MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

On March 10, 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco for short),
filed two applications with the Public Service Commission (Commission
for short), one, for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial
and other non-residential customers for general lighting, heating
and/or power purposes (P.S.C. Case No. 85880) and the other for
revision and reduction of its residential meter rate, schedule, RM-3,
(P.S.C. Case No. 85800). These applications were approved by the
Commission in a decision rendered on September 24, 1955. On August 24,
1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction
of its general power rate, Schedule GP 2 (P.S.C. Case No. 89293), which
was provisionally approved on August 31, 1955. Previous to these
applications, Meralco filed seven (7) other applications for revision
and reduction of rates.

On June 9, 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission
requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of
Meralco’s books of accounts.

The General Auditing Office (GAO, for short) examined and audited
the books and under date of May 11, 1956, it presented a report which
was submitted to the Commission, on May 28, 1956 (Annex D of Petition).
On May 30,1956, the Commission, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo,
reset the hearing of case Nos. 85889, 85890 and 89893, for June
22,1956, “for the purpose of considering such further revision of
applicant’s rates as may be found reasonable.” On said date, the
parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant
and Chief of the Finance and VOL. 120, JUNE 30, 1964 323 Manila
Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission, et al. Rate Division of the
Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the
parties, announced that the hearing was an “informal hearing”, and its
purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to
define the issues “so that at the hearing we know exactly what are
disputed at this informal hearing”. Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases
on the report of the GAO dated May 11, 1956 and on a letter dated June
7, 1956 he sent to the Commission, in which he asked the Commission,
inter alia, to allow the Meralco “a rate of return of only 8% on its
invested capital” (Annex B, Petition). The Solicitor General submitted
the case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil and on a
letter-report (4 pages) addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the
Commission on November 21, 1955. Other parties made common cause with
Dr. Gil.

Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which
to file an Answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO.
The following proceedings which took place on said preliminary hearing”
is revealing:

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“The case for
petitioners is since they have submitted their evidence I ask now for
(time for) presentation of respondent’s evidence and due to its
inability, I ask that the case be set on August 6.

“Solicitor General Padilla:

“I want the Commissioner to rule first on that point. We want the Manila Electric Company to define its stand.

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“Our
stand is clear. We received the auditor’s reports. The Auditor’s
reports have been represented in evidence, upon which the Manila
Electric Company cannot be required to answer in writing that report.
The Manila Electric Company in going to refute that report by
presenting their evidence.

x x x

“Commission:

“I think all of us are
interested in the early disposition of these cases. The Manila Electric
Company itself is interested in the early disposition of these cases.
Now, I think it is well taken the Manila Electric Company to state what
portions of the auditor’s report it will object to, so that at the
hearing we know exactly what (facts) are disputed. At any rate, the
Manila Electric Company can present any and all relevant evidence to
justify its rates but tne other parties in this case as well as the
Commission would like to know exactly what it will dispute in this
report because on the basis of this report the Commission can issue an
order because the General Auditing Office is the arm of the Commission
in fixing the rates of public utilities. So I think it is to the best
interest of all parties in this case that the Manila Electric Company
should specify the items in the audit report that it objects to before
the hearing and we will give you 10 days to submit a memorandum
specifying the portion of the audit report, specifying in a statement
whatever you call the items in the report that you will object to so
that at the hearing we will know them.

“Solicitor General Padilla:

“And the basis for controverting those portions of the report.

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“The basis will be prevented in evidence.

“Solicitor-General Padilla:

What is the purpose of Counsel Carruscoso in trying to cancel (conceal) the basis?

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“We
are presenting (will present) evidence and I am trying to say again;
every report by the petitioner’s need not be answered in writing but as
the Commission wants to facilitate we will do so. We will make a
statement or a list of statements and we will submit that in one week.

“Commission:

“When you specify the items in the audit report to which you object there must be basis to it.” (Transcript, pp. 35-38.)

