis had forcibly entered upon it. The trial court declared Lumawag the owner and ordered Solis to deliver yearly shares of palay and corn. The Court of Appeals later reversed that judgment and dismissed Lumawag's complaint. What makes the case unusual, and what makes it worth studying, is what happened afterward: the trial court, on Solis's motion, proceeded to award damages against Lumawag even though Lumawag and his wife were already dead, and counsel kept appealing for a client who no longer existed. The Supreme Court's brief resolution teaches a hard procedural lesson about substitution of heirs and about where a money claim against a deceased person's estate must be filed.

Procedural History

The case began in the trial court, which rendered judgment declaring Lumawag the owner of the land. It ordered Solis to deliver to Lumawag 150 cavans of palay and 30 cavans of corn beginning in 1947, at the market value of eight pesos per cavan of palay and four pesos per cavan of corn. Pending appeal, that judgment was executed upon Lumawag's filing of a bond of 3,000 pesos with two bondsmen, and Solis delivered the land to Lumawag.

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in October 1963 and dismissed Lumawag's complaint. On Solis's motion, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, and the sheriff restored Solis to the land in March 1964. The sheriff reported that as of that date both Lumawag and his wife, Gabina Casamayor, were dead.

Counsel for Lumawag then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition and certiorari questioning the trial court's jurisdiction over Solis's claim for damages. The Supreme Court dismissed that petition in a minute resolution in November 1964. Despite the deaths, the trial judge continued to hear Solis's claim for damages and, in an order dated April 5, 1965, ordered the deceased Lumawag to deliver to Solis 150 cavans of palay and 30 cavans of corn yearly from February 20, 1958 to March 16, 1964, or to pay their equivalent value. Counsel appealed to the Supreme Court although Lumawag was already dead. When the Court required plaintiff's counsel to state the names of the persons who succeeded Lumawag and his wife as plaintiffs, counsel did not comply. The case thus reached the Supreme Court by appeal from the trial court's order on damages.

Facts

Silverio Lumawag claimed ownership of a parcel of land in Barrio Tina, Dumarao, Capiz, and alleged that Dominador Solis had forcibly entered upon it. The trial court agreed with Lumawag, declared him the owner, and ordered Solis to deliver yearly shares of palay and corn reckoned from 1947. While the case was on appeal, Lumawag posted a bond of 3,000 pesos and took possession of the land.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in October 1963 and dismissed Lumawag's complaint. Solis then moved for execution, and in March 1964 the sheriff restored him to the land. In his report, the sheriff stated that both Lumawag and his wife, Gabina Casamayor, were already dead.

Notwithstanding their deaths, the trial judge continued to hear Solis's claim for damages and in April 1965 ordered the deceased Lumawag to deliver to Solis the yearly palay and corn for the period from February 20, 1958 to March 16, 1964, or to pay their equivalent value. Counsel appealed for the deceased Lumawag and, in the concluding part of his brief, raised for the first time the point that Solis's claim should be filed in the administration proceeding for the settlement of Lumawag's estate. Solis filed no brief. When the Court asked counsel to name the persons who succeeded Lumawag and his wife as plaintiffs, counsel did not comply.

Issues

• Whether or not a case may be decided where the deceased appellant has not been substituted by his heirs.
• Whether or not the claim of Solis, which is ultimately a money claim, should have been ventilated in the proceeding for the settlement of the debtor's estate.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5, Rule 87, now Rule 86, of the Rules of Court, as cited by counsel for the plaintiff, provides:

Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set up as a defense to a proceeding by the executor or administrator for the recovery of any demand, or to a set-off or counterclaim or other defense to a claim filed by the executor or administrator against a third person, or to a claim filed by the executor or administrator against a third person, or to a set-off or counterclaim or other defense to a claim filed by the executor or administrator against a third person.

This provision bears on the case because the Court treated Solis's demand for the value of the palay and corn as a money claim against a deceased person, which belongs in the settlement of that person's estate rather than in the original action for recovery of land.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court resolved to dismiss the case. It noted that counsel for the plaintiff-appellant had not complied with the resolution requiring him to state the names of the persons who succeeded Lumawag and his wife as plaintiffs. The Court held that it is anomalous to decide a case where the deceased appellant has not been substituted by his heirs. The absence of substitution, left uncured despite the Court's express directive, left the appeal without a proper party to pursue it.

On the second issue, the Court likewise resolved to dismiss. It reasoned that the claim of Solis is ultimately a money claim which should have been ventilated in the proceeding for the settlement of the debtor's estate. That is the procedure contemplated by Section 5, Rule 87, now Rule 86, of the Rules of Court, which requires claims for money against a decedent to be filed in the estate proceeding. The trial court's order awarding yearly palay and corn, or their equivalent value, against a man already dead was therefore not the proper way to pursue the demand.

Doctrine

Two rules emerge from this case. First, a case cannot be decided where the deceased appellant has not been substituted by his heirs; the failure of counsel to comply with the Court's resolution to name the successors leaves the appeal defective and subject to dismissal. Second, a claim for money against a deceased person, even one that began as part of an action over land, is ultimately a money claim that must be ventilated in the proceeding for the settlement of the debtor's estate, consistent with Section 5, Rule 87, now Rule 86, of the Rules of Court. A bar candidate should state both rules together: substitution of heirs is jurisdictional in effect for the continuation of the case, and money claims against a decedent belong in the estate proceeding.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the case, without costs, for the failure to substitute the deceased appellant's heirs and because Solis's money claim should have been pursued in the settlement of Lumawag's estate.

Remember This

Memorize this line: it is anomalous to decide a case where the deceased appellant has not been substituted by his heirs, and a money claim against a decedent belongs in the settlement of the estate. Examiners use this case to test substitution of heirs under the Rules of Court and the rule that claims for money against a deceased person must be filed in the estate proceeding.