THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DOMINADOR SEGARINO Y BORGA AND CREGORIO DE GUZMAN Y GABRIEL, ACCUSED, LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, BONDSMAN AND APPE…

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The case of “People vs. Dominador Segarino et al.,” No. 58507, for
theft, was called for trial in the Court of First Instance of Manila on August
2, 1961. Accused Gregorio de Guzman did not appear and a member of his family
presented a motion for postponement alleging that said accused was sick. Seeing
that the medical certificate at- tached thereto was not under oath, the court
declared that the motion was “sham” and ordered the immediate issuance of a new
warrant of arrest as well as the confiscation of his bail bond posted by Liberty
Insurance Corporation in the amount of P2,000.00. A policeman was sent to arrest
the accused but he reported that the latter was not at his .residence.

On August 9, 1061 Liberty Insurance Corporation received copy of the
confiscation order. On September 6, ; 1961 it filed a motion for extension of
the thirty-day period to produce the accused, due to expire on September 9,
1961. The motion stated among other things that the accused was “already under
the custody and pending transfer to the City Jail,” and that a certificate of
confinement had been requested from the City Jail authorities but the same was
not yet issued. Movant prayed for another thirty days from September 9, 1961 to
produce “the certificate of confinement and/or the body of the accused.”

On September 12, 1961 the court, stating that “there is no proof of capture
and detention of [the] accused,” denied the motion and ordered execution against
the bond. On September 15,1961 the bonding company filed a “motion to lift order
of confiscation of bond, for the surrender of the accused and the cancellation
of his bond.” A certificate from the police department that the accused was
confined in the City Jail was attached to the motion.

On September 19, 1961 the court handed down an order stating: “Surrender
accepted; tout cancellation of bond denied”.

On September 21, 1961, the bonding company filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above-stated order, together with a petition to lift the order of
execution. Movant stated that it had notified the accused of the trial set for
August 2,1961 ten days in advance; that the accused failed to appear because he
was “sick, could hardly move, much less hear, inasmuch as both his ears were
swollen and obnoxious substances flowed from his ears”; that movant found
difficulty in locating him since he had moved to another address; and that he
was apprehended on September 4, 1961 and subsequently turned over to the City
Jail but the certificate of confinement was not issued before the period to
produce him expired on September 9, 1961.

On September 25, 1961 the court denied the motion for consideration and the
petition to lift the execution order. Among other things, the court observed
that to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial the bonding company
simply notified him thereof; that this was not sufficient to comply with the
undertaking of a bondsman; and ” the alleged sickness of the accused was
unbelievable because the medical certificate presented was not under oath and
the accused could not be found in his house.

The bonding company appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of
execution, but the appeal was certified to this Court as involving only
questions of law. Appellant contends that Section 15, Rule 110 (now Rule 114) of
the Rules of Court was complied with and that forfeiture of the bond should have
been lifted. This Section provides:

SEC. 15. Forfeiture of bail.—When the appearance of the defendant is required
by the Court, his sureties shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date. If the defendant fails to appear as required, the bond is declared
forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty days within which to produce their
principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them
for the amount of their bond. Within the said period of thirty days, the
bondsmen (a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for its
non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not
appear before the court when first required so to do. Failing in these two
requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen.”

On the first requisite, appellant asserts that the non-production of the
accused within the thirty-day period was explained in its motion of September 6,
1961 stating that he had already been apprehended but the City Jail had not yet
issued the certificate of confinement. As noted by the court a quo, the
detention and capture of the accused within the thirty-day period was merely
asserted but not duly established. Furthermore, appellant could have produced
the body of the principal within said thirty-day period required by the Rules if
indeed he was already under custody.

The second requisite is for the bondsman to “explain satisfactorily why the
defendant did not appear before the court when first required so to do.”
According to appellant it had notified the accused of the trial. The bondsman’s
undertaking is not simply to remind the accused of the trial, but to produce him
bodily in court when so required, for its authority as surety “is no more nor
less than the Government’s authority to hold the said accused under preventive
imprisonment.” (People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil., 404, 408.)

As to the alleged sickness of the accused, this explanation was rejected by
the lower court because, first, the medical certificate was not verified, and,
secondly, whereas it was stated therein that the accused was “sick, could hardly
move, much less hear… as… his ears were swollen and obnoxious substances
flowed from his ears,” the fact is that when the policeman went to arrest him he
could not be found in his house. The question of whether the explanation is
satisfactory generally lies within the discretion of the court (People
vs. Alamada, 89 Phil., 1), and We find no reason to differ from the
lower court’s foregoing conclusion.

In its brief, the bonding company prays for an alter native relief by way of
reduction of its liability to 10% of the amount of the bond. In People
vs. Puyat, 98 Phil., 415; 52 Off. Gaz., 6886, We stated that after the
surety has presented the person of the accused to the court, albeit tardily,
partial remission of its liability may be granted. The extent of such remission,
however, is determined upon the circumstances of each case (People vs.
Reyes, 48 Phil., 139). In People vs. Alamada, supra, where the
explanation for the non-appearance of the accused was found satisfactory by the
lower court as well as this Court, ft reduction to 10%, of the amount of the
bond was granted; But in People vs. Reyes, supra, where the accused’s
non- appearance was not explained, the liability of the surety was remitted to
one-half. And in People vs. Puyat, supra, where no satisfactory
explanation for the accused’s non-appearance was given, the liability was
reduced from P10,000.00 to P3.000.00 with a statement that the bond of
P10,000.00 was out of proportion to the sentence of 5 years, Months and 11 days
of prision correctional. Since the to proper bond therein would be about
P6,000.00, the reduction was in effect approximately one-half of the liability.

Viewing the particular facts of the case at bar, this Court deems it just
that appellant’s liability under the bond be reduced to one-half of its amount.
To this effect, therefore, the order appealed from is modified.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal, Regala
and Zaldivar, JJ. concur.