DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. EPIFANIO ROMAMBAN, ET AL, CLAIMANTS-APPELLEES.

The only issue in this case, certified to us by the Court of Appeals
(now the Intermediate Appellate Court) on a pure question of law is
whether or not the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch II,
Iba, erred in denying the Director of Lands’ Petition for Relief from
the Order of said Court dismissing the appeal in Cad. Case No. 191, Cad.
Rec. No. 641, Lot No. 42-E of the Iba Cadastre.

The antecedental facts follow:

On December 8, 1924, the Director of Lands filed with the Court of
First Instance of Zambales, Branch II, a petition for cadastral hearing
to settle and adjudicate, in accordance with Section 1855 of the
Revised Administrative Code, a tract of land with an area of 17,181,376
square meters more or less, divided into 791 lots, and situated at Iba,
Zambales. Attached to the petition was a numerical as well as an
alphabetical list of all occupants and claim­ants. The notice of
initial hearing was duly published in the Official Gazette.

On July 26, 1928, the Director of Lands filed a claim stating that
certain lots in the petition including the lot in question, Lot 42,
were of the public domain because they had not been acquired by any
person either by composition title from the Spanish Government, or by
possessory informa­tion title, or by any other means of acquiring public
lands, and that even conceding that said lots had been acquired by
private persons, any right or interest they might have had therein, had
already been lost by prescription, as said lots were adversely,
continuously, openly, exclusively, peacefully and notoriously possessed
by the Philippine Government as public lands.

An Order of General Default was entered in 1949. On September 16,
1968, or 19 years after the Order of General Default had been issued,
claimant Epifanio Romamban filed a cadastral answer for Lot 42-E, with
an area of approximately 29 hectares, stating that he had been in
possession of the land as owner for over thirty (30) years, and that he
had introduced improvements and constructed his house thereon; that his
co-owner was claimant Santiago Parong to whom he had sold an eight
(8)-hectare-portion on the southern part of said lot. Romamban and
Parong will hereinafter be referred to as the Claimants.

On October 1, 1968, Claimants filed a “Motion to Hear Uncontested
Lot”. The Director of Lands opposed the same alleging that they had not
established any right nor acquired any registrable title to the land;
that said lot, which had been surveyed as public land, was covered by
several valid and subsisting applications pending disposition in the
Bureau of Lands (a homestead application over 20 hectares on the
northern portion by Jorge Josafat, and a free patent application for 8
hectares on the southern portion by Diego Lim); that an Order of General
Default had already been issued, for which reason the cadastral Answer
of claimants should not be admitted.

On November 20, 1969, the Court rendered a Decision adjudicating the lot in question to the Claimants.

On December 24, 1969, the Director of Lands moved for
reconsideration averring that the cadastral Court erred in admitting
Claimants’ cadastral Answer and in allowing them to present evidence; in
applying the principle of constructive possession in favor of Romamban
and awarding Lot 42-E to him; and in not holding that the land in
question was still part of the public domain. The lower Court denied
re­consideration.

On March 6, 1970, the Director of Lands filed a Notice of Appeal and
a Notice of Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal, and prayed that
he be granted an extension of twenty (20) days from the expiration of
the thirty-(30)-day original period to perfect the appeal.

The Court disallowed the appeal in its Order of March 10, 1970 stating:

“On November 20, 1969, this Court rendered a decision in favor of
claimant Epifanio Romamban, et al. This decision was received by Atty.
Rico Manzano, counsel for the Director of Lands on December 11, 1969.
On December 24, 1969, said counsel filed his motion for reconsidera­tion
which was originally set for hearing on January 9, 1970 but transferred
to January 30, 1970 and which motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 30, 1970, copy of the order denying said motion was received by
Atty. Manzano on February 5, 1970. On March 6, 1970, said counsel filed
his notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file record on
appeal. From the above-mentioned dates it will appear that from
December 11 to 23, 1969, 12 days have already elapsed, and from February
5, to March 5, 1970, 28 days had already elapsed, or a total of 40 days
which is far beyond the time to perfect an appeal. Assuming Atty.
Manzano received the order of denial of his motion for reconsideration
on February 15, 1970, still from February 16, 1970 to March 5, 1970, is a
period of 18 days. Adding 12 days to 18 days is a total of 30 days.
So when he filed on March 6, 1970 his notice of appeal and motion for
extension of period within which to file his record on appeal, the
period to appeal has already expired.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal interposed by the pe­titioner Director of Lands is hereby dismissed.”^[1]

On May 5, 1970, counsel for the Director of Lands filed a Petition for
Relief from the Order dismissing appeal on the ground of excusable
negligence, to which was appended an Affidavit of Merit. Therein,
counsel explained:

“4. That on March 6, 1970 I filed a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal and while it was
stated in the notice of appeal and in the motion for extension of time
to file record on appeal that the order of January 30, 1970 was received
on February 5, 1970, such date was in fact the time when it was
reportedly delivered to my office and that I was then conducting
research for my exhibits in Land Reg. Case No. N-13-O entitled ‘Ricardo
Baloy vs. Director of Lands, et al.’ in the Library of Malacanang and
that on February 6, 1970 I was also making research in the justice
department library to support a memorandum for another case.

