TERESITA CELESTINO HOWARD AND JOSE HOWARD, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL…

Howard versus Secretary of Justice

The Case

Teresita Celestino Howard and Jose Howard, Jr. filed this special civil action for certiorari against the Secretary of Justice and the People of the Philippines, to annul the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice that refused to disturb the finding of probable cause made by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. The prosecutors found probable cause to charge the Howards with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, and Teresita alone with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, over a one million peso check that was dishonored because the account had been closed. The case matters because it fixes the narrow gate through which a litigant may ask the courts to overturn a prosecutor's finding of probable cause, and it reminds us that once an accused has been arraigned, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice is effectively foreclosed.

Procedural History

On March 30, 2012, private respondent Raymond Theodore A. Almeda filed a complaint-affidavit with the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. After the parties submitted their pleadings, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge the Howards with estafa and Teresita alone with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. The corresponding information for estafa was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City on July 13, 2012.

On July 27, 2012, the Howards filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice. Meanwhile, the trial court denied their urgent motions to suspend arraignment, and on November 7, 2012 both accused were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition for review in a resolution dated February 12, 2013, and denied reconsideration in a resolution dated December 3, 2013. The Howards then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, affirming both resolutions.

Facts

Almeda alleged that in June 2011 the Howards proposed a contract to produce and air a television program on the awarding and recognition of outstanding Filipino actors and actresses. To fund the production, the Howards borrowed one million pesos from him and simultaneously issued and delivered Security Bank Check Number 0528040 for the same amount, promising that it would be sufficiently funded upon presentment. When the check was presented within ninety days from its date, it was dishonored because the account was closed. Demands went unheeded, and a final demand letter dated February 14, 2012 was refused.

The Howards told a different story. They denied any loan and any long-time friendship with Almeda. According to them, Airtime Marketing Phil., Inc., which they owned, and Exile, Inc., headed by Joey Valencia, agreed to produce the star awards for television in 2011, each contributing two million pesos in capital and sharing income equally. On June 21, 2011, Valencia delivered to Airtime a Bank of the Philippine Islands check for one million pesos drawn on the account of Almeda Construction and Equipment Rentals, as payment for Exile's share. The Howards denied issuing and delivering the Security Bank check to Almeda. They claimed Valencia merely borrowed the check, promising not to deposit it, and that they deliberately left their signatures off it. When Valencia said he could not find it, they closed the account so that the check could not be cleared by whoever might have found or stolen it.

The prosecutor found probable cause, treating the Howards' defenses as evidentiary matters for trial. The trial court denied their motions to suspend arraignment, and they were arraigned. The Secretary of Justice dismissed their petition for review for failure to append the motion to defer proceedings, and later held that the trial court's orders had rendered the motion for reconsideration moot, leaving the matter to the court in line with the ruling in Crespo versus Mogul.

Issues

• Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for review on procedural grounds.
• Whether or not the Supreme Court may disturb the determination of probable cause made by the Assistant City Prosecutor.

Applicable Provisions

Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as described in the decision, punishes estafa committed by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the fraud, and its elements are stated as follows:

That the offender has defrauded another by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: by postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued, lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check, and damage to the payee thereof.

These elements are what the prosecutor had to find before filing the information for estafa.

The decision also sets out the elements of the offense under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22:

The mere issuance of the check for payment of an obligation, the knowledge of the maker that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, and the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

These elements supplied the prima facie basis for the separate charge against Teresita.

Finally, the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, as cited in the decision, governs when a petition for review may be given due course:

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition for review shall not be given due course if the accused has already been arraigned.

This rule is the procedural wall that the Howards ran into after their arraignment.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Secretary of Justice acted in accordance with Section 12(b), in relation to Section 7, of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal, which authorizes the Secretary to dismiss a petition outright if it is patently without merit, manifestly intended for delay, or too insubstantial to require consideration. The Court noted that the failure to attach the motion to suspend arraignment was not the sole reason for the denial, since the assailed resolution also relied on the trial court's order finding probable cause. More decisively, the Court stressed that it could no longer entertain the petition because the Howards had admittedly been arraigned, and the rule expressly withholds due course from a petition for review once the accused has been arraigned.

On the second issue, the Court held that it found no error in the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. The decision whether to dismiss a criminal complaint rests on the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and courts will not interfere with preliminary investigations or substitute their judgment for that of the executive branch. The prosecutor's findings are not subject to review unless patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. The Court defined probable cause as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged was guilty of the crime prosecuted, adding that it does not import absolute certainty and need not rest on evidence sufficient to procure a conviction. It is enough that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Applying this to the record, the Court found that the loan, the postdated check, its dishonor for a closed account, and the failure to pay were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that estafa had been committed, while the Howards' defenses, including the claim that the check was incomplete or not issued for value, were matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial.

Doctrine

A finding of probable cause is the prosecutor's call, and courts will not disturb it absent a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged is guilty of the offense, and it requires neither clear and convincing evidence nor proof beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime charged must, however, be present before probable cause can be found, as with the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. And under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, once an information has been filed and the accused arraigned, a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice shall not be given due course.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated February 12, 2013 and December 3, 2013 were affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: probable cause does not require absolute certainty, only a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the accused is probably guilty, and it is not for the courts to substitute their judgment for the prosecutor's. Examiners use this case to test the standard of probable cause, the limits of judicial review over the prosecutor's discretion, and the arraignment bar under the National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal.