AMELITO R. MUTUC, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GEN. MANUEL T. YAN & BRIG. GEN. VICENTE RAVAL, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction praying that the resolutions of respondent court in CA-G.R. No.
42658-R of June 21, 1969*,
October 24, 1977**,
January 26, 1978 and March 28, 1978, requiring petitioner to show cause why he should not be held
liable and dealt with for contempt of court and be suspended from the practice
of law be declared null and void and to make permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction.

The pertinent facts of the case as summarized in the June 21, 1969 resolution of the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:

On March 13, 1969, the Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated
a resolution fixing at P5,000.00
the amount of the bond for the provisional release of Fortunato
Medina, petitioner-appellee in CA­-G.R. No. 42658-R,
pending appeal by the respondents to said court, such bond being required by
the provisions of Section 20, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

On April 16, 1969,
the said Division required the
Solicitor General to answer the
motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner-appellee on March 28, 1969.

On May 2, 1969,
the Solicitor General filed an opposition thereto in Manila,
when the Fourth Division was
holding session in Baguio City,
which was actually received in Baguio
City on May 20, 1969.

On June 10,
1969, the petitioner-appellee’s motion for reconsideration of March 28, 1969 was denied for lack of
merit, the requirement of the bond for his release being mandatory and
indispensable.

But before the Court of Appeals could act on petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration the following news article attributed to Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel of record
of petitioner-appellee, appeared in the May 8, 1969
issue of the Manila Times, pages 1 and 22-A thereof:

“Mutuc Hits Appeals
Court Ruling”

“A division of the Court of Appeals was denounced by former
Ambassador Amelito R. Mutuc
yesterday for he said, ‘knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and rank
injustice’ on a dissident suspect.

“Mutuc spoke of the case of Fortunato Medina, a Filipino worker who was arrested by
armed forces intelligence officers in Saigon last year
and forcibly flown to Manila.  Since his arrest last November 23, Medina
has been detained without any criminal case filed in court against him.  He is now at the Arayat
Municipal Jail.

“The case in the Court of Appeals arose from a petition for
habeas corpus filed by Mutuc with the Supreme
Court.  The high court had given due
course to the case and made the writ returnable to the Quezon
City Court of First Instance.

“Detention
Illegal”

“The lower court later ruled that Medina’s
detention was illegal since there was no pending criminal case against
him.  The court ordered his immediate
release.  But the Solicitor General’s
office appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals.

“Mutuc then filed an urgent motion
before the Court of Appeals for Medina’s
release without posting bail on the basis of the lower court’s findings and the
fact that the man is a pauper.

“Mutuc said the Court of Appeals
Fourth Division denied this motion and ordered Medina
post a P5,000.00 bail bond for his provisional liberty.

“Reconsideration”

“Arguing that Medina’s
detention is illegal, Mutuc sought the
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals order. 
The Solicitor General’s office opposed this latest motion, and this is
now pending before the Court of Appeals.

“Mutuc said in his statement

‘It is unthinkable, deplorable and
shocking to see in our midst – in a country which has prided itself as being a
proud example of a vibrant democracy and a firm adherent to the rule of law –
this sad spectacle of a man kept
illegally for 165 days without any criminal complaint pending against him.’

“Extremely Dubious”

“Mutuc said the appeal of the
Solicitor General was filed under ‘extremely dubious circumstances’ because the
notice of appeal was filed even before the copy of the decision of the lower
court was mailed to him.”

On May 9, 1969, the issue of the Manila Times, pages 1 and 14-A,
carried the news item that petitioner-appellee Fortunato Medina escaped from confinement upon the advice
of his counsel, Atty. Amelito Mutuc.  Contacted by newspaper reporters for comment
thereon, Atty. Mutuc issued the following statement
which was published on page 14-A of the Manila Times issue abovementioned:

“I have advised him (Medina)
to escape.  After all, his detention is illegal.  It is the only way to regain his
freedom.”

On May 10, 1969, the Manila Times issue, on page 1 and 18-A,
carried the news report that Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar
and Solicitor Dominador Quiroz, counsel for the
respondents, were studying the feasibility of asking the Court of Appeals to cite Atty. Amelito
Mutuc for contempt and of instituting disbarment proceedings against him if it was
really true that he advised petitioner-appellee
Medina to escape from prison.           

On May 11, 1969,
Atty. Amelito Mutuc,
reacting to the proposed action of the Solicitor General, and apparently taking
pride in having advised Fortunato Medina to escape
from jail, issued the following statement:

“I am ready and willing to be imprisoned or stripped of my
privilege as a lawyer if the Supreme Court so decrees that my cause is not just
and that I am in error.”