“5. That after coming from the court in Iba on February 14,
1970, I had to rush preparation of pleadings for other cases and I
immediately proceeded to Naga City to attend the hearing of Civil Case
No. 6610 entitled ‘S. Yago, et al. vs. Director of Lands, et al,’ on
February 16, 1970, and thereafter I proceeded to Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
to attend the trial of Land Reg. Case No. N-1060 entitled ‘D. Serrano
vs. Director of Lands, et al.’ on February 17, 18 and 19, 1970;

“6. That from Tigaon, Camarines Sur, I had to prepare and
attend the Hearings of the following: Civil Case No. 1970 entitled
‘Andres Castillo vs. Director of Lands, et al,’ before the Court of
First Instance of Isabela in Ilagan on February 24, 1970; Civil Case No.
4850 entitled ‘Republic of the Philippines vs. Federico Rivera, et al,’
before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Cabanatuan City on
February 25, 1970; and Land Reg. Case No. 105-IV entitled ‘Rizal de
Peralta, et al. vs. Director of Lands, et al.’ before the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte in Batac town on February 26, 27 and 28, 1970;

“7. That from Batac, Ilocos Norte, I had to prepare for and
attend the trial of Civil Case No. 6835 entitled ‘Mariano de Ramos vs.
Director of lands, et al.’ before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
in Lucena City on March 3, 1970, and thereafter, I had also to prepare
for and attend the trial of Land Registration Case No. N-1715 entitled
‘A Doronila vs. Director of Lands, et al.’ before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Pasig, on March 6, 1970;

“8. That in view of my heavy schedule of cases for trial in
distant places where I had to commute and consume much time in going to
and in returning from the same, there was practically no opportunity or
material time for me to prepare and submit earlier the appeal in the
above-entitled case and it was only on March 5, 1970 when I had the
needed time to finalize and file the notice of appeal together with a
motion for extension of tine to file the corresponding record on
appeal.”^[2]

Respondents opposed said petition alleging that the basis for the claim
of excusable negligence was not meritorious because petitioner heads a
bureau with personnel, had ample time to submit within the prescribed
period the record on appeal, and that the Affidavit of Merit failed to
show a good and substantial cause of action or defense.

On August 28, 1970, the Court denied relief for the reason that:

“x x x To the mind of the court, the alleged heavy schedule of
cases for trial and the pressure of time in meeting deadlines in the
submission of pleadings in other courts would not prevent petitioner’s
counsel, with due diligence, to ask for extension of time to file his
record on appeal before the expiration of the period, either by himself
or through his colleagues in his office. He could even wire the court
for such extension with the proper motion to follow later.”^[3]

Petitioner appealed to the then Court of Appeals which, as aforestated,
certified the case to us on a purely legal issue on April 25, 1973.

It should be noted that notwithstanding the disallowance of the appeal,
the Trial Court had approved the Record on Appeal in its Order of
October 30, 1970.

For resolution is the propriety of the denial by the lower Court of the
Director of Lands’ Petition for Relief, which was filed by reason of the
dismissal of his appeal submitted beyond the reglementary period.

Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity and it is granted only in exceptional cases^[4]
, as when a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is
taken through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negli­gence.^[5]
The petition must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learned of
the judgment or order or other proceeding, and not more than 6 months
after said judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken,
and must be accompanied with an Affidavit showing fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense.^[6]

The Petition for Relief was filed within the statutory period. The
Affidavit of petitioner’s counsel did show an extremely heavy schedule
of trial in different places of Luzon, from the Bicol area to Isabela,
Ilocos Norte, Nueva Ecija, Lucena City, and Rizal, Pasig, which
prevented him from seasonably interposing his appeal. Apparently,
petitioner’s legal staff was, indeed, “few and overworked”, its members
having been “assigned several cases distributed in the various courts
all over the country.” It could reasonably be believed, therefore, that
under the circumstances, counsel’s failure to interpose petitioner’s
appeal on time could be attributable to pardonable over­sight.
Moreover, considering the nature of the controversy, which is, whether
the lot in question is public land, it is in the interest of substantial
justice that the evidence presented be reviewed by a higher judicial
authority.

Petitioner appears to have a good and substantial cause of action, too.
The Order of General Default was entered in 1949, but it was only on
September 16, 1968, or after a lapse of 19 years, that respondents filed
their Cadastral Answer to Lot 42-E. Respondents were not in the
numerical nor the alphabetical list of claimants appended to the
petition for cadastral hearing. The lot is also covered by a pending
homestead application on the northern portion, and a free patent
application on the southern portion indicating that it was considered
public land.

The statement of the lower Court that, since the claim of the Director
of Lands that the disputed property is part of the public domain is “an
affirmative allegation, it is duty bound to prove that fact,” is
inaccurate. On the contrary, all lands belong to the public domain,
unless it is shown that they have been in the possession of an occupant
or his predecessors in interest since time immemorial.^[7]

Additionally, dismissal of appeals based on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon by Courts as it is their policy to encourage hearings of
appeals on the merit.^[8]
Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat substantial
justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense.^[9]

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated August 28, 1970, of the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Branch II, Iba, in Cad. Case No. 191, Cad. Rec.
No. 641, Lot 42-E of the Iba Cadastre, disallowing petitioner’s appeal
is hereby set aside. The Regional Trial Court corresponding to the
former Court of First Instance of Zambales, at Iba, is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioner’s appeal from its judgment dated November
20, 1969, and to elevate the records to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Record on Appeal, pp. 86-87.

^[2] Ibid., pp. 92-94.

^[3] Ibid., p. 99.

^[4] Dirige vs. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840 (1966).

^[5] Section 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court; Ocampo vs. Caluag, 19 SCRA 971 (1967).

^[6] Section 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court; Domingo vs. De la Cruz, 23 SCRA 1121 (1968).

^[7] Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 (1941); Director of Lands vs. CA, 38 SCRA 634 (1971).

^[8] Catindig vs. CA, 88 SCRA 675 (1979).

^[9] Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association vs. CA, 106 SCRA 630 (1980).