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“Mr.
Commissioner. As I say (see it) the Solicitor General is asking us to
submit objections which is really in the nature of a memorandum or in
the way of answer. I want to make it appear of record that only to
facilitate the work of the Commission, I have said we will submit a
summary and we will ask that that summary is not to be considered at
all as answer because the Solicitor General, Dr. Gil and somebody else
may contend that we may not present evidence beyond the notion given in
that summary. You see Mr. Commissioner I don’t want that to happen. . .
” (Transcript, pp. 42-43).

“Commission:

“This is
the way I gather. The Solicitor General wants in you(r) so-called
answer to specify the items in the audit report that you will object to
and include any or all matters that you would like to show before the
Commission to justify the rates.” (Transcript, p. 45).

“Commission:

“I will report this matter to the Commissioner, Judge Feliciano Ocampo.

(After a brief recess, Mr. Peralta came back).

“Commission:

“I
have reported this matter to the Commissioner, Judge Ocampo and he
directed me to state this: The Manila Electric Company is directed to
file its memorandum on the audit report of the General Auditing Office
specifying the items it will object to and the reasons for its
objection within 15 days from today and the General Auditing Office is
also given a period of time 15 days from the date they are furnished
with a copy of the report to submit its reply memorandum and on the
baais of this memoranda the Commission will make decision and if it
finds that additional hearing will be conducted it will so order a
hearing but front the basis of this memorandum it can resolve ibis case
on the evidence which it believes necessary are already in.

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“I
dont believe the case can be submitted on tne basis of memoranda. The
renpondent is entitled in present its evidence. Aside from this I ask
30 days.

“Commission:

“The Commissioner says that
the Manila Electric Company can be granted 30 days to file its
memorandum.” (Transcript, pp. 46-48).

On July 31, 1956, the Meralco filed its answer (Annex F) to the GAO’s report, specifying its objection and stating:

“Meralco respectfully submits that it was, and it is
the duty of the complainant, Dr. Pedro Gil, to present evidence in
support of his claim that Meralco’s rates are high and exorbitant, but
he has never done it.

“In so far as Meralco is concerned,
the Company is disposed and ready to present evidence before this
Commissioner as to what the present value of its property, plant and
equipment is, for rate base purposes, upon the above cases being reset
for hearing and reception of such evidence.”

and asked—

“(a) that the above three numbered cases be reset
for hearing to enable ths parties to present their proofs. Meralco will
present evidence in support of the allegations of this ANSWER.”

Dr. Gil filed his reply on August 23, 1956 (Annex G). The Solicitor
General did the same on September 15, 1956 (Annex H), followed by a
manifestation (Annex I) in which he asked that the rate of return of
12% allowed the Meralco on its invested capital be reduced to 8% as
submitted by the GAO.

Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2)
without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May
11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision and (3)
without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to
present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged
in said report and controverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the
said Commission, handed down a decision, the dispositive portion of
which recites the following:

“In view of the Foregoing, and finding that the
reductions adverted to are just, reasonable and equitable among the
various groups of customers, we are of the opinion that the petition
for reduction of rutes in these cases should be as it is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Manila Electric Company is hereby required to
reduce its present authorized rates effective January 1, J958, by the
following percentages on the bills of customers computed on the basis
of the present authorized rates:

‘Residential and domestic customers …………………………… 16%

‘Commercial
customers, including government agencies and street lighting (except
the street lights for the City of Manila, the rates for which are fixed
by contract)
…………………………………………………..
8%

‘Industrial customers, including non-associated electric utilities………………………..6 %.

 

“Entered, Manila, December 27, 1957.

“(SGD.) ALEJANDRO A. GALANG

Commissioner

 

“WE CONCUR:

“(SGD.) GABRIEL P. PRIETO

Associate Commissioner

A. H. ASPILLERA (On sick leave)

Associate Commissioner”

The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision (Annex K),
filed on January 14, 1958, by the Meralco, was denied by the Commission
on a 2 to 1 vote, on March 3, 1958, Commissioners Galang and Prieto,
voted for denial, while Commissioner Aspillera voted for granting.

Hence, the present petition for review with preliminary injunction which was issued by this Court.

