IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES; PABLO LEE ALIAS ENG JIO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

The Solicitor General has
appealed from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (in its naturalization case No. 606) declaring
petitioner Pablo Lee alias Eng Jio entitled to
naturalization as a Filipino citizen.

It is the burden of the State’s
appeal that the trial court failed to give due weight to the petitioner’s use of
an alias, without proper authority to do so, and in erroneously holding as duly
proved that the petitioner held a lucrative trade, profession or
occupation.

We find merit in the appeal.

The exhibits (F, I, J, K, L, M,
N, O and P) reveal that the applicant-appellee has
been using the names of Pablo Lee and Eng Jio, the
latter as an alias; and this is also shown in his application. No showing is
made that the use of the alias has been authorized, as required by Commonwealth
Act No. 142. The unauthorized use of aliases has been repeatedly held by this
Court to be disqualifying (not irreproachable) conduct.

In
Wang
I. Fu vs.
Republic, G. R. No. L-15819, promulgated on
29 September
1962,
this Court ruled:

“* * *. The use of said aliases
is not explained and there is no showing that it has been authorized as required
by the Alias Law (Commonwealth Act No. 142). Being violative of the law, We think this
act of petitioner is not beyond reproach and is, therefore, a ground for denying
his application for naturalization. (See Koa Gui vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-17317, July 31,
1962; Lim Bun vs. Republic, G.
R. No. L-12822, April 26,
1961; and Ng Liam Keng vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-14146, April 29,
1961.)”

On the issue of the applicant’s
having a lucrative trade, profession or occupation, applicant only testified
that he is a graduate engineer, employed by the Lu Tai Lumber Co., at a stipend
of P250.00 with free board and lodging. Admittedly, applicant owns no real
property. It was shown, however, that the Lumber Company is owned by a
partnership in which applicant’s father has an interest and that the petitioner,
who is single, in fact lives with his parents. Moreover, while in Exhibit X the
Lu Tai Lumber Company certified, as of 17 July 1961, that the petitioner “is an
employee here with this office,” no specific salary is mentioned; and the income
tax returns (Exhs. Y and B) submitted by the applicant
cover the year 1961, which is later than the filing of his application in
November of 1960.

All the foregoing circumstances
render dubious the applicant’s claim to a lucrative occupation. It hardly needs
emphasizing that the qualifications of an applicant must be possessed by him at
the time he applies for naturalization, and not subsequently.

In the case of Que Choc Gui vs. Republic, G. R.
L-16184, this court ruled:

“Lastly, petitioner’s only income
is a monthly salary of P150 he claims to receive as salesman in the
aforementioned store since June 1,
1908. We
have repeatedly declared that such income, allegedly derived from employment in
a business enterprise of petitioner’s father, is insufficient to establish
compliance with the statutory requirement of lucrative occupation or calling
(Sy Ang Hoc vs.
Republic, L-12400, March 29, 1961; Richard Velasco vs. Republic, L-12214,
May 25, 1960; Tan vs. Republic, L-14861, March 17; 1961; Zacarias vs. Republic, L-14860, May 30, 1900, May 30,
1961).”

It is urged for the applicant
that no opposition has been registered against his petition oh the issues
above-discussed. Absence of opposition, does not preclude the scanning of the
whole record by the appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of
citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor
(Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-20151, March
31, 1965). The applicant’s complaint of
unfairness could have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points
not previously passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new
but well-known, having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we see no
excuse for failing to take them into account.

We agree with the counsel for the
government that the evidence for the applicant does not fully satisfy that he
possesses all the qualifications required by the law.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
reversed, and the application for naturalization is ordered dismissed. Costs against applicant-appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.