Considering the statements attributed to Atty. Mutuc as grossly defiant, offensive and derogatory to the
dignity and integrity of the members of the Fourth Division of the Court of
Appeals, the latter required Atty. Mutuc to show
cause why he should not be held liable and dealt with for contempt and
suspended from the practice of law as member of the Philippine Bar (Rollo, pp. 35-40).

Hence, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction was filed with the Supreme Court and docketed as G.
R. No. L-30978 entitled “Fortunato Medina v. Gen. Manuel T. Yan,
Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval and the Court of
Appeals” seeking to annul the aforementioned resolution of the
Court of Appeals and all other pertinent orders, and resolutions of said Court
and prohibit it from proceeding further with the case and to compel it to
certify said case to this Court on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal, (Rollo, p. 47) In a decision
promulgated on September 30, 1974, the Supreme Court denied the petition and
authorized respondent Appellate Court to proceed with the appealed case and all
incidents thereof.  The restraining order
dated September 4, 1969
issued by the Supreme Court against the respondent court was lifted.  (Rollo, p. 52)

After remand of the case by the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, promulgated a decision on October
24, 1977 in CA – G.R. No. 42658-R reiterating its June 21, 1969 resolution requiring
Atty. Mutuc to show cause why he should not be held
liable and dealt with contempt and suspended from the practice of law.  (Rollo, p. 75).

On November 22, 1977, petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the
members of the respondent court “on the ground of bias and prejudice and
that they had prejudged the case against him” (Rollo,
p. 22) which was denied in a resolution dated January 26, 1978 and which again
directed petitioner to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt
of court and suspended from the practice of law.  (Rollo, pp. 89-90)

A motion for reconsideration, filed on February 14, 1978 was denied on March 28, 1978 on the ground that the
June 21, 1969 resolution of
the former Special Fourth Division was merely a prima facie findings, not a positive premature
determination of petitioner’s guilt.  (Rollo, pp. 93-94)

And so, for the second time, this case was elevated to this Court
in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
on June 9, 1978, docketed as
G.R. No. 48108 entitled “Amelito R. Mutuc v. Court of Appeals et al”.  The Second Division of this Court required
the respondents to file an answer and issued a Temporary Restraining Order,
enjoining respondent court from proceeding with the proceeding for contempt of
court against petitioner in CA- G.R. No. 42658-R, (Rollo,
pp. 115-117)

The parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.  Respondents filed their
memorandum on September 27, 1978
(Rollo, p. 148) while petitioner filed his memorandum
on October 11, 1978.  (Rollo, p. 173)

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner was
deprived of due process by the resolution of the Court of Appeals in question.

Petitioner argued that in ordering him to “show cause why he
should not be dealt with for contempt of court and be suspended from the
practice of law after, not before, finding
him guilty of contempt of court and of having violated his lawyer’s oath and in
refusing to disqualify themselves from proceeding further, the Court of Appeals
has deprived petitioner of his right to due process of law”.  (Rollo, p. 183) He
further alleged that he has been deprived of his right to a hearing before
being found guilty of contempt of court and of having given ground for
suspension from the practice of law which is in violation of his right to due
process of law.  (Rollo,
p. 185)

Respondents, on the
other hand, pointed out that the disputed resolution of the respondent court
substantially followed a standard form of citations for contempt and that the
questioned resolution of June 21, 1969 is a prima facie finding as a basis for requiring
petitioner to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for making the
statements attributed to him in the
newspaper.  Without such findings, there
would be no basis for ordering
petitioner to answer.  (Rollo, p. 161)

There is no question
that the “essence of due process is
a hearing before conviction and ‘before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal’” (Rollo, p. 173) but due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require a
trial-type proceeding (Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166
SCRA 316 [1988] citing the ruling in Torres vs. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272
[1987]).  The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438 [1981] and Richards vs. Asoy, 152 SCRA 45 [1987]). “To be heard” does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. 
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process (Juanita Yap Say vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73451, March 28,1988).

What the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard.  (Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA
438 [1981])

Petitioner cannot allege lack of due process since in all the
four (4) questioned resolutions, he was given ample time to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court and suspended from the practice
of law.  What due process contemplates is
freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the
substance rather than the form being paramount (Maglasang
vs. Ople, 63 SCRA 511 [1975]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED and
this case is hereby remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.  The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 9, 1978 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera,
(Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

*
Penned by Associate Justice Salvador V. Esguerra and
concurred in by Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan and Edilberto Soriano.

**
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano Serrano and concurred in by the then Acting
Presiding Justice Andres Reyes and Associate Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.