Petitioner Manila Electric Company alleges in its brief that the Public Service Commission erred—

I. In rendering its decision without a previous healing; without
giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of its
answer; and in basing its decision on the report of the General
Auditing Office dated May 11, 1056, without having given petitioner an
opportunity to cross-examine the officers of the General Auditing
Office who prepared the said report and without having given petitioner
an opportunity to refute the facts alleged in the said report of the
General Auditing Office and controverted by petitioner.

II. In holding that for rate base purposes, the appraised value at
of 1945 of petitioner’s pre-war property, plant and equipment should be
considered at the present fair value of said properties.

III. In not considering certain properties as part of the property,
plant and equipment in service cf petitioner for rate base purposes.

IV. In using the net average investment rate base, instead of the
year-end rate base, for determining the value of petitioner’s property,
plant and equipment entitled to return.

V. In sanctioning GAO’s readjustment of the reserves for depreciation of petitioner’s property, plant and equipment.

VI. In disallowing legitimate operating expenses in the determination of petitioner’s working capital.

VII. In not taking into consideration the value of materials and
supplies carried in ntock in the determination of petitioner’s rate
base.

VIII. In not giving effect to the contract between petitioner and the Philippine Power and Development Company.

IX. In ordering petitioner to reduce its rates.

X. In basing its decision on obsolete allegations of fact.

XI. In denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Set Aside Decision.’

As must be observed, the assignment of errors is divided into two
groups: one is the fundamental issue on due process of law and the
other is the determination of the veracity or correctness of the
alleged facts, upon which the respondent Commission based its findings
and conclusions; and the legality, propriety and efficacy of the
methods employed by the said Commission, in computing and finding the
rates it tries to enforce.

If, as claimed by the petitioner, the first assignment of error is
true, then it would be an idle gesture on our part to delve further
into the merits of the case, for then the petitioner in these 3 cases,
was not accorded due process of law. And We believe that petitioner was
not afforded the constitutional right it is invoking.

No less than a distinguished member of the PSC has expressed the
conviction, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, that the
petitioner was not given a proper hearing. Commissioner Aspillera’s own
findings and conclusions were substantially supported by the evidence
of record. Commissioner Aspillera in the dissenting portion of his
opinion, said:

“Was there a hearing? The record shows that no hearing was held.

On June 22, 1956, parties appealed before attorney Vivencio L.
Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division,
Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to rcreive the
evidence of the parties’, and the record shows that the hearing held
before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because,
using his own words, ‘I said at the beginning that this is only
preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of
understanding.’ (Transcript, p. 24).

And pages 3, 7 and 40 of the transcript, show the following:

“Commission:

‘Gentlemen. The Commission
has called these three cases for today after it has received the audit
report of the General Auditing Office. The Manila Electric Company and
Dr. Pedro Gil have been furnished with copies of this audit report.

‘There
are several observations made in this audit report of the General
Auditing Office. The Commission is ready to hear from the different
parlies interested in the revision of the rates of the Manila Electric
Co. and to receive any and all relevant evidence that may guide the
Commission in the determination of the just and reasonable rates. There
are many matters that are put in issue in the audit report of the
General Auditing Office. For instance the rate base and the rate of
return, among other matters that may be brought up during this hearing.
So if there are any remarkg or statements before we proceed to a veal
fonnul hearing we will be ready to hear them.’ (Transcript p. 3).

“Commission:

“May
we hear from the representative of the Manila Electric Co. or from
their counsel? This is only preliminary and if necessary to go to a
formal hearing we will go to it.” (Transcript, p. 7).

“Commission:

‘In
this audit report you will see the difference in the figures of the
Manila Electric Company and the figures of the General Auditing Office.
The General Auditing Office has disagreed with the book figures of the
Manila Electric Company. So it is not difficult to identify the
figures. You will have no difficulty as the General Auditing Office
stated in the report those items not considered as part of the
consideration in the determination of the rates. So it will be the turn
of the General Auditing Office to state why those items should be
considered. And before the hearing, we would like to know that so that
we will know what are the items.’ (Transcript, pp. 30-40).

and counsel for the Manila Electric Company, confirming the statements made by the Commissioner, said:

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“Mr. Commissioner. What
we are having today as you remark at the beginning is an informal
heating. This is not, a formal hearing. I have already stated what we
think of the submission of that report atone. I am not to make further
statement. So I suggest that we set this case to a formal hoariup. Let
us proceed presenting evidence on what they want and present our
evidence.” (Transcript, pp. 21-22).

“The second question is,
‘Was Manila Electric Company deprived of its property without due
process of law? Was the company deprived of an opportunity to be heard
to present evidence in support of its Answer?’ Again I refer to the
record of the cases, and the answer must be in the negative. I quote
from the pages of the transcript of the stenographic notes hereinafter
mentioned.”

“Commission:

“Now, what is necessary is
the final revision of the rates will be really the determination of a
reasonable rate of return that will be allowed to the Manila Electric
Company whether it is 12% or 8% or any other percentage and we will
require evidence in order to arrive at a reasonable rate of return that
will be allowed the Manila Electric Company. We cannot merely fix a
rate at the mere wish of the Commission or mere wish of any party.
There must be evidence on which the Commission must fix a reasonable
rate of return.”(Transcript, p. 8).

“Commission:

“*
* That is why we would like to know whether the parties interested in
the case as well as the Manila Electric Company and the Solicitor
General to submit to this Commission such evidence that will guide the
Commission in determining the proper rate base and the proper rate of
return.” (Transcript, p. 19).

“Commission:

“* * If
there is evidence other than the report of the General Auditing Office
that can bte presented here, the Commission will appreciate it. • •”
(Transcript, p. 30).

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“We object.
We have to object. We object and reiterate our objection to the
admission of these reports. These reports alone without the men who
prepared tltem taking the witness stand subject himself to
cross-examination by the respondent are not admissible in evidence.”
(Transcript, p. 31.)

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“We will
not be required to present answer to the report we are going to present
evidence, but answer the report in writing there is no rule to present
an answer to a report.

“We are going to present evidence but
we are not going to present any written answer to the auditor’s
reports.” (Transcript, p. 33.)

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“Certainly, Mr. Commissioner. After we have presented our evidence they
can rebut. We object to each and every portion of the report except the
Manila Electric Co. figures quoted in the report. After we finish
presenting our evidence Dr. Gil and the other complainants can present
their evidence. That is all.”

“I am not talking on issues. I
am talking on evidence the respondent will submit. We are objecting to
the report as a whole.

We will present evidence. The Solicitor General is confusing: the issues and the report.” (Transcript, p. 34.)

“Commission:

“.
. . At any rate, the Manila Electric Company can present any and all
relevant evidence to justify its rates but the other parties in this
case as well as the Commission would like to know exactly what it will
dispute in this report. . .” (Transcript, p. 36.)

“Commission:

“.
. . The only difficult portion in the fixing of rates by the Commission
on which to base the determination of the reasonableness of the rates
is on the basis of the evidence it can gather in this sense.”
(Transcript, p. 41.)

The record further shows that after the “preliminary hearing” held
on June 22, 1958, no other hearing was field; the cases were never set
for hearing; and Meralco was not given an opportunity to present
evidence to rebut the audit report or in support of its Answer, in
which the company prayed, among other things.

“(a) that the above three numbered rases be reset
for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs. Meralco will
present evidence in support of the allegations of this Answer.”

I notice also that at the roncluaion of the “preliminary hearing”
held on June 22, 1956, the Commissioner authorized to receive the
evidence of the parties advised them that after reporting to Public
Service Commissioner Ocampo the discussion had and what had transpired
at the said “preliminary hearing”, Commissioner Ocampo directed him to
tell the parties that they should submit memoranda and “that the case
is considered submitted wilesa the Commission believot that further
hearing is necessary”, but counsel for the Meralco objected to such
procedure and said:

“Atty. Carrascoso:

“I don’t believe the
rate can be submitted on the basis of the memoranda. The respondent is
entitled to present its evidence. Aside from this I ask 30 days.”
(Transcript, pp. 47-48.)

And Commissioner Aspillera concluded—

“Considering
the proceedings had, I am of the opinion that the decision of December
27, 1967 was not promulgated ‘upon proper notice and hearing’, as
required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis
for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in
the decision. But I believe there is a basis for ordering the Meralco
to elect a reduction of rates although not to the extent fixed in the
decision. From statements of Meralco’s counsel during the hearing of
lite motion for reconsideration, it would appear that they assail
certain items considered by the Commission in arriving at the
conclusion that the Meralco made an excess profit of roughly four and
half million pesos. I gather from the statements made that because of
erroneous allowances and disallowance made, this figure is incorrect by
about two million pesos, that is, that the excess profit found should
be reduced by two million. This, I believe, is an admission by the
Meralco that it did make an excess pro.it of two and a half million
pesos. By virtue of this admission I think that the Meralco can be
ordered to reduce its rates on the basis of this excess profit of two
and a half million pesos.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the above cases never
having been set for hearing after the ‘preliminary hearing held on June
22, 1956, find Meralco not having been afforded the right to present
evidence in support of us Answer, a right expressly granted to it by
law. I am constrained to hold, as I hereby hold, that Meralco’s motion
for reconsideration and to set aside should be, as it is hereby,
granted, the ucclsicn of December 27, 1957 entered in these cases set
aside, all those cases set for hearing to receive such evidence as the
Meralco may desire to present in support of its Answer.

The Manila Electric Company, however, is ordered, effective April 1,
1938, to reduce its residential rates by 8-1%, its commercial rates by
4-1% and its industrial rates by 3-1%.”

And judging from the allegations in the motion for reconsideration
and some of the alleged errors assigned in the petitioner’s brief,
there is indeed need of presenting evidence in support thereof or at
least to substantiate its answer. Laying aside the legal questions the
resolution of which will be mainly predicated on facts proven, the
Commission should determine the actual cost of petitioner’s post-war
property, plant and equipment; what are the petitioner’s properties,
plant and equipments in service for rate base purposes; the year-end
rate base, for determining the value of petitioner’s property, plant
and equipment entitled to return; the basis of readjustments of the
reserves for depreciation of petitioner’s property, plant and
equipment; what legitimate operating expenses should be disallowed in
the determination of petitioner’s working capital; the petitioner’s
working capital during the test year 1955; the value of materials and
supplies carried in stock to be taken into consideration in the
determination of petitioner’s rate base; the basis for ordering the
petitioner to reduce its rates, etc. As there is an allegation that the
Commission based its decision on obsolete allegations of fact contained
in the GAO report, the petitioner should have been given the
opportunity to prove at least what these obsolete facts were or what
were not. It should be recalled that the test year for the reduction of
the rates was 1955 to be enforced on January 1, 1958. During that long
span of time, in a fast moving and progressive business world, where
prices are yearly going to the skies, it is really doubted whether the
facts as found and existing in 1955 will not look obsolete in 1955. One
can hardly decide what is true facts, or facts nearing to the truth, on
the controverted report of the GAO. The report can not be
cross-examined or confronted. The persons who prepared the report could
be cross-examined or confronted; but petitioner was not allowed to do
so.

In the motion for consideration dated January 17, 1958, (Annex 6),
petitioner specifically prayed that the decision of December 27, 1957
be reconsidered and set aside; that the cases be reset for hearing for
the reception of all pertinent evidence: that the Meralco be granted a
period of two months within which to submit a revised schedule of
rates, affecting a reduction thereof, commensurate with existing
conditions; and that, in any case, the effectivity of said decision be
stayed, pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, or during
appeal in the remote even the motion will be denied. It was alleged
therein that: The decision was null and void, having been render
without any hearing; the Commission could not validly make findings of
fact without affording petitioner the right to cross-examine and
confront witnesses, as well as the right to present its evidence; the
decision contained findings contrary to law and at any event, the
decision was based on obsolete allegations of fact, and since the
submission of the audit report of the GAO, on whose allegations the
decision was predicated, there had occurred recent developments which
had substantially altered the situation of the Meralco and which have
to be taken into account by the Commission, in fixing just and
reasonable rates, such as (1) Government restrictions mid changing
policies (2) higher rate base (3) higher cost of production and other
changes. These grounds were and still vital to the issues in the case,
even if taken only on their face value. They should have merited the
attention of the Commission. But two of the Commissioners denied the
motion stating, among other things, “The desire of the Meralco to
cross-examine witnesses and present oral testimonies may just lead to
more years of protracted and delayed hearings, which will undoubtedly
affect adversely the public interest. Hence, the procedure followed by
the Commission in deciding these cases was the usual practice adopted
by the Commission in fixing rates of electric power plants.” If the
practice of the Commission alluded to is what is revealed in the record
of this case, then it is not a good practice, nay, it is unlawful
because it breaches the guarantees of due process. There should be no
short cuts in the disposition of the time-honored principle that no one
should be deprived of his life, liberty and property, without due
process of law. Considering the fact that the reduction of rates herein
sought might involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged to
have been committed, if true, would affect likewise not only the right
of the petitioner but also public interest, it would have been a better
part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the final
resolution of the controversy. And moreover, when the Commission
finally decided the cases, making its decision effective as of 1958,
indeed many great changes, (as enumerated in the petitioner’s brief),
had already taken place. From 1955, the test year to 1958, plenty of
water had already rolled under the bridge.

Respondents advanced the theory that proceedings in the Public
Service Commission are administrative, not judicial, that
administrative agencies have three functions—adjudication, rule making
and enforcement; that in legislative or rule-making function there is
no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever; that rate fixing is
a legislative function; that the requirement of “proper notice and
hearing” provided by section 16, par. (c) of the Public Service Act had
been complied with, not in “auditory hearing, but in the “canned
method” or the submission of prepared forms issued by the agency, or
the submission of pleadings, briefs and memorandums or even by mere
inspection; that the Commission is not bound by strict rules of
evidence and it can make use of its own independent surveys of the
situation to acquire an understanding of the problem before it; that
petitioner was notified by the Commission of the time and place of
hearing and also of the subject matter; that following the no-called
“preliminary hearing”, the hearing officer announced “Now we are really
proceeding to the hearing itself”, and petitioner was granted 30 days
to file a memorandum which it submitted, captioned “Answer”, consisting
of 120 pages, wherein it expounded in detail, with exhaustive citations
of authorities and jurisprudence, on the theories and practices
followed in the United States in the determination of just and
reasonable rates, which answer drew a sharp reply from respondents,
after which the Commission declared there was sufficient basis or
evidence before it to enable it to decide the cases without the
necessity of resetting them for hearing, for the reception of
additional evidence; that the petitioner’s objections to the GAO report
are essentially legal and not factual in nature and deals merely with
the application of rate-making and accounting principles; that the
report of the GAO dated May 11, 1956 is admissible in evidence and the
auditors who prepared it were not asked by petitioner to be
cross-examined, as in fact, according to respondents, there was not
even need of presenting them in evidence, as said reports formed part
of the official records of the Commission (citing certain cases and CA
No. 325); that no amount of oral testimonies could have changed the
figures and matters appearing in the report of the GAO and the answer
of the petitioner and their respective contentions; and that it is only
when the Commission exercises its judicial functions that “proper
notice and hearing” is required (Sec. 16, Public Service Act), but not
when it exercises its legislative functions (Sec. 17, same act).

We have gone over the merits and demerits of the essays and
beautiful theories advanced by the respondents, as stated above, but
the cld fact remains, after a panoramic perusal of the record and
circumstances surrounding these cases, that the petitioner had not been
given its day in court.

We need not be reminded that it is the cardinal right of a party in
trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected tn present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented
considered by the tribunal (Comm. of Immigration vs. Fernandez, et al.,
G.R. No. L-2269G, May 1964 and cases cited therein.) “Even if the
Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must
bow its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be
deprived of right without due process of law”, which binds not only the
government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches,
agencies, etc. Duo process of law guarantees notice and opportunities
to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act
contemplated” (Halili vs. Public Service Com., et al. 49 Off. Gaz.,
825, citing 16 C.J.S. 1141, 1149).

In view of the findings and conclusions reached, We deem it
unnecessary to delve into the other issues raised by the parties.

Wherefore, we set aside the decision of the respondent Public
Service Commission of December 27, 1957 and the Order of March 3,1958,
and remand the records of the above entitled cases to the Commission
for further proceedings, and render judgment accordingly. No